Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Wu v. Tri-City Medical Center Corp. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JIANHUA WU, D087684 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (San Diego Super. Ct. No. 24CU026778N) TRI-CITY MEDICAL CENTER CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed. Jianhua Wu, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Kjar, McKenna & Stockalper, Curtis Chapin Holmes II, for Defendant and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 This appeal is the product of what is sometimes referred to as derivative litigation—that is, a second round of litigation spawned by an initial lawsuit. (See generally Forbes v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 59.) Landlords Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu were involved in a protracted retaliatory eviction lawsuit that ended in December 2023 with a judgment in their tenants’ favor. The landlords then initiated a second action against three entities they believed had committed litigation misconduct during the earlier suit: (1) Gogal Law Office (Gogal Law), which represented the tenants, and nonparties to the retaliatory eviction lawsuit (2) GenMark Diagnostics, Inc. (GenMark) and (3) Tri-City Medical Center Corporation (Tri-City). Relevant to this appeal are the landlords’ allegations of identical misconduct by the latter two entities. Discovery during the retaliatory eviction lawsuit included subpoenas issued by Gogal Law to GenMark and Tri-City—which had employed Deng and Wu, respectively—for documents related to the landlords’ finances. According to the complaint in this case, both companies violated the landlords’ right to privacy by producing directly to Gogal Law, rather than through the designated deposition officer (see Code 1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.) In addition, we refer the reader to our unpublished opinion in Deng v. Gogal Law Office (June 5, 2026, D086588) (nonpub. opn.) (Deng) for additional background. Further, the case caption in the trial court refers to Deng v. Gogal Law Office, and the parties’ briefs identify both Deng and Wu as the plaintiffs-appellants. It was conceded below, however, that Wu was the only plaintiff with a claim against Tri-City Medical Center (Tri-City). Accordingly, we have revised the caption to identify Wu as the only appealing party. 2 Civ. Proc., § 2020.420 et seq.), documents that (1) contained more pay-related information than was authorized by an August 2023 court order and (2) in some instances, included their full social security numbers. In July 2025, the trial court dismissed Deng’s claim after granting GenMark’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that Deng had sufficiently pleaded a claim for invasion of privacy, but held the cause of action was barred by the litigation privilege under the rationale stated in Foothill Federal Credit Union v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 632 (Foothill), which involved an overbroad production of documents in litigation. Deng appealed, arguing that the privilege does not protect acts which violate court orders or the civil discovery statutes. We disagreed and affirmed the judgment of dismissal in June 2026. (See Deng, supra, D086588.) In January 2026—while Deng’s appeal was pending—the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on Wu’s claim after sustaining Tri-City’s demurrer. As before, the court held that Wu’s invasion of privacy claim, although sufficiently pleaded, was barred by the litigation privilege. Wu filed an appeal and, in briefing completed before we issued our decision in Deng, also argued for a reversal on grounds the litigation privilege does not protect conduct that violated a court order or the rules of discovery. As we stated when deciding the Deng appeal, an invasion-of-privacy claim cannot be based on communications that are protected by the litigation privilege. (Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 635; accord Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) We explained that “[p]leadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1058; accord RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 435 [stating the elements of the privilege]). The protection extends to communications and “necessarily related” 3 noncommunicative acts even when a party believes that a court order or statute was violated (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 957; see id. at p. 959), an overbroad document production was made (Foothill, at pp. 635–636), or confidential information was mistakenly produced (Nelson v. Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 846–847). Accordingly, the alleged misconduct by GenMark fell within the ambit of the litigation privilege. Based on our de novo review of the order sustaining Tri-City’s demurrer (City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13, 22–23 [standard of review]), the same result is compelled in Wu’s appeal. Wu asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting her request for leave to amend. She offers to revise her claim to include more detailed allegations about the confidential information that Tri-City disclosed, the documents that exceeded the scope of the trial court’s order, and how the company bypassed the deposition officer. She also contends that additional discovery can further fill out the record in these respects. Because these amendments merely seek to bolster her fundamentally flawed arguments on the litigation privilege, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in withholding leave to amend. (Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. v. City of Irvine (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1124 [leave to amend properly denied where amendment would be futile].) 4 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Tri-City is entitled to costs on appeal. DATO, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: DO, J. KELETY, J. 5