Wu v. Tri-City Medical Center Corp. CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketD087684
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Wu v. Tri-City Medical Center Corp. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JIANHUA WU, D087684
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (San Diego Super. Ct.
No. 24CU026778N)
TRI-CITY MEDICAL CENTER
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.
Jianhua Wu, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kjar, McKenna & Stockalper, Curtis Chapin Holmes II, for Defendant
and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
This appeal is the product of what is sometimes referred to as
derivative litigation—that is, a second round of litigation spawned by an
initial lawsuit. (See generally Forbes v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 48, 59.) Landlords Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu were involved
in a protracted retaliatory eviction lawsuit that ended in December 2023
with a judgment in their tenants’ favor. The landlords then initiated a
second action against three entities they believed had committed litigation
misconduct during the earlier suit: (1) Gogal Law Office (Gogal Law), which
represented the tenants, and nonparties to the retaliatory eviction lawsuit
(2) GenMark Diagnostics, Inc. (GenMark) and (3) Tri-City Medical Center
Corporation (Tri-City).
Relevant to this appeal are the landlords’ allegations of identical
misconduct by the latter two entities. Discovery during the retaliatory
eviction lawsuit included subpoenas issued by Gogal Law to GenMark and
Tri-City—which had employed Deng and Wu, respectively—for documents
related to the landlords’ finances. According to the complaint in this case,
both companies violated the landlords’ right to privacy by producing directly
to Gogal Law, rather than through the designated deposition officer (see Code
1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion
because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.) In addition,
we refer the reader to our unpublished opinion in Deng v. Gogal Law Office
(June 5, 2026, D086588) (nonpub. opn.) (Deng) for additional background.
Further, the case caption in the trial court refers to Deng v. Gogal Law Office,
and the parties’ briefs identify both Deng and Wu as the plaintiffs-appellants.
It was conceded below, however, that Wu was the only plaintiff with a claim
against Tri-City Medical Center (Tri-City). Accordingly, we have revised the
caption to identify Wu as the only appealing party.
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Civ. Proc., § 2020.420 et seq.), documents that (1) contained more pay-related
information than was authorized by an August 2023 court order and (2) in
some instances, included their full social security numbers.
In July 2025, the trial court dismissed Deng’s claim after granting
GenMark’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that Deng
had sufficiently pleaded a claim for invasion of privacy, but held the cause of
action was barred by the litigation privilege under the rationale stated in
Foothill Federal Credit Union v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 632
(Foothill), which involved an overbroad production of documents in litigation.
Deng appealed, arguing that the privilege does not protect acts which violate
court orders or the civil discovery statutes. We disagreed and affirmed the
judgment of dismissal in June 2026. (See Deng, supra, D086588.)
In January 2026—while Deng’s appeal was pending—the trial court
entered a judgment of dismissal on Wu’s claim after sustaining Tri-City’s
demurrer. As before, the court held that Wu’s invasion of privacy claim,
although sufficiently pleaded, was barred by the litigation privilege. Wu
filed an appeal and, in briefing completed before we issued our decision in
Deng, also argued for a reversal on grounds the litigation privilege does not
protect conduct that violated a court order or the rules of discovery.
As we stated when deciding the Deng appeal, an invasion-of-privacy
claim cannot be based on communications that are protected by the litigation
privilege. (Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 635; accord Civ. Code, § 47,
subd. (b).) We explained that “[p]leadings and process in a case are generally
viewed as privileged communications.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1048, 1058; accord RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 435 [stating the elements of the privilege]).
The protection extends to communications and “necessarily related”
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noncommunicative acts even when a party believes that a court order or
statute was violated (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 957;
see id. at p. 959), an overbroad document production was made (Foothill, at
pp. 635–636), or confidential information was mistakenly produced (Nelson v.
Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 846–847). Accordingly, the
alleged misconduct by GenMark fell within the ambit of the litigation
privilege. Based on our de novo review of the order sustaining Tri-City’s
demurrer (City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 13, 22–23 [standard of review]), the same result is compelled in
Wu’s appeal.
Wu asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting
her request for leave to amend. She offers to revise her claim to include more
detailed allegations about the confidential information that Tri-City
disclosed, the documents that exceeded the scope of the trial court’s order,
and how the company bypassed the deposition officer. She also contends that
additional discovery can further fill out the record in these respects. Because
these amendments merely seek to bolster her fundamentally flawed
arguments on the litigation privilege, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in withholding leave to amend. (Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. v. City of
Irvine (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1124 [leave to amend properly denied
where amendment would be futile].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Tri-City is entitled to costs on appeal.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
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