Full Opinion

Case: 26-1066 Document: 50 Page: 1 Filed: 10/08/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ RENE ORTIZ, Claimant-Appellant v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________ 2026-1066 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 24-4746, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr. ______________________ Decided: October 8, 2026 ______________________ RENE ORTIZ, Sacaton, AZ, pro se. MATTHEW LEWIS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing- ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, Of- fice of General Counsel, United States Department of Vet- erans Affairs, Washington, DC. Case: 26-1066 Document: 50 Page: 2 Filed: 10/08/2026 2 ORTIZ v. COLLINS ______________________ Before LOURIE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Rene Ortiz appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”), which affirmed a Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”) denial of Ortiz’s entitlement to additional compen- sation for his children who were receiving Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance (“DEA”) benefits un- der 38 U.S.C. Ch. 35. Ortiz v. Collins, No. 24-4746, 2025 WL 2171145, at *1 (Vet. App. July 31, 2025) (“Deci- sion”). For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND Ortiz served on active duty in the United States Marine Corps from January 1990 to January 1994. S.A. 8. 1 In 2014, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) assigned Ortiz a 100-percent disability rating and granted eligibility for DEA benefits. See Decision, 2025 WL 2171145, at *1; S.A. 38–43. The VA later granted each of Ortiz’s children DEA benefits and removed them from Ortiz’s additional de- pendent compensation award when their respective DEA benefits commenced. See S.A. 50–54; S.A. 61; S.A. 72. Ortiz appealed to the Board, which denied him addi- tional dependency compensation for his three children. See S.A. 105–110. The Board explained that while additional compensation under 38 U.S.C. § 1115 is available to disa- bled veterans with at least a 30-percent disability rating who have dependents, S.A. 103, “38 U.S.C. § 3562 make[s] clear that a veteran is not entitled to § 1115 benefits for a child who has elected to receive Chapter 35 benefits,” 1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix at- tached to the government’s brief. Case: 26-1066 Document: 50 Page: 3 Filed: 10/08/2026 ORTIZ v. COLLINS 3 S.A. 108. Ortiz appealed to the Veterans Court, which af- firmed the Board’s denial of additional compensation under § 1115. Decision, 2025 WL 2171145, at *1. Ortiz timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). DISCUSSION Ortiz argues that the VA should not have removed his additional compensation provided under 38 U.S.C. § 1115 simply because his adult children began to receive DEA benefits under Chapter 35. See Ortiz Br. 3–6. 2 He further contends that even if the VA could take such action, section 3562 does not provide a permanent bar to dependent compensation. Id. at 10. We disagree. “Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited to reviewing legal questions, including ‘the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof.” Wright v. Collins, 145 F.4th 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c)). We review legal deter- minations de novo. Id. We have directly addressed the issue of whether the VA can remove additional compensation under 38 U.S.C. § 1115 from a veteran’s award when the dependent upon who it is based is in receipt of DEA benefits. In Wright we held that the VA could plainly do so. 145 F.4th at 1341 (“We conclude that the nonduplication provision of section 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional compen- sation under section 1115(1)(F) once his or her child elects to receive DEA benefits.”). Thus, Ortiz’s arguments fail as a matter of law. 2 Citations to the Ortiz Br. follow the PDF pagina- tion. Case: 26-1066 Document: 50 Page: 4 Filed: 10/08/2026 4 ORTIZ v. COLLINS As Wright explains, “section 1115[] provides financial assistance in the form of ‘additional compensation’ to disa- bled veterans to support their dependents.” Id. at 1338. That “additional compensation” may include, as relevant here, an “amount payable on account of each child who has attained the age of eighteen years and who is pursuing a course of instruction at an approved educational institu- tion.” 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F). Congress, however, limited a veteran’s entitlement to such compensation when the child elects to receive DEA benefits under Chapter 35. Spe- cifically, the commencement of a dependent child’s DEA benefits bars the veteran from receiving increased or addi- tional compensation on account of that child. See 38 U.S.C. § 3562 (“The commencement of a program of education . . . under [Chapter 35] shall be a bar . . . to increased rates, or additional amounts, of compensation . . . because of such a person [i.e., the eligible person receiving Chapter 35 bene- fits] whether eligibility is based upon the death or upon the total permanent disability of the parent.”). Accordingly, in Wright, we held that “the statutory text and context demonstrate that the non-duplication bar in section 3562 prohibits all monthly payments to a disabled veteran under section 1115 that the veteran would other- wise receive if his child did not elect to receive DEA bene- fits.” 145 F.4th at 1340 (explaining that § 1115 benefits constitute the “additional . . . compensation” barred by § 3562 because § 1115 expressly characterizes those bene- fits as “additional compensation”). We further held that the section 3562 bar did not allow section 1115(1) compen- sation to resume. Id. at 1341–43 (Section 3562 “clearly im- poses a permanent bar on a veteran’s receipt of additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once his or her child begins to receive DEA benefits.”). Ortiz argues that “no duplication of benefits exists.” Ortiz Br. 16. He specifically contends that because “[t]he Veteran does not receive [DEA benefits]” and “[t]he child does not receive, and has never applied for, Compensation” Case: 26-1066 Document: 50 Page: 5 Filed: 10/08/2026 ORTIZ v. COLLINS 5 under § 1115, “there is no concurrent receipt and no factual or legal basis for nonduplication.” Ortiz Br. 16. But the benefits are duplicative in the relevant sense. Both DEA benefits and the “additional compensation” payable under § 1115 are intended to provide support on account of the same dependent child, which is precisely why Chapter 35 bars concurrent payment. Compare Wright, 145 F.4th at 1338 (“[S]ection 1115, provides financial assistance in the form of ‘additional compensation’ to disabled veterans to support their dependents.”), with id. (“DEA benefits are di- rect payments made to the dependent children of disabled veterans to support their educational pursuits.” (citing 38 U.S.C. § 3511(a)(1)(A))). Because Ortiz’s case is indistinguishable from Wright and Wright precludes the relief that Ortiz seeks, we con- clude that the Veterans Court did not err in affirming the Board’s decision. CONCLUSION We have considered Ortiz’s remaining arguments but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af- firm. AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.