Loomis v. Collins

Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 1 Filed: 09/03/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ CHARLES GLEN LOOMIS, Claimant-Appellant v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________ 2026-1063 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 23-4348, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Judge Joseph L. Toth, Judge Scott Laurer. ______________________ Decided: September 3, 2026 ______________________ CHARLES GLEN LOOMIS, Richmond Hill, GA, pro se. BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also repre- sented by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, BRENDAN D. JORDAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT A. SHUMATE; MICHELLE BERNSTEIN, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States De- partment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 2 Filed: 09/03/2026 2 LOOMIS v. COLLINS CLAIRE A. FUNDAKOWSKI, Winston Taylor LLP, Wash- ington, DC, argued as amicus curiae. ______________________ Before MOORE, Chief Judge, CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge, and SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge. 1 SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge. Charles Loomis served in the United States Air Force for 20 years. Upon his retirement from the service in Feb- ruary 2015, he needed a pilot certification for a job as a sensor operator. When he sought to cover the cost of a flight training class with educational assistance benefits, his ap- plication was denied by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the denial was upheld on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. On appeal, Mr. Loomis challenges that court’s inter- pretation of two statutes and their associated regulations. We affirm. BACKGROUND Claimant-appellant Charles Loomis served in the Air Force from 1995 to 2015. Dkt. 9 at 32. Following his service, he joined General Atomics as a field service representative. Id. Mr. Loomis wanted to become a sensor operator, but General Atomics required him to first earn a pilot certifi- cation. Id. To pay for the certification, Mr. Loomis applied for ed- ucational assistance benefits from the VA to cover his training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC (Mid- Coast). Id. at 33. In support of his application, Mr. Loomis 1 Honorable Arun Subramanian, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 3 Filed: 09/03/2026 LOOMIS v. COLLINS 3 submitted a certificate from the Federal Aviation Admin- istration (FAA) authorizing MidCoast to operate a provi- sional pilot school with a private pilot course. Id. The VA denied Mr. Loomis’s application, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. Id. The Board acknowledged that Mr. Loomis had a basic entitlement to educational assistance benefits. Id. But because MidCoast was not recognized as an educational institution of higher learning (IHL) and Mr. Loomis was not taking the course in pursuit of a college degree, it concluded that the law did not permit Mr. Loomis to obtain benefits for the course. Id. at 31–34. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. Id. at 32. The majority held that Mr. Loomis was foreclosed from receiving benefits for the course because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL. Id. The majority relied on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b), which prohibits the approval of a veteran’s enrollment in a flight training course “other than one given by an educational in- stitution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking.” Judge Laurer dissented. Id. at 52–56. He read the law to allow benefits to be used for FAA-approved flight train- ing courses regardless of IHL affiliation. Id. at 56. Judge Laurer relied on a different statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that “[a] flight training course approved by the Federal Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certifi- cate” is “deemed . . . approved.” Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 4 Filed: 09/03/2026 4 LOOMIS v. COLLINS Mr. Loomis appealed pro se. 2 On this appeal, the question is how to reconcile Sec- tions 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 3680A(b). I A “The United States has a proud history of offering edu- cational assistance to millions of veterans, as demon- strated by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.” Rudisill v. McDonough, 601 U.S. 294, 298–99 (2024) (quoting Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, § 5002(3), 122 Stat. 2358, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.). But the resources for educational assistance to veterans, like all government resources, are finite, so Congress has limited the educational programs for which veterans can receive benefits. Mindful of Congress’s careful considera- tion of the types of education that are covered, we consider whether the VA was required to cover Mr. Loomis’s Mid- Coast course. Our review is guided by a pair of statutes. The first, 38 U.S.C. § 3672, is titled “Approval of courses.” In the circum- stances presented by this case, a course is eligible for ben- efits “only if” it “is approved . . . by the State approving agency for the State where such educational institution is located, or by the Secretary.” 3 38 U.S.C. § 3672(a). In some 2 The Court appointed Claire A. Fundakowski as amicus curiae to argue in support of Mr. Loomis’s interpre- tation of the law. Ms. Fundakowski ably discharged her re- sponsibilities, and the Court greatly appreciates her assistance. 3 All references to “Secretary” in quoted statutes and in the body of this opinion refer to the Secretary of Veter- ans Affairs. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(1). Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 5 Filed: 09/03/2026 LOOMIS v. COLLINS 5 instances, that approval may be constructive rather than express. For instance: Subject to section[] . . . 3680A . . . of this title, a pro- gram of education is deemed to be approved for pur- poses of this chapter if a State approving agency, or the Secretary when acting in the role of a State approving agency, determines that the program is . . . [a] flight training course approved by the Fed- eral Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate. 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphases added). Section 3680A, in turn, is titled “Disapproval of enroll- ment in certain courses.” It prohibits the Secretary from approving a veteran’s enrollment in several types of educa- tional programs, such as any “bartending course” or any course that is “avocational or recreational in character.” 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(a)(1), (3). Relevant here, it states: Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this title or chapter 106 of title 10, the Secretary shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible vet- eran in any course of flight training other than one given by an educational institution of higher learn- ing for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking. 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b) (emphases added). The disagreement between Mr. Loomis and the Secre- tary rests on how to reconcile these two statutes. Mr. Loomis argues that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is an exception to Section 3680A(b)’s IHL requirement. He points to the carveout in Section 3680A(b), which states that the statute applies “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this title.” Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 6 Filed: 09/03/2026 6 LOOMIS v. COLLINS Under Mr. Loomis’s reading, if a flight training course is approved by the FAA and offered by a certified pilot school (per Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)), it doesn’t matter whether the course is given by an IHL for the pursuit of a college degree (per Section 3680A(b)). As for the proviso in Section 3672(b)(2)(A) that it is “[s]ubject to sec- tion[] . . . 3680A,” Mr. Loomis reads that as incorporating all of the other restrictions in Section 3680A (which, among other things, would bar the use of benefits for a recrea- tional flight course) but not Section 3680A(b). The Secretary disagrees with this reading. He argues that Section 3680A(b) bars the approval of a veteran’s en- rollment in any flight training course unless it is given by an IHL and counts toward a veteran’s college degree. The Secretary maintains that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn’t “specifically provide[]” otherwise, as Section 3680A(b) re- quires. Indeed, the Secretary observes, Section 3672(b)(2)(A) makes clear that its provisions are “subject to” Section 3680A, which can only be understood to include the IHL requirement. B “[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 381 (2021). Where a statute’s text is clear, we need not look any further in determining its meaning. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). We begin with Section 3672. As relevant here, that statute establishes that as a precondition to a veteran re- ceiving benefits for “a course of education offered by an ed- ucational institution,” the course must receive approval from the Secretary or the state where the institution is lo- cated. 38 U.S.C. § 3672(a). Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides that a flight training course is “deemed . . . approved” where, “[s]ubject to” Sec- tion 3680A (and other statutes not relevant here), the state Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 7 Filed: 09/03/2026 LOOMIS v. COLLINS 7 or Secretary determines that the course is “approved by the Federal Aviation Administration [and] is offered by a cer- tified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate.” As the “[s]ubject to” clause suggests, course approval under Section 3672 isn’t the end of the story. While any course must be approved for a veteran to be eligible to en- roll using benefits, there are nevertheless further require- ments for some kinds of courses. That takes us to Section 3680A. That statute is titled “[d]isapproval of enrollment in certain courses,” and it describes situations where the Sec- retary “shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible vet- eran.” One of those limitations is that “the Secretary shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran in any course of flight training other than one given by an educa- tional institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking.” Id. § 3680A(b). That prohibition applies “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided” in Title 38 (or Chapter 106 of Title 10, which is not at issue here). Id. The question is whether Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) “spe- cifically provide[s]” that approval may be granted even if Section 3680A(b)’s requirements are not satisfied. The an- swer is no. Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn’t expressly set aside the IHL requirement, and it also doesn’t use the kind of lan- guage one would expect to see if it were an exception: “In addition to,” “As an exception to,” “Notwithstanding,” etc. Just the opposite, Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A. And being “subject to” a statute means be- ing “subordinate” to or “governed or affected by” its provi- sions. Subject To, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 8 Filed: 09/03/2026 8 LOOMIS v. COLLINS So when Section 3672(b)(2)(A) says that its provisions are “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A, it confirms that Sec- tion 3680A provides additional requirements for eligibility. And that makes sense given the statutory structure: Sec- tion 3672(a) states that a veteran shall receive benefits “only if” the desired course is “approved,” but that leaves open the possibility of further restrictions (whether govern- ing course approval itself or enrollment more generally). What’s more is that Mr. Loomis’s contrary argument— that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) independently authorizes the payment of benefits—conflicts with another statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3034(d). As discussed further below, Sec- tion 3034(d) provides an express exception to Sec- tion 3680A(b). It states that “[t]he Secretary may approve” flight training not given by an IHL if, unlike Mr. Loomis, a veteran already has a private pilot certificate and the courses satisfy certain other requirements. One of those re- quirements is that “the flight school courses are approved by the [FAA] and are offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid [FAA] pilot school certificate.” Id. § 3034(d)(3). Of course, that matches the text of Sec- tion 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii). But if Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) alone authorizes the payment of benefits, regardless of whether a veteran already has a pilot certificate, then Sec- tion 3034(d) is a nullity. This underscores that course ap- proval under Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the starting point, not the end, of the benefits determination. Taken together, Sections 3672 and 3680A provide as follows. A course must receive approval of the Secretary or the state in which the school sits. If it is determined that a flight training course is FAA-approved and provided at a certified pilot school, then it is “deemed . . . approved.” Id. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii). But such a course still must be given by an IHL as part of a veteran’s college degree program. Id. § 3680A(b). Since there is no dispute that the MidCoast course fails the IHL requirement, we agree with the Court Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 9 Filed: 09/03/2026 LOOMIS v. COLLINS 9 of Appeals for Veterans Claims that Mr. Loomis is ineligi- ble for coverage. C Mr. Loomis and Judge Laurer’s dissent below raise two thoughtful counterarguments, but they do not counsel a different interpretation of these statutes. First, we consider whether our interpretation of the statutes renders Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) superfluous. Why allow for the approval of courses at FAA-approved schools if the IHL requirement nevertheless applies? This objection appears to rest on the implicit assump- tion that FAA-approved pilot schools are never themselves IHLs, and so no course could satisfy both Sec- tion 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) and Section 3680A(b). But that as- sumption is incorrect. As the majority below noted, and Mr. Loomis doesn’t dispute, the FAA licenses pilot schools that are part of IHLs. Dkt. 9 at 45. The FAA’s website shows that many IHLs are licensed as Part 141 pilot schools, such as the University of Oklahoma and The Ohio State University, just to name two. See AVInfo Find a Fa- cility Dashboard, Fed. Aviation Admin., https://www.faa.gov/av-info/facility-dashboard (last visited September 2, 2026) (to find a pilot school, click on “PART 141 PILOT SCHOOL,” type in a ZIP code, press the enter key, and click “See/Download Contact Information”). That alone defeats the surplusage argument. And even if most FAA-approved flight training courses are not offered directly by an IHL, Section 3680A(b) might still be satisfied where an IHL contracts with a private pi- lot school. The VA has permitted such an arrangement in its governing regulations. See 38 C.F.R. § 21.4233(e) (per- mitting “[a]ll or part of the program of education of a school” to be “provided by another school or entity under contract,” with contracted flight training courses having Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 10 Filed: 09/03/2026 10 LOOMIS v. COLLINS the additional requirement that they be approved by the FAA). 4 Second, Mr. Loomis argues that the Secretary’s read- ing would render the “[e]xcept” clause of Section 3680A(b) superfluous. As he sees it, Congress explicitly contem- plated exceptions to the IHL requirement, and Sec- tion 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s allowance for FAA-approved courses is precisely that. While it is true that Section 3680A(b) allows for excep- tions where another statute “otherwise specifically pro- vide[s],” Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn’t do so. Instead, that statute is “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A’s requirements. 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A). By contrast, Section 3034(d), discussed above, explic- itly notes that it allows for courses “in addition to” what may be approved under Section 3680A(b). Id. § 3034(d) (al- lowing the Secretary to approve a flight training course for veterans who already have a private pilot license “in addi- tion to a course of flight training that may be approved un- der section 3680A(b)”). Section 3034(d), therefore, “specifically provides” for an exception to Section 3680A(b)’s IHL requirement. So our interpretation does not render the “[e]xcept” clause in Section 3680A(b) superflu- ous. Mr. Loomis argues that Section 3034(d) is a red her- ring. He highlights that in 1990, the precursor to Sec- tion 3034(d)—38 U.S.C. § 1434(d)(1) (1990)—contained the 4 We need not decide the question of whether such an arrangement would satisfy Section 3680A(b)’s require- ment that the course be “given by” an IHL, as Mr. Loomis does not contend that the regulation would be satisfied in this case. Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 11 Filed: 09/03/2026 LOOMIS v. COLLINS 11 “in addition to” language referenced above. But the precur- sor to Section 3680A(b) in effect at that time did not contain an “[e]xcept” clause. Id. § 1673(b) (1990). Based on this history, Mr. Loomis asks why Congress would have added an “[e]xcept” clause to Section 3680A(b) to address an exception that already existed. This argu- ment, however, overlooks that “Congress may amend a statute simply to clarify existing law.” Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, Congress may have included the “[e]xcept” clause in Sec- tion 3680A(b) to resolve the clear conflict that had previ- ously existed—one statute saying that the Secretary may approve courses that do not satisfy the IHL requirement (Section 3034(d)’s predecessor) and one saying the Secre- tary may not do so (Section 3680A(b)’s predecessor). Superfluity issues aside, Mr. Loomis’s reading is un- tenable given Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s text. Under Mr. Loomis’s interpretation, while this provision is “[s]ub- ject to . . . section 3680A,” Section 3680A(b) is implicitly carved out. There is no textual justification for that read- ing. We reject the notion that, without explanation, Sec- tion 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is only subject to some of Section 3680A’s prohibitions (e.g., that a veteran cannot use their benefits for recreational courses, see 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(a)(3)) but not the only prohibition relating specifi- cally to flight training courses. * * * Under Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are deemed approved. But the re- ceipt of benefits is subject to Section 3680A(b)’s further re- quirement that any flight training course be given by an IHL and count toward a veteran’s college degree. As a re- sult, Mr. Loomis is ineligible to receive benefits for the flight training course at MidCoast. Case: 26-1063 Document: 30 Page: 12 Filed: 09/03/2026 12 LOOMIS v. COLLINS II Mr. Loomis separately challenges several regulations as conflicting with the statutes addressed in this opinion. The majority below said that Mr. Loomis “may have a point” and “might be right” about the regulations’ invalid- ity, Dkt. 9 at 32, 51, but it ultimately concluded that the issue was irrelevant given that his application for benefits was foreclosed by statute. We agree. Mr. Loomis is ineligible for benefits by stat- ute, and so any irregularity in the regulations causes him no injury and warrants no relief. 5 AFFIRMED COSTS No costs. 5 Because Mr. Loomis has no grounds to challenge the regulations, we need not consider the Secretary’s sepa- rate argument that we lack jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) to consider Mr. Loomis’s regulatory challenge.