Osoro v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA1/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA175537
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Osoro v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FRED OSORO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A175537
v.
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT (Alameda County
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Super. Ct. No. 25CV124094)
Defendant and Respondent.
In 2019, appellant Fred Osoro received unemployment insurance
benefits, and by July of that year had collected the full benefits available.
Following a few months at another employer, in January 2020, Osoro filed a
claim for additional benefits, called lag benefits, a claim ultimately rejected
by the Employment Development Department in July 2020. Such denial is
appealable to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) “within 30 days from
service of the notice” of the department’s determination, which a 30-day
period may be extended for good cause. Osoro did appeal, but not until
January 2025, over four years after the adverse determination. An ALJ
dismissed the appeal. Finding no good cause, the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board rejected his appeal from the ALJ decision. And following its
independent review, the Superior Court denied his petition for administrative
1
mandamus, finding the Board’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The General Setting
Osoro worked for Cisco Systems, and was apparently laid off in
December 2018. In January 2019, Osoro filed a claim for unemployment
benefits, and collected such benefits from January 2019 and “zeroed out his
claims” by July 2019—or as the ALJ put it, “collected [his] full benefit
package” allowed.
Where a person receives unemployment benefits, Unemployment
Insurance Code1 section 1277 prevents that person from establishing a valid
claim for unemployment benefits in two successive benefit years—called lag
benefits—unless the individual meets the eligibility criteria for having
reestablished an attachment to the labor market subsequent to the effective
date of the first claim. Osoro worked during October, November, and
December of 2019, apparently as an independent contractor at “My
Trucking,” “lost” that job, and in January 2020 filed a claim for lag benefits.2
The Employment Development Department (EDD) investigated Osoro’s
January 2020 claim and initially determined that Osoro was ineligible for lag
benefits because he failed to submit required proof of identity and failed to
establish qualifying employment and earnings. As alluded to above, section
1328 provides that such determination may be appealed to an ALJ “within 30
days from service of notice of the determination or reconsidered
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment
Insurance Code.
2 Though he did not list “My Trucking” in his claim, apparently claiming
that his employment was at Cisco Systems.
2
determination. The 30-day period may be extended for good cause, which
shall include, but not be limited to, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.”
Osoro did appeal, though apparently not within the 30-day period. The
ALJ accepted Osoro’s proof of identity, reversed the denial of benefits on that
ground, and remanded the matter to EDD for redetermination.
In July 2020, EDD issued a new determination, concluding that Osoro
failed to establish eligibility for lag benefits based on the work and earning
requirements. According to EDD’s records, its determination was mailed to
Osoro at the address on record with EDD, the address Osoro had confirmed
with EDD was correct—indeed, an address Osoro admitted he maintained
from 2015 until 2022 or 2023.
As noted, the EDD determination is appealable. No such appeal was
forthcoming.
Osoro’s position was, and is, that he did not receive notice of the July
2020 rejection and, according to his testimony, for several weeks he tried
calling EDD and checking its online portal to determine the status of his
benefits, without success.
The EDD records in fact show that on October 29, 2021, Osoro spoke
with an EDD representative regarding the status of his claim, and was
informed that although his identity verification was corrected, his claim was
denied on July 1, 2020, because he was ineligible for lag benefits based on
work and earnings requirements. On that same day, October 29, EDD again
mailed its July 1, 2020 determination to Osoro.3
3 Osoro’s brief distills all of this in these few lines: “Appellant
acknowledged a telephone conversation with EDD in 2021 in which he was
told the claim had been denied, but he was never sent written notice
3
In short, at least by October 2021, Osoro was aware of EDD’s adverse
determination, but he did not appeal.4 And had no substantive contact with
EDD between October 2021 and January 2025, when he contacted his local
state senator who provided him an EDD appeal form, which he completed
and filed in January 2025.
The Administrative Law Proceeding
Osoro’s appeal was heard on February 26, 2025, before an ALJ. Osoro
testified essentially that he did not file the appeal because he did not receive
written notice of EDD’s determination or an appeal form, and that without a
physical copy of the appeal form, he was unable to appeal EDD’s
determination.
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision “dismissing
untimely filed appeal,” in the course of which the ALJ made findings of fact
that reflected Osoro’s testimony, which included the following:
“The Employment Development Department mailed the claimant an
adverse notice of determination on July 1, 2020. This notice contained a
statement that its decision was final unless appealed within 30 days from
mailing of the notice. The appeal was filed on January 10, 2025. [¶] . . . [¶]
“At the hearing, the claimant noted that he worked for a different
employer October, November and December of 2019 by the name of “My
Trucking.” The claimant was not reported as an employee during this period
of time and the claimant had not mentioned it at the time that he opened his
explaining his appeal rights or deadlines. (AR26.) After that call, he
continued trying to reach EDD by email and telephone, but could not get
through. (AR19.)”
4 An appeal form is available from the EDD website:
https://edd.ca.gov/en/unemployment/appeals.
4
claim in January 2020. The claim in January 2020 was not initially paid
because he had both an ID verification disqualification and a Lag
disqualification as the 429 Recall did not show work and earnings to validate
a new claim. The claimant was advised that there were two issues pending
and if the ID issue was removed, he would still have the Lag issue. The
claimant was able to remove the ID issue in an appeal which was rendered in
approximately June of 2020, and the department issued the 1277
determination July 1, 2020, advising that he was ineligible as he did not have
sufficient work and earnings to verify and validate a new claim effective
January 5, 2020.
“The claimant had been living at the same address since 2015, but did
not believe he received this notice. The claimant was sent also
documentation asking for him to verify any interim wages which he did not
return. The claim notes do not reflect any further contact with the claimant
until October of 2021, October 29 when he was advised again that he had not
met the Lag requirements, and they did not have any documentation from
him, and he was reissued the determination in October of 2021. The
claimant, at the hearing, noted that he did not receive this document either.
Then there is no contact with the department between October of 2021 until
January of 2025. The claimant acknowledges that he had returned to work
between 2022 and 2024 and then opened a new claim at the end in 2024. The
claimant, at the hearing, claimed that he made several attempts to get
through to the department and was not successful and contacted his local
legislator and then got through in January of 2025, after he had opened his
new claim in the end of 2024. The claimant is being paid currently on his
2024 claim. [¶] . . . [¶]
5
“All these facts lead to the fact that the four and a half years that the
claimant waited to actually file the appeal in 2025, was not with good cause,
as he clearly was advised even by phone again in October of 2021, the need to
file an[] appeal.”
And so, with Osoro failing to show good cause, the ALJ determined
there was no jurisdiction to review EDD’s determination and dismissed the
appeal.5
Osoro appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board (Board). The Board independently reviewed the matter, and
on April 23, 2025, issued its final determination holding that the timeliness
of an appeal is jurisdictional and requires good cause before the ALJ can
decide a case on the merits. The Board found the ALJ’s findings were
supported by the weight of the evidence and affirmed the ALJ’s decision to
dismiss the appeal as untimely, adopting the ALJ decision as its own.
The Proceedings Below
On May 29, representing himself, Osoro filed in Superior Court a
petition for writ of administrative mandamus against the Board. At an early
case management conference, held before the Board’s answer was due, Osoro
told the court he was awaiting completion of the administrative record, and
would not file an opening brief. The court set the hearing on Osoro’s petition
for October 16, and further ordered dates for the Board’s opposition brief and
an optional reply brief by Osoro.
On September 15, the Board filed its opposition brief, and a week later
its answer to the petition.
5 If an ALJ determines that a claimant’s appeal is untimely, the ALJ
must dismiss the appeal “unless the appellant shows good cause for the
untimeliness.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §§ 5051, 5066.1, subd. (g).)
6
On September 23, Osoro lodged the administrative record, and that
same day filed his reply brief. In it, Osoro continued to assert his failure to
receive the notices of determination and appeal form in July 2020 and
October 2021, as well as his inability to reach EDD by phone and email due
to the COVID pandemic as good cause for his late appeal. He asserted that
EDD’s customer service did not suggest directly downloading the appeal form
or any other way of accessing the appeal form as a basis for good cause. And,
he claimed, laches should apply based on his non-receipt of EDD’s
determination.
Following the Board’s answer, on September 29, Osoro filed an “ex
parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer, with moving papers that did not
specify a hearing date either as an ex parte application or a noticed motion,
(though Osoro had reserved a December 2 hearing date for the motion). The
motion to strike argued that the Board’s answer was a general “return” and
opposition brief that should not be considered by the court.
Osoro’s petition for mandamus came on for hearing as scheduled on
October 16, at the conclusion of which the court took the matter under
submission.
On November 6, the trial court filed its amended order denying Osoro’s
petition. After setting forth the “Background” of all that had occurred, and
then the “Legal Standard” governing its review, the trial court’s order ended
with its discussion, which included this:
“At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he had lived at the same
address in Fremont from before he filed his claim through 2022 or 2023, but
that he did not receive documentation from EDD regarding the denial and
how to appeal until he obtained help through his state representative in
2025. (AR24-26.) Petitioner acknowledged that he had a telephone
7
conversation with EDD in 2021, when he was informed of the denial. (AR26.)
He testified that he tried calling and emailing at different times but could not
get through. (AR19.)
“The ALJ concluded that Petitioner had not established good cause to
extend the 30-day deadline to appeal, based on the length of time during
which Petitioner had no contact with the EDD. He was told that he had to
appeal in October 2021 but did not offer an adequate explanation for the
failure to file his appeal until January 2025.
“The Appeals Board carefully and independently reviewed the record
and adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own. (See AR86.) This court has also
carefully and independently reviewed the administrative record and finds
that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
“Petitioner argues that the COVID pandemic disrupted EDD
operations and may have been the reason he did not receive the notices
mailed by the EDD in 2020 and 2021. Any such circumstances, however,
cannot account for the three years of silence after Petitioner was informed of
the determination over the phone. Indeed, Petitioner testified that he had
filed a new claim with EDD in 2024, and was receiving unemployment
insurance benefits at the time of the hearing. (AR24.)”
In sum, the trial court concluded that upon its independent review of
the administrative record, Osoro failed to establish good cause for his multi-
year delay in appealing EDD’s denial of lag benefits. The court’s reasons
included the fact that Osoro’s address had not changed and that by October,
2021, he knew he had to appeal the adverse determination, yet failed to offer
an adequate explanation for his delay in filing his appeal until January of
2025. Further, while Osoro asserted the pandemic disrupted EDD
8
operations, this did not account for his three years of silence after he was told
about the adverse decision and need to file an appeal.
By a later ruling the trial court vacated the December hearing date on
Osoro’s “ex parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer as moot, also
determining that Board’s answer was neither an improper second reply nor a
writ return as asserted by Osoro.
On November 18, the court entered judgment in favor of the Board,
from which Osoro filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Osoro represents himself here, which, of course, is his right. Doing so,
however, he is held to the same standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Self-representation is not a ground
for lenient treatment and, as in the case with attorneys, a person who
represents herself “must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
Osoro has filed a 13-page opening brief that is most conclusory. His
“Statement Of The Case” is nothing but a list of dates and things that were
filed or happened on those dates. And his “Statement Of Facts” is three short
paragraphs, entitled, “Non-Receipt of Written Notice,” seven lines in length;
“IRS Transcripts Submitted to EDD,” nine lines in length; and “Superior
Court Proceedings,” five lines in length, all three paragraphs contained on a
single page in his brief. It is not compliant with the Rules of Court or
principles of appellate advocacy.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) provides that an
appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant
facts . . . .” And the leading California appellate practice guide instructs
9
about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately
and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and
likewise as to the applicable law. [Citations.] [¶] Misstatements,
misrepresentations, and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law
can instantly ‘undo’ and otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and
arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw
sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et
al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025)
(Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary is missing here.
But beyond that, to the extent that Osoro sets forth as a fact the “non-
receipt of written notice,” he violates the most fundamental rule of appellate
review that the evidence is read to be in favor of the ruling, not him. (See
Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Nestle v. City of
Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.)
Turning to the arguments in the brief, Osoro argues that the “Superior
Court Erred in Denying Good Cause for Late Filing,” an argument that has
sub-parts asserting that: “Oral Notice is Legally Insufficient,” Osoro “acted
promptly,” the “ALJ Failed to Consider Relevant Evidence,” and “the
Superior Court Failed to Address” his contest of the tentative ruling.
However Osoro purports to compartmentalize his argument, it is in one way
or another an attack on the trial court’s determination—confirming that of
the Board, and the ALJ—that Osoro “had not established good cause.” Thus
what Osoro faces in his appeal is the need to demonstrate, under the
applicable standard of review, that such holding is not supported by the
record here. This, he has not done.
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Standard of Review
As Osoro acknowledges, we review a superior court’s decision on
administrative mandamus for substantial evidence. (Fukuda v. City of
Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824; Martinez v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 500, 505.) We resolve all evidentiary
conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the
trial court’s decision. Where the evidence supports more than one reasonable
inference, the appellate court may not substitute its deductions for those
made by the trial court. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 457.)
Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable mind might accept it as
adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” (South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Board (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 303; Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health
Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748, 762.) If “substantial evidence in favor of
the respondent . . . is present, no matter how slight it may appear in
comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld.”
(Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.)
In fact, given the determination that Osoro failed to meet his burden to
demonstrate good cause, his burden on appeal is daunting, as set forth, for
example, in Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic): “ ‘Thus, where the issue on appeal
turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter
of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ (In re I.W. (2009)
11
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528[, overruled in part on other grounds as
stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010].)”
One relatively recent case described the burden imposed by Sonic this
way: “ ‘ “[w]here, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the
burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by
arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless
the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we
presume the trial court found the [party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight
and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power
on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” ’
[Citation.] The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations
for those of the trial court; it must view all factual matters most favorably to
the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. [Citation.] ‘ “All
conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent.’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067.)
Osoro has not demonstrated that the evidence compels a finding in his
favor.
Substantial Evidence Supports that Osoro Failed to Show Good
Cause
To begin with, despite Osoro’s fundamental position that the delay was
justified based on his claim he did not receive a physical copy of the
decision—not in 2020 when it was rendered and not in October 2021 when
the EDD again sent a copy to him—both copies of the decision were mailed to
Osoro’s correct legal address, and thus were presumed to have been received.
(Evid. Code, § 641.) And while the presumption can be rebutted by testimony
denying receipt (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Edwards (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th
12
1470, 1486), “the disappearance of the presumption does not mean there is
insufficient evidence” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416,
421), as the trier of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence supporting mailing.
(Ibid.)
Moreover, EDD’s transcript of events demonstrated that Osoro was
receiving EDD’s mailings, shown by the facts he appealed the first denial of
his lag benefits claim, and that EDD’s records showed no returned mail.
Thus, the trial court was entitled to discount Osoro’s bare assertion that he
never received EDD’s twice mailed determination—and to conclude that he
failed to meet his burden of showing good cause. (See Evid. Code, § 780.)
In any event, there is no question that in October 2021 Osoro was in
contact with EDD and was told about the denial of his claim and his need to
appeal, and did not in fact appeal for an additional three years and three
months.
Finally, there is the fact—a fact the trial court found significant—that
during the three-plus-year period between October 2021 and January 2025,
Osoro was able to file a new claim for unemployment benefits after a period
of employment. It is significant, as held in Fermin v. Department of
Employment (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 586, 588, cert. den. (1963) 375 U.S. 888,
where the petition was dismissed based on a three-month delay, and the
court concluded there was no good cause for the late appeal where claimant
filed a separate unemployment claim during the period of delay.
As alluded to above, Osoro has a brief additional argument that the
ALJ erred in failing to address his IRS transcripts, this despite that Osoro’s
tax filings were never introduced in the trial court nor during the
administrative appeal. At best, Osoro testified during the ALJ hearing that
he provided information of his IRS transcript to his legislative representative
13
for transmission to EDD. Regardless, evidence related to his IRS transcripts
could not matter because the administrative appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The IRS transcripts could have nothing to do with that.
Lastly on Osoro’s discussion of evidence issues, Osoro asserts that the
trial court erred in failing to address his position in response to the tentative
ruling because the court made no changes to its tentative ruling in its final
order. The argument is fatuous.
The trial court’s minute order describes the tentative ruling as
contested, and that the court took the matter under submission; the final
order likewise reflects that the matter was taken under submission following
argument, all supporting the conclusion that the trial court considered the
arguments raised during the hearing.
Moreover, Osoro’s opening brief concedes that the tentative was
contested, that the court asked him questions during oral argument, and that
the trial court took the matter under submission following argument. The
fact that the court ultimately adopted its tentative ruling as the final ruling
of the court does not mean the court failed to consider the arguments raised
at the hearing. (See People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 651–652
[court’s reading of a prewritten ruling after hearing argument did not mean
the court prejudged its decision or failed to consider the parties’ arguments].)
Rather, it is an indication that the court was ultimately unpersuaded by
Osoro’s arguments.
Gibson v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494,
the case Osoro cites as supporting good cause, is easily distinguishable.
There, the appeal was late by three days, which lateness was caused by a
calendaring mistake by the claimant’s attorney. Considering the delay was
only three days, that it was caused by the attorney not the claimant, and
14
there was admittedly no prejudice, the California Supreme Court determined
good cause was established as a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 500–501.) The
facts here are a far cry.
Finally, Osoro has a brief argument that asserts error in the failure of
the trial court to rule on his ex-parte motion to strike the department’s
return.
By way of brief recap, following the entry of the order denying the
petition for mandamus, the trial court vacated the December 2 reserved
hearing date as moot. In a brief nine-line argument, Osoro asserts that the
trial court’s failure to rule on his motion before ruling on the merits was
prejudicial error. The argument fails for several reasons.
First, as Osoro concedes, he raised the issue of his motion to strike
during the hearing on his writ petition. Under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1091, the court was authorized to consider Osoro’s objection to the
Board’s answer as having been made during the trial of the writ. Thus there
was no need for the December hearing.
Second, the order denying Osoro’s petition rendered his ex parte motion
moot because no further relief was available on his petition. Osoro’s
substantive claims were fully resolved.
Third, there were procedural defects in Osoro’s “ex parte” motion:
the moving papers failed to specify the hearing date and time thereby
rendering them defective. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1110(b), 3.1204(a)(1).)
But more fundamentally, there was no prejudice. As noted, the
ultimate determination against Osoro was that he failed to demonstrate good
cause, a failure based on Osoro’s lack of evidence. So, even if the
department’s return had been stricken, Osoro’s showing would still have
failed. Thus the error could not be prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No
15
judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, . . . or for any
error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 475.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
SWEET, J.
(A175537N)
Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17