Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Osoro v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO FRED OSORO, Plaintiff and Appellant, A175537 v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT (Alameda County INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Super. Ct. No. 25CV124094) Defendant and Respondent. In 2019, appellant Fred Osoro received unemployment insurance benefits, and by July of that year had collected the full benefits available. Following a few months at another employer, in January 2020, Osoro filed a claim for additional benefits, called lag benefits, a claim ultimately rejected by the Employment Development Department in July 2020. Such denial is appealable to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) “within 30 days from service of the notice” of the department’s determination, which a 30-day period may be extended for good cause. Osoro did appeal, but not until January 2025, over four years after the adverse determination. An ALJ dismissed the appeal. Finding no good cause, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board rejected his appeal from the ALJ decision. And following its independent review, the Superior Court denied his petition for administrative 1 mandamus, finding the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. BACKGROUND The General Setting Osoro worked for Cisco Systems, and was apparently laid off in December 2018. In January 2019, Osoro filed a claim for unemployment benefits, and collected such benefits from January 2019 and “zeroed out his claims” by July 2019—or as the ALJ put it, “collected [his] full benefit package” allowed. Where a person receives unemployment benefits, Unemployment Insurance Code1 section 1277 prevents that person from establishing a valid claim for unemployment benefits in two successive benefit years—called lag benefits—unless the individual meets the eligibility criteria for having reestablished an attachment to the labor market subsequent to the effective date of the first claim. Osoro worked during October, November, and December of 2019, apparently as an independent contractor at “My Trucking,” “lost” that job, and in January 2020 filed a claim for lag benefits.2 The Employment Development Department (EDD) investigated Osoro’s January 2020 claim and initially determined that Osoro was ineligible for lag benefits because he failed to submit required proof of identity and failed to establish qualifying employment and earnings. As alluded to above, section 1328 provides that such determination may be appealed to an ALJ “within 30 days from service of notice of the determination or reconsidered 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment Insurance Code. 2 Though he did not list “My Trucking” in his claim, apparently claiming that his employment was at Cisco Systems. 2 determination. The 30-day period may be extended for good cause, which shall include, but not be limited to, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Osoro did appeal, though apparently not within the 30-day period. The ALJ accepted Osoro’s proof of identity, reversed the denial of benefits on that ground, and remanded the matter to EDD for redetermination. In July 2020, EDD issued a new determination, concluding that Osoro failed to establish eligibility for lag benefits based on the work and earning requirements. According to EDD’s records, its determination was mailed to Osoro at the address on record with EDD, the address Osoro had confirmed with EDD was correct—indeed, an address Osoro admitted he maintained from 2015 until 2022 or 2023. As noted, the EDD determination is appealable. No such appeal was forthcoming. Osoro’s position was, and is, that he did not receive notice of the July 2020 rejection and, according to his testimony, for several weeks he tried calling EDD and checking its online portal to determine the status of his benefits, without success. The EDD records in fact show that on October 29, 2021, Osoro spoke with an EDD representative regarding the status of his claim, and was informed that although his identity verification was corrected, his claim was denied on July 1, 2020, because he was ineligible for lag benefits based on work and earnings requirements. On that same day, October 29, EDD again mailed its July 1, 2020 determination to Osoro.3 3 Osoro’s brief distills all of this in these few lines: “Appellant acknowledged a telephone conversation with EDD in 2021 in which he was told the claim had been denied, but he was never sent written notice 3 In short, at least by October 2021, Osoro was aware of EDD’s adverse determination, but he did not appeal.4 And had no substantive contact with EDD between October 2021 and January 2025, when he contacted his local state senator who provided him an EDD appeal form, which he completed and filed in January 2025. The Administrative Law Proceeding Osoro’s appeal was heard on February 26, 2025, before an ALJ. Osoro testified essentially that he did not file the appeal because he did not receive written notice of EDD’s determination or an appeal form, and that without a physical copy of the appeal form, he was unable to appeal EDD’s determination. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision “dismissing untimely filed appeal,” in the course of which the ALJ made findings of fact that reflected Osoro’s testimony, which included the following: “The Employment Development Department mailed the claimant an adverse notice of determination on July 1, 2020. This notice contained a statement that its decision was final unless appealed within 30 days from mailing of the notice. The appeal was filed on January 10, 2025. [¶] . . . [¶] “At the hearing, the claimant noted that he worked for a different employer October, November and December of 2019 by the name of “My Trucking.” The claimant was not reported as an employee during this period of time and the claimant had not mentioned it at the time that he opened his explaining his appeal rights or deadlines. (AR26.) After that call, he continued trying to reach EDD by email and telephone, but could not get through. (AR19.)” 4 An appeal form is available from the EDD website: https://edd.ca.gov/en/unemployment/appeals. 4 claim in January 2020. The claim in January 2020 was not initially paid because he had both an ID verification disqualification and a Lag disqualification as the 429 Recall did not show work and earnings to validate a new claim. The claimant was advised that there were two issues pending and if the ID issue was removed, he would still have the Lag issue. The claimant was able to remove the ID issue in an appeal which was rendered in approximately June of 2020, and the department issued the 1277 determination July 1, 2020, advising that he was ineligible as he did not have sufficient work and earnings to verify and validate a new claim effective January 5, 2020. “The claimant had been living at the same address since 2015, but did not believe he received this notice. The claimant was sent also documentation asking for him to verify any interim wages which he did not return. The claim notes do not reflect any further contact with the claimant until October of 2021, October 29 when he was advised again that he had not met the Lag requirements, and they did not have any documentation from him, and he was reissued the determination in October of 2021. The claimant, at the hearing, noted that he did not receive this document either. Then there is no contact with the department between October of 2021 until January of 2025. The claimant acknowledges that he had returned to work between 2022 and 2024 and then opened a new claim at the end in 2024. The claimant, at the hearing, claimed that he made several attempts to get through to the department and was not successful and contacted his local legislator and then got through in January of 2025, after he had opened his new claim in the end of 2024. The claimant is being paid currently on his 2024 claim. [¶] . . . [¶] 5 “All these facts lead to the fact that the four and a half years that the claimant waited to actually file the appeal in 2025, was not with good cause, as he clearly was advised even by phone again in October of 2021, the need to file an[] appeal.” And so, with Osoro failing to show good cause, the ALJ determined there was no jurisdiction to review EDD’s determination and dismissed the appeal.5 Osoro appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board). The Board independently reviewed the matter, and on April 23, 2025, issued its final determination holding that the timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional and requires good cause before the ALJ can decide a case on the merits. The Board found the ALJ’s findings were supported by the weight of the evidence and affirmed the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the appeal as untimely, adopting the ALJ decision as its own. The Proceedings Below On May 29, representing himself, Osoro filed in Superior Court a petition for writ of administrative mandamus against the Board. At an early case management conference, held before the Board’s answer was due, Osoro told the court he was awaiting completion of the administrative record, and would not file an opening brief. The court set the hearing on Osoro’s petition for October 16, and further ordered dates for the Board’s opposition brief and an optional reply brief by Osoro. On September 15, the Board filed its opposition brief, and a week later its answer to the petition. 5 If an ALJ determines that a claimant’s appeal is untimely, the ALJ must dismiss the appeal “unless the appellant shows good cause for the untimeliness.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §§ 5051, 5066.1, subd. (g).) 6 On September 23, Osoro lodged the administrative record, and that same day filed his reply brief. In it, Osoro continued to assert his failure to receive the notices of determination and appeal form in July 2020 and October 2021, as well as his inability to reach EDD by phone and email due to the COVID pandemic as good cause for his late appeal. He asserted that EDD’s customer service did not suggest directly downloading the appeal form or any other way of accessing the appeal form as a basis for good cause. And, he claimed, laches should apply based on his non-receipt of EDD’s determination. Following the Board’s answer, on September 29, Osoro filed an “ex parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer, with moving papers that did not specify a hearing date either as an ex parte application or a noticed motion, (though Osoro had reserved a December 2 hearing date for the motion). The motion to strike argued that the Board’s answer was a general “return” and opposition brief that should not be considered by the court. Osoro’s petition for mandamus came on for hearing as scheduled on October 16, at the conclusion of which the court took the matter under submission. On November 6, the trial court filed its amended order denying Osoro’s petition. After setting forth the “Background” of all that had occurred, and then the “Legal Standard” governing its review, the trial court’s order ended with its discussion, which included this: “At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he had lived at the same address in Fremont from before he filed his claim through 2022 or 2023, but that he did not receive documentation from EDD regarding the denial and how to appeal until he obtained help through his state representative in 2025. (AR24-26.) Petitioner acknowledged that he had a telephone 7 conversation with EDD in 2021, when he was informed of the denial. (AR26.) He testified that he tried calling and emailing at different times but could not get through. (AR19.) “The ALJ concluded that Petitioner had not established good cause to extend the 30-day deadline to appeal, based on the length of time during which Petitioner had no contact with the EDD. He was told that he had to appeal in October 2021 but did not offer an adequate explanation for the failure to file his appeal until January 2025. “The Appeals Board carefully and independently reviewed the record and adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own. (See AR86.) This court has also carefully and independently reviewed the administrative record and finds that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. “Petitioner argues that the COVID pandemic disrupted EDD operations and may have been the reason he did not receive the notices mailed by the EDD in 2020 and 2021. Any such circumstances, however, cannot account for the three years of silence after Petitioner was informed of the determination over the phone. Indeed, Petitioner testified that he had filed a new claim with EDD in 2024, and was receiving unemployment insurance benefits at the time of the hearing. (AR24.)” In sum, the trial court concluded that upon its independent review of the administrative record, Osoro failed to establish good cause for his multi- year delay in appealing EDD’s denial of lag benefits. The court’s reasons included the fact that Osoro’s address had not changed and that by October, 2021, he knew he had to appeal the adverse determination, yet failed to offer an adequate explanation for his delay in filing his appeal until January of 2025. Further, while Osoro asserted the pandemic disrupted EDD 8 operations, this did not account for his three years of silence after he was told about the adverse decision and need to file an appeal. By a later ruling the trial court vacated the December hearing date on Osoro’s “ex parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer as moot, also determining that Board’s answer was neither an improper second reply nor a writ return as asserted by Osoro. On November 18, the court entered judgment in favor of the Board, from which Osoro filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Introduction Osoro represents himself here, which, of course, is his right. Doing so, however, he is held to the same standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Self-representation is not a ground for lenient treatment and, as in the case with attorneys, a person who represents herself “must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Osoro has filed a 13-page opening brief that is most conclusory. His “Statement Of The Case” is nothing but a list of dates and things that were filed or happened on those dates. And his “Statement Of Facts” is three short paragraphs, entitled, “Non-Receipt of Written Notice,” seven lines in length; “IRS Transcripts Submitted to EDD,” nine lines in length; and “Superior Court Proceedings,” five lines in length, all three paragraphs contained on a single page in his brief. It is not compliant with the Rules of Court or principles of appellate advocacy. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) provides that an appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts . . . .” And the leading California appellate practice guide instructs 9 about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and likewise as to the applicable law. [Citations.] [¶] Misstatements, misrepresentations, and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law can instantly ‘undo’ and otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) (Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary is missing here. But beyond that, to the extent that Osoro sets forth as a fact the “non- receipt of written notice,” he violates the most fundamental rule of appellate review that the evidence is read to be in favor of the ruling, not him. (See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.) Turning to the arguments in the brief, Osoro argues that the “Superior Court Erred in Denying Good Cause for Late Filing,” an argument that has sub-parts asserting that: “Oral Notice is Legally Insufficient,” Osoro “acted promptly,” the “ALJ Failed to Consider Relevant Evidence,” and “the Superior Court Failed to Address” his contest of the tentative ruling. However Osoro purports to compartmentalize his argument, it is in one way or another an attack on the trial court’s determination—confirming that of the Board, and the ALJ—that Osoro “had not established good cause.” Thus what Osoro faces in his appeal is the need to demonstrate, under the applicable standard of review, that such holding is not supported by the record here. This, he has not done. 10 Standard of Review As Osoro acknowledges, we review a superior court’s decision on administrative mandamus for substantial evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824; Martinez v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 500, 505.) We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s decision. Where the evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, the appellate court may not substitute its deductions for those made by the trial court. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 457.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” (South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 303; Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748, 762.) If “substantial evidence in favor of the respondent . . . is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) In fact, given the determination that Osoro failed to meet his burden to demonstrate good cause, his burden on appeal is daunting, as set forth, for example, in Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic): “ ‘Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ (In re I.W. (2009) 11 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528[, overruled in part on other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010].)” One relatively recent case described the burden imposed by Sonic this way: “ ‘ “[w]here, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial court found the [party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” ’ [Citation.] The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. [Citation.] ‘ “All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067.) Osoro has not demonstrated that the evidence compels a finding in his favor. Substantial Evidence Supports that Osoro Failed to Show Good Cause To begin with, despite Osoro’s fundamental position that the delay was justified based on his claim he did not receive a physical copy of the decision—not in 2020 when it was rendered and not in October 2021 when the EDD again sent a copy to him—both copies of the decision were mailed to Osoro’s correct legal address, and thus were presumed to have been received. (Evid. Code, § 641.) And while the presumption can be rebutted by testimony denying receipt (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Edwards (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 12 1470, 1486), “the disappearance of the presumption does not mean there is insufficient evidence” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 421), as the trier of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence supporting mailing. (Ibid.) Moreover, EDD’s transcript of events demonstrated that Osoro was receiving EDD’s mailings, shown by the facts he appealed the first denial of his lag benefits claim, and that EDD’s records showed no returned mail. Thus, the trial court was entitled to discount Osoro’s bare assertion that he never received EDD’s twice mailed determination—and to conclude that he failed to meet his burden of showing good cause. (See Evid. Code, § 780.) In any event, there is no question that in October 2021 Osoro was in contact with EDD and was told about the denial of his claim and his need to appeal, and did not in fact appeal for an additional three years and three months. Finally, there is the fact—a fact the trial court found significant—that during the three-plus-year period between October 2021 and January 2025, Osoro was able to file a new claim for unemployment benefits after a period of employment. It is significant, as held in Fermin v. Department of Employment (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 586, 588, cert. den. (1963) 375 U.S. 888, where the petition was dismissed based on a three-month delay, and the court concluded there was no good cause for the late appeal where claimant filed a separate unemployment claim during the period of delay. As alluded to above, Osoro has a brief additional argument that the ALJ erred in failing to address his IRS transcripts, this despite that Osoro’s tax filings were never introduced in the trial court nor during the administrative appeal. At best, Osoro testified during the ALJ hearing that he provided information of his IRS transcript to his legislative representative 13 for transmission to EDD. Regardless, evidence related to his IRS transcripts could not matter because the administrative appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The IRS transcripts could have nothing to do with that. Lastly on Osoro’s discussion of evidence issues, Osoro asserts that the trial court erred in failing to address his position in response to the tentative ruling because the court made no changes to its tentative ruling in its final order. The argument is fatuous. The trial court’s minute order describes the tentative ruling as contested, and that the court took the matter under submission; the final order likewise reflects that the matter was taken under submission following argument, all supporting the conclusion that the trial court considered the arguments raised during the hearing. Moreover, Osoro’s opening brief concedes that the tentative was contested, that the court asked him questions during oral argument, and that the trial court took the matter under submission following argument. The fact that the court ultimately adopted its tentative ruling as the final ruling of the court does not mean the court failed to consider the arguments raised at the hearing. (See People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 651–652 [court’s reading of a prewritten ruling after hearing argument did not mean the court prejudged its decision or failed to consider the parties’ arguments].) Rather, it is an indication that the court was ultimately unpersuaded by Osoro’s arguments. Gibson v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494, the case Osoro cites as supporting good cause, is easily distinguishable. There, the appeal was late by three days, which lateness was caused by a calendaring mistake by the claimant’s attorney. Considering the delay was only three days, that it was caused by the attorney not the claimant, and 14 there was admittedly no prejudice, the California Supreme Court determined good cause was established as a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 500–501.) The facts here are a far cry. Finally, Osoro has a brief argument that asserts error in the failure of the trial court to rule on his ex-parte motion to strike the department’s return. By way of brief recap, following the entry of the order denying the petition for mandamus, the trial court vacated the December 2 reserved hearing date as moot. In a brief nine-line argument, Osoro asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion before ruling on the merits was prejudicial error. The argument fails for several reasons. First, as Osoro concedes, he raised the issue of his motion to strike during the hearing on his writ petition. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1091, the court was authorized to consider Osoro’s objection to the Board’s answer as having been made during the trial of the writ. Thus there was no need for the December hearing. Second, the order denying Osoro’s petition rendered his ex parte motion moot because no further relief was available on his petition. Osoro’s substantive claims were fully resolved. Third, there were procedural defects in Osoro’s “ex parte” motion: the moving papers failed to specify the hearing date and time thereby rendering them defective. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1110(b), 3.1204(a)(1).) But more fundamentally, there was no prejudice. As noted, the ultimate determination against Osoro was that he failed to demonstrate good cause, a failure based on Osoro’s lack of evidence. So, even if the department’s return had been stricken, Osoro’s showing would still have failed. Thus the error could not be prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No 15 judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, . . . or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 16 RICHMAN, J. We concur. STEWART, P. J. SWEET, J. (A175537N)  Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 17