Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 27, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II GINA HUNT, No. 60797-2-II Respondent, v. EDWARD A. MONK, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. LEE, J. — Edward A. Monk appeals the superior court’s order denying his motion to amend judgment. Because Monk raises no issues related to the order being appealed, we affirm. FACTS In October 2018, Gina Hunt filed a complaint against Monk, alleging Monk committed timber trespass by cutting the trees she grew along their joint property line. Monk failed to respond to the complaint, and Hunt moved for a default judgment. On October 26, the superior court entered an order of default against Monk. Based on the order of default, Hunt obtained a default judgment for $69,802.65 against Monk. After Hunt obtained the default judgment, Monk filed multiple motions to dismiss the judgment, which were denied. In December 2021, Monk, who was represented by counsel at the time, filed a CR 60(b)(2) motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that he had been of unsound mind and unable to respond to the complaint. Before the CR 60(b)(2) motion was heard, Monk began representing himself. In March 2022, a pro tem judge decided Monk’s CR 60(b)(2) motion to vacate. The pro tem judge found that Monk was of unsound mind at the time the complaint was filed and when the No. 60797-2-II default judgment was entered. The pro tem judge also found that Monk had not met his burden to demonstrate a defense to liability, but he had met his burden to demonstrate a defense to the amount of damages. Thus, the pro tem judge vacated the default judgment as to damages and found an equitable basis to award Hunt her attorney fees for proceedings related to Monk’s motion to vacate and resulting proceedings. After Monk’s motion to show cause was granted as to damages, Monk continued to file motions to vacate the judgment as to liability, which were denied. On March 26, 2025, Monk filed a motion to amend judgment, claiming that the judgment should be amended to reflect a judgment amount of $0.00. The motion was denied the same day it was filed. Monk appeals the superior court’s March 2025 order denying his motion to amend the judgment.1 1 Hunt claims that the March 2025 order is not appealable under RAP 2.2. Hunt filed a motion challenging the appealability of the March 2025 order. A commissioner of this court ruled that the March 2025 order appeared to be a denial of a CR 60 motion, which is appealable. Hunt’s motion to modify the commissioner’s ruling was denied. However, the commissioner’s ruling allowed for a renewal of the motion to dismiss if additional documents demonstrated that the March 2025 order was not appealable. The record shows that Monk filed a motion in the trial court to amend the judgment, which was denied. Monk cited to CR 54(b) in his motion, which relates to judgments on multiple claims or involving multiple parties and is not applicable. However, the content of Monk’s motion clearly requests amendment of the judgment. An amendment of judgment is governed by CR 59, and an order on a motion for new trial or amendment of judgment is an appealable order under RAP 2.2(a)(9). Therefore, based on the record, we reject Hunt’s claim that the March 2025 order is not appealable. 2 No. 60797-2-II ANALYSIS A. MONK’S APPEAL Monk raises numerous issues related to judicial authority and other issues related to the March 2022 order granting his motion to vacate in part. However, Monk raises no errors related to the order being appealed in this case, which is the March 2025 order. On appeal, Monk raises five assignments of error: 1. On 02-04-22 and after facts prove the trial courts lack of jurisdiction violated appellant constitutional & civil rights. 2. On 02-04-22 the trial court without notice to appellant in a fraud upon the court allowed Benton County District Court Judge John Zioboro to impersonate a superior court judge in a show cause proceeding in this timber trespass case[.] 3. On 02-04-22 without notice a District Court Judge John Zioboro was allowed by trial court official to act in this timber trespass case without having met AR[ ]6, without oath sworn in this case or an order of appointment to this case. 4. On 03-17-22 Benton County District Court Judge John Zioboro impersonated a superior court judge pro tem and filed a forged Benton County Superior Court order. 5. On 09-19-25 a void judgment was entered in this void timber trespass case. Amend. Br. of Appellant at 4 (bold face and italics omitted). None of these assignments of error relate to the March 2025 order that is designated in the notice of appeal. See RAP 2.4(a). The first four assignments of error all relate to the March 2022 order granting Monk’s motion to vacate the judgment as to damages. That order was not appealed and was not designated in the notice of appeal. Further, the time to appeal the March 2022 order has long since expired. See RAP 5.2(a). Therefore, the assignments of error related to the March 2022 order are outside the scope of this appeal. 3 No. 60797-2-II Monk’s fifth assignment of error relates to the judgment entered following the jury trial on damages. That order was entered several months after the March 2025 order designated in the notice of appeal. No notice of appeal for this final judgment has been filed and appeal of that order is now untimely. See RAP 5.2(a). Monk argues that the issues he raises are jurisdictional and, therefore, may be raised at any time. We disagree. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted for the first time at any point in the proceedings, including on appeal. In re Marriage of McDermott, 175 Wn. App. 467, 479, 307 P.3d 717, review denied, 179 Wn.2d 1004 (2013). “‘Subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to a court’s ability to entertain a type of case, not to its authority to enter an order in a particular case.” In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wn.2d 438, 448, 316 P.3d 999 (2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 869 (2014). If the court has subject matter jurisdiction to address the type of case, “‘then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.’” ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, 173 Wn.2d 608, 618, 268 P.3d 929 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)). Monk does not raise any argument alleging that the superior court does not have the ability to entertain an action for timber trespass. Monk’s arguments all relate to the pro tem judge’s specific authority to enter the March 2022 order. An individual judge’s authority is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the pro tem judge who entered the March 2022 order is not the judge who entered the March 2025 order designated in the notice of appeal for this case. Accordingly, Monk has not raised an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that could be raised at any time. 4 No. 60797-2-II B. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL Hunt requests attorney fees and costs on appeal “caused by the unnecessary litigation forced upon her” by Monk. Br. of Resp’t at 9. Under RAP 18.9, we may impose terms on a party for filing a frivolous appeal or failing to comply with the appellate rules. Here, Monk appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to amend the judgment. However, Monk’s briefing is devoid of any argument addressing issues related to the order being appealed, to which Hunt was required to respond. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (Appellant’s brief should contain “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.”). Thus, pursuant to RAP 18.9, we grant Hunt’s request for attorney fees and costs on appeal. CONCLUSION Monk has failed to identify or argue any error relevant to the order designated in the notice of appeal. Any issues he does raise are outside the scope of this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Lee, J. We concur: V eljacic, C.J. Cruser, J. 5