Isaac Raldy Louiniste v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket24-10768
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10768
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ISAAC RALDY LOUINISTE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cv-81199-RLR
____________________
Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Isaac Louiniste, a Florida prisoner who is counseled on ap-
peal, challenges the district court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10768
§ 2254 petition on the ground that it was not timely filed. He con-
tends that the unexpired federal limitations period was tolled by a
state appellate court’s grant of a petition for a belated appeal in a
post-conviction proceeding. The district court rejected this argu-
ment, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a habeas
petition as untimely. Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.
2006). Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal habeas petition is subject
to a one-year statute-of-limitations period that begins to run on the
latest of four triggering events, including, as relevant here, “the
date on which the [state-court] judgment became final by the con-
clusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A state prisoner’s convic-
tion becomes final when the time for seeking review in the U.S.
Supreme Court expires, which is 90 days after the court of appeals’
entry of judgment. See Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d
1273, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3.
The limitations period is statutorily tolled during the pen-
dency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application is “properly filed”
when its delivery and acceptance comply with the laws and rules
governing such filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). “The
time that an application for state postconviction review is ‘pending’
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24-10768 Opinion of the Court 3
includes the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determina-
tion, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that
the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Evans
v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (emphasis omitted). “[T]he claim
remains pending until the time to seek review expires.” Cramer v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 461 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 2006).
Motions for state post-conviction relief filed pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, motions to correct an
illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule 3.800(a), and motions to re-
duce sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(c), are “application[s] for
State post-conviction or other collateral review” within the mean-
ing of § 2244(d)(2) and may thus toll the statute of limitations. Day
v. Crosby, 391 F.3d 1192, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2004) (Rule 3.850); Ford
v. Moore, 296 F.3d 1035, 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (Rule 3.800(a));
Rogers v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2017)
(Rule 3.800(c)). Any appeal filed in a state court from the denial of
one of these motions also qualifies as an “application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see
also, e.g., Day, 391 F.3d at 1192–93. If a defendant appeals, a post-
conviction appeal in Florida remains pending until the mandate is-
sues. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000). The
denial of a Rule 3.800(c) motion is not appealable. Spaulding v.
State, 93 So. 3d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Louiniste’s petition for belated appeal under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.141(c) is not an application for state post-
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10768
conviction or collateral review for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). See Es-
pinosa v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 804 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 2015)
(addressing a petition for a belated appeal in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding); Danny v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 811 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2016) (addressing a petition for a belated direct appeal); see also
Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(1)–(2) (providing that “petitions seeking be-
lated appeals or belated discretionary review” “shall be treated as
original proceedings”). Indeed, we have previously held that a pe-
tition to file a belated appeal that was filed after the one-year federal
limitations period had expired and that was later granted by the
state appellate court could not retroactively toll the one-year limi-
tation period. See Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1379–80 (11th Cir.
2003).
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Louiniste’s
§ 2254 petition on the ground that it was untimely. His petition for
belated appeal does not toll the AEDPA limitations period because
it constituted an original proceeding. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.141(c)(1)–(2); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Espinosa, 804 F.3d at 1141.
Consequently, the limitations period ran untolled for 63 days be-
tween January 8, 2020, which was 30 days after the state court’s
denial of the Rule 3.800(a) motion, and March 11, 2020, when
Louiniste filed the Rule 3.850 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);
Cramer, 461 F.3d at 1383; Day, 391 F.3d at 1192–93. And it then ran
untolled for another 320 days between October 7, 2022, when the
state court issued its Rule 3.850 mandate, and August 23, 2023,
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24-10768 Opinion of the Court 5
when Louiniste filed his federal habeas petition. 1 Therefore,
Louiniste filed that § 2254 petition 18 days after the expiration of
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Chavers, 468 F.3d at 1275. Accordingly, we hold
that Louiniste’s habeas petition was untimely and thus affirm the
judgment of the district court. 2
AFFIRMED.
1 We give Louiniste the benefit of the doubt and assume that he properly com-
plied with the requirements of the prison mailbox rule, and thus that the rele-
vant date for the timeliness analysis is the date of mailing, August 23, instead
of the actual date of filing, August 28. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
Rule 3(d) (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if
deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day
for filing.”). Regardless, this five-day difference does not impact our determi-
nation that he exceeded the one-year limitations period.
2 Louiniste argues that we should equitably toll the limitations period despite
his failure to comply with AEDPA’s one-year rule. See Holland v. Florida, 560
U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (permitting equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations pe-
riod if a petitioner shows that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and
that an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way of timely filing). But his
equitable-tolling argument was not specified in the certificate of appealability.
And, “in an appeal brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate re-
view is limited to the issues specified in the COA.” Murray v. United States, 145
F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998).