Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program v. A.S., the Mother of J.W., Jr., J.M.H., K.A.P., & S.R.P.; B.R.H., the Father of J.M.H.; And K.P., the Father of K.A.P. & S.R.P.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledAugust 25, 2020
Docket1D20-0795
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D20-795
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES and GUARDIAN AD
LITEM PROGRAM,
Appellants,
v.
A.S., the Mother of J.W., Jr.,
J.M.H., K.A.P., & S.R.P.; B.R.H.,
the Father of J.M.H.; and K.P.,
the Father of K.A.P. & S.R.P.,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Michael G. Allen, Judge.
August 25, 2020
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Department of Children and Families and the
Guardian Ad Litem program appeal a final judgment denying a
petition to terminate parental rights as to the parents of four
children (one mother and three fathers, one deceased). We affirm.
Facts.
The record supports the trial court’s findings of the following
facts. The mother’s current husband, who was the father of two of
the children involved here, sexually abused another of the
children, his four-year-old step-daughter. The mother initially
denied the abuse, and allowed her husband continued access to
this girl as well as the other children. The children were
adjudicated dependent in 2017.
Although the mother initially failed to recognize the need to
protect the children and failed to comply substantially with her
case plan for reunification, her understanding and behavior
improved. The trial court found that she changed her attitude and
took steps to comply in 2018 and 2019, completing her tasks or
actively working on them by the time of the TPR hearing. She
finally admitted the abuse occurred. She also filed a pro-se petition
to dissolve her marriage to the abusive father.
As of the TPR hearing, the trial court found, the mother had
demonstrated understanding of the issues involved, compliance
with her case plan, and a willingness to continue engaging in
protective services. The trial court was unable to conclude by the
applicable standard of clear and convincing evidence that further
services would be futile or ineffective. To the contrary, the trial
court concluded that “there is significant possibility that the
mother could in fact substantially comply with the case plan if she
continues to participate in the services.”
As to one of the two living fathers, the trial court found he
abandoned his child and made no significant contribution to the
child’s care or to maintaining a relationship. The State’s primary
concern with this father was his failure to appreciate the need to
protect his child from the mother’s abusive husband. By the time
of the TPR hearing, the trial court found that this father was
providing some support for the child; and, although his visitation
was sporadic, there was not clear and convincing evidence that he
lacked the intent to function as a parent to the child. This father
had participated somewhat in services, and the concern with lack
of protective capacity was not established by clear and convincing
evidence.
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The trial court found that the other living father (of two
children), who sexually abused his four-year-old step-daughter,
failed to care for or protect his children appropriately. As of the
TPR hearing, he had not completed services in his case plan, but
testified that ability to pay was an obstacle as to some services and
that he was working on others. The trial court reserved ruling as
to this father pending updated evidence.
In the order under review, reflecting the facts that existed as
of the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court concluded that legal
grounds for termination of parental rights did not exist. The trial
court reviewed the statutory factors and found them on balance
either neutral or less than clear and convincing. Only the GAL’s
recommendation clearly weighed in favor of termination. Without
the requisite clear and convincing evidence, the trial court declined
to terminate parental rights.
Analysis.
Termination of parental rights is necessarily fact-intensive.
Appellants point to record evidence contrary to the trial court’s
findings, particularly evidence more remote in time from the
adjudicatory hearing. They also argue, among other things, that
the trial court failed to further the children’s interests in
permanency.
The trial court’s findings are presumed correct, but we must
be able to find that the record contains competent, substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, which in turn must
be based on clear and convincing evidence. N.L. v. Dep’t of Children
& Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 996, 1000–01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). We
must consider the best interests of the children, but cannot
reweigh the evidence or overturn the trial court’s assessment of
the evidence unless it is “unreasonable as a matter of law.” N.L.,
843 So. 2d at 999; see J.P. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 183
So. 3d 1198, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (explaining our review is
“highly deferential”). Applying these standards to the record and
the ruling before us, we conclude that we must affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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ROBERTS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Department of Children and
Families, Tallahassee, for Appellant Department of Children and
Families; Thomasina Moore, Statewide Director, and Sara
Elizabeth Goldfarb, Senior Attorney, Guardian ad Litem Program,
Tallahassee, for Appellant Guardian ad Litem Program.
David Maldonado of the Maldonado Law Firm, P.A., Lakeland, for
Appellee A.S.; Crystal McBee Frusciante and Anne Marie Perine,
Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict
and Civil Regional Counsel Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellee
B.R.H.; Kari Jorma Myllynen, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee K.P.
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