Full Opinion

J-S26018-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF G.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: G.H., FATHER : : : : : : No. 354 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered February 5, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000056-2025 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant G.H. (Father) appeals from the February 5, 2026 order1 of adjudication and disposition with respect to his daughter, G.H., born in December of 2025. Additionally, Father’s court-appointed attorney, Kim Marie Staron, Esq., (Counsel), has filed a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).2 After careful review, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the underlying order. ____________________________________________ 1 We note that while the order at issue was dated February 3, 2026, the trial court did not docket the order until February 5, 2026. 2 The Anders procedure for withdrawal of court-appointed counsel applies in a dependency matter, “even in the absence of an involuntary termination decree.” In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2017). J-S26018-26 We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter from the certified record. Father was nineteen years old and J.B.-S. (Mother) (collectively with Father, Parents) was seventeen years old at the time of Child’s birth.3 Parents’ relationship has been marred by domestic violence. One notable incident occurred in October of 2025, when police were called to the home of Father’s mother, K.S. (Paternal Grandmother), in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, where Parents were then residing. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 6-9, 45, 70, 99, 107. During the incident, Father locked Mother out of the home in cold weather without proper clothing while she was approximately seven months pregnant with G.H. See id. at 6-9, 45, 70. Police attempted to help Mother regain access to the home by speaking with Paternal Grandmother, who was not home at the time, but Paternal Grandmother did not provide permission for Mother to return inside. See id. at 8, 109. As a result, police transported Mother to a local hospital.4 See id. at 9. Father’s sister retrieved Mother from the hospital and took her to an undisclosed location. See id. at 9-11. The Tioga County Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with this family at the time of Child’s birth, upon receiving a report that alleged Parents’ improper conduct involving domestic violence, substance ____________________________________________ 3 Mother turned eighteen years old approximately two weeks later. 4 The record does not reveal the result of this hospital visit. -2- J-S26018-26 abuse, and overall parental incapacity. See id. at 16; see also DHS Ex. 2. Although Parents were residing in Tioga County, Mother gave birth to Child at Corning Guthrie Hospital in Steuben County, New York. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 14, 66-67, 107. According to Kimberly Fultz (“Nurse Fultz”), labor and delivery nurse at the hospital, Father went outside to smoke marijuana “every hour or two[,]” including during Mother’s labor.5 Id. at 21. The next day, Mother’s hospital drug test returned a positive result for marijuana.6 See id. at 16-17. When Nurse Fultz entered Mother’s hospital room to inform Parents of the drug test results, Father grabbed the isolette, i.e., a neonatal incubator, that Child was placed in, pushed it towards Nurse Fultz, and proceeded to grab and push Nurse Fultz. See id. at 17, 20, 35-36. Father then took his shirt off, clenched his fists, and paced around the room, red- faced and “very irate and angry.” Id. at 17. As a result, Father was removed from the hospital by security and prohibited from returning. See id. at 18, 36. After their discharge from the hospital, Mother and Child resided with M.B.-K. (Maternal Great-Grandmother) in Tioga County, separate from Father. ____________________________________________ 5 At a point undisclosed in the record, Father had a medical marijuana card. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 93-94. At the time of the hearing, Father testified that it had expired and did not recall when that had happened. See id. at 94. 6 Mother admitted to using marijuana during her pregnancy. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 21. There is no indication in the record that she had a valid prescription. -3- J-S26018-26 See id. at 45; see also DHS Ex. 1 at 8; Ex. 2 at 2. On December 4, 2025, Mother agreed to a safety plan proposed by DHS wherein she would continue to reside with Maternal Great-Grandmother and Father was barred from entering the property. See DHS Exhibit 10. Father initially agreed to the safety plan but rescinded it during a meeting with DHS on December 8, 2025. See id.; see also N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 58-60. In addition, during this same meeting, Father declined to participate in any recommended services and refused to communicate any further with DHS. See N.T. 1/13/2026, at 53, 58-60. On December 19, 2025, DHS received a referral that Mother, along with Child, left Maternal Great-Grandmother’s home and went to Paternal Grandmother’s home, where Father resided. See DHS Ex. 10. A DHS caseworker subsequently went there but failed to make contact with anyone. See id. DHS filed an application that same day to obtain emergency protective custody of Child, which the trial court granted. Police located the family later that same day, and DHS placed Child in a kinship home with S.B.- K., Child’s maternal great-aunt. DHS filed the subject dependency petition on December 22, 2025, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) and requested that Child remain in her kinship placement. The evidentiary hearing commenced on January 13, 2026, -4- J-S26018-26 as a combined shelter care and dependency hearing.7 On that date, DHS presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Nurse Fultz; Officer Eli Cochran (Officer Cochran) of the Wellsboro Police Department; Katie Rawlings, caseworker with Steuben County Social Services; and Kayla Hurler and Brenda Matteson, DHS caseworkers. DHS also proffered ten documentary exhibits, which the trial court admitted without objection. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 2. In addition, Father, represented by Counsel, testified on his own behalf, and presented the testimony of Paternal Grandmother and his grandmother, K.C. (“Paternal Great-Grandmother”). Specifically, Father testified that he and Mother were then cohabiting at Paternal Great-Grandmother’s residence in Steuben County, New York. See id. at 77, 88-89, 96. Father reiterated his refusal to accept services from DHS. See id. at 85-86. Mother declined to testify on this date. At the conclusion of the January 13, 2026 hearing, the trial court issued a shelter care order, maintained Child’s placement in the kinship home, and continued the dependency hearing to February 3, 2026. See id. at 124-25. On that date, Father testified via telephone and confirmed that he and Mother were still residing together in New York. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/3/26, at 11. The trial court also admitted one additional exhibit from DHS. See id. at 9. Mother ____________________________________________ 7 The shelter care hearing was originally scheduled for January 6, 2026, but was continued to January 13, 2026. -5- J-S26018-26 appeared, but again declined, to testify or present any evidence on her own behalf. By order of adjudication and disposition entered on February 5, 2026, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent and found that allowing Child to remain in Parents’ home “would be contrary to the child’s welfare.” Trial Ct. Order, 2/5/26, at 3. The order maintained DHS’s legal and physical custody of Child and her kinship care placement. See id. at 4. On February 27, 2026, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 25, 2026. Counsel filed an Anders/Santiago brief and a petition to withdraw in this Court on April 20, 2026, which we must address before reaching the merits of this appeal. See In re B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 661 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”) (citations omitted). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must meet the following procedural requirements: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention. -6- J-S26018-26 Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009)). With respect to the third procedural requirement of Anders—that counsel advise the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal—this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). Applications to withdraw filed during ongoing dependency proceedings have further requirements, due to the parent’s continuing right to counsel in such proceedings. See J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 906-07. Therefore, counsel who seek to withdraw during dependency proceedings must inform the parent of his or her right to counsel in any subsequent dependency or involuntary termination proceedings. Counsel must also inform the parent that, if he or she cannot afford counsel, he or she may contact the trial court in order to obtain new counsel. This information must be conveyed to the parent at the same time that counsel informs the parent of his or her other rights pursuant to Anders[.] Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337. With respect to the substantive requirements for Anders/Santiago briefs, our Supreme Court has stated that counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; -7- J-S26018-26 (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Here, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw, certifying that she reviewed the case and determined that Father’s appeal is frivolous. Counsel averred that she served Father with her Anders/Santiago brief and a letter, which was attached to the petition, that properly complied with Millisock and J.D.H.8 Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief includes a summary of the history and facts of the case with citations to the record; the issues raised by Father; the facts that purportedly support the appeal; and her assessment of why this appeal is frivolous with citations to relevant legal authority. As such, we conclude that Counsel has satisfied the requirements of Anders and Santiago. We must next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if, on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the undersigned counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel should be granted, where counsel has made a ____________________________________________ 8 To date, Father has not filed any response in this Court. -8- J-S26018-26 conscientious and thorough review of the record, investigated the possible grounds for appeal, found no arguable issues of merit, and finds the only issues raised on appeal to be frivolous? 2. Whether the trial court erred by making factual findings unsupported by competent evidence, where the court relied on disputed and unverified statements in reaching its decision adjudicating the child dependent[?] 3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to find the minor child dependent based on the minor child being without proper care and control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care, or control necessary for her physical, mental, or emotional health or morals[?] 4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that it was contrary to the minor child’s welfare, safety or health to remain in the home of the Father[?] Anders/Santiago Brief at 8 (formatting altered).9 Our scope and standard of review over dependency cases is well- established: In dependency proceedings, our scope of review is broad. Nevertheless, we will accept those factual findings of the trial court that are supported by the record because the trial judge is in the best position to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility. We accord great weight to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Although bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the court’s determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, and must order whatever right and justice dictate. ____________________________________________ 9 Child was represented by a guardian ad litem at the subject hearing, who argued in favor of adjudicating Child dependent and maintaining her kinship placement. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/3/26, at 28-30. -9- J-S26018-26 In re C.B., 357 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). Overall, we review the findings of the trial court for an abuse of discretion. See In re K.B., 331 A.3d 50, 56 (Pa. Super. 2025). Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child,” in relevant part, as one who: is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for [her] physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.] 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). The General Assembly “defined ‘dependent child’ in exceedingly broad terms precisely because it is impossible to foresee all the possible factual situations that may arise.” In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426, 433 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). This broad definition “enables the experienced juvenile court judge to apply his [or her] training and compassion to the unique facts of each case.” Id. A more restrictive definition “would compel the juvenile court judge to place the child in the home of the natural parents to determine whether they are able to render proper care, and ignores the possibility that if the ‘experiment’ proves unsuccessful, the consequences to the child could be seriously detrimental or even fatal.” Id. “A finding that a child is dependent requires proof by clear and convincing evidence[.]” K.B., 331 A.3d at 56. This Court has explained that - 10 - J-S26018-26 the “question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and control encompasses two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper care and control, and if so, whether such care and control is immediately available.” Id. (citation omitted). We have concluded that evidence that a parent is “evasive, untruthful, and uncooperative” with a child welfare agency is “wholly sufficient to demonstrate [a c]hild was without proper parental care and no such care was immediately available.” Id. at 61. Once the trial court determines that a child is dependent, it may enter an order of disposition that is “best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a). This includes transferring “temporary legal custody” to “[a]n agency . . . licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(2)(ii). Relatedly, Section 6351(b) provides, in relevant part: (b) Required preplacement findings.—Prior to entering any order of disposition under subsection (a) that would remove a dependent child from his home, the court shall enter findings on the record or in the order of court as follows: (1) that continuation of the child in his home would be contrary to the welfare, safety or health of the child; [] .... 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(b)(1). - 11 - J-S26018-26 Here, the trial court explained on the record in open court that it adjudicated Child dependent pursuant to Section 6302(1) based upon the following facts, which are supported by the record: [T]he [domestic violence] incident that occurred in October [2025] was significant enough that it required the arrival of police. Whether a report was made or charges were filed, it was significant enough that Officer Cochran made a call to the homeowner, [Paternal Grandmother,] who was not present, who advised him, no, [Mother] is not to be there. That is consistent and corroborates with the subsequent statements that [Mother] has made to Nurse Fultz, [and] to [DHS] staff. . . . [Mother] was removed from the . . . property, had to be taken to the hospital because she couldn’t be inside on a cold day, when she was pregnant, in the home that she had been [living] in. . . . This is a child who is a newborn[,] totally vulnerable, totally dependent, and totally reliant upon the judgment and the care and the control of the people who are in her immediate vicinity. It is, therefore, essential that [P]arents be able to have the skills and the judgment necessary. * * * What happened [in the hospital at the time of Child’s birth] . . . when a perceived crisis arose, there was an absolute overreaction that endangered the child and clearly demonstrated a lack of self- control on the part of [Father], which is simply not conducive to exercising parental safety. N.T. Hr’g, 2/3/26, at 31-34. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that it was also significantly concerned with Father’s unwillingness to accept services or cooperate with DHS. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/25/26, at 4-5. In addition, the trial court found that Father had relocated to Paternal Great-Grandmother’s home - 12 - J-S26018-26 in Steuben County, New York, in an attempt to avoid contact with DHS. See id. at 4, 6. Our review reveals sufficient record evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Child is presently without proper parental care and control, and such care and control is not immediately available due to the domestic violence between Parents; Father’s inability to provide safety for Child; and Father’s refusal to accept or cooperate with the services offered by DHS. Regarding domestic violence and Father’s lack of protective capacity, we agree with the trial court that Father’s conduct in the hospital after Child’s birth was an “immediate violent reaction to a perceived threat [which] demonstrates clearly that Father lacks the self-control necessary to exercise parental safety.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/25/26, at 3. We note that it is significantly concerning that Father not only placed Child in physical danger when she was barely one day old, but also that he behaved in this manner while in a supervised environment. Further, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that this singular incident can form the basis of a dependency finding. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 37 (citing In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 351 (Pa. Super. 2013) (determining that the record supported a dependency adjudication pursuant to Section 6302(1) because the parent left the eight-month-old child home alone for several hours on one occasion)). With respect to Father’s refusal to engage with DHS or participate in any recommended services, Father confirmed his refusal during his direct - 13 - J-S26018-26 examination. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 85-86. Ms. Matteson testified that Father told her to stop contacting him after December 8, 2025, and he never responded to any of DHS’s subsequent communications. See id. at 58-59. In addition, on cross-examination, Father admitted that he fled from Tioga County, Pennsylvania, to Steuben County, New York, to evade DHS, as follows: Q: Why are you staying with your grandmother right now? A: It’s very stressful, and I can’t stay home with all this going on. Q: What do you mean? A: It’s just very stressful. I just can’t handle it. Q: What’s stressful about being at your mother’s home? A: The [Child Protective Services] showing out of random, just all of the above. It’s just really stressful. * * * Q: You stated that hopefully you can stay with your mom once this is all solved; what do you mean? A: Well, they kind of just came in, as I see it, they came in and took my kid. Q: Tioga [DHS]? A: Yeah, whoever was amongst them. Q: So, once they’re not involved anymore, it’ll be less stressed? A: Life will be better, yeah, hopefully. Q: And you’ll be able to stay at your mom’s again? A: Yeah, yeah. - 14 - J-S26018-26 N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 88-89. This same exchange, wherein Father essentially claims that DHS removed Child for no reason, demonstrates his lack of appreciation for how his actions endangered Child’s safety and his inability to recognize his parenting deficiencies.10 See id. Father also texted a DHS caseworker between the first and second hearing dates, telling her that he “will not be showing up to anything more” because he is “stepping back” and again advised DHS to stop contacting him. DHS Exhibit 11. Father reiterated at the second hearing date that he did not want DHS to contact him. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/3/26, at 10-11. Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that this record demonstrates that Child is presently without proper parental care or control due to Father’s conduct, which placed her health, safety, or welfare at risk. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1); see also K.B., 331 A.3d at 56, 61. This same evidence also readily establishes that proper parental care and control is not immediately available. See id. Therefore, we agree with Counsel that any argument Father would raise about Child’s dependency adjudication is frivolous. Regarding the disposition of Child pursuant to Section 6351(a), the trial court determined that, due to the significant concerns present in this case, “it ____________________________________________ 10 In the same vein, Father requested that he be “reimbursed” by DHS for the “time and pain” along with the stress they have caused him by “forcing themselves” into his life. N.T. Hr’g, 1/13/26, at 86, 95. - 15 - J-S26018-26 was and remains appropriate to place [Child] outside of Father’s home, until such time [Child] residing in the home is no longer contrary to [G.H.]’s welfare, safety, or health.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/25/26, at 6. This conclusion is amply supported by the same record evidence that supports the trial court’s decision to adjudicate Child dependent, discussed thoroughly above, also supports the trial court’s determination that continuation of Child in Father’s home would be contrary to her welfare, safety or health and that removal is the disposition that is best suited to the safety, protection, and physical, mental, and moral welfare of Child. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a), (b)(1). Therefore, we concur with Counsel’s assertion that any issue with respect to disposition is frivolous. Based upon our independent review, the certified record reveals no preserved non-frivolous issues that would arguably support Father’s appeal. We agree with Counsel’s assessment that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Thus, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw as Father’s attorney and affirm the February 5, 2026 order of adjudication and disposition with respect to Child. We remind the trial court that it must appoint new counsel for Father for the ongoing dependency proceedings if he cannot afford to pay for private representation. See J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 906. Application to withdraw granted. Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. - 16 - J-S26018-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 11/03/2026 - 17 -