Andrew Todd Brown v. Lindzey Holland Brown
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2026 CU 0349
StatusUnknown
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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FIRST CIRCUIT
2026 CU 0349
Offil' ' 41
VERSUS
Judgment Rendered:
ON APPEAL FROM THE
21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION " K"
LIVINGSTON PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA,
DOCKET NUMBER 184572
HONORABLE JEFFERY T. OGLESBEE, JUDGE PRESIDING
Emily A. Lindig Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Beau James Brock Andrew Todd Brown
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
and
Mark D. Plaisance
Marcus J. Plaisance
Prairieville, Louisiana
Sherman Q. Mack Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
C. Glenn Westmoreland Lindzey Holland Brown
Albany, Louisiana
BEFORE: WOLFE, STROMBERG, and BALFOUR, JJ.
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STROMBERG, J.
The mother of twins appeals from a trial court judgment denying her request
to relocate to Tremont, Mississippi and awarding joint custody to both parents, as
well as ordering that the parents share equal physical custody of the twins on a week -
For the
to -week basis alternating in accordance with the father' s wort-,schedule.
following reasons, we affirm the trial court' s judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2020, Lindzey Holland Brown and Andrew Todd Brown met while
working in Tupelo, Mississippi. In June of 2021, Mr. Brown relocated to Livingston
Parish, Louisiana for work as a paramedic. Ms. Brown and Mr. Brown were married
on October 3, 2023. On April 5, 2024, Ms. Brown gave birth to twin boys, T.B. and
S. B., in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and the family resided in Livingston Parish.' Ms.
Brown also has a ten -year- old son from a prior relationship, who at the time of the
trial was living with his maternal grandparents. After the twins were born, both
parties experienced anxiety and depression. By the summer of 2024, the parties
discussed moving to Mississippi to be closer to Ms. Brown' s family for help in
raising the twins. In August of 2024, the parties signed a purchase agreement to
purchase land in Tremont, Mississippi, where Ms. Brown is originally from.
Approximately one month later, in September of 2024, the parties separated.
On September 26, 2024, Mr. Brown filed a petition in Livingston Parish for
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ex parte temporary custody and a petition for an article 102 divorce, custody, and
determination of incidental matters. Mr. Brown alleged that Ms. Brown relocated
1 Pursuant to Uniform Rules —Courts of Appeal, Rule 5- 2, we refer to the minor children by their
initials.
2 Pursuant to La. C. C. art. 102, unless the parties have contracted a covenant marriage, a divorce
shall be granted upon the motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce
and upon proof that the requisite period of time elapsed from the service of the petition, or from
the execution of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart
continuously for at least the requisite period of time prior to the filing of the rule to show cause.
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with the twins to Mississippi over his objection. Mr. Brown requested temporary
sole custody, subject to reasonable visitation in favor ofMs. Brown, and offered Ms.
Brown use of the matrimonial domicile, which was Mr. Brown' s separate property.
On October 30, 2024, the parties signed a stipulated judgment, which granted Ms.
Brown exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile and the trial court
implemented an interim temporary custody arrangement for the twins.
On January 8, 2025, Mr. Brown filed a motion requesting, the trial court order
Ms. Brown to submit to a mental health evaluation. On January 8, 2025, the trial
court signed a stipulated judgment changing the visitation schedule to a two -two -
three joint custody agreement. On February 19, 2025, the parties entered into
another stipulated judgment, wherein Ms. Brown was ordered to submit to a mental
health evaluation with Dr. Brandon P. Romano. On June 23, 2025, Ms. Brown
submitted to a psychological evaluation. Dr. Romano' s report stated that Ms.
Brown' s medical records confirmed that she was diagnosed with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, combined presentation, generalized anxiety disorder,
postpartum depression, and major depressive disorder. Dr. Romano recommended
that Ms. Brown receive individual counseling, continue taking psychotropic
medication, and suggested a co -parenting program for the parties.
The trial court held a two-day hearing in August of 2025. Multiple witnesses
testified at the hearing, including: Suzanne Brown, Mr. Brown' s mother; Kaitlyn
Fontenot, a neighbor of the parties; Barbara Williams, a friend of Ms. Brown; and
Tammy Holland, Ms. Brown' s mother. After hearing testimony from the witnesses,
the trial court rendered its judgment on September 3, 2025, denying Ms. Brown' s
motion to relocate to Mississippi with the twins.
The trial court orally considered the relocation factors set forth in La. R.S.
9: 355. 14, as well as the best interest factors set forth in La. C. C. art. 134. At the
conclusion of its oral reasons, the trial court awarded the parties joint care, custody,
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and control of the twins, with Ms. Brown designated as the domiciliary parent. The
trial court ordered that the parties share equal custody of the twins on a week -to -
week basis, with the weekly schedule alternating in accordance with Mr. Brown' s
work schedule, with exchanges occurring every Sunday. On October 15, 2025, the
trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its oral ruling., On November 20,
2025, Ms. Brown devolutively appealed the October 15, 2025 judgment. Ms. Brown
assigns the following errors on appeal:
1. The trial court erred in denying Ms. Brown' s request to relocate
with evidence —including the absence of any local support
network, her documented inability to obtain employment in
Louisiana, the prohibitive cost of childcare, the availability of
family support, employment, and stable housing in Mississippi, and
the presence there of her older son — demonstrated that relocation
was in the best interest of the [ twins] under the factors set forth in
La. R.S. 9: 355. 14.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in structuring the custody
schedule around Mr. Brown' s work schedule -where the [ trial] court
itself found the exchanges dynamic to be hostile and inappropriate,
and where a schedule reducing exchange frequency would better
serve the [ twins'] best interest.
3. The trial court erred in its evaluation of the best interest factors
under La. C. C. art. 134 by giving insufficient consideration to the
substantial and uncontradicted evidence that the [ twins] were
returned from Mr. Brown' s custody on a recurring basis with
injuries, severe diaper rash, inadequate nail care, and other signs of
neglect, and by granting equal physical custody notwithstanding
that evidence.
APPLICABLE LAW
In every child custody case, custody must be awarded in the best interest of
the child. La. C. C. art. 131; see Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193, 1201 ( La.
1986). Louisiana Civil Code article 134( A) directs courts to consider all relevant
factors in determining the best interest of the child, which may include:
1. The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children' s
Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
2. The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and
the child.
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3. The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.
4. The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
5. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.
6. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
7. The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of
the child.
8. The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any
party.
9. The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an
abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other
parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
10. The home, school, and community history of the child.
11. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
12. The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other
party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific
abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have
reasonable concerns for the child' s safety or well-being while in the
care of the other party.
13. The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
14. The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.
A trial court must consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest
of the child and is provided with guiding factors to assist in its consideration;
however, the list is not exhaustive or exclusive. See La. C. C. art. 134, cmt. (b). The
weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. Couvillon
v. Couvillon, 2023- 0056 ( La. App. I Cir. 8/ 29/ 23), 2023 WL 5542771, * 3
unpublished). In making its determination, the trial court is not bound to make a
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mechanical evaluation of or provide a literal articulation of all of the statutory factors
listed in Article 134 and is not required to specifically explain its weighing and
balancing of the factors. Id. Rather, the trial court should decide each case on its
own facts and circumstances in light of La. C. C. art. 134 and other relevant factors.
Id.
When the practical effect of a custody judgment is the relocation of the child,
the trial court must additionally consider the relocation factors set forth in La. R.S.
9: 355, et seq. Trahan v. Kingrey, 2011- 1900 ( La. App. I Cir. 5/ 4/ 12), 98 So. 3d
347, 351, writ denied, 2012- 1586 ( La. 8/ 1/ 12), 92 So. 3d 3511; Bonnecarrere v.
Bonnecarrere, 2011- 0061 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 1/ 11), 69 So. 3d 1225, 1233; see also
Ramirez v. Hite, 2015- 1179 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 2015 WL 9466920, * 4
unpublished). As it applies to child custody, " relocation" includes an attempt to
change the location previously designated by the court as the child' s primary
residence to a location outside of Louisiana, irrespective of the geographic location
of the parents. See La. R.S. 9: 355. 1 and 9: 355. 2( B)( 1); Nelson v. Land, 2001- 1073
La. App. I Cir. 11/ 9/ 01), 818 So. 2d 91, 93- 94 ( citing Bullock v. Bullock, 98- 0206
La. App. 4 Cir. 1/ 29/ 98), 706 So. 2d 671, 672). When the relocation of the child' s
primary residence is contested, La. R.S. 9: 355. 10 requires that the proponent of
relocation prove that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and in the best
interest of the child. Thus, Louisiana' s relocation statutes retain the best interest of
the child standard as the fundamental principle governing decisions made pursuant
to its provisions. Bridges v. Bridges, 2020- 0300 ( La. App. I Cir. 11/ 10/ 20), 316
So. 3d 17, 24.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 355. 14( A) provides:
In reaching its decision regarding a proposed relocation the court
shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether relocation is
in the best interest of the child, including the following:
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1. The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the
relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and
siblings, and other significant
with the non -relocating person,
persons in the child' s life.
2. The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely
impact the relocation will have on the child' s physical,
educational, and emotional development.
3. The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non -
relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody
or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial
circumstances of the parties.
4. The child' s views about the proposed relocation, taking into
consideration the age and maturity of the child.
5. Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the
person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to
promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.
6. How the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of
life for the child, including but not limited to financial or
emotional benefit and educational opportunity.
7. The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation.
8. The current employment and economic circumstances of each
person and how the proposed relocation may affect the
circumstances of the child.
9. The extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial
obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child
support, spousal support, and property, and
community
alimentary obligations.
10. The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person.
11. Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either
the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a
consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure of any
attempts at rehabilitation.
12. Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.
Although La. R.S. 9: 355. 14( A) requires the trial court to consider all twelve
factors in a relocation case, it is not necessary that the trial court expressly analyze
each factor in its oral or written reasons for judgment and its failure to do so does
not constitute an error of law. Gray v. Gray, 2011- 548 ( La. 7/ 1/ 11), 65 So. 3d 1247,
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600.
1255; State v. Titus, 2018- 1511 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 28/ 19), 274 So. 3d 591,
While La. R.S. 9: 355. 14 requires consideration of all twelve factors, the court is not
required to give preferential consideration to any certain factor or factors. Langston
v. Langston, 54, 611 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 5/ 25/ 22), 340 So. 3d 1272, 1279. Ultimately,
the question to be determined. by the appellate court on review is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in determining that the relocation would be in the child' s
best interest. See Gray, 65 So. 3d at 1255.
DISCUSSION
In her first and third assignments of error, Ms. Brown argues that the trial
court erred in denying her request to relocate to Mississippi under the factors set
forth in La. R.S. 9: 355. 14 and La. C. C. art. 134. In its oral reasons, the trial court
reviewed the twelve factors contained in La. R.S. 9: 355. 14 in its determination of
the contested relocation and stated the following as to each factor:
1. The twins are very young. The parties separated at an early stage of
the twins' lives. However, because Ms. Brown is a stay- at-home
mom, she is involved more in the twin' s everyday life.
2. Due to the twins' ages, this factor is not applicable. However, the
trial court acknowledged that if Ms. Brown was allowed to relocate
to Mississippi, it would significantly impact Mr. Brown' s ability to
have a relationship with the twins due to his work schedule and
where he is currently residing.
3. The trial court believed it would be difficult for Mr. Brown to
maintain a good relationship with his children due to the vast
distances between the parties. Ms. Brown does not have a job at the
moment although she indicated that she may have a job waiting for
her in Mississippi.
4. The twins are too young to have a view about the proposed
relocation.
5. The trial court believes that both parties are at fault in this aspect.
They have a great deal of difficulty in co -parenting.
6. The trial court stated the only reason Ms. Brown gave for the
relocation is that her family lives there and that she has support from
her family. The trial court is still unaware of where Ms. Brown
would work and how the twins would benefit from this relocation.
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7. The purchase agreement introduced into evidence indicates that both
parties considered relocation.
8. Ms. Brown has not demonstrated that she has employment in
Louisiana or Mississippi. Mr. Brown is currently employed in
Mississippi.
9. Mr. Brown has fulfilled his financial obligations in this matter.
10. There was little testimony from Mr. Brown on the feasibility for him
relocating to Mississippi, while the trial court acknowledged that he
is currently employed in Mississippi, far away from where Ms.
Brown is seeking to relocate.
11. The evidence introduced revealed that Ms. Brown has been arrested
several times for violating the protective order Mr. Brown filed.
While some charges were dismissed, some are still pending. The
trial court attributes these arrests to the parties' hostile relationship
and considered this when considering the request to relocate.
12. The other factors the trial court considered in determining the twins'
best interest are contained in La. C. C. art. 134.
After considering the factors enumerated in La. R.S. 9: 355. 14, the trial court
stated that it considered the fourteen factors contained in La. C. C. art. 134 to
determine the twins' best interest. The trial court stated that in, regards to La. C. C.
art. 134, it was minimizing the parties' contact with one another to make exchanges
less intense. The record reveals that the trial court thoroughly considered the
relocation statute, La. R.S. 9: 355. 14, and analyzed the twelve relocation factors to
determine whether Ms. Browns' proposed relocation was in the best interest of the
twins. In its reasons, the trial court stated several times that the relocation of the
twins to Mississippi was not in the twins' best interest because Mr. Brown would no
longer have physical access to the twins and his relationship with them would be
significantly impacted.
After a review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that relocation was not in the best interest of the twins. In
its oral reasons, the trial court strongly considered how the impact of a relocation to
Mississippi would affect the twins' relationship with Mr. Brown.. The trial court also
strongly considered the financial situation of each party in determining the best
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interest of the twins. After a review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that relocation was not in the best interest of the
twins. See Ovide v. Rivers, 24- 140 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 10/ 16/ 24), 398 So. 3d 1184,
1190. While a different conclusion could have been reached based on the facts
presented, the consideration on appeal is whether the trial court abused its great
discretion in arriving at its conclusion. Id. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact,
is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses. Id.
Furthermore, the record reveals that the trial court considered the hostile
relationship the parties had with one another when determining the best interest of
the twins pursuant to La. C. C. art. 134. In its oral reasons, the trial court stated that
nobody was shown in a good light. Every single one of those exchanges that were
admitted into evidence] via video, whether it involved the [ parties] or [ their]
parents, were completely inappropriate."
Ms. Brown further argues on appeal that the trial court failed to consider her
evidence admitted into the record showing that the twins were injured and received
inadequate care from Mr. Brown. However, in its oral reasons, the trial court stated
it was " disturbed by the pictures that were introduced [ into evidence] regarding [ Mr.
Brown and the twins]" evidencing consideration of the care issue. In Gathen v.
Gathen, 2010- 2312 ( La. 5110111), 66 So. 3d 1, 8, n. 4, the Louisiana Supreme Court
explained that the trial court is in a better position to evaluate the best interests of
children from the trial court' s total overview of the conduct and character of the
parties and the children and of community standards. Thus, the trial court, sitting as
the trier of fact, was in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses
and weigh the evidence when determining the best interest of the twins pursuant to
La. C. C. art. 134 to determine if relocation was warranted under La. R.S. 9: 355. 14.
Accordingly, having examined the evidence presented and. the trial court' s
ruling, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying relocation,
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awarding joint care, custody, and control of the twins to the parties, and naming Ms.
Brown as the domiciliary parent. Therefore, we find that Ms. Brown' s first and third
assignments of error have no merit and the trial court' s ruling should be affirmed.
In her second assignment of error, Ms. Brown argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in structuring the custody schedule around Mr. Brown' s work
schedule. Ms. Brown asserts that the trial court' s oral reasons noted that the parties
had too many exchanges. However, Ms. Brown argues that the week -to -week
custody schedule the trial court ordered in its judgment " does not meaningfully
address the problem the court identified." Therefore, Ms. Brown argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in entering a custody schedule that did not meaningfully
consider alternatives to reduce exchange frequency.
The record reveals that before the trial court' s judgment, the parties were on
a rotating two -two -three custody schedule. The trial court' s October 15, 2025
judgment changed the parties' custody arrangement for the twins to a week -to -week
schedule, requiring weekly Sunday exchanges. The trial court' s new custody
arrangement for the twins reduces the frequency of the exchanges between the
parties from the previous custody arrangement and appears to be feasible and in the
best interest of the twins pursuant to La. C. C. art. 134, considering that the parties
share equal physical custody of the twins. Thus, under the facts of this case, we do
not find that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a week -to -week custody
arrangement, as this schedule reduces the number of exchanges the parties' have
compared to their previous custody arrangement. We find the second assignment of
error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court' s October 15, 2025 judgment is
affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Lindzey Holland Brown.
AFFIRMED.
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