C.M.D. v. H.M.

J-A08034-26 2026 PA Super 126 C.M.D. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : H.M. : : Appellant : No. 2336 EDA 2025 : Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations at No(s): 0C2400443 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and KING, J. OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 18, 2026 H.M. appeals from the August 15, 2025 final custody order pertaining to her biological daughter, N.H.B.-F. (“Child”), born in July 2022. On appeal, H.M. challenges the trial court’s finding that H.M.’s former partner, C.M.D., has standing to seek custody of Child. After careful consideration, we affirm pursuant to Glover v. Junior, 333 A.3d 323, 358 (Pa. 2025) (“Glover”) (adopting “the doctrine of intent-based parentage” in Pennsylvania). The trial court authored an apt and comprehensive summary of the extensive factual and procedural history of this matter, as follows: C.M.D. and H.M. [(collectively, “the parties”) are both women] and met on OKCupid around January 2016. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 66. . . . They began [their] romantic relationship in Cincinnati,[ Ohio,] but H.M. remained in the closet to her family in London[, United Kingdom]. See id. at 67. . . . In March 2018, the parties broke up, before reconciling in late April 2018. See id. at 68. It is unclear from the record what the status of their relationship was [through] October 2018. During that—for lack of J-A08034-26 a better term, complicated—period, H.M. began the process of potentially pursuing reproducing through [assistive reproductive technology (“ART”)] by purchasing vials of sperm. See id. at 81. In October 2018, H.M. began living with C.M.D. and in May 2019, H.M. fully vacated her own apartment upon the expiration of her lease. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 20. Shortly thereafter, H.M. began the process of egg retrieval for use in future [in vitro fertilization (“IVF”)] procedures [through the University of Cincinnati (“UC”)]. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 107-08. [H.M.] revealed to C.M.D. that she had already bought sperm from a sperm bank, but she offered to return it if C.M.D. wanted to participate in choosing the sperm donor. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 219. C.M.D. expressed that she was content with H.M.’s prior choice of sperm donor and agreed to move forward with that donor. See id. [Seventeen of H.M.’s] eggs were successfully retrieved, [six] of them were successfully fertilized with the [mutually approved] donor sperm, and [two] of the resulting embryos were viable for future implantation. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 108-09. The embryos were frozen in September 2019. See Exhibit P-11. [A]lthough the various medical forms H.M. filled out for her [first course of] fertility procedures included blanks for “partner” or “intended parent,” these were left blank. See Exhibits C-F. In the event of H.M.’s death, [H.M. initially stipulated that] the embryos were to be entrusted to [her] sister, not C.M.D. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 136-37. In 2020, H.M. underwent [intrauterine insemination (“IUI”)] at UC and became pregnant in September 2020[,] while the parties were looking for a home to buy together in Philadelphia. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 172; N.T., 3/25/24, at 31-32. C.M.D. [took] H.M. to medical appointments and was included in discussions about the procedures. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 28, 217. Ultimately, the IUI pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage; the parties buried the remains of the miscarriage together. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 176. In November 2020, the parties moved to Philadelphia [and] into a house they bought together. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 165; N.T., 3/18/24, at 47. Included in their bid for the house was a letter to the seller that said, among other things, “Your home immediately struck us as the home we see ourselves filling with music and raising a family in” and “We are excited to . . . welcome more children there.” Exhibit P-10. H.M. put C.M.D. on her health -2- J-A08034-26 insurance as her “domestic partner” and C.M.D. remained insured under H.M.’s plan until [the end of their relationship.] N.T., 1/3/25, at 292. Later that same month, they began the [administrative] process of [transferring the previously frozen embryos to] Main Line Fertility Center [(“Main Line Fertility”) in Philadelphia, with the intent of the embryos being implanted into C.M.D.] See Exhibit P-11 [(listing C.M.D. as the “patient)]. Unlike the [UC] paperwork, all of the Main Line Fertility paperwork listed both C.M.D. and H.M. as “Patient” or “Partner (if applicable).” Id. Furthermore, H.M. changed the legal control of the embryos to [include both of the parties]. They updated the embryo disposition terms such that in the event of either’s death, the embryos were to be entrusted to the “exclusive control” of the other. See id.; see also Exhibit C. . . . In [the spring of] 2021, H.M. underwent another round of IVF, [which] did not result in any viable embryos. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 141-42. In May 2021, the parties decided to implant one of the two viable embryos into C.M.D., but it did not result in a successful pregnancy. See id. at 142; see also N.T., 12/12/24, at 192. Finally, in October 2021, the other viable embryo was implanted in H.M.[, which] resulted in a successful pregnancy and[,] eventually[,] the birth of Child in July 2022. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 143-44. The [successful] implantation procedure required the consent of both of the parties. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-98; N.T., 12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. During H.M.’s pregnancy, C.M.D. drove H.M. to [her] doctor’s appointments and came in when possible, although she was not always permitted to do so due to COVID restrictions. N.T., 12/12/24, at 196-97. H.M. texted “congratulations” to C.M.D. when Child’s fetal heartbeat was detected. Id. at 197. And the healthcare staff at Main Line Fertility held H.M.’s phone to the ultrasound machine so C.M.D. could listen to the heartbeat. See id. C.M.D. took over a larger household role while H.M. was pregnant. See id. at 198. C.M.D. administered progesterone shots to H.M. in their home. See id. C.M.D. underwent a months[-]long process to induce lactation. See id. at 202-03. When C.M.D. was eventually successful in inducing lactation, H.M. thanked C.M.D. for all she was doing. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 161- 62, 307. During the pregnancy, H.M. gave C.M.D. a Valentine’s Day card that, among other things, said: “Can you believe our little family grows both in love and in numbers?” Id. at 315-16; Exhibit P-40. The parties both scheduled and later took parental -3- J-A08034-26 leave for the birth of Child. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 199, 210. C.M.D.’s church threw a baby shower for the parties. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 304. [The parties also] collaborated on determining Child’s name. See Exhibit P-15. Child was ultimately given four names, two of which drew from C.M.D.’s side of the family and two of which met H.M.’s priorities for simplicity and heritage. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 154-57; N.T., 12/12/24, at 213-15. The parties discussed whether to put C.M.D.’s name on the birth certificate. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 152. They ultimately did not do so because of a belief that they could not legally do so while unmarried. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 152; N.T., 12/19/24, at 220-21. The parties also consulted with an attorney about the possibility of C.M.D. adopting Child, but they ultimately never moved forward with that. See N.T., 3/25/24, at 66-67. When Child was born, C.M.D. was in the birthing room with H.M. and caught Child, cut the umbilical cord, and had skin-to- skin time in the birthing suite. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305; N.T., 12/12/24, at 206. Child drank C.M.D.’s breastmilk in the hospital. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 208. When Child’s bilirubin levels were high, C.M.D. alone took Child to a medical appointment while H.M. was recovering from delivery. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 167. C.M.D. and H.M. took Child together to subsequent appointments. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 167, 397-400. C.M.D. also took on an outsized role in managing the household during H.M.’s recovery. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 320-21; N.T., 12/12/24, at 207-10. Both of the parties breastfed Child, although H.M. did the majority of the breastfeeding. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 307-08; N.T., 12/12/24, at 220-22. Contemporaneously, C.M.D. sent out a birth announcement, including H.M., referencing both C.M.D. and H.M. as parents of Child. See Exhibit P-16. H.M. did not object publicly (to the recipients of the announcement) or privately (to C.M.D.) to C.M.D.’s characterization of both C.M.D. and H.M. as parents or the characterization of Child as “our daughter.” See N.T., 1/3/25, at 396. H.M. sent out a separate announcement to her family (who did not know her sexual orientation) that did not reference C.M.D. See id. at 396. On August 12, 2022, seventeen days after Child was born, H.M. gave C.M.D. a birthday card which contained statements like “baby girl has joined us,” “what an incredible time of parenting, of growing as a family,” “here’s to -4- J-A08034-26 your birthday with [Child],” “you’re an incredible mom,” and “looking forward to our journeys together as a family.” Exhibit P- 36. C.M.D.’s family sent several cards to H.M., C.M.D., and Child[,] which explicitly referred to both H.M. and C.M.D. as mothers to Child and C.M.D.’s parents as Child’s grandparents. See Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-4. H.M. did not object to [these characterizations]. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 32. C.M.D.’s father sent a family heirloom to Child, a shadowbox made from a piece of [his] crib. See Exhibit P-5. H.M. did not suggest that this was odd or that Child was not part of C.M.D.’s family. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 31-32. C.M.D.’s mother visited to see Child and H.M. took “family photos” of C.M.D., C.M.D.’s mother, and Child. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 53-55; Exhibits P-6 and P-7. C.M.D.’s mother retired, partially, so she would be able to spend more time supporting H.M. and C.M.D. by providing care for Child. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 78. H.M. also arranged for a professional photographer to take family photos of the parties and Child. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 443-45; C.M.D.’s Exhibit 14. C.M.D.’s mother referred to C.M.D. as Child’s mother in H.M.’s presence and H.M. did not correct her. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 451-52. The parties collaborated on finding a daycare for Child and ultimately chose a daycare that C.M.D. suggested. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 175; N.T., 12/12/24, at 274. C.M.D. contributed financially for the daycare expenses[,] but H.M. chose not to use the contributions. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 43-44. In December 2022, due to tension in their relationship, C.M.D. moved out of their bedroom and into the guest room. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 111. In May or June 2023, as the relationship continued to deteriorate, C.M.D. moved out of the house and into a “carriage house” immediately adjacent. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 161; N.T., 3/18/24, at 68. C.M.D. continued to see Child “almost daily,” including dropping her off at and picking her up from daycare and usually spending two hours with Child on Thursday evenings. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 114, 177; N.T., 12/19/24, at 224; N.T., 12/12/24, at 159, 226-27. H.M. lived with and cared for Child in H.M.’s and C.M.D.’s house in Philadelphia. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 110. Around February 2024, H.M. moved out of the house with Child. See id. at 116. H.M. refused to disclose to C.M.D. her new address. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 236-37. Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 1-6 (cleaned up). -5- J-A08034-26 C.M.D. initiated these proceedings by filing a custody complaint on March 7, 2024, wherein she requested shared legal and physical custody of Child and asserted that she was Child’s “non-biological parent.” See Complaint for Custody, 3/7/24, at ¶¶ 3, 5. Due to H.M.’s status as a citizen of the United Kingdom, C.M.D. requested the entry of “an order preventing Child from leaving the country until a custody order is issued.” Id. at ¶ 15. The same day, C.M.D. also filed an emergency custody complaint requesting the same relief. See generally Emergency Complaint for Custody, 3/7/24, at ¶¶ 1-15. The case was initially assigned to the Honorable Mark B. Cohen of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“Judge Cohen”). On March 11, 2024, Judge Cohen held the first custody hearing, at which both parties appeared with counsel. See N.T., 3/11/24, at 3-5. Therein, H.M. made an oral motion to dismiss C.M.D.’s complaints based upon her alleged lack of standing to seek custody of Child See N.T., 3/11/24, at 5. C.M.D. maintained her standing was based upon the newly announced paradigm of “parentage by intent” pursuant to Glover v. Junior, 306 A.3d 899 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc), affirmed on appeal, 333 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2025).1 See id. at 11. The same day, Judge Cohen entered an interim custody order precluding H.M. from leaving the Commonwealth. See Order, 3/11/24, at 1. ____________________________________________ 1 At the time C.M.D. made these arguments, this Court’s en banc holding in Glover was on appeal in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. -6- J-A08034-26 On March 18, 2024, H.M. filed formal preliminary objections asserting, inter alia, that C.M.D. lacked standing. See Preliminary Objections, 3/18/24, at ¶¶ 105-57. The same day, H.M. also filed a petition requesting a protracted hearing on the issue of C.M.D.’s standing to seek custody. Also on March 18, 2024, Judge Cohen held a second custody hearing. Therein, C.M.D. expanded upon her initial arguments and asserted that she had standing to seek custody based upon, inter alia, intent and in loco parentis. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 6-9. H.M. responded that paternity by intent was not permitted pursuant to C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018). See id. at 10-14. This hearing was largely focused upon whether or not there was a custody emergency that required immediate action by the trial court. See id. at 16-22. While Judge Cohen had already entered an order prohibiting H.M. from leaving Pennsylvania, C.M.D. claimed that H.M. had also been withholding Child from her. See id. at 16. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cohen filed an order that, inter alia, scheduled a hearing for March 25, 2024, to permit H.M. to present evidence and argument concerning her preliminary objections. See Order, 3/18/24, at 1. On March 25, 2024, the hearing regarding H.M.’s preliminary objections took place as scheduled. The parties each testified and introduced a number of additional documentary exhibits into evidence. Thereafter, the trial court filed a “temporary” order that provided, in pertinent part, as follows: THE EMERGENCY PETITION FILED MARCH 7, 2024 IS HEREBY GRANTED. [C.M.D.] IS FOUND TO BE A PARENT TO THE CHILD -7- J-A08034-26 FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE EMERGENCY PETITION, UNTIL OR UNLESS OTHERWISE DETERMINED AT A FUTURE HEARING. [C.M.D.] SHALL HAVE PARTIAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF [CHILD] STARTING FROM PICK UP FROM THE DAYCARE AT 4:30 P.M. ON MONDAYS AND DROP OFF AT THE DAYCARE ON WEDNESDAY MORNINGS AT 8:30 P.M. UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT. [H.M.]’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCETS ONLY ARE OVERRULED AND ARE OTHERWISE PRESERVED FOR FUTURE HEARINGS. Order, 3/25/24, at 1.2 On March 27, 2024, this case was transferred to the purview of the Honorable Rajinderpal Sandher. See Order, 3/27/24, at 1 (unpaginated). Following Judge Sandher’s appointment, H.M. sought to further litigate the matter of C.M.D.’s standing. Ultimately, Judge Sandher held that he was bound by Judge Cohen’s ruling with respect to H.M.’s preliminary objections pursuant to the rule of coordinate jurisdiction. 3 See Order, 7/15/24, at 1 (unpaginated). Thereafter, the trial court held protracted custody hearings on December 12 and December 19, 2024, and January 3, 2025. In pertinent part, the trial court heard extensive testimony from the parties that largely ____________________________________________ 2 On April 8, 2024, H.M. filed an application requesting that the trial court amend its March 25, 2024 order to permit her to file an immediate interlocutory appeal. See Application to Amend Order, 4/8/24, at 1-22 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.[ § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311). The same day, H.M. also filed a separate application seeking a stay of the proceedings. The parties each submitted substantial materials in support and opposition to these requests. There is no indication that the trial court ever ruled on these applications. 3 H.M. has not challenged this aspect of the court’s holding on appeal. -8- J-A08034-26 pertained to custody issues that are not directly implicated in the instant appeal. On February 18, 2025, the trial court filed an order that awarded the parties shared legal custody of Child. See Order (Part 1), 2/18/25, at 3. The order awarded H.M. primary physical custody while granting C.M.D. partial physical custody “every other weekend” and overnight on Wednesdays. Id. at 4. The order also set forth a number of additional custody parameters that are not relevant to our resolution of this matter. 4 On March 12, 2025, H.M. filed a motion for reconsideration requesting clarification and revisions of various aspects of the trial court’s custody order that did not relate to C.M.D.’s standing.5 On March 19, 2025, the trial court filed an order expressly granting H.M.’s request for reconsideration. See Order, 3/19/25, at 1 (unpaginated). On March 20, 2025, C.M.D. filed an answer and cross-motion for reconsideration. On March 27, 2025, C.M.D. filed a praecipe providing the trial court with a copy of the Supreme Court’s holding in Glover, which had been issued seven days earlier. See Glover, 333 A.3d at 325 (filed on March 20, 2025). ____________________________________________ 4 H.M. has not challenged these custody parameters on appeal. Nonetheless, we note that Judge Sandher issued extensive and well-reasoned findings pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). See Order (Part 2), 2/18/25, at 1-10. 5 On March 12, 2025, H.M. filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) with respect to the trial court’s February 18, 2025 order. Following the trial court’s grant of reconsideration, however, H.M. filed a praecipe seeking to strike the notice of appeal and concise statement of appeal as inoperative. See Praecipe in Custody Matters, 3/31/25, at 1 (unpaginated). -9- J-A08034-26 On August 15, 2025, the trial court filed an order that resolved the outstanding matters raised in the parties’ respective requests for reconsideration. See Order, 8/15/25, at 1. On September 11, 2025, H.M. timely filed a notice of appeal along with a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement. On October 9, 2025, the trial court filed a thoroughly responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 1-35. H.M. has raised the following issues for our consideration: 1. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that C.M.D. had standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under an intent- based analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)? 2. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that C.M.D. had standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under an estoppel analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)? 3. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did C.M.D. have standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under a contract-based analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)? 4. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did C.M.D. have in loco parentis standing to assert a custody claim under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2)? H.M.’s Brief at 9-10 (issues reordered for ease of disposition; cleaned up). Generally, in addressing issues of standing, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Hunt v. Vardaro, 317 A.3d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citing In the Interest of K.N.L., 284 A.3d 121, 132-33 (Pa. 2022)). Where our mandate involves reviewing the factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial court, we will accept them - 10 - J-A08034-26 insofar as they are supported by the record. See K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 132 (cleaned up). In the context of child custody, we are “compelled to perform a comprehensive review of the record for assurance the findings and credibility determinations are competently supported.” Id. at 133 (cleaned up). Our Supreme Court has delineated the basic legal considerations relevant to standing disputes in child custody matters, as follows: The fundamental concept of standing ensures that a party seeking to litigate a matter has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. In the area of child custody, principles of standing have been applied with particular scrupulousness[.] This stringent application of standing principles serves to protect both the interest of the court system by ensuring that actions are litigated by appropriate parties and the interest in keeping a family unit free from intrusion by those that are merely strangers, however well-meaning. . . . The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody and control of their children is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by this Court. Determining standing in custody disputes is a threshold issue that must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the underlying custody action. It is a conceptually distinct legal question which has no bearing on the central issue within the custody action-who is entitled to physical and legal custody of a child in light of his or her best interests. C.G., 193 A.3d at 898 (cleaned up). At the statutory level, the Custody Act (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5322-40, provides that the “parent” of a child is entitled to seek “any form of physical custody or legal custody.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1). There is, however, no statutory definition of who qualifies as a “parent” for these purposes. See generally 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322 (“Definitions”). “‘Absent a definition . . ., statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and - 11 - J-A08034-26 plain everyday sense, and the popular meaning of such words must prevail.’” C.G., 193 A.3d at 900 (quoting Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 658 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1995)). Traditionally, Pennsylvania law has recognized four paths to parentage and seeking custody: (1) biology; (2) adoption; (3) equity or estoppel; and (4) contract. See id. at 906. Of late, however, our statewide jurisprudence has increasingly recognized “the reality of the evolving concept of what comprises a family cannot be overlooked,” particularly in “cases that specifically involve the use of alternative means of conceiving and[/]or reproducing through [ART].” Id. at 900. Indeed, this Court has observed that “changes in social mores and increased individual freedom have created a wide spectrum of arrangements, filling the role of the traditional nuclear family.” J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1320 (Pa. Super. 1996). Until recently, our Supreme Court had declined to adopt “the broad proposition that parentage can be established by intent in situations where a child is born with the aid of [ART].” C.G., 193 A.3d at 905. These considerations culminated in the issuance of Glover, wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court formally endorsed a “fifth pathway to parentage” in a case involving a “same-sex couple” who conceived a child through the use of a sperm donor and ART. Glover, 333 A.3d at 327. Specifically, our Supreme Court held that “parentage may be established by proof of intent shared by two parties to use ART to conceive and co-parent a child together, - 12 - J-A08034-26 even without meeting all the formalities of contract law.” Id. at 356. Glover declined to establish a bright-line rule or create a new presumption: Instead, it is enough to say that courts undertaking an intent- based parentage analysis should consider all evidence from all relevant time periods – including, when applicable, pre- conception, during conception, during gestation, during birth, and post-birth – to determine whether the parties jointly undertook ART intending to conceive and co-parent the child together. Id. at 357. Instantly, the trial court undertook a meticulous review of the evidence adduced by the parties and concluded, inter alia, that Glover applied such that C.M.D. should be deemed Child’s parent due to the evidence concerning the parties’ intent to conceive and co-parent Child together. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 17-26. This aspect of the trial court’s holding is the subject of H.M.’s first claim for relief, wherein she argues that the trial court misapplied Glover. See H.M.’s Brief at 47-69. Specifically, H.M. maintains the trial court failed to give appropriate weight to facts that she claims distinguishes this case from the holding in Glover. See id. Given the factually intensive nature of our inquiry, a close review of the facts in Glover is warranted. That case concerned a married same-sex couple, Chanel Glover and Nicole Junior, who began pursuing conception and mutually entered into a series of contracts with ART-related medical providers between February 2021 and August 2021. See Glover, 333 A.3d at 327-28. The parties collaborated in selecting a sperm donor who resembled Junior. See id. at 327. Junior also shared in the costs of the ART treatments and - 13 - J-A08034-26 “assisted” Glover with medical procedures. Id. Ultimately, the child was conceived in August 2021 utilizing Glover’s egg and the donor sperm. See id. at 328. The parties in Glover executed affidavits indicating their intent to co- parent and Junior attested to her intent to adopt the child. See id. The parties also planned a baby shower together, although it was eventually cancelled. See id. at 329. The parties’ relationship quickly deteriorated, which led to Glover filing a complaint in divorce in April 2022, while still pregnant. See id. Junior filed a petition for special relief for pre-birth establishment of parentage and an emergency petition seeking the same relief. See id. Ultimately, the family court filed an order granting her relief, which “confirmed” Junior as a legal parent under a contractual theory. Id. Glover appealed. This Court initially reversed but subsequently granted Junior’s application for en banc review and held that Junior had “established parentage by three alternative means: (1) a contract-based right; (2) equitable estoppel; and (3) intent-based parentage.” Id. at 335-36 (citing Glover v. Junior, 306 A.3d 899, 913-19 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc)). Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal, adopted the theory of intent- based parentage under Pennsylvania law, and affirmed on that basis alone. See id. at 357. In holding that Junior was a legal parent based upon the parties’ shared intent, the Supreme Court emphasized the following: [T]he record here is replete with evidence to support the lower courts’ holdings the parties mutually intended to bring [the child] into the world and raise him together, and that Junior participated in that process. Among other things, Glover and Junior jointly - 14 - J-A08034-26 entered into multiple contracts pertaining to the conception and birth of [the child], and Junior was even listed as a “Co-Intended Parent” [on one such contract]. Junior played an active role in selecting the sperm donor, and the couple chose a donor based on his similarities to Junior. Junior shared equally in the costs of conceiving [the child] and assisted Glover with the IVF process by administering injections and attending doctors’ appointments. They planned a baby shower together and picked out a name for the baby. But perhaps most cogently, both Glover and Junior signed affidavits stating their intentions plainly.[6] Id. In pertinent part, H.M.’s arguments highlight several factual differences between the instant circumstances and those in Glover, including: (1) the absence of affidavits attesting to the parties’ intent; (2) the fact that H.M. and C.M.D. were not married; (3) C.M.D. did not directly participate in the selection of the sperm donor; (4) C.M.D. did not contribute to the costs associated with the ART treatments; (5) C.M.D. was not identified as a co- parent during H.M.’s initial treatments through UC; (6) H.M. “never agreed” to C.M.D. adopting Child; and (7) the parties’ conduct following Child’s birth indicates a lack of shared intent. See H.M.’s Brief at 53-67. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged that there are some factual distinctions between this case and Glover. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 25-26. Nonetheless, the court concluded that “the facts weighing against intent are not only overcome, but overwhelmed, by the facts ____________________________________________ 6 As discussed further infra, however, our Supreme Court clarified that its holding in Glover did not “require” couples in “similar circumstances to document their intentions in writing.” Glover, 333 A.3d at 357. - 15 - J-A08034-26 indicating intent to co-parent” in this case. Id. The court detailed its findings, with extensive and accurate citations to the certified record, as follows: 1. Legal Rights Over the Embryos [I]t is important to see the evolution of H.M.’s and C.M.D.’s relationship during H.M.’s “fertilization journey.” H.M. first began her “fertilization journey” by herself by purchasing sperm without telling C.M.D. around the time of their first break-up. N.T., 1/3/25, at 129. If that were when she had become impregnated, it would be clear she had no intent for C.M.D. to be the other parent. But H.M. did nothing with the sperm until after C.M.D. and H.M. got back together and began living together. After their reconciliation, H.M. went through an egg retrieval procedure. She then used the sperm to create fertilized embryos. C.M.D. testified (and H.M. never contradicted her testimony) that H.M. first offered to return the sperm and allow C.M.D. to be involved in the selection of the sperm donor but C.M.D. was content with the sperm donor H.M. had previously chosen. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 219-20. The fertilization resulted in two viable embryos, which were kept frozen at [UC]. H.M. alone had legal control over the embryos and H.M.’s sister was named the beneficiary of the embryos in the event of H.M.’s death. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 136-37. H.M. then attempted to get pregnant via IUI, not IVF, instead saving her viable embryos for a potential future child. At this time, C.M.D. was heavily involved in planning to have a child and in accompanying H.M. to appointments. [See N.T., 12/19/24, at 28, 217.] C.M.D. and H.M. were also looking for a home to purchase together in Philadelphia. [See N.T., 12/12/24, at 172; N.T., 3/25/24, at 31-32.] However, H.M.’s name, alone, was on all of the fertilization paperwork at [UC]. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 135-36. H.M. did successfully become pregnant via IUI and she celebrated with C.M.D. and C.M.D. even informed her family that they were expecting a child. . . . However, this pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage[,] and the parties buried the remains together. [See N.T., 12/12/24, at 176.] After the parties moved to Philadelphia, though, H.M. transferred her frozen embryos from [UC] to [Main Line Fertility]. Importantly, upon doing so, H.M. changed the legal status of the - 16 - J-A08034-26 embryos. They were no longer under her control alone but under both C.M.D.’s and H.M.’s legal control. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294- 98; N.T., 12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. And in the event of either’s death, the embryos would pass to the other. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 188-89; Exhibit P-11. Only in the event of the parties’ simultaneous death would the embryos pass to H.M.’s sister. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 189. This change of legal control over the embryos is a clear manifestation of intent that the embryos and any potential children would be the children of both C.M.D. and H.M. And, in fact, when the second embryo was thawed and implanted into H.M. before becoming Child, both H.M. and C.M.D. had to consent to that procedure. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-98; N.T., 12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. This [c]ourt found it highly improbable that H.M. would cede such ownership and control over her embryos to C.M.D., especially requiring C.M.D.’s consent to implant an embryo into H.M., unless she intended C.M.D. to be her co-parent. 2. Implantation of an Embryo into C.M.D. Before the embryo that became Child was implanted into H.M., the other of the two viable embryos was implanted into C.M.D. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 142; N.T., 12/12/24, at 192. H.M. argues that C.M.D. was merely her girlfriend, or a trusted support person, not a co-parent. See N.T., 3/25/24, at 140-41. And she tried to explain away the implantation of one of her two viable embryos into C.M.D. as a decision that she succumbed to because of C.M.D.’s nagging. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 142-43. H.M. further testified that she thought of this action as giving away an embryo and that she never would have considered the resulting child (had there been one) to be her child. See id. at 143. This [c]ourt found it incredibly unlikely that someone would give up an embryo she had worked so hard for and when she had so few due to mere nagging. This unlikelihood is exacerbated by the fact that H.M. repeatedly testified as to her desire to have full biological siblings. See id. at 132, 137. Given the failure of IUI to this point, these two embryos were potentially the only opportunities to create H.M.’s own biological children. . . . This [c]ourt did not find H.M.’s testimony credible on this matter. 3. C.M.D. Breastfed Child - 17 - J-A08034-26 Early in H.M.’s pregnancy with Child, C.M.D. began a lengthy process to induce her own lactation due to the biological difficulty of doing so without becoming pregnant. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 202-03. C.M.D. scheduled consultations with a lactation specialist and H.M. accompanied her to at least one of these consultations. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305. C.M.D. took various hormones for months to induce lactation and when she eventually produced colostrum, H.M. photographed the occasion and thanked C.M.D. for all she was doing. See id. at 307. H.M. testified that she never expressed any reservations to C.M.D. about C.M.D.’s clear intent to breastfeed Child. See id. at 162, 428. And Child first drank C.M.D.’s breastmilk in the birthing suite immediately after the birth. And C.M.D. continued to breastfeed for the first six months of Child’s life, albeit in a limited capacity because H.M. had ample breastmilk and it would cause H.M. pain if Child did not drink it. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 162-63; N.T., 3/25/24, at 59. H.M. testified that she in no way endorsed or encouraged C.M.D. to breastfeed and that H.M. was simply doing her own thing while C.M.D. did hers. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 161-62. This court, again, found this testimony not credible. H.M. had countless opportunities to address the matter and it is not typical for mere friends and support people (non-parents) to breastfeed other’s children, let alone to put months of preparation into being able to do so. And this court found it highly unlikely that H.M. would not say anything while watching C.M.D. put in this sort of effort to prepare to breastfeed H.M.’s child unless it was also intended to be C.M.D.’s child. 4. H.M. Referred to C.M.D. as Child’s Mother H.M. explicitly called C.M.D. Child’s mother on multiple occasions, both to C.M.D., herself, and to strangers. On C.M.D.’s birthday, seventeen days after Child was born, H.M. gave C.M.D. a birthday cared which included the statements: “baby girl has joined us,” “what an incredible time of parenting, of growing as a family,” “here’s to your first birthday with [Child],” “you’re an incredible mom,” and “looking forward to our journeys together as a family.” Exhibit P-36. [I]t also contained an outline of Child’s hand surrounded by the words: “a new precious hand to hold and to love and to care for.” Id. H.M. also sent C.M.