Full Opinion

J-A17024-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 CYNTHIA L. SHERMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAVE BUTLER : : Appellant : No. 3309 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Order Entered July 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 2942 CV 2025, 364 DR 2025, PACSES: 322303263 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2026 Appellant Jave Butler appeals pro se from the July 31, 2025 order denying his challenges to the registration and enforcement in Monroe County of a child support order in favor of Appellee Cynthia L. Sherman entered in the State of New Jersey. On appeal, Appellant challenges whether the trial court had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the New Jersey child support order. We affirm. The trial court set forth the following procedural history: By way of background, this matter involves a child support action that originated in the State of New Jersey, and more recently, a child support order from such action that was transferred to this Commonwealth for registration and enforcement in Monroe County. Shortly after such registration, on May 27, 2025, Appellant filed an objection to registration of foreign order, in which he stated his objection to the cited registration for the following reasons: (a) lack of jurisdiction; and (b) Title IV-D fraud. [The trial] court held a hearing concerning such objections on July J-A17024-26 31, 2025, which was attended by Appellant, who appeared pro se. The solicitor for the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section, James P. McGregor, Esquire, also appeared at the time of such hearing. At the conclusion of such hearing, [the trial] court entered the underlying order dated July 31, 2025, dismissing the objections of Appellant. [] Appellant filed the instant appeal to the Superior Court. Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/26, at 1-2 (some formatting altered). The trial court issued an order dated January 13, 2026 directing Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 10, 2026, the trial court noted that Appellant failed to comply and that same day, filed a statement requesting that this Court dismiss Appellant’s appeal and affirm the trial court’s July 31, 2025 order. See Trial Ct. Stmt., 2/10/26. On February 21, 2026, Appellant filed an application for relief with this Court in which he requested that this Court accept his Rule 1925(b) statement. This Court, on February 27, 2026, entered an order granting his requested relief as it related to his Rule 1925(b) statement,1 finding that the trial court’s order dated January 13, 2026 was never entered. See Order, 2/27/26 at 1-2. This Court remanded the record for the trial court to review Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and to file an opinion addressing the issues raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement. See id. at 2. The trial court filed a revised Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 31, 2026. ____________________________________________ 1 In its February 27, 2026 order, this Court denied several of Appellant’s other requests for relief, including a request to stay the trial court’s July 31, 2025 order pending appeal and a request that the trial court judge, Hon. C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., recuse himself. See Order, 2/27/26. -2- J-A17024-26 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice without first resolving challenges to subject matter jurisdiction? 2. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the alleged Title IV-D enforcement matter absent a valid application or judicial determination? 3. Whether Appellant was denied due process where no full and fair evidentiary hearing was conducted? 4. Whether the trial court erred in preventing Appellant from presenting evidence of fraud upon the court? 5. Whether dismissal with prejudice was improper where jurisdictional and constitutional issues remained unresolved? 6. Whether enforcement of the support order during an active jurisdictional challenge constituted unlawful enforcement of a potentially void order? 7. Whether the absence or omission of transcripts from the July 31, 2025 proceeding deprived Appellant of meaningful appellate review? 8. Whether the trial court improperly ratified executive enforcement actions in violation of separation-of-powers principles? 9. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a ruling unsupported by the record? Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. -3- J-A17024-26 In his first issue, Appellant raises challenges to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 10. Specifically, Appellant makes the following argument: “Here, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s petition without resolving jurisdiction. This alone requires reversal.” Id. In support of his argument, Appellant cites to two decisions from our Supreme Court stating that a court “must determine jurisdiction as a threshold issue before proceeding[,]” and “[a] judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void.” Id. (purportedly quoting In re Melograne, 888 A.2d 753 (Pa. 2005), and Commonwealth v. Little, 455 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1983)2). Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s argument is confined to four sentences summarily stating that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant provides no other discussion of relevant authority nor citations to the certified record. Failure to develop an argument in an appellate brief is grounds for waiver. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted and formatting altered); see also Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that “arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived” (citation ____________________________________________ 2 We note that while Appellant’s citation to Melograne is an accurate citation to that case in the Atlantic Reporter, our review did not reveal the purported quoted material anywhere within the decision. Appellant’s purported citation to Little at page 119 of Volume 455 of the Second Edition of the Atlantic reporter leads us to a decision of this Court captioned Dietrich Indus., Inc. v. Abrams, 455 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 1982). We, therefore, conclude that Appellant’s citations are hallucinated citations. See Kaspryak v. Stadarskyy, ---A.3d---, 2026 WL 2417124 at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 19, 2026). -4- J-A17024-26 omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (providing that the argument section of an appellate brief shall contain discussion of the issues raised therein and citations to pertinent legal authorities and references to the record). A challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however, cannot be waived. Turner v. Estate of Baird, 270 A.3d 556, 560 (Pa. Super. 2022). “The want of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be questioned at any time[,]” including for the first time on appellate review, “and it is fatal at any stage of the proceedings, even when collaterally involved[.]” Id. (quoting Strasburg Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail Rd., Inc., 210 A.3d 1064, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2019). Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s first issue. A challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, and our review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 211 (Pa. 2007). In the context of enforcing child support orders originating from other jurisdictions, this Court has explained: Under Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, each state must give full faith and credit to the . . . judicial proceedings of every other state. This mandate, however, applies only to final orders; therefore, Pennsylvania courts have held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to modifiable child support orders. Pennsylvania, in conjunction with other states, adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, (UIFSA), 23 Pa.C.S. § 7101 et seq., to provide for the interstate enforcement of modifiable support obligations. [The UIFSA] provides a registration process, which requires that certain documents be sent to the appropriate tribunal in the receiving state. 23 Pa.C.S. § 7601-02. Once registered in the Commonwealth, a foreign order may be enforced as if it had been issued here. 23 Pa.C.S. § 7603. Further, [] UIFSA requires that the nonregistering party receive notice of registration, and -5- J-A17024-26 provides a procedure through which the validity or enforcement of the registered order may be contested. 23 Pa.C.S. § 7605-06. [UIFSA] also restricts the circumstances under which Pennsylvania may modify a registered foreign support order. [See] 23 Pa.C.S. § 7610. Clark v. Clark, 714 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quotation marks, footnotes and some citations omitted). Section 7610 of UIFSA states: A [Pennsylvania court] may enforce a child support order of another state registered for purposes of modification in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this [Commonwealth], but the registered support order may be modified only if the requirements of section 7611 (relating to modification of child support order of another state) or 7613 (relating to jurisdiction to modify child support order of another state when individual parties reside in [Pennsylvania]) have been met. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 7610. Cochrane v. Tselekis, 342 A.3d 17, 20-21 (Pa. Super. 2025), appeal denied, 352 A.3d 941 (Pa. 2026). Here, the trial court concluded: [T]he evidence produced at the hearing on July 31, 2025, clearly showed that an out of state child support [o]rder from New Jersey in Appellant’s county of residence. Further, [the trial] court was addressing Appellant’s objections to the validity and enforcement at the time of the cited hearing. Accordingly, it is submitted this issue raised by Appellant is without merit. Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/26, at 3. Our review of the record reflects that on May 5, 2025, a child support order entered by the Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of New Jersey dated November 23, 2018, was registered with the Court of Common -6- J-A17024-26 Pleas of Monroe County Domestic Relations Section (DRS). See New Jersey Support Order, 11/23/18 rec’d by Monroe County Domestic Relations, 5/5/25. See also Aff. of Personal Service, 5/5/25 (indicating that Appellant refused to sign for personal service). The record reflects that an order was entered by the State of New Jersey and was registered with the trial court’s Domestic Relations Section; therefore, pursuant to the UIFSA, the New Jersey order may be enforced in this Commonwealth as if it were originally entered by a Pennsylvania court. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 7601-7603. Further, the record reflects that Appellant was provided proper notice of the registration of the New Jersey order with the Monroe County DRS. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 7605- 7606. Accordingly, as the New Jersey child support order was registered with the Monroe County DRS prior to Appellee’s enforcement action, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of the support order. Appellant, therefore, is not entitled to relief. In his remaining eight issues, Appellant provides minimal argument in support of his claims. While Appellant includes reference to case law throughout his brief, he does not provide any argument as to how the cited case law applies to his case, nor does he provide any citations to the certified record. See generally Appellant’s Brief at 11-15. As stated generally above: “[W]here an appellant fails to properly raise or develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, [this Court] will not consider the merits of the claims raised on appeal.” Lynch v. Zwecharowski, 1041 EDA 2021, 2022 WL 1836263 at *3 (Pa. Super. [filed June 3,] -7- J-A17024-26 2022) (unpublished mem.) (citation omitted); see also Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 945 (Pa. Super. 2000) (finding waiver where the appellant “failed to cogently explain . . . why the trial court abused its discretion or made an error of law”). “Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to the[ rules of appellate procedure] may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention.” Lackner[, 892 A.2d at 29-30] (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)- (c). Saber v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 350 A.3d 965, 969 (Pa. Super. 2026). See also M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66. Similar to the appellant in Saber, while Appellant’s brief in the instant appeal includes citations to actual authority, “he fails to reference the place in the record where the matter referred to appears, that is, to relate the cited authority to the questions to be argued.” Saber, 350 A.3d at 970 (formatting altered) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c)). Accordingly, we find that Appellant’s remaining issues are waived on appeal. See id.; see also M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66. Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 11/10/2026 -8-