Uriarte v. Matrai CA1/4

Filed 10/20/26 Uriarte v. Matrai CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR MICHELE URIARTE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A168443 v. GYORGY MATRAI, (Contra Costa County Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. MSD19-02312) Gyorgy Matrai, who is representing himself in a marital dissolution action with his former spouse, Michele Uriarte, appeals an order entered by the trial court on May 22, 2023, granting Uriarte’s request for a charging order pursuant to Corporations Code section 17705.03, subdivision (a). He contends the order must be vacated because (1) the court lacked “jurisdiction” to issue a charging order in family court proceedings; (2) Uriarte failed to substantiate her request; and (3) he was not served with notice of the May 22 hearing. Uriarte did not file a respondent’s brief or any other documents in the appeal, so we decide the appeal based on Matrai’s opening brief and the record he supplied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) We conclude that Matrai has failed to establish any error in the trial court’s May 22 order and therefore affirm.  BACKGROUND On March 13, 2023, Uriarte filed a request for charging order pursuant to Corporations Code section 17705.03, subdivision (a), directing Goodwood Properties, LLC to “pay over to Petitioner any distribution that would otherwise be paid to GYORGY MATRAI.” In her declaration attached to the request, Uriarte states that Matrai owes her more than $1 million in unpaid child and spousal support, attorney fees, and sanctions under final orders entered by the court between October 2019 and September 2022. The declaration further states that the court has good cause to enter the charging order because “[n]ot only has GYORGY MATRAI refused to pay any court ordered amounts, the LLC is the only asset this court has been able to attach to these proceedings. As such, without the charging order the petitioner is unlikely to recover any funds.” A hearing on the request was noticed for May 22, 2023. Uriarte’s request was granted following the hearing.1 DISCUSSION This action has been pending since May 2019. In that time, Matrai has filed multiple appeals challenging various orders issued in the same underlying action. He has been advised repeatedly that the filing of appellate briefs not supported by citations to a proper record and appropriate authority can preclude meaningful appellate review. (Uriarte v. Matrai (Mar. 25, 2024, A165401) [nonpub. opn.] 2024 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 1885 at *2; Uriarte v. Matrai (June 1, 2023, A166135, A166232) [nonpub. opn.] 2023 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 3178 at *4.) Matrai has once again failed to 1 The hearing was unreported. Matrai has not included a settled statement of the hearing in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) Matrai’s request for judicial notice filed on September 6, 2023 is denied. Matrai’s motion fails to demonstrate the relevance of any of the documents to the pending appeal. 2 heed these warnings. His brief repeatedly asserts error without citations to the record or to any case law. Based on the limited record before us, we reject his arguments. Matrai fails to cite any authority for the proposition that a charging order is unavailable to enforce a judgment or order entered in family court proceedings. Family Code section 290 authorizes the court to enforce a judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code “by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary.” (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 680.230 [“ ‘Judgment’ means a judgment, order, or decree entered in a court of this state”].) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 708.310, “[i]f a money judgment is rendered against a partner or member but not against the partnership or limited liability company, the judgment debtor’s interest in the partnership or limited liability company may be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment by an order charging the judgment debtor’s interest pursuant to Section . . . 17705.03 of the Corporations Code.” Section 17705.03, subdivision (a), states, “On application by a judgment creditor of a member or transferee, a court may enter a charging order against the transferable interest of the judgment debtor for the unsatisfied amount of the judgment. A charging order constitutes a lien on a judgment debtor’s transferable interest and requires the limited liability company to pay over to the person to which the charging order was issued any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor.” (See also Baum v. Baum (1959) 51 Cal.2d 610, 612–613 [charging order was proper mechanism in divorce proceeding for one spouse to enforce judgment against other spouse’s partnership interest].) 3  The record provided by Matrai does not support his assertion that he was not given notice of the May 22 hearing. In a prior appeal, Matrai also asserted that an order must be reversed because he was not given notice of the hearing. We rejected that argument. We noted that the register of actions showed that several proofs of service were filed at the same time as the motions and subsequent orders to continue the hearing. We explained that, “[b]ecause Matrai did not include any of these documents in the record, he has forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of the notice as to these motions. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574, 224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624 [appellant ‘has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record’].)” (Uriarte v. Matrai (Mar. 25, 2024, A165401) [nonpub. opn.] 2024 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 1885 at *4.) Once again, the register of actions shows that a proof of service was filed on the same day as Uriarte’s request for charging order, but that proof of service has not been included in the clerk’s transcript. Accordingly, this argument has been forfeited. We reject Matrai’s argument that the charging order is unsubstantiated. First, Matrai’s opening brief fails to comply with rule 8.204 of the California Rules of Court, which requires that an appellant’s opening brief “provide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” (Id., rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [“appellants who challenge the decision of the trial court based upon the absence of substantial evidence to support it ‘ “ are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed waived” ’ ”].) Second, and in any event, Uriarte’s declaration submitted with her request was sufficient to support issuance of the charging order. (See Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, LLP v. Fotouhi (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1132, 4 1138–1139 [on appeal of order granting charging order, appellate court reviews the superior court’s determination of disputed factual issues for substantial evidence].) The enforceability of the unsatisfied orders referenced in the request or the amounts thereof are not properly before this court. None of the other conclusory assertions in Matrai’s brief otherwise establish any error. DISPOSITION The order granting Uriarte’s request for charging order is affirmed. GOLDMAN, J. WE CONCUR: BROWN, Acting P. J. GORDON, J.* * Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 5