Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 1 of 35 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14109 ____________________ BUILDING RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE & DEVELOPING GREATER EQUITY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ACTING DIRECTOR, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-01367-TPB-NHA ____________________ USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 2 of 35 2 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 ____________________ No. 26-10508 ____________________ BUILDING RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE & DEVELOPING GREATER EQUITY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ACTING DIRECTOR, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-01367-TPB-NHA ____________________ Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge: These consolidated appeals require us to decide whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau exceeded its statutory au- thority, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or violated the Tenth Amendment when it regulated certain home-improvement loans offered by local governments. For many years, the Bureau ex- cluded tax assessments and liens from the definition of credit under USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 3 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 3 the Truth in Lending Act. After local governments began offering residents home-improvement loans, which the residents repay with their property taxes, and Congress directed the Bureau to reg- ulate the loans, the Bureau promulgated a rule treating the loans as consumer credit transactions. Building Resilient Infrastructure & Developing Greater Equity, Inc., sued to challenge the regulation. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to stop enforcing the rule and later granted summary judgment in favor of the Bu- reau. Because the loans are consumer credit transactions, the Bu- reau reasonably relied on available data in crafting its rule, and the loans are not an exercise of state taxing authority, we affirm the summary judgment and dismiss the appeal of the denial of the pre- liminary injunction as moot. I. BACKGROUND We divide the background of these appeals into three parts. First, we describe the residential home-improvement loans that lo- cal governments offer. Then, we describe the federal regulation of lending and the rule promulgated by the Bureau. Finally, we re- count this litigation. A. Residential Home-Improvement Financing Programs Property Assessed Clean Energy loans provide “financing to cover the costs of home improvements that results in a tax assess- ment on the real property of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(i). The home improvements “promote energy ef- ficiency” and “help prepare for natural disasters.” Residential Prop- erty Assessed Clean Energy Financing (Regulation Z), 90 Fed. Reg. USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 4 of 35 4 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 2434, 2434–35 (Jan. 10, 2025) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). Examples include installation of solar panels, impact windows, im- pact doors, and energy-efficient roofs. To fund the improvements, homeowners and local governments enter “voluntary financing agreements,” through which the local government covers the cost of the improvements and then collects repayment with interest “through the same process as real property taxes.” Id. at 2435, 2449. The lenders may be municipalities or “intergovernmental organi- zations whose membership consists of multiple local govern- ments.” Id. at 2435 n.3. The loans range from five-year terms to thirty-year terms, but “most often” have twenty-year terms. Id. at 2435. And the loans have “relatively high interest rates compared to primary mortgages.” SIOBHAN MCALISTER & RYAN SANDLER, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE) FINANCING AND CONSUMER FINANCIAL OUTCOMES 13 (2023) [hereinafter PACE REPORT]. To secure the loans, local governments obtain liens on im- proved properties. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2435. The liens ordinarily enjoy a priority status superior even to earlier mortgages on the properties. Id. As a result, if an encumbered property is sold at a foreclosure or tax sale, the proceeds first settle outstanding debt from the home-improvement loan. Id. at 2435–36. And the loan re- payment obligations are “tied to the property, not the property owner,” so the loan “technically remains with the property” through ownership transfers. Id. But “most home buyers are un- willing to take on the remaining payment obligation for [these loans], or their mortgage lender prohibits them from doing so.” Id. USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 5 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 5 at 2436. The federal entities that purchase residential mortgages to increase lenders’ funds refuse to purchase mortgages for properties encumbered by these first-priority loans. Id. at n.20; see FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 758 (2026); FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAMILY, Refinancing and Energy Retrofit Pro- grams, https://perma.cc/7C6A-UJJ9; see also Montgomery Cnty. Comm’n v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 776 F.3d 1247, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing these entities). And the Federal Housing Admin- istration does not insure mortgages on the encumbered properties. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2436 n.20; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Handbook 4000.1: FHA Single Family Policy Handbook 169 (2026). So the homeowners must ordinarily satisfy the loans before they can sell the encumbered properties. See Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2436. At least nineteen states and the District of Columbia have enabling legislation for these loans, but only a few states, including California, Florida, and Missouri, have implemented programs, which vary by state. See id. at 2435. At least some of the states with enabling legislation declined to create statewide programs and chose instead to let each county and municipality opt in through appropriate local action. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.081(1)(a); CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.20(a)(2). In some states, counties and municipalities may impose requirements on the loans beyond what state law requires. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.081(1)(a). And at least two states regulate the loans. See, e.g., id. § 163.081(4)(a)(1)–(4) (re- quiring written disclosures of the estimated amount to be financed, the term of the financing agreement, the interest charged, and the USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 6 of 35 6 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 estimated annual percentage rate); CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5898.16 (imposing a right to cancel and a maximum financing- to-property-value ratio), 5898.17 (requiring disclosures). Most participating governments enlist private companies to market and sell the loans, “make underwriting and eligibility deter- minations,” and manage the programs. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2435. These companies “often rely heavily on home[-]improve- ment contractors” that market the loans while selling their services door-to-door. Id. These contractors are often “the primary point of contact” with homeowners deciding whether to seek a loan. Id. Sometimes companies purchase bonds from the local govern- ments, which fund the programs. Id. But some local governments run the programs without the aid of private companies. Id. B. Federal Regulation of the Home-Improvement Financing Programs The home-improvement financing programs arose against a backdrop of longstanding federal regulation. For example, Con- gress passed the Truth in Lending Act to promote “[t]he informed use of credit . . . by consumers” in consumer credit transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The Act requires creditors to make certain disclo- sures to debtors when lending credit, grants debtors rights to re- scind agreements, and sets minimum standards for residential mortgage loans. See id. §§ 1631(a), 1635(a), 1639(a), 1639c. It defines “credit” as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer pay- ment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” Id. § 1602(f). And it imposes requirements on “consumer” credit transactions, USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 7 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 7 defined as transactions “in which the party to whom credit is of- fered or extended is a natural person” and the credit offered is “pri- marily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 1602(i). For many years, the Act did not apply to this category of home-improvement loans. When Congress passed the Act, it “del- egated expansive authority to the Federal Reserve Board . . . to en- act appropriate regulations” to implement the Act. Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 235 (2004). Under that authority, the Board interpreted the meaning of “credit” to exempt certain transactions. In a public staff letter, the Board explained that credit “necessarily assumes the right to avoid incurring debt” because “the debt must arise from a contractual relationship, voluntarily entered into, between the debtor and creditor.” “Tax liens” and “tax assessments” could not be credit because they “do not involve the voluntary incurring of debt” or “do not involve the right to de- fer a debt.” Truth in Lending; Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20848, 20851 (Apr. 7, 1981). The Board then issued “official staff commentary to Regulation Z,” the implementing regulation, to confirm the exclusion for tax liens and assessments. See Truth in Lending; Official Staff Commentary, 46 Fed. Reg. 50288, 50288, 50292 (Oct. 9, 1981); 12 C.F.R. § 226 supp. I § 226.2 cmt. 2(a)(14)(1)(ii) (2025). Because of this commentary, some courts concluded that the loans were not subject to the Act. See, e.g., In re Hero Loan Litig., No. CV 1602478, 2017 WL 3038250, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2017) (relying on the staff commentary as an “[i]nde- pendently dispositive” reason for holding that the loans could not be credit under the Act). The only limits on the loans were state USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 8 of 35 8 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 and local regulations and “voluntary consumer protection policy principles.” Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2438. Congress later amended the Truth in Lending Act in the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits creditors from extending residen- tial mortgage loans until the creditor ensures, through “verified and documented information,” that “the consumer has a reasona- ble ability to repay the loan.” See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1)). The implementing regulations require creditors to consider eight un- derwriting factors. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2) (2025). Creditors that violate these underwriting requirements may be civilly liable to consumers under the Truth in Lending Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). The Dodd-Frank Act also created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and transferred to it the authority to promulgate and enforce regulations to implement the Truth in Lending Act. See §§ 1021–22, 124 Stat. 1979–85 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511, 5512); see 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(O), (14). A year later, the Bureau adopted the official commentary of the Federal Reserve Board, “pending further [Bureau] action.” Identification of Enforceable Rules and Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 43569, 43570 (July 21, 2011). The Bureau republished Regulation Z and its official commentary in an interim final rule, which kept the exception for tax assessments and liens. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 79918 (Dec. 22, 2011). USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 9 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 9 In 2018, Congress again amended the Truth in Lending Act—this time to subject the home-improvement loans to federal regulation. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 307, 132 Stat. 1296, 1347 (2018) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)). In section 307 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed the Bureau to “prescribe regulations that carry out the purposes” and apply two provisions of the Truth in Lending Act “with respect to” the loans: (1) the ability-to-repay provision and (2) the civil-liability provision. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii)); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639c(a), 1640. Con- gress mandated that the regulations “account for the unique na- ture” of these municipal programs. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii). And Congress authorized the Bureau to “collect such information and data that the Bureau determines is necessary” to prescribe the regulations. Id. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(iii)(I). The Bureau issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and so- licited information about the loans. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Residential Property Assessed Clean Energy Fi- nancing, 84 Fed. Reg. 8479 (Mar. 8, 2019). It also solicited opinions on whether other provisions of the Act or Regulation Z should ap- ply to the loans. Id. at 8482. The next year, the Bureau requested data from companies that facilitate the loans. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2440. A national consumer reporting agency also provided credit data for municipal-program loan applicants and participants. Id. In total, the Bureau received data about 370,000 program appli- cations submitted to Florida and California from 2014 to 2019. Id. USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 10 of 35 10 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 Of those applications, 128,000 led to transaction originations. Id. The Bureau also received credit data for about 208,000 of those consumers that accounted for 286,000 applications and 100,000 transactions. Id. With this data, the Bureau reviewed the impact of the mu- nicipal-program loans on mortgage delinquency. Id. Its PACE Re- port compared municipal-program loan participants to applicants who were approved for the municipal-program loans but never completed the loan transactions. Id. (citing PACE REPORT, supra) The Bureau found that the loans “led to an increase in negative credit outcomes.” Id. The Report found that before receiving such a loan, the average rate of mortgage delinquency was 7.1 percent, and for loan participants, that rate was 2.5 percentage points higher. Id. at 2470 (citing PACE REPORT, supra, at 26–27). The Re- port explained that the loans increased the probability of mortgage delinquency by 35 percent. Id. (citing PACE REPORT, supra, at 27). Finally, the Bureau found that California reforms “improved con- sumer outcomes while substantially reducing the volume of [pro- gram] lending.” Id. at 2441. Based on its findings, the Bureau issued a final rule, which it published in early 2025 to take effect on March 1, 2026. Id. at 2434. The Rule clarifies that the exception to the credit definition applies only to involuntary tax liens and assessments, not to voluntary loan terms. Id. at 2443, 2546. So loans that had long been exempt from the Act are now subject to regulation as credit. See id. at 2443, 2502. The Bureau explained that the tax exception was always meant to USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 11 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 11 cover only involuntary taxes, even though the exception had been taken out of context and caused confusion. Id. at 2448. It explained that the loans “easily fit” the definition of credit because “[c]on- sumers voluntarily incur these financial obligations and are signa- tories to the financing agreements.” Id. at 2447. This clarification meant that provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act would also apply to the loans because some of its provisions are integrated into the Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 2452–55; 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b); see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.19(e), (f), 1026.37, 1026.38 (2025). These provisions require creditors to give disclosures to consumers and mandate a waiting period between the disclosures and final consummation of a loan. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2452, 2454–55, 2502; see 12 C.F.R. § 1026.19(e), (f)(1)(ii) (2025). The Rule also subjects these loans to the requirements of the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act, which places obliga- tions on “loan originators,” including licensing and training re- quirements. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2495–96; 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(f) (2025) (requiring loan originators to comply with the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 and its implementing regulations); see generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 5103, 5104. The Rule applies the ability-to-repay and civil-liability provi- sions to the loans. The Bureau acknowledged that the loans “can result in a sharp increase in the consumer’s escrow payments,” so the Rule requires creditors to consider the timing and amount of these escrow payments when evaluating an applicant’s ability to USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 12 of 35 12 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 pay. Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2467, 2503. The Bureau also rec- ognized the extensive use of private companies to administer these loans. Id. at 2473. And because local governments are immune from liability under the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1612(b), the Rule extends civil liability to the private companies “substantially involved” in making the underwriting decision for the loans, Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2473, 2503. The Bureau concluded that private com- panies must be liable for unlawful activities if loan participants are to have any recourse, as Congress intended. Id. at 2473. C. Litigation Several months after the Bureau issued the Rule, Building Resilient Infrastructure & Developing Greater Equity, Inc., filed this action. Building Resilient is a trade organization that advocates on behalf of the companies involved in this type of home-improve- ment loan. On behalf of itself and the industry for this type of home-improvement loan, Building Resilient challenged the Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act on four grounds: (1) the Rule was not submitted to a small business review panel as re- quired, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D); (2) the Rule exceeds the Bureau’s statutory authority under section 307, see id. § 706(2)(C); (3) the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, see id. § 706(2)(A); and (4) the Rule abridges the states’ taxing authority and commandeers the states to enforce a federal program in violation of the Tenth Amendment, see id. § 706(2)(B). USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 13 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 13 Building Resilient moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied. Building Resilient filed an interloc- utory appeal of the denial. The parties also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau. Building Resilient appealed. We consolidated the ap- peals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review de novo a summary judgment.” Green Rock LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., 104 F.4th 220, 225 (11th Cir. 2024). “De novo review of a summary judgment [about] agency action is, in effect, a direct review of the agency’s decision.” Id. at 226 (citation modi- fied). III. DISCUSSION We divide this discussion into three parts. First, we explain that the Bureau properly exercised its rulemaking authority and that the Rule is consistent with section 307. Second, we explain that the Rule is not arbitrary and capricious because the Bureau reason- ably relied on available data. Finally, we explain that the Rule does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it neither infringes the states’ taxing authority nor commandeers states to implement or enforce a federal program. We do not address two matters. We do not address the ar- gument that the Bureau should have convened a small business panel because Building Resilient forfeited it. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“[I]ssues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned.”). We USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 14 of 35 14 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 also do not address the denial of the motion for preliminary injunc- tion. “Once a final judgment is rendered, the appeal is properly taken from the final judgment, not the preliminary injunction.” Burton v. Georgia, 953 F.2d 1266, 1272 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992). The “de- nial of permanent relief rendered that earlier ruling moot.” Id. A. The Rule Did Not Exceed the Bureau’s Statutory Authority. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agency action is unlawful when such action is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). Even though the Rule applies more sections of the Truth in Lending Act than those mentioned by section 307, the Rule was adopted based on the Bureau’s longstanding general rule- making authority under the Truth in Lending Act. 1. The Rule Is a Permissible Exercise of the Bureau’s General Rulemaking Authority. The Truth in Lending Act gives the Bureau authority to “prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes” of the Act and to “provide for such adjustments and exceptions . . . as in the judg- ment of the Bureau are necessary or proper to effectuate th[ose] purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a). The Act covers consumer credit transactions, so to fall within the Bureau’s rulemaking authority, the loans must meet the Act’s definition of those transactions. See id. § 1602(f), (g), (i). It defines credit as “the right granted by a cred- itor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” Id. § 1602(f). A creditor is a person who “(1) regularly extends . . . consumer credit which is payable by agreement in USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 15 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 15 more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially paya- ble on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or . . . by agree- ment.” Id. § 1602(g). A “person” can mean either a natural person or an organization. Id. § 1602(e). And a consumer credit transaction is “one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 1602(i). The loans are consumer credit transactions under these def- initions. The local governments grant homeowners a right “to de- fer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” See id. § 1602(f). The homeowner is a natural person, and the money is “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” See id. § 1602(i). The local governments are creditors because they regu- larly extend credit payable by more than four installments and the debts are initially payable to them. See id. § 1602(g). Section 307 supports the reading that these loans are con- sumer credit transactions. Congress placed its directions in a part of the Act that regulates credit, which would be unusual if the loans were not credit. And section 307 instructed the Bureau to apply the civil-liability provision to any loan that violates the ability-to-repay requirement. See id. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii). But there can be no viola- tion of the ability-to-repay requirement—and resulting civil liabil- ity—unless there is a consumer credit transaction. See id. USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 16 of 35 16 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 § 1639c(a)(1) (“[N]o creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless . . . .”); id. § 1602(dd)(5) (“The term ‘residential mortgage loan’ means any consumer credit transaction that is secured by a mortgage . . . or other . . . consensual security interest on a dwell- ing or on residential real property . . . .” (emphasis added)). So the loans must involve consumer credit transactions for Congress’s in- struction to make sense. Building Resilient responds that the text of section 307 is an “express recognition” that the loans are “a tax assessment.” But Congress did not define the loans as a tax assessment; it defined the loans as “financing . . . that results in a tax assessment.” Id. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(i). Building Resilient objects that certain characteristics of the loans exclude them from the definition of credit. For example, the loans “do not appear on consumer[s’] credit reports” and “do not constitute personal debt under state law.” Building Resilient con- tends that because the loans attach to the property and do not fol- low the homeowners, the owners “cannot possibly be” debtors. See Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2465 (explaining that program loans are nonrecourse). It cites unpublished California district court opin- ions supposedly “easily reject[ing] th[e] theory” that the homeown- ers are debtors such that the loans are credit. These objections are meritless for two reasons. First, the Act applies to other nonrecourse obligations. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.33(a) (2025) (applying the Act’s requirements to reverse mortgage trans- actions, which are “nonrecourse consumer credit obligation[s]”). USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 17 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 17 That the “owner has no personal liability” for the loan does not disqualify the loan from meeting the definition of credit. Second, at least some of the program contracts state, “The Property Owner acknowledges that it is responsible for paying the Assessments.” In signing the loan agreement, the “Property Owner agrees to pay the Assessments levied under [the loan contract] to pay for the cost of the Project” and the “rights and obligations, including the obliga- tion to pay the Assessments,” are the “rights and obligations of the Property Owner and all future owners,” even if those rights and obligations “run with the land.” Building Resilient is wrong to ar- gue that the program participant “is [not] legally obligated to re- pay” the loans. According to Building Resilient, signing an agreement does not make the homeowner a debtor because the homeowner incurs no personal liability—instead, the transferable “property owner[]” position incurs the responsibility. Building Resilient rejects “func- tional responsibility” that assigns the debt to the contract signatory because the signatory is “functionally responsible” for the debt. It contends that these transactions have no debtor. We disagree. The homeowner incurs the debt and accepts responsibility for repaying it. Even if the obligation to repay the assessment is a transferable function of ownership, the homeowner still has an ob- ligation to pay the loan or suffer the consequences, regardless of whether those consequences are nonrecourse. And even if the debt remains with the land for future homeowners, “[m]ost home buy- ers are unwilling to take on the remaining payment obligation for USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 18 of 35 18 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 [these loans], or their mortgage lender prohibits them from doing so.” Regulation Z, 90 Fed. Reg. at 2449 n.121. And beyond buyer preference, the federal entities that purchase residential mortgages refuse to “purchase . . . mortgages on properties with outstanding” first-priority liens for these home-improvement loans. Id. So the debtors “typically must pay off” these liens before they sell or re- finance their homes. Id. at 2449. Building Resilient ignores where the true responsibility to repay falls: the homeowner. The loans fall within the definition of consumer credit transactions, so the Bu- reau can regulate them under its general rulemaking authority. 2. The Rule Is Consistent with Section 307. Building Resilient responds that if “credit” under the Act co- vers these programs, section 307 is superfluous. It maintains that this dispute “has nothing to do with [the Bureau’s] general rule- making authority.” Instead, it contends that this case presents a question of statutory interpretation that requires us to consider the relationship between the Act’s general rulemaking authority and the more specific section 307. In its view, if the Bureau’s general rulemaking authority permitted the Rule, section 307 would be su- perfluous. Cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that would render a related statute “meaningless” or “superfluous”). We again disagree. Even if these programs are “credit” under the Truth in Lend- ing Act and subject to the Bureau’s general rulemaking authority, section 307 still does three things. First, it restricts the Bureau’s au- thority to exempt transactions. The Act gives the Bureau authority USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 19 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 19 to “exempt . . . any class of transactions.” 15 U.S.C. § 1604(f). But section 307 changes that default and requires the Bureau to subject the program transactions to certain provisions of the Act, restrict- ing the Bureau’s exemption ability. See id. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii). Sec- ond, section 307 directs the Bureau to engage in rulemaking to ad- dress novel programs. That Congress empowered the Bureau to regulate credit broadly does not render superfluous its later di- rective requiring the Bureau to regulate a specific kind of credit. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 383 n.9 (1999) (explain- ing that there is no redundancy in a statute requiring an agency to do something that the agency had been authorized to do). Third, section 307 provides the Bureau authority to tailor the provisions to the unique nature of these loans. For example, the civil-liability provision creates a private right of action against creditors who vi- olate the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640. But the creditors are local gov- ernments immune from suit. See id. § 1612(b). Congress required the Bureau to “account for the unique nature” of the programs when “prescrib[ing] regulations that carry out the purposes” of the ability-to-repay and civil-liability provisions. See id. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii). This authority allows the Bureau to enforce the civil-liability provision against the private loan-facilitating com- panies that might not otherwise meet the definition of creditor. And because there is no conflict between the general rulemaking authority and section 307, there “is no need to engage in a gen- eral/specific canon analysis” or an older/more recent canon anal- ysis, despite Building Resilient’s attempt to invoke those canons. USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 20 of 35 20 Opinion of the Court 25-14109 See In re 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, 142 F.4th 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2025). Building Resilient insists that because section 307 identified two specific provisions, the Bureau could apply only those two pro- visions to the program loans and no others. It maintains that Con- gress phrased section 307 “in [the] light of the uniform understand- ing that” these loans are not credit under the Act. And, it contends, Congress considered imposing the entire Act on these loans but “took the middle road” and chose to extend the Act “in one specific respect.” This argument fails for two reasons. First, Congress directed the Bureau to “carry out the purposes of” the ability-to-repay sec- tion while “account[ing] for the unique nature of [the programs].” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii). This broad directive necessarily con- templates authority and discretion to adapt the Act to address a novel situation. And nothing in that language alters the Bureau’s existing authority to “prescribe regulations to carry out the pur- poses of” the Act. Id. § 1604(a). Second, “longstanding administra- tive construction” supports the Rule. Cf. Monsalvo v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (2025) (citation modified). Congress adopted sec- tion 307 “against the backdrop of” determinations that tax liens and assessments were not credit under the Act. Id. With that under- standing, Congress defined “Property Assessed Clean Energy fi- nancing” as “financing to cover the costs of home improvements that results in a tax assessment on the real property of the con- sumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(C)(i). It did not provide that this USCA11 Case: 25-14109 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 21 of 35 25-14109 Opinion of the Court 21 financing is a tax assessment, which would render the loans ex- empt; Congress instead provided that this financing results in a tax assessment. And it directed the Bureau to bring these loans under the ability-to-repay provision, which by its very terms applies only to consumer credit transactions. See id. §§ 1639c(b)(3)(C)(ii), 1639c(a), 1602(dd)(5).