Full Opinion

Filed 10/27/26 Seales-Perkins v. Los Rios Community College Dist. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) TUESDAY SEALES-PERKINS, C104599 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24CV023830) v. LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. Self-represented plaintiff Tuesday Seales-Perkins appeals from the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees to defendants Los Rios Community College District, Albert Garcia, Andre Coleman, Toni Newman, and Linda Delgadillo (together, defendants). The attorney fees order came after the trial court partially granted defendants’ anti- SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for relief from monetary sanctions stemming from discovery disputes unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff contends the trial court: (1) failed to specify the hours defendants’ counsel spent on successful claims in awarding attorney fees; and (2) failed to safeguard her public benefits income when imposing monetary sanctions. 1 We disagree with her first contention and affirm the attorney fees order. We need not address her second contention because it concerns an appeal from a nonappealable order that we dismiss. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Attorney Fees The trial court partially granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint. Later, on October 20, 2025, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for attorney fees (the attorney fees order). In the attorney fees order, the trial court quoted the rule in Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328 (Mann): “ ‘[A] defendant should not be entitled to obtain as a matter of right his or her entire attorney fees incurred on successful and unsuccessful claims merely because the attorney work on those claims was overlapping. Instead, the court should first determine the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant’s relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate.’ ” Applying this rule, the trial court determined defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was “largely successful” and observed plaintiff’s “allegations were intertwined … such that it is not reasonably possible to parse through the work performed by [d]efendants’ counsel to determine the amount of hours spent on successful portions of the motion.” It also found “the time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion [was] justified given the difficulty in deciphering [p]laintiff’s allegations and the excessive filings [p]laintiff ha[d] made throughout this litigation.” But the trial court still reduced defense counsel’s compensable hours from 82.6 to 70 “given that the motion was not entirely successful.” 2 II. Motion for Relief from Monetary Sanctions In April 2025, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel defendants’ responses to discovery and granted in part defendants’ request for monetary sanctions against plaintiff. After plaintiff failed to pay the sanctions, defendants moved for an order to show cause why plaintiff should not be held in contempt and for monetary sanctions. In July 2025, the trial court denied the motion but again ordered plaintiff to pay monetary sanctions to defendants. In November 2025, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for relief from the monetary sanctions imposed in its April 2025 and July 2025 orders (the motion for relief from monetary sanctions order). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 2025, purporting to appeal from an order after judgment entered on September 8, 2025. She filed a second notice of appeal on October 28, 2025, referencing an order after judgment entered on October 20, 2025, and attaching the attorney fees order. On November 13, 2025, plaintiff filed a third notice of appeal, citing the motion for relief from monetary sanctions order. DISCUSSION I. Attorney Fees Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “[i]dentify hours attributable to successful portions,” “[e]xclude time tied to unsuccessful arguments,” and “[s]egregate anti-SLAPP work from parallel litigation.” We disagree. As an initial matter, we reject defendants’ contention that the attorney fees order is not immediately appealable. An order awarding attorney fees to a defendant who partially prevailed in an anti-SLAPP action falls under the collateral order exception to the one judgment rule and is directly appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782.) Defendants’ reliance on Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139 is misplaced because Doe did not consider the collateral order exception. We next examine the merits of plaintiff’s contention. 3 A party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion may recover attorney fees “reasonably allocable to achieving that victory.” (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 605.) But when the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action is overlapping, it is possible that “the amount to be awarded could not be calculated through a purely mechanical approach by allocating particular hours to particular claims.” (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) In this instance, the court should consider “the defendant’s relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate.” (Ibid.) “The trial court is best positioned to determine whether to award fees and costs … and to determine … the appropriate allocations and the amounts reasonably awardable.” (Area 51 Productions, Inc., at p. 605.) We review the trial court’s anti-SLAPP attorney fees award for abuse of discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322.) Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. It determined allocating particular hours to particular claims was “not reasonably possible” because plaintiff’s allegations were “intertwined.” The trial court then considered the relative success of the anti- SLAPP motion and, after finding the motion was “largely” but “not entirely successful,” the trial court reduced the hours. This approach followed Mann’s guidance. Plaintiff contends the trial court failed to allocate hours to defense counsel’s work on other discovery matters. But she cites nothing in the record showing defense counsel sought compensation for the hours spent on discovery in the attorney fees motion. On the other hand, the trial court found the hours justified, and “[w]e [as the appellate court] are required to presume all facts to support the court order.” (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) II. Motion for Relief from Monetary Sanctions Plaintiff contends the motion for relief from monetary sanctions order failed to safeguard her public benefits income. We dismiss this appeal. 4 “The name of a motion is not controlling, and[] regardless of the name, a motion asking the trial court to decide the same matter previously ruled on is a motion for reconsideration.” (Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577.) Here, plaintiff’s motion for relief from monetary sanctions effectively requested the trial court to reconsider the monetary sanctions. We accordingly construe her motion as a motion for reconsideration. The trial court’s order denying such a motion is not appealable even when based on new facts or law. (Id., at p. 1576.) DISPOSITION The attorney fees order is affirmed. Plaintiff’s appeal from the motion for relief from monetary sanctions order is dismissed. Defendants shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) /s/ MESIWALA, J. We concur: /s/ RENNER, Acting P. J. /s/ WISEMAN, J. * * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 5