Liu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS CA2/2

Filed 10/29/26 Liu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO HUASHA LIU et al., B341221 Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04056) BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Judge. Affirmed. Reed Smith, Raymond Cardozo, Terence N. Hawley, Kathryn M. Bayes; Alston & Bird, Jason Levin and Lisa L. Garcia for Defendant and Appellant.  Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai, Dan Stormer, Brian Olney; Robert D. Newman; Law Office of Lisa Holder and Lisa Holder for Plaintiffs and Respondents. ______________________________ Defendant and appellant Board of Administration of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) appeals from an order awarding plaintiffs and respondents Huasha Liu (Liu) and Sandeepa Maheshwari (Maheshwari) (collectively respondents) $2,989,269.75 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.1 Respondents’ litigation resulted in CalPERS applying the correct definition of “bonus” under the applicable regulations when calculating employees’ final compensation for pension purposes. CalPERS challenges respondents’ statutory entitlement to attorneys’ fees and the amount of fees awarded. We affirm. BACKGROUND I. CalPERS and “Special Compensation” The Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL) establishes CalPERS, “a prefunded, defined benefit pension plan for state employees and employees of participating local public agencies.” (Hale v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 764, 772.) “An employee’s pension is determined by a formula that takes into account the employee’s age at retirement, number of years of service, and final compensation.” (Ibid.) “Final compensation” is based on a formula that includes “payrate” and “special compensation.” (Id. at p. 773.) 1 Unless otherwise stated, subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2  CalPERS promulgated California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571 to combat “pension spiking,” which is the “intentional inflation” of “final compensation” of employees of CalPERS’s contracting agencies. (DiCarlo v. County of Monterey (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 468, 485–486 (DiCarlo).) California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571 defines the criteria under which “special compensation” may be included in pension calculations. (DiCarlo, supra, at pp. 485–486.) II. SCAG’s Merit Pay Policy The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) contracts with CalPERS to provide pensions for SCAG employees. In July 2004, SCAG issued its merit pay policy “to provide a merit increase to recognize an employee for performance and achievement of objectives.” Evaluation ratings of “meets standards,” “above expectations,” and “excels” result in merit increases of 0–3 percent, 4–6 percent, and 7–9 percent, respectively. A merit increase is applied to an employee’s base salary or, if employees are already “at the top of the approved salary range,” they are paid a “lump sum equivalent of the percentage increase on an annualized basis,” i.e., a bonus. In April 2006, after receiving a copy of SCAG’s merit pay policy, CalPERS informed SCAG that its “current bonus plan meets the definition of bonus/merit pay and is reportable to CalPERS for retirement purposes.” However, in September 2017, CalPERS reversed its position and determined that SCAG’s merit pay policy did not fully comply with PERL. Specifically, CalPERS determined that the following two items did not qualify as “special compensation” under California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571: (1) SCAG’s merit payments for evaluation ratings less than “excels”; and (2) any lump-sum merit payments 3 available only to employees at the top of their salary ranges. III. CalPERS Excludes Merit Payments From the Calculations of Respondents’ Pension Benefits Liu and Maheshwari retired from SCAG in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Respondents are “classic members” of CalPERS because they became members prior to the effective date of the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013. SCAG paid Liu $10,378.58 in merit pay during her final year of employment pursuant to the merit pay policy. By excluding the merit pay from Liu’s final compensation, CalPERS reduced Liu’s retirement benefits by approximately $4,500 per year. Liu filed an administrative appeal. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Liu’s appeal and upheld CalPERS’s interpretation of California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571. CalPERS adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision. IV. Trial Court Proceedings A. Liu’s petition for writ of administrative mandate In September 2019, Liu filed a section 1094.5 petition seeking a writ of administrative mandate requiring CalPERS to set aside its administrative decision with respect to her pension. The following month, Liu’s counsel sent a letter to CalPERS demanding that it “provide full retirement benefits to . . . Liu and all other similarly situated CalPERS members.” CalPERS did not respond to this request. In January 2020, Liu filed a first amended complaint adding class action claims and a section 1085 petition for writ of traditional mandate challenging CalPERS’s decision on behalf of 4 all similarly situated employees. In an email dated January 27, 2020, Liu’s counsel proposed a stipulation to dismiss the class allegations without prejudice in exchange for CalPERS’s “agreement to apply any ruling regarding [Liu] to all others similarly situated in terms of retroactive pension benefits.” (Italics added.) CalPERS rejected the stipulation as “overly broad.” CalPERS later admitted that not agreeing to Liu’s stipulation “trigger[ed] [respondents’] class certification [motions] and discovery.” At CalPERS’s request, the trial court stayed Liu’s class claims, stayed discovery, and scheduled a bench trial on the section 1094.5 petition. In December 2020, the court granted the petition, finding that CalPERS erred in excluding lump-sum merit payments from Liu’s “final compensation.” The court then granted the parties’ joint stipulation to stay the order, lift the stay on Liu’s class claims and discovery, and authorize Liu to file a second amended petition. In the stipulation, CalPERS stated that it “want[ed] to raise a number of legal challenges to the operative pleading, in particular the class claims in this lawsuit.” B. The second and third amended petitions In February 2021, respondents filed a second amended petition and complaint adding Maheshwari as a party and revising the class definition, among other changes. CalPERS demurred to the class allegations in the second amended petition. CalPERS asserted that “the determination of special compensation is an individualized process that cannot be performed on a classwide basis” and the proposed class was “unascertainable.” The trial court sustained the demurrer in relevant part with leave to amend. In July 2021, respondents filed a third amended petition 5 and complaint, which revised the class definition and identified five other contracting agencies that have “SCAG-like [m]erit [p]ay policies.” CalPERS demurred to the class claims. The trial court overruled CalPERS’s demurrer in its entirety. C. Class discovery Respondents conducted extensive class discovery and made California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests focused on identifying state agencies with SCAG-like payment policies and similarly situated employees. Respondents served 10 sets of written discovery; took four depositions; participated in multiple informal discovery conferences; and filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted in part. Respondents’ counsel sent CPRA requests or subpoenas to 145 contracting agencies, corresponded with agency staff to obtain the records, and reviewed approximately 50,000 pages of documents the agencies produced. CalPERS objected to the written discovery, in part, on the grounds that the requests were unduly burdensome because CalPERS does not maintain or track the information requested. CalPERS filed a motion for protective order, which the trial court denied. D. Motion for class certification and stipulation In November 2022, Respondents moved to certify a class comprised of SCAG employes who are classic members of CalPERS and who “received and/or will receive [m]erit [p]ayment(s) in lump sum(s) pursuant to policies adopted by SCAG.” CalPERS opposed the motion. In March 2023, the parties filed a stipulation stating they had “reevaluated their respective positions on the necessity of class certification in view of” questions for oral argument that the 6 trial court had issued before a hearing on the issue. The parties stipulated that respondents would withdraw their class certification motion and dismiss the class allegations without prejudice. The parties stipulated that “[s]hould the [c]ourt issue the requested writ of mandate on the grounds that CalPERS has misconstrued or has misapplied [California Code of Regulations, title 2, section] 571’s provisions relating to the pensionability of ‘Bonuses’ . . . , and should the [c]ourt’s decision not be reversed on any appeal CalPERS may take, CalPERS will, without requiring the certification of a class, apply the [c]ourt’s construction of [California Code of Regulations, title 2, section] 571 to all [c]lassic [m]embers of CalPERS currently or formerly employed by SCAG or other contracting employers of CalPERS who, while at the top of their pay schedule, received and/or will receive [m]erit [p]ayment(s) in lump sum(s) pursuant to policies adopted by these contracting employers.” E. Ruling on petition for writ of traditional mandate The parties briefed respondents’ claims under section 1085. Despite the March 2023 stipulation, CalPERS argued that the requested “classwide” writ relief was improper because determining whether lump-sum merit bonuses are pensionable “requires multiple individualized inquiries.” In February 2024, the trial court granted the section 1085 petition in relevant part, finding that “CalPERS violated the relevant regulations in failing to treat [respondents’] lump sum payments as pensionable ‘Bonus’ pay.” The court ordered CalPERS to apply the December 2020 order granting Liu’s section 1094.5 petition, including “that [o]rder’s interpretation of California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571, to all [c]lassic 7 [m]embers of CalPERS currently or formerly employed by SCAG or other contracting employers of CalPERS who, while at the top of their pay schedule, received and/or will receive [m]erit [p]ayment(s) in lump sum(s) pursuant to policies adopted by these contracting employers.”2 F. Judgment In July 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Liu on one cause of action under section 1094.5, and in favor of respondents on one cause of action under section 1085. The court retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the judgment and writ. G. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees In October 2024, respondents moved for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5. They requested a lodestar fee of $1,973,115.45, a 1.5 multiplier, and $124,121 for work on the reply, for a total fee award of $3,056,771.90. In April 2025, the trial court granted the motion and awarded respondents a lodestar fee of $1,992,846.50 and a 1.5 multiplier, for a total attorney fee award of $2,989,269.75. CalPERS timely appealed. 2 Respondents request judicial notice of a letter, dated March 20, 2026, showing that CalPERS subsequently increased Maheshwari’s retirement benefits, and paid her a retroactive adjustment of $11,762.36. We deny the request because this letter was not before the trial court and is not relevant to the appeal of the trial court’s fee order. (See Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 737.) 8  DISCUSSION I. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 1021.5 A. Applicable law “Section 1021.5 authorizes a court to ‘award attorneys’ fees to a successful party . . . in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest . . . .’ ” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 250.) In determining whether to award fees under section 1021.5 to a “successful party,” the trial court “appl[ies] a three-prong test inquiring whether (1) the litigation resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of individuals, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders the award appropriate.” (Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 154, 159.) Here, CalPERS challenges only the trial court’s finding that this action conferred a significant benefit on a large class of individuals. “When determining whether a lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, a trial court should perform ‘a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.’ [Citation.]” (McCormick v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 996, 1005 (McCormick).) “[T]he Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney[s’] fees in every case involving a statutory violation.” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939.) However, “[t]he courts are not required to narrowly construe the significant benefit factor. ‘The “extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an 9 attorney fee[s] award.” ’ [Citations.]” (Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 521, 543.) “Furthermore, ‘evidence of the size of the population benefited by a private suit is not always required. The substantial benefit may be conceptual or doctrinal, and need not be actual and concrete, so long as the public is primarily benefited.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 543–544.) B. Standard of review “We will uphold the trial court’s decision to award attorney[s’] fees under section 1021.5 unless the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation.] In making this determination we review the entire record, noting the trial court’s stated reasons for awarding fees and whether it applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision. [Citation.] Where, as here, litigation ends at the trial court level, we owe ‘the trial court a full measure of deference in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 980 (Sweetwater).) CalPERS contends that we should apply de novo review because this case “involved statutory construction and a quasi- legal assessment of the action’s impact.” We disagree. This case did not result in a published appellate decision, which is a factor that could have justified de novo review. (See Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Democratic Central Committee (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.) Nor does the entitlement to fees under section 1021.5 depend on statutory construction. Instead, the trial court used its equitable discretion to determine, based on an extensive record, the benefit of the judgment. In such circumstances, “it is not our role to reweigh the equities.” 10 (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 574.) Regardless, we would reach the same decision even if we applied a de novo standard of review. C. Analysis The trial court found that this litigation conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons because the court’s ruling “clarified the pension rights of government employees in nearly 3000 public agencies that contract with CalPERS.” The court stated: “[U]ncertainty as to which individuals might actually receive a financial benefit does not justify denial of attorney[s’] fees under section 1021.5. The clear benefit accruing to [c]lassic [m]embers is that their right to a proper calculation of their pension benefits under California law is now being enforced.” The trial court was correct. As CalPERS admits, the lawsuit directly benefits some CalPERS members “by requiring CalPERS to . . . recalculate their pensions.” More broadly, however, the litigation benefits all classic members of CalPERS because it compels CalPERS to apply the correct definition of “bonus” in California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571 when calculating salaries for pension purposes. A “central function” of section 1021.5 is “ ‘to call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law.’ [Citation.]” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632.) Moreover, California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571 is an important part of CalPERS’s pension scheme because it prevents pension spiking. (DiCarlo, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 485–486.) CalPERS contends that respondents failed to produce sufficient evidence “of the size of the potentially impacted group.” 11 The class of persons benefited need not be “readily ascertainable” to award fees under section 1021.5. (See Sweetwater, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) The clarification of the pension laws governing CalPERS was sufficient to satisfy the significant- benefit requirement. Therefore, “evidence on the size of the group benefited was not required.” (McCormick, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009; see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 711.) Regardless, there is sufficient evidence that the litigation conferred a significant benefit on a large group of CalPERS members. CalPERS is the nation’s largest public pension, administering retirement benefits for nearly 3,000 public agencies and more than 2,000,000 members.3 CalPERS has more than 675,000 retired “classic members” and 375,000 active “classic members.” In discovery, CalPERS produced a list of 484 agencies that, since 2016, reported bonus payments for their employees to CalPERS. According to CalPERS’s Office of Audit Services, four of the 126 contracting agencies (3.2 percent) it audited between 2017 and 2020 had SCAG-like merit pay policies that CalPERS disapproved for the same reasons it rejected respondents’ lump- sum merit pay bonuses. Respondents submitted evidence that, through CPRA requests to approximately 140 contracting agencies, their attorneys identified nine additional contracting 3 Although CalPERS objected to respondents’ request for judicial notice of documents containing this information, it did not object to these documents as evidence. Furthermore, “the statements in the documents, which were made by CalPERS, have not been disputed by CalPERS.” The trial court properly considered this evidence. 12 agencies (6.4 percent) that provide lump-sum merit payments according to a rating system. Finally, CalPERS acknowledged that this litigation may impact a large number of employees. As the trial court noted, “One of the reasons that CalPERS asked this court not to provide relief for non-SCAG employees was because it might be burdensome for CalPERS to provide such relief, given that ‘CalPERS has approximately 3,000 member agencies, and each agency may have more than one bonus plan . . . ’ [Citation.] After claiming that the large number of employers and [c]lassic [m]embers would make provision of relief burdensome, CalPERS should not now be heard to claim that no relief will be provided to that large class of [c]lassic [m]embers.” CalPERS resists this conclusion, arguing that the benefit of the trial court’s ruling is limited because members must satisfy five requirements: “[the] person must be (1) a [c]lassic [m]ember; (2) currently or formerly employed by a contracting employer; (3) at the top of their pay scale; (4) who received merit pay in lump sum; (5) pursuant to the employer’s policy that is similar to SCAG’s.” CalPERS also contends that each qualifying bonus payment would have to meet nine requirements in California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571, subdivision (b)(1). These requirements simply define the class of CalPERS members who will receive a direct, pecuniary benefit from this lawsuit. They do not limit the broader class of CalPERS members who benefit from CalPERS applying the proper definition of “bonus” in calculating their pensions. More important, CalPERS presented no argument or evidence to the trial court that these requirements would prevent any classic members from having their lump-sum merit pay count toward their retirement. 13  In sum, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5. Standing alone, the clarification and enforcement of California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571 justifies the award, but based upon the evidence, the trial court could reasonably find that a large number of classic CalPERS members would benefit from this litigation. We need not reach the court’s alternative finding that the 53 people who benefitted from this litigation, per CalPERS’s concession, were sufficient to satisfy the significant- benefit requirement. II. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees A. Applicable law “In determining the fee award, the trial court must first determine ‘a “lodestar” or “touchstone” figure, which is the product of the number of hours worked by the attorneys and a reasonable fee per hour.’ [Citations.]” (Greene v. Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 422.) “The trial court then has the discretion to increase or reduce the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative ‘ “multiplier” ’ based on a variety of factors. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “Factors that the court may consider in adjusting the lodestar include ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.’ [Citation] . . . [A]ny one factor ‘may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.’ [Citation.]” (Yes In My Back Yard v. City of Culver City (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1122 (Yes In My Back Yard).) “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys 14 in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.) B. Standard of review “ ‘We review attorney[s’] fee awards for abuse of discretion. An experienced trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the value of professional services rendered in the trial court. We presume the fee approved by the trial court is reasonable. We will not disturb the trial court’s judgment unless it is clearly wrong.’ [Citation.]” (Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 921.) C. Reasonable number of hours Respondents sought a lodestar of $1,973,115.45, representing 2,058.39 hours of work by six attorneys and two legal assistants. Respondents also requested an additional 118.7 hours and $124,121.00 in fees for work on the reply. In total, respondents sought 2,177.09 hours for more than six years of work. Respondents excluded 70 hours of work completed by three law clerks and one legal assistant; one attorney deleted more than 30 hours of his time; and respondents reduced the remaining hours by 10 percent “ ‘to account for any potential billing errors or duplication of effort.’ ” The hours claimed by respondents are well supported by 130 pages of billing entries and multiple attorney declarations. With a few exceptions (discussed below), CalPERS does not contest that 2,177.09 hours is a reasonable amount of time for a class action of this nature. Rather, CalPERS contends that the trial court did not properly apportion time pursuant to Harman v. City and County 15 of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407. Harman establishes a two-part test for apportioning time between successful and unsuccessful claims. First, the court determines whether the plaintiff lost on claims that were “unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded[.]” (Id. at p. 417.) Claims that “ ‘are based on different facts and legal theories . . . qualify as unrelated claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘Apportionment is not required when the issues in the fee and nonfee claims are so inextricably intertwined that it would be impractical or impossible to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Second, if the successful and unsuccessful claims are found to be related, the court then “evaluate[s] the ‘significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff obtained ‘excellent results,’ full compensation may be appropriate. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The trial court rejected CalPERS’s arguments that the lodestar fees should exclude time pursuing class certification, class discovery, and “unsuccessful or unnecessary” claims. As CalPERS acknowledges, all of respondents’ claims were based on the same lump-sum, off-salary-schedule payments and “concern the calculation of [c]lassic [m]embers’ pension benefits.” Accordingly, the trial court could not find that the off-salary- schedule-pay issues and alleged civil rights violations were “distinct in all respects” from the writ relief granted in this case. Further, CalPERS is responsible for the extensive litigation and related attorneys’ fees in this case. In January 2020, respondents’ counsel proposed “dismissing [the] class allegations without prejudice in exchange for [CalPERS’s] agreement to 16 apply any ruling regarding [Liu] to all others similarly situated in terms of retroactive pension benefits.” This stipulation would have alleviated the need for a class action and extensive discovery, streamlining the litigation. Instead, CalPERS rejected this stipulation, leading to the extensive class action litigation in this case. Over the next three years, CalPERS twice challenged respondents’ class allegations by demurrer, resisted class discovery, and opposed the class certification motion. Then, in March 2023, CalPERS finally agreed to “apply the Court’s construction of [California Code of Regulations, title 2, section] 571 to all [c]lassic [m]embers of CalPERS currently or formerly employed by SCAG or other contracting employers of CalPERS who, while at the top of their pay schedule, received and/or will receive [m]erit [p]ayment(s) in lump sum(s) pursuant to policies adopted by these contracting employers,” i.e., to employees “similarly situated” to Liu. This supports the trial court’s decision not to apportion fees in this case. “ ‘The government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.’ [Citation.]” (City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 580, fn. 11.) The stipulation was similar, if not preferable to, the class relief that respondents sought in their third amended petition. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees for all hours claimed by respondents. CalPERS contends that the trial court did not undertake the second step of Harman and determine the significance of the overall relief obtained by respondents. “ ‘[T]here is no general rule requiring trial courts to explain their decisions on motions seeking attorney[s’] fees.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, we draw no 17 negative inference from an explanation [CalPERS] considers to be ‘inadequate.’ ” (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 361–362.) Furthermore, the trial court considered Harman and concluded that no apportionment was required because respondents achieved their litigation objectives based on “intertwined” claims. This was sufficient. CalPERS next asserts that it “correctly rejected” the January 2020 stipulation and had no choice but to challenge respondents’ motion for class certification and class discovery. The record belies this assertion. In January 2020, Liu’s counsel proposed a stipulation to dismiss the class allegations without prejudice in exchange for CalPERS’s “agreement to apply any ruling regarding [Liu] to all others similarly situated . . . .” (Italics added.) CalPERS declined the offer as “overly broad” but then agreed to similar terms three years later. Contrary to CalPERS’s assertion, the January 2020 proposed stipulation did not state that CalPERS would be required to pay members retirement benefits to which they were not legally entitled. Regardless, CalPERS could have proposed changes to the stipulation to address its concerns. Instead, CalPERS continued to litigate and argued that the requested “classwide” writ required “multiple individualized inquiries.” Finally, CalPERS challenges the hours the trial court awarded for CPRA requests (213.75 hours), the fourth amended petition (55.62 hours), and the reply brief to the fee motion (118.7 hours). We find no abuse of discretion. The CPRA requests uncovered material evidence for this lawsuit; the CPRA “does not limit a requester’s right to obtain fees and costs pursuant to . . . any other law;” and there is no evidence of a double recovery. (Gov. Code, § 7923.115, subd. (c).) Respondents 18 prepared the fourth amended complaint before the parties reached a stipulation that alleviated the need to file it. The time spent on the reply is not unreasonable because it included preparing 96-page evidentiary objections and other papers, and appearing at the hearing. D. Reasonable hourly rates In determining the hourly rates, the trial court relied on: (1) “published market rate data for work on complex cases in the Los Angeles legal community for counsel of comparable skill and experience”; (2) “available information about rates charged by counsel or awarded by other courts”; and (3) declaration evidence concerning the experience and qualifications of the attorneys and legal assistants. The court found flaws in “the parties’ respective expert declarations regarding fees” and did not rely on that evidence. In sum, the court considered all relevant evidence and exercised its own independent judgment, which was not an abuse of discretion. CalPERS contends that the trial court should have credited the declaration of its fee expert, who opined that respondents’ counsel rates should be compared to those at smaller law firms rather than large, “premium-rate firms.” The court rejected the expert’s approach, as it was entitled to do, because it “under- compensate[s] lawyers who work for smaller law firms that primarily do contingency work.” (See Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 873 [attorney fee award must be based on “the reasonable market value of services”].) “We may not reweigh on appeal a trial court’s assessment of an attorney’s declaration.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323.) CalPERS also contends that the trial court awarded “top-of- 19 market rates,” which were not justified for this “straightforward mandamus proceeding.” CalPERS misstates the record. This case was litigated as a class action for over three years because CalPERS refused to proceed by way of a mandamus action, declined efforts to mediate the case, and litigated this case tenaciously. Furthermore, the court could reasonably find that the rates it awarded—most of which were not “top-tier”—were amply justified by the attorneys’ skills and experience. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination of the lodestar rates. E. Multiplier Here, the trial court awarded a 1.5 multiplier because: (1) respondents’ counsel litigated the case on a contingency basis; and (2) the time spent on the litigation precluded employment on other matters. We find no abuse of discretion. Respondents’ counsel litigated this case on a strictly contingent fee basis with no guarantee that they would be paid for their legal work. Several other law firms were unwilling to represent respondents on a contingent basis. Respondents’ counsel devoted nearly 2,200 hours to this case, which precluded employment on other matters. The trial court could reasonably award a 1.5 multiplier based on these two factors alone. (See Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 83.) CalPERS contends that the trial court erred in awarding a multiplier based upon the level of skill and complexity of issues because it considered these same factors in determining the rates. CalPERS misinterprets the record. The court awarded a multiplier based upon the contingent fees and the attorneys’ inability to accept other work. The court then found: “[N]othing about [respondents’] counsel’s representation in this litigation or 20 the difficulty of California law regarding pension benefit calculations suggests that a multiplier of 1.5 would be too high to properly compensate [respondents’] counsel.” Thus, the court merely considered these factors in deciding not to reduce the multiplier. There was no double counting. Finally, CalPERS contends that the current rates awarded by the trial court sufficiently compensate respondents’ counsel for the contingency risk and the time spent on the litigation. The court found: “Although the reasonable hourly rates that support the award here are current billing rates, and this litigation stretches back several years to a period when reasonable rates undoubtedly were lower, use of current rates offsets the harm resulting from delay in payment, separate and apart from the contingency consideration.” A fee award under section 1021.5 “should be fully compensatory.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133.) “[W]hen determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider the[] [multiplier] factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.” (Id. at p. 1138, italics added.) Here, the trial court implicitly found that the award of current billing rates and a 1.5 multiplier were needed to fully compensate respondents’ counsel given the long delay in payment. The court could have reasonably found this approach more practical than calculating the lodestar fee based on the applicable rates for each year and then awarding a higher multiplier. We “ ‘presume the trial court considered all the appropriate factors in choosing the multiplier and applying it to the whole lodestar.’ [Citation.]” (Espejo v. The Copley Press (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 329, 384.) CalPERS has not cited evidence to overcome this presumption, and “we will not second-guess the 21 trial court’s assessment.” (Yes In My Back Yard, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123.) DISPOSITION The order granting attorneys’ fees is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. GOORVITCH, J. We concur: LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. 22