The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty LLC

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC SCT-Civ-2025-0008 Appellant/Defendant, Re: ST-2024-RV-00019 v. KLB REALTY LLC Appellee/Plaintiff. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT/ORDER TO: Justices of the Supreme Court Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court Judith L. Bourne, Esq. Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq. Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court Supreme Court Law Clerks Supreme Court Secretaries Order Book Westlaw Lexis/Michie Please take notice that on September 17, 2026, a(n) Order dated September 17, 2026, was entered by the Clerk in the above-entitled matter. Dated: September 17, 2026 DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ. Clerk of the Court By: Deputy Clerk II  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0008 ) v ) ) KLB REALTY, LLC ) Appellee/Plaintiff. ) ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas and St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Sigrid M. Tejo Considered: October 16, 2025 Filed: September 17, 2026 Cite as: 2026 VI 20 BEFORE MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Judith L. Bourne, Esq The Bourne Law Office, PLLC St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorneys for Appellant Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq Hodge & Hodge St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellee JUDGMENT CABRET, Associate Justice AND NOW, consistent with the Opinion of even date, it is hereby ORDERED that the Superior Court’s January 21, 2025 judgment is AFFIRMED; it is further ORDERED that copies be directed to the appropriate parties SO ORDERED this 17th day of September 2026 The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Judgment Page 2 of 2 BY THE COURT: -/ Mr ee 44 a le RIA M(CAB Ber Assoc Speen ATTEST: DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ. Clerk of the Court Jim By Deputy Clerk Dated YX \ X NS WO Copies (with accompanying Opinion of the Court) to Justices of the Supreme Court Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court Judith L. Bourne, Esq Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court Supreme Court Law Clerks Supreme Court Secretaries Order Book Westlaw Lexis/Michie For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0008 ) v ) ) KLB REALTY, LLC ) Appellee/Plaintiff. ) a) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas and St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Sigrid M. Tejo Considered: October 16, 2025 Filed: September 17, 2026 Cite as: 2026 VI 20 BEFORE MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Judith L. Bourne, Esq The Bourne Law Office, PLLC St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorneys for Appellant Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq Hodge & Hodge St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellee OPINION OF THE COURT CABRET, Associate Justice ql The Bourne Law Office, PLLC (“Bourne”) appeals from the Superior Court’s January 21, 2025 order granting attorney’s fees to appellee KLB Realty (“KLB”), which KLB incurred in connection with Bourne’s seeking Superior Court review of the Magistrate Division’s August 23, The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 2 of 12 2024 order in a forcible entry and detainer action granting restitution of certain premises to KLB For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s order I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND "2 This appeal stems from a protracted and heavily-litigated dispute between Bourne and its landlord, KLB, concerning the premises occupied by Bourne as a law office. The underlying case originated in the Magistrate Division as a Forcible Entry and Detainer (“FED”) action initiated by KLB. KLB prevailed in that case and in an order dated August 23, 2024, the Superior Court granted immediate restitution of the premises to KLB, subject to a seven-day stay of execution. Bourne filed a notice of appeal seeking Superior Court review! of the magistrate judge’s decision on August 28, 2024, and filed a motion in the Magistrate Division for an emergency stay of execution pending appeal on August 29, 2024. Bourne argued that the stay was necessary to avoid the mooting of its appeal pursuant to this Court’s holding in Keating-Smith v. Mustafa, 78 V.1. 866 (V.I. 2024).? The magistrate judge denied this motion on September 3, 2024. The same day Bourne filed an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration” of its August 29 emergency motion for stay of execution. The magistrate judge denied that motion on September 6, 2024 £3 On September 6, 2024, Bourne filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, which this Court denied on September 13, 2024 on the grounds that Bourne failed to first request a stay of execution from the Superior Court judge assigned to the review. Jn re: The Bourne ' Judges of the Magistrate Division may hear forcible entry and detainer actions pursuant to the original jurisdiction granted by 4 V.LC. section 123(a)(6). When a magistrate judge enters a final judgment in a case over which it has original jurisdiction pursuant to 4 V.I.C. section 123(a), that judgment is “immediately appealable to the judges of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.” SUPER CT. R. 322(a) ? In Keating-Smith, this Court held that restoration of the subject premises to the landlord moots an FED appeal because the Superior Court cannot divest a landlord of possession once possession is restored, even if the judgment was entered in error. Keating-Smith, 78 V.I. at 880-81, In other words, an FED judgment effectively becomes unreviewable once the premises have been restored to the landlord The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 3 of 12 Law Office, PLLC, 2024 V1 31. On September 16, 2024 Bourne filed an “Urgent Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,” which the Superior Court granted in an order dated September 18, 2024, subject to Bourne’s posting of a supersedeas bond of $25,950. On September 23, 2024, Bourne moved for reconsideration of that order, on grounds that the Superior Court relied on 28 V.I.C. § 788, which had been declared unconstitutional.? Three days later, Bourne filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court, requesting that the Court require the Superior Court judge assigned to the review of the magistrate judge’s decision to issue a stay of the magistrate’s judgment. In an order dated September 30, 2024, this Court stayed enforcement of the magistrate judge’s decision granting restitution until resolution of the mandamus proceedings 44 While the mandamus proceedings were pending, the Superior Court judge scheduled a hearing on Bourne’s motion for reconsideration, and on October 22, 2024, issued a revised order that set the terms of the supersedeas bond at $10,800. Later, in an opinion dated November 12, 2024, this Court granted Bourne’s mandamus petition in part, ordering the Superior Court judge to apply the correct legal standard in fixing the terms of the supersedeas bond and vacating the October 22, 2024 order fixing the bond at $10,800. Jn re: The Bourne Law Office, PLLC, 2024 VI 31. The next day, November 13, 2024, Bourne filed a dismissal of review pursuant to Superior Court Rule 322.5(a) and the Superior Court held a hearing on November 14, 2024. At that hearing, the Superior Court clarified that the rule under which Bourne had attempted to dismiss its case had been repealed, and Bourne then moved the court to dismiss the review “under whatever rule is relevant” (S.A. 100-01). KLB did not oppose Bourne’s motion to dismiss the review, and the 3 28 V.I.C.§ 788 formerly provided that no appeal from an FED judgment may be taken unless the defendant posted a bond, guaranteed by two sureties, to the plaintiff in the amount of twice the rental value of the premises for the period from when the initial judgment is rendered to the time a final judgment is rendered. In Keating-Smith, this Court found section 788 to be unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Keating-Smith, 78 V1. at 876-77 The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 4 of 12 Superior Court dismissed the review in an order dated November 15, 2024. At the hearing on Bourne’s dismissal, KLB informed the Superior Court that it intended to seek attorney’s fees and the Superior Court granted KLB fourteen days to file the motion q5 On November 27, 2024, KLB moved pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 541(b) for attorney’s fees of at least $4,875, which it claimed were solely incurred in defending the review of the magistrate judge’s decision in the Superior Court, including work on the mandamus action in this Court Alternatively, KLB requested attorney’s fees for the entirety of the proceedings in the amount of $12,862.50. Bourne opposed KLB’s motion for fees on December 13, 2024. In an order entered on January 21, 2025, the Superior Court granted KLB’s motion and awarded the attorney’s fees incurred in defending Bourne’s review of the magistrate judge’s August 23, 2024 decision, as well as defending against Bourne’s petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court. The Superior Court ultimately awarded $4,875 in fees and $156.76 in costs. Bourne timely filed a notice of appeal from the order granting fees and costs on February 18, 2025 II DISCUSSION A Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 46 This Court may not consider the merits of an appeal unless we first determine that we have jurisdiction. Richards v. People, 74 V.1. 539, 544 (V.I. 2021) (citing V.. Gov't Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.I., 50 V.I. 276, 279 (V.I. 2008)). This Court has jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court.” 4 V.LC. § 32(a). Generally, “a trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees is a final judgment provided that the lower court has quantified the award if it has awarded fees.” V.1. Gov't Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov'tof the V.I., 50 V.I. 276, 279 (V.I. 2008) The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 5 of 12 47 Here, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order quantified both the fees and costs to be awarded to KLB. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order constitutes a final order and this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. See Rojas v. Two/Morrow Ideas Enters., Inc., 53 V.L. 684, 691 (V.I. 2010) (orders fully adjudicating attorney’s fees and costs are final and appealable) 48 “This Court reviews the Superior Court's ruling on a motion for attorney's fees and costs for abuse of discretion.” Jn re Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.1. 446, 449 (V.I. 2013) (citing Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 277 (V.I. 2012)). “To the extent the review implicates an interpretation of law, however, we review that interpretation de novo.” Id. B The Prevailing Party 49 Bourne argues that the Superior Court erred in granting attorney’s fees to KLB, contending that KLB was not a prevailing party with regard to the review because Bourne moved to dismiss the review before the Superior Court rendered a decision on the merits. Bourne further reasons that because the “only matter that was actively litigated” was the legality of the supersedeas bonds imposed by the Superior Court, KLB could not be a prevailing party because this Court determined that both the September 18, 2024 bond of $25,950 and the October 22, 2024 bond of $10,800 were unlawfully calculated. We disagree on both issues £10 In the Virgin Islands, the prevailing party in a civil action other than a non-frivolous personal injury suit may recover “such sums as the court in its discretion may fix by way of indemnity for [its] attorney's fees in maintaining the action or defenses thereto.” 5 V.I.C. § 541(b) The Legislature enacted section 541(b) to abolish the “American Rule,” which prohibits awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action. Hansen v. Bryan, 68 V.1. 603, 613 (V.I. 2018) By abolishing the American Rule, the Legislature intended to allow the prevailing party in an The Bourne Law Office, PLLC y. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 6 of 12 action to recover their attorney’s fees. The Legislature made this decision for reasons of public policy, “believing that a party should not have to bear the legal expenses of demonstrating either that it is not at fault or that it is the victim of another's fault.” DaCosta v. DaCosta, 74 V.I. 640, 646 (V.I. 2021); Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc., No. ST-97-CV-925, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 51, at *]—2 (Super. Ct. Sep. 28, 2012) (unpublished) (“The purpose of the statute is “to indemnify the prevailing party” for legal expenses incurred in connection with the prevailing party's efforts to establish that it was ‘not at fault or [was] the victim of another's fault.’”); Znt'l Leasing & Rental Corp. v. Gann, Civ. No. 08-40, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172, at *3 (D.V.I. Mar. 23 2010) (unpublished) (same) §11 Accordingly, although the term “prevailing party” is not defined by statute, “we adopt [a] more liberal construction of ‘prevailing party,’” in order to give effect to the legislative intent behind the enactment of section 541(b).” DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 645. But even before this Court held that “prevailing party” should be liberally and broadly construed, courts in the Virgin Islands held that a prevailing party is one “who has achieved at least some of the benefits which were sought in the litigation, even if judgment is not obtained.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Garcia, 72 V.1. 344, 347 (Super. Ct. 2020) (citing Isaac v. Crichlow, Case No. SX-12-CV-065 2016 V.I. LEXIS 145, at *3 (Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2016) (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Gov't of the V.I., No. ST-09-CV-118, 2009 V.I. LEXIS 53, at *3 (Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (holding that “[a] prevailing party in a civil action exists if ‘a party has achieved at least some of the benefits which were sought in the litigation, even if a judgment is not finally obtained’”) and Jo-Ann’s Launder Ctr. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 31 V.1. 226, 233 (D.V.I. 1995) (“[A] prevailing party is one who has received ‘at least some of the benefits which were sought in the litigation, even if a judgment is not finally obtained.’”). In our decision in DaCosta, where this Court held that The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 7 of 12 “prevailing party” should be liberally construed, we reaffirmed these constructions of the phrase and endorsed the notion that total success on the merits is not a prerequisite for an award of attorney’s fees, so long as a party has achieved at least some of the benefits it sought in the litigation. DaCosta, 74 V.1. at 646 (“In this case, the Superior Court ruled in [plaintiffs] favor on every disputed issue, and the monies awarded to [plaintiff] on those issues greatly exceed the sum that she consented to pay to [defendant]. To hold, under these circumstances, that [plaintiff] is not a prevailing party for purposes of section 541 would effectively elevate form over substance, and improperly construe section 541 in the same manner as federal statutes providing limited exceptions to the ‘American Rule *”): This interpretation of “prevailing party” is further indicative of the flexibility applied by Virgin Islands courts in order to give effect to section 541(b) 412 However, Bourne cites to Rohn v. Daily News Publ'g Co., Inc., 72 V.1. 301 (Super. Ct 2019) for the proposition that because Bourne moved to dismiss its review and the Superior Court granted its motion, KLB cannot be a prevailing party as no judgment on the merits was entered. In Rohn, the plaintiff brought a defamation action which she failed to prosecute. /d. at 303-04. After the court ordered sanctions prohibiting the plaintiff from offering any trial testimony which could have been elicited at a deposition, the plaintiff moved to dismiss her own lawsuit with prejudice Id. Thereafter, the defendant moved for attorney’s fees incurred in preparing for the suit. /d. In analyzing whether the defendant was a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees, the Superior Court noted that “[nJeither a judgment nor judicial decision has been rendered in Daily News favor,” and that “where a judgment or judicial decision has not been rendered a defendant may not recover fees when a plaintiff dismisses an action with prejudice absent exceptional circumstances.” Rohn, 72 V.1. at 309, 310 (internal citations omitted). The Superior Court therefore denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 8 of 12 413 There are, however, several distinctions which render Rohn inapposite. Here, unlike in Rohn, a decision has been rendered in KLB’s favor. KLB prevailed in the underlying FED action when the Superior Court granted restitution of the premises, and the subsequent lengthy motion practice in the Superior Court and the prohibition and mandamus actions in this Court solely concerned the underlying FED judgment. Further, the cases supporting the Superior Court’s decision in Rohn are primarily federal, and accordingly interpret and apply the American Rule on attorney’s fees—which the Virgin Islands has explicitly abrogated. See Hansen, 68 V.I. at 613 Chief among these distinctions, however, is the fact that in the intervening period since Rohn was decided this Court has held that the term “prevailing party” should be liberally and broadly construed. This directive is in line with the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the American Rule and to afford relief to the party who achieved at least some of the benefits they sought in the litigation See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 644, 646. In light of these distinctions, Rohn is not persuasive authority on the question of whether KLB is a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under the circumstances presented 414 Applying a liberal and broad construction of the term “prevailing party” under DaCosta, we find that KLB is the prevailing party. KLB prevailed on the merits in the underlying FED action when the Superior Court granted restitution of the premises. Accordingly, when Bourne initiated a review of that determination in the Superior Court, Bourne sought the benefit of having the judgment reversed and retaining the subject premises. In defending the review, KLB sought the benefit of preserving the magistrate judge’s decision and regaining possession of the subject premises. When Bourne dismissed the review, KLB achieved “at least some of the benefits” it sought in the litigation—indeed, KLB achieved the only benefit it sought in initiating the FED action. See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 646. In effect, KLB occupies the position it would have if the The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 9 of 12 Superior Court entered judgment in its favor. Although Bourne unilaterally moved to dismiss the review before the Superior Court could render judgment, this does not mean that neither party prevailed in the litigation. The FED judgment in favor of KLB stands, and that is the primary benefit sought by KLB in defending against Bourne’s review. Despite the fact that the Superior Court did not render a judgment on the merits of the restitution issue, no one can question that KLB achieved arguably the only benefit it sought from the litigation. Accordingly, we hold that KLB is a prevailing party in the review 415 This construction of “prevailing party” follows our precedent and squares with formulations that have already been applied in the Superior Court. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 72 V.1. at 347. This construction also comports with the legislative intent in enacting section 541(b), which was to abolish the American Rule and allow for a prevailing party to recover its attorney’s fees—an endeavor which requires a broad and liberal construction of the statute. See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 646-47 C Fees in The Underlying FED Matter 4.16 Bourne also argues that the Superior Court did not have authority to award attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of the underlying FED matter, as a motion for costs and fees was never before the Superior Court and attorney’s fees are not recoverable in FED cases 417 In the Virgin Islands, longstanding law prohibits the recovery of attorney’s fees in FED actions. See 28 V.I.C. § 794 (providing that the total court fees and costs for the summary proceedings provided for by this chapter shall be $2.00); C.AZL., Inc. v. Dunagan, 904 F.2d 189 191 (3d Cir. 1990) (Section 794 “specifically addressed to costs in FED proceedings prevails over the general costs statute and . . . attorney's fees are not recoverable in FED proceedings.”); Jn re The Bourne Law Office, 2024 VI 31, n.2 (“While the construction adopted by the Third Circuit The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 10 of 12 in C_M_L. is not binding on this Court, it is binding on the Superior Court until and unless this Court adopts a different rule in an appropriate future case.”). Accordingly, any fees granted by the Superior Court for work KLB performed in litigating the FED matter before the magistrate division would be prohibited €18 However, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order granted attorney’s fees and costs which KLB certified that it incurred in defending the review, and did not grant any fees or costs it incurred in litigating the underlying FED matter. When the Superior Court entered its order, it specifically noted that the grant of fees and costs “exclude[d] any time spent defending the matter in the magistrate division.” Accordingly, the Superior Court’s grant of fees did not encompass work Bourne performed in litigating the underlying FED action, and was thus proper. Therefore, we decline to disturb the Superior Court’s award of fees on this ground D Fees for the Mandamus Petition in the Supreme Court 419 Finally, Bourne argues that the Superior Court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to KLB for work it performed while defending Bourne’s mandamus petition — which this Court granted in part in Jn re: The Bourne Law Office, PLLC, 2024 V1 31—because that petition was “a separate civil matter in a different court, over which the Superior Court has no jurisdiction.” Accordingly, Bourne argues, the Superior Court lacked authority to award fees for work KLB performed outside of the Superior Court review of the magistrate judge’s decision 420 In making this argument, Bourne provides no citation to statutory or case law. Bourne’s argument on this point consists of three sentences, and is thus undeveloped. See Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc. v. Crown Bay Marina, L.P., 68 V.1. 584, 600 (2018) (finding a three-sentence argument to be perfunctory and waived under Rule 22(m)(3)). Accordingly, this argument is waived because this issue is ““adverted to in a perfunctory manner” and “unsupported by argument The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-C1IV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 11 of 12 and citation to legal authority.” V.I.R. App. P. 22(m)(3). “This form of conclusory argument deprives this Court of any meaningful opportunity to review an allegation of error.” FirstBank P.R v. Harthman Leasing III, LLLP, 2025 VI 18, £48. Accordingly, we uphold the Superior Court’s award of fees.* Ill CONCLUSION 921 KLBisa prevailing party in the Superior Court review, because the term “prevailing party” is to be interpreted liberally and broadly, and KLB achieved the benefit it sought in the review The Superior Court’s grant of costs and fees was proper because it excluded work Bourne performed in the underlying FED action, and Bourne’s argument that the Superior Court could not award fees related to the mandamus petition is waived because it is unsupported by citation to the record or statutory or case law. Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court’s grant of fees and costs Dated this 17th day of September 2026 BY THE COURT: am Ae ees MARIA M../CAB ssociate 4 We note that Rule 30(a) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure is the sole vehicle for parties to seek costs related to actions in this Court. Rule 30(a) provides, in pertinent part, “if a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, or a petition granted in part and denied in part, reasonable costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the Supreme Court.” V.1. R. App. P. 30(a) (emphasis added). Rule 30(a)’s mandatory language is demonstrative of the intent that this procedural provision control over section 541(b)’s general rule that attorney’s fees may be recovered in civil actions. This rule controls because “[t]he authority of this Court to create procedural rules and substantive law is concurrent with the Legislature,” World Fresh Mkts., LLC v. Palermo, 74 V.1. 455, 461 (V.I. 2021), and where this Court has enacted a procedural rule, that rule controls over a procedural statute enacted by the Legislature. See id. See also Haynes v. Ottley, 61 V.1. 547, 561 (V.1. 2014) (quoting V./. Pub. Servs. Comm'n v. V.L Water & Power Auth., 49 V.I. 478, 485 (V.1. 2008)) (“[T]he more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one, unless it appears the Legislature intended for the more general to control, or for both statutes to apply concurrently.”); Hansen v. Bryan 68 V.I. 603, 613 n.6 (V.I. 2018) (“[T]he Legislature intends for section 541 to operate as a general rule in all civil cases, to be deviated from only in cases where the Legislature enacts a statute imposing a different standard.”). Parties seeking costs related to actions in this case should thus follow the procedure set out by Rule 30 The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC SCT-CIV-2025-0008 Opinion Page 12 of 12 ATTEST: DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ Clerk of the Court By Z 74 hy Deputy Clerk Dated rik Wo