Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON LORI SHAVLIK, individually, No. 88336-4-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. MALAYNA HIRA and JOHN DOE UNPUBLISHED OPINION HIRA, husband and wife, including their marital community and INDERJIT HIRA and JANE DOE HIRA, husband and wife, including their marital community, Defendants, SEARS INJURY LAW, PLLC, Respondent. SMITH, J. — Lori Shavlik hired Sears Injury Law, PLLC, to represent her in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) case. Shavlik later fired Sears, retained new counsel, and settled the MVA case. Sears initiated an attorney fee lien against the proceeds of the settlement. After the court dismissed the MVA case based on the settlement, Shavlik moved to adjudicate fees. When Sears learned of these motions, it made an appearance, and the trial court determined Sears was entitled to $3,333.33 in fees. Shavlik appealed, asserting numerous claims. Finding no error, we affirm. No. 88336-4-I/2 FACTS In early November 2021, Lori Shavlik retained attorney Robert L. Sears, of Seattle Injury Law (SIL), to represent her in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) case against Malayna Hira. Shavlik signed a contract with SIL, which included the following provisions: (8) Attorneys reserve the right to withdraw from representation in this matter after reasonable notice to the Client, in which case said Attorneys waive any right to fees in the matter, but shall be paid any costs. (9) If Client elects at any time to abandon this claim or discharge the Attorney, then in either event, Client agrees to pay to said Attorney at said time and prior to release of Client's file in this matter a reasonable fee for services performed to date of such discharge or abandonment, which shall be computed at a rate of $375.00 per hour and any and all costs, expenses and disbursements made or incurred on Client's behalf. Paralegal and/or Independent Contractor time shall be computed at the rate of $95.00 per hour. 10. If Client terminates the services of Seattle Injury Law at a time when there is an offer that has been extended to settle the claim, Client hereby agrees that Seattle Injury Law has substantially performed and is entitled to a fee of one-third of the said offer plus costs. In September 2022, SIL sent a demand to Hira’s insurer and, in January 2023, the insurer offered a top and final amount of $10,000. Shavlik did not want to settle for this amount and the relationship between herself and SIL deteriorated. The parties contest who terminated the relationship. According to Sears, Shavlik terminated her relationship with SIL during a phone call on January 20, 2023. Shavlik maintains SIL terminated the relationship. In September 2023, Shavlik retained attorney Tyler K. Firkins, at Van Siclen Stocks & Firkins, P.S. Inc. (VSSF), to pursue her MVA claim. Firkins 2 No. 88336-4-I/3 initiated the lawsuit in Snohomish County Superior Court, and in February 2024, the court appointed an arbitrator to hear the case. On April 10, an arbitrator awarded Shavlik $45,919.14 plus costs. On April 22, Firkins received an e-mail from Hira’s counsel noting Sears, on behalf of SIL, had initiated a lien on the arbitration award, and the insurer would not pay the arbitration award without assurances. In May, SIL sent Firkins a notice of lien claim for $5,405.50. In Firkin’s closing statement to Shavlik, he set aside $7,379.18 to be in trust for SIL. In June 2024, the court dismissed Shavlik’s MVA case with prejudice. On November 12, Shavlik entered her own notice of appearance in the dismissed action and, on the same day, petitioned for summary adjudication of fees. In her petition, Shavlik contended that SIL did not file a lawsuit on her behalf and, therefore, under their contract and RCW 60.40(1)(c), SIL was not entitled to fees. Shavlik noted her motion for a hearing but did not provide SIL with notice, and the motion was stricken. Shavlik re-noted her motion in February 2025 and, again, did not provide notice to SIL. The court struck the motion and noted that, although SIL “is not a party to this action, there is a request to adjudicate [its] lien and [it] therefore needs notice of the proceeding.” In March 2025, SIL checked the docket for Shavlik’s case and learned of Shavlik’s petition for adjudication of fees and subsequent attempts to note the issue for a hearing. Holly D. Brauchli entered a notice of appearance on behalf of SIL and responded to Shavlik’s motion for summary adjudication. In its response, SIL suggested “the appropriate and equitable resolution” would be to 3 No. 88336-4-I/4 reduce the lien to $3,333.33—the pre-litigation fee amount pursuant to the contract. Brauchli noted the issue for a hearing on May 27 and served Shavlik with notice. The court considered the matter without oral argument1 and issued an order on May 30 that reduced SIL’s lien to $3,333.33 and required Shavlik to pay it within seven days. On June 6, Shavlik appealed the order. Shavlik did not pay or post a bond; instead, she initiated an action against Firkins for the full amount he was holding in trust pending the resolution of the lien. VSSF moved for the court to issue an order permitting it to interplead the disputed funds into the court registry. In July, the court granted VSSF’s motion. Shortly thereafter, SIL moved for an order compelling the clerk of the court to issue a check from the court’s registry to SIL for $3,333.33. Shavlik did not file an opposition. The court set to the motion to be heard without oral argument and e-mailed the notice to Firkin and Shavlik. Shavlik replied to that e-mail with the following: This case is closed. The judges have no authority to litigate my case whatsoever ever [sic] without all the parties. This is not a circus. The courts aren’t meant to be a forum for retaliation. It sounds like the judge is a party now? It sounds like the Judge is asking the clerk to be the process server for the attorneys? All the Judges in Snohomish County are currently being represented by the same attorneys that are representing the same judges in my PRA CASE. Wow unbelievable behavior for a racket that uses their robe for power. 1 SIL notes the hearing was cancelled because of the judge was ill, and the parties were told the matter would be determined on the written filings. Shavlik does not contest this portrayal of events. 4 No. 88336-4-I/5 This is everyone’s notice that I am filing a writ and a summons complaint. The court issued an order on August 6 noting, “In an absence of an order staying judgment, this court is compelled by law to grant the motion to disburse the funds.” On August 29, this court terminated Shavlik’s appeal for failure to address the filing fee or designate clerk’s papers. This court reinstated Shavlik’s appeal in September after Shavlik requested relief. In October, SIL moved to be added as a respondent in the matter, which Shavlik opposed. Commissioner Rogers granted SIL’s motion. In her appeal, Shavlik contends the trial court erred because it (1) lacked jurisdiction to enter orders after it dismissed her MVA case and after she filed her appeal; (2) allowed Sears, a non-party, to participate in proceedings; (3) erroneously recognized and enforced Sears’s lien; (4) improperly altered court records; (5) violated Shavlik’s due process by not providing for oral argument; and (6) relied on false declarations. Shavlik also claims the Court of Appeals erroneously recognized SIL as a respondent, and Commissioner Rogers should have recused himself. We find no merit to any Shavlik’s arguments and affirm. 5 No. 88336-4-I/6 ANALYSIS Jurisdiction Shavlik contends the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction2 to enter orders on May 30 and August 6, 2025, because the court previously dismissed the case and this court had accepted review. Because the superior court retains jurisdiction to enforce a judgment while appellate review is pending, we find the court had jurisdiction to enter the orders. Generally, this court will not review claims raised for the first time on appeal, but if a claim establishes a manifest error affecting a constitutional right or challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court, we may accept review. RAP 2.5(a). An error is manifest “if it results in actual prejudice to the [appellant].” State v. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 602-03, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999). The party raising the claim must show that “ ‘the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences’ ” in their case. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 (quoting State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dougherty v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310, 314, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003). “Jurisdiction ‘is the power and authority of the court to act.’ ” Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 315 (quoting 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 1, at 608 (1997)). When a court 2 In her reply brief, Shavlik contends for the first time that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over SIL. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn. 2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). 6 No. 88336-4-I/7 dismisses an action with prejudice, this constitutes a final judgment on the merits. Elliott Bay Adjustment Co., Inc. v. Dacumos, 200 Wn. App. 208, 213, 401 P.3d 473 (2017). A final judgment disposes of all the issues in a case “ ‘except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney’s fees) and enforcement of the judgment.’ ” Dacumos, 200 Wn. App. at 214 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (10th ed. 2014)). If a party appeals a decision made by the trial court, the trial court has authority to enforce any decision of the trial court and a party may execute on any judgment of the trial court unless a judgment has been stayed under RAP 8.1 or RAP 8.3. RAP 7.2(c). Here, the superior court retained jurisdiction to enforce the order regarding petition for summary adjudication of fees. Because SIL’s lien concerned attorney fees and costs related to the original action and Shavlik did not take any steps to stay the execution of the order (i.e., file a bond under RAP 8.1), the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its orders on May 30 and August 6, 2025. We affirm. Non-Party Shavlik claims both the superior court and the Court of Appeals commissioner erred by allowing SIL to participate in proceedings because it was not a party of record and, therefore, did not have standing. We review issues of standing de novo. Benton County Water Conservancy Bd. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 3 Wn.3d 59, 66-67, 546 P.3d 394 (2024). Generally, standing “ ‘refers to a particular party’s right to bring a legal claim.’ ” Benton County Water Conservancy Bd., 3 Wn.3d at 67 (quoting Wash. State 7 No. 88336-4-I/8 Hous. Fin. Comm’n v. Nat’l Homebuyers Fund, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 704, 711, 445 P.3d 533 (2019)). Under RCW 60.40.010, an attorney may file a lien “upon money in the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding, in which the attorney was employed” or upon an action pursued by arbitration. Adjudication of an attorney lien against a judgment does not require a separate action. King County v. Seawest Inv. Assoc., LLC, 141 Wn. App. 304, 314, 170 P.3d 53 (2007); see also Ferguson Firm, PLLC, v. Teller & Assocs., PLLC, 178 Wn. App. 622, 631, 316 P.3d 509 (2013) (“An attorney may sue a client for unpaid fees, but an attorney also has the option of asserting a lien to ensure payment without resorting to a lawsuit to recover those fees.”). 1. Superior Court First, Shavlik contends only parties of record have standing to participate in judicial proceedings, and CR 24 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism for intervening in a pending action. Shavlik’s argument fails because SIL did not seek to intervene in the underlying case; it only sought a lien on attorney fees, which does not require intervention. RCW 60.40.010 and case law make clear that an attorney does not need to sue or become party to an underlying action to seek a lien and recover fees. See Seawest, 141 Wn. App. at 314. Also, the only case Shavlik cites to support her claim that a party who has not intervened lacks standing to participate in proceedings does not address CR 24 or standing.3 Where a party does not cite authorities to support their 3 In re Dependency of A.G., 93 Wn. App. 268, 276, 968 P.2d 424 (1998). 8 No. 88336-4-I/9 proposition, “ ‘the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.’ ” Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, P.S. v. Linth, 195 Wn. App. 10, 19-20, 380 P.3d 565 (2016) (quoting DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)). Because SIL did not need to intervene to initiate a lien and Shavlik presents no case law to suggest otherwise, no issue of standing exists. 2. Court of Appeals Shavlik also contends the Court of Appeals erred when it added SIL as a respondent in Shavlik’s appeal. Shavlik cites to RAP 3.1, RAP 5.3, and RAP 15.34 to claim SIL cannot be added as a respondent on appeal because it was not a named party of record in the trial court. None of these rules support Shavlik’s arguments. RAP 3.1 provides that “[o]nly an aggrieved party may seek review by the appellate court.” An aggrieved party is “ ‘one whose personal right or pecuniary interests have been affected.’ ” State v. Taylor, 150 Wn.2d 599, 603, 80 P.3d 605 (2003) (citing State ex rel. Simeon v. Superior Court, 20 Wn.2d 88, 90, 145 P.2d 1017 (1944)). RAP 5.3 provides requirements for the content of a notice of appeal, including the requirement that the party filing the appeal must “specify the party or parties seeking the review.” RAP 5.3(a). 4 Shavlik also erroneously cites to RAP 15.3 to contend it is the exclusive mechanism for intervention in an appellate proceedings, but RAP 15.3 address payment for charges for reproducing briefs—it does not concern appellate review. 9 No. 88336-4-I/10 Shavlik’s first points to RAP 3.1 to contend SIL cannot seek review because it is not an aggrieved party. This argument fails because SIL is not the one seeking review, Shavlik is. But even if SIL was seeking review, it is an aggrieved party because its interest in compensation is affected by Shavlik’s motion for summary adjudication of attorney’s fees. Next, Shavlik claims RAP 5.3 “defines the parties on appeal as those named in the notice of appeal and parties of record in the trial court” and SIL was not a party in the underlying matter. Shavlik is correct that SIL was not a party to the MVA claim, but, as the commissioner correctly noted, SIL was a party to the attorney lien dispute, which is what Shavlik appealed. Accordingly, Commissioner Rogers did not err when he added SIL as a respondent after Shavlik failed to serve SIL a notice of appeal. Validity of Lien Shavlik asserts SIL’s lien was invalid under RCW 60.40.010 and the parties’ contract because SIL did not initiate the action. Because an attorney can collect proceeds incurred before an action is formally commenced, we find no error. Shavlik contends SIL’s lien was invalid under RCW 60.40.010(1)(d) because the statute requires services performed in the action in which the lien is asserted. Shavlik claims that because her relationship with SIL ended before the action was filed, it did not perform services as contemplated by the statute. But the work of an attorney in an action applies to pre-filing preparations, such as investigating, meeting with clients and witnesses, and obtaining and reviewing pertinent documents. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn. App. 675, 693, 128 10 No. 88336-4-I/11 P.3d 1253 (2006). Accordingly, SIL may recover proceeds related to work performed prior to filing of the case, and the lien under RCW 60.040.010 was valid. Shavlik next asserts that even if SIL could otherwise claim costs and fees, the contract Shavlik and SIL signed expressly extinguished this right. Shavlik points to section eight of the contract which states, “Attorneys reserve the right to withdraw from representation in this matter after reasonable notice to the Client, in which case said Attorneys waive any right to fees in the matter, but shall be paid any costs.” But Shavlik provides no evidence to support a finding that SIL withdrew; she only makes general assertions. Conversely, SIL provided evidence to support a finding that Shavlik fired SIL, including Sears’s declaration and an online review where Shavlik stated, “After I hired [SIL] they DID NOTHING. I FIRED THEM.” Because the evidence in the record supports a finding that Shavlik terminated the attorney-client relationship, sections nine and ten of the contract control. Under sections nine and ten of the contract, if the client (Shavlik) terminates SIL’s services, SIL may recover fees for services performed before termination. Accordingly, the lien was valid under the contract. Recusal Shavlik contends Commissioner Rogers should have recused himself because he was not impartial. We disagree. Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, parties in a legal proceedings must receive a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing. State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535, 540, 387 P.3d 703 (2017). An appearance of fairness claim will 11 No. 88336-4-I/12 succeed only where there is “ ‘[e]vidence of a judge’s actual or potential bias.’ ” State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 187-88, 225 P.3d 973 (2010) (quoting State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 37, 162 P.3d 389 (2007)). The test to determine whether a judge exhibited bias, actual or potential, “is an objective test that assumes a reasonable observer knows and understands all the relevant facts.” Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d at 540. Shavlik claims Commissioner Rogers’s institutional ties to the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) biased his ruling in favor of Sears, another member of the WSBA. But every attorney in the State of Washington must be a member of WSBA to practice law. APR 1(b). Following Shavlik’s logic, no Washington judge or commissioner could ever rule on a case involving allegations against a Washington attorney. This is not the law. Because there is absolutely no evidence in the record to support Shavlik’s argument, the argument has no support in law, and no reasonable observer could find that Commissioner Rogers exhibited any bias whatsoever, we conclude recusal was neither appropriate or required. Due Process Shavlik claims the trial court violated her due process when it entered the May 30 and August 6, 2025 orders without oral argument. Both the federal constitution and the Washington State Constitution require that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Due process requires the opportunity to be heard “ ‘at a meaningful time and in a 12 No. 88336-4-I/13 meaningful manner.’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)). The opportunity to be heard does not require any particular form or procedure. “ ‘[It] requires only that a party receive proper notice of proceedings and an opportunity to present [its] position before a competent tribunal.’ ” Rivers v. Wash. State Conf. of Mason Contractors, 145 Wn.2d 674, 697, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parker v. United Airlines, 32 Wn. App. 772, 728, 649 P.2d 181 (1982)). Oral argument on a dispositive motion is not a due process right. Rivers, 145 Wn.2d at 697. Shavlik contends the trial court violated her due process right to be heard because the court entered orders without oral argument. Because Shavlik did not raise this issue below, she must show the lack of oral argument resulted in actual prejudice. Shavlik claims oral argument was necessary because (1) the funds were being awarded to a non-party, (2) the case was closed, (3) the lien was contested on multiple grounds, and (4) the declaration the court relied upon contained material representations. As discussed supra and infra, none of these issues are meritorious. Shavlik provides no reason for why presenting her arguments in writing versus at oral argument prejudiced her or deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to present her case. Because Shavlik’s argument rests on conclusory statements and is not supported by applicable law, we conclude the trial court did not violate Shavlik’s due process right when it entered orders without oral argument. 13 No. 88336-4-I/14 Additional Claims Shavlik raises several claims for the first time on appeal, including (1) the trial court’s May 30, 2025, order is void because the court relied on false representations in Sears’s declaration; (2) the county clerk erroneously altered the case; and (3) the lien is invalid because SIL filed it in a different county than the original action. Because Shavlik did not raise these issues below, we decline review. See RAP 2.5(a) (“The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.”) We affirm. WE CONCUR: 14