State v. Altajir
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJanuary 3, 2012
DocketSC18706
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Harper
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
******************************************************
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the
beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will
be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the
date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative
date for the beginning of all time periods for filing
postopinion motions and petitions for certification is
the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.
In no event will any such motions be accepted before
the ‘‘officially released’’ date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the
event of discrepancies between the electronic version
of an opinion and the print version appearing in the
Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con-
necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the
latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official
Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service
and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes
of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of
the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro-
duced and distributed without the express written per-
mission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALIA K. ALTAJIR
(SC 18706)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Harper, Js.
Argued October 19, 2011—officially released January 3, 2012
Moira L. Buckley, with whom was Morgan P. Rueck-
ert, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was David Shepak, state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion
HARPER, J. In this certified appeal, the defendant,
Alia K. Altajir, appeals from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court affirming the judgment of the trial court
revoking the defendant’s probation and sentencing her
to three years incarceration. See State v. Altajir, 123
Conn. App. 674, 689, 2 A.3d 1024 (2010). On appeal to
the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial
court had violated her right to due process under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution
and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut
by improperly admitting, during the dispositional phase
of a probation revocation proceeding, a number of
undated photographs gathered from Facebook, a social
network website on which the defendant maintained a
profile.1 The Appellate Court concluded that this claim
was unpreserved and that it did not merit review pursu-
ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989). We assume, without deciding, that the claim
was preserved and we affirm the Appellate Court’s judg-
ment on the ground that the photographs satisfied the
minimum standard of reliability constitutionally
required to admit evidence at the dispositional phase
of a probation revocation hearing.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. In July, 2004, the then nineteen
year old defendant operated an automobile while under
the influence of alcohol. She lost control of her vehicle,
which was carrying two passengers, and inadvertently
drove off the road, down an embankment and into a
river. One of the passengers drowned as a result of the
accident. In October, 2006, the defendant pleaded nolo
contendere to charges of misconduct with a motor vehi-
cle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-57 and
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence by
a person under twenty-one years of age in violation of
General Statutes § 14-227g. In accordance with a plea
agreement, the trial court, Brunetti, J., imposed a sen-
tence of five years of incarceration, suspended after
one year, and five years of probation. The trial court also
imposed a number of special conditions of probation,
including that the defendant install an ignition interlock
device on any vehicle she owned or operated and that
she not operate a motor vehicle without a valid license.
The trial court at sentencing ‘‘stress[ed] to this defen-
dant that the treatment conditions, postincarceration,
are very important and will certainly be enforced as
aggressively as possible by the state.’’ The court further
specified that ‘‘[i]f you do ten out of eleven [special
conditions of probation] that is not good enough. If you
violate one of those conditions you could be violated
and wind up serving the balance of the four years.’’
The defendant was released from prison in 2008, after
serving the nonsuspended year of her sentence. While
on probation in 2009, she was involved in a minor motor
vehicle accident. The accident did not involve alcohol
use; police determined, however, that she was operating
a vehicle without the requisite ignition interlock device
and that she had not restored her driver’s license follow-
ing its temporary suspension. The defendant subse-
quently admitted to violating the special conditions of
probation that prohibited her from engaging in that
conduct.
At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the state rec-
ommended that the court revoke the defendant’s proba-
tion and impose the remaining four years left to serve
on her underlying sentence. The state characterized the
defendant as a ‘‘marginal probationer’’ who had failed to
obtain a job, further her education or provide sufficient
evidence of community service while on probation. The
state proceeded to emphasize that the defendant is
‘‘maintaining [a] Facebook site, and this is put out on
the public domain for people to see. And when one
looks at the Facebook site . . . [one sees] that there
were multiple, multiple, multiple occasions where this
defendant had left the state of Connecticut without
permission during that period of time between the start
of probation and the violation of probation. We see
evidence that she’s in Florida . . . [and] in New York
City. . . .
‘‘But the other thing we see, Your Honor, in all of
these pictures is again [the defendant] worshipping at
the altar of alcohol and debauchery and lewd behavior.
And why is that significant? It’s significant because the
message didn’t get sent, and this individual refused to
accept it.’’
Defense counsel in turn suggested that the court look
to the severity of the offenses underlying the defen-
dant’s probation violations, arguing that the commis-
sion of an infraction (driving without restoring her
license) and a class C misdemeanor (driving without
the ignition interlock device), neither of which involved
alcohol, warranted a more lenient sentence. In response
to the state’s argument regarding information gleaned
from the defendant’s Facebook page, defense counsel
countered that the alcohol related behavior evident on
the defendant’s Facebook profile was reflective of pre-
vailing social norms, that the images were not represen-
tative of the way the defendant spent most of her time
and that the photographs were undated. Defense coun-
sel also contested the state’s basis for asserting that
the defendant had been to New York or Florida but
noted that she had been granted permission from a
probation officer to travel to New York.
The trial court, Ginocchio, J., noted that photographs
on Facebook of the defendant consuming alcohol had
played an aggravating role at the defendant’s sentencing
for the underlying offense and that ‘‘now after she’s
done her time and she’s come back before the court
now, she still has the audacity to go back on Facebook
and show herself in the condition of being intoxicated.
. . . [W]hy would someone, knowing what was at stake
here, do that again? It’s baffling . . . but maybe she’ll
address it, or [counsel] can address it, but it doesn’t
make any sense.’’
Shortly thereafter, the defendant took the opportu-
nity to address the court, at which point she apologized
for ‘‘everything that has taken place’’ and asserted that
she no longer drove after drinking. She acknowledged
through counsel, however, that she did continue to con-
sume alcohol, and she did not contest the state’s charac-
terization of the photographs viewable on her Facebook
profile. When the court later offered the defendant the
opportunity to say more, she replied, ‘‘No.’’
Subsequent to the defendant’s allocution, the state
sought to introduce printed copies of approximately
seventy photographs, along with associated captions
and comments, purportedly viewable on the defen-
dant’s Facebook page. The state presented no evidence
regarding how these photographs had been acquired,
who could view the defendant’s Facebook profile or
how Facebook’s features governing publicity and pri-
vacy functioned during the relevant time period.2 In
support of the images’ admission, the state argued that
‘‘the court has the authority to consider a wide range
of information as long as there is some indicia of reliabil-
ity, and it seems to me that all parties have talked about
this. It informs everyone’s position . . . .’’ Defense
counsel objected, stating that ‘‘I don’t think any of that
provides a foundation for the violation of probation,
which is at issue here, and so I think it sets up a due
process issue with the court considering collateral and
extraneous matters with this proceeding.’’ The court
overruled the defendant’s objection and allowed the
images to be marked as a full exhibit, reasoning that it
could consider any evidence in a sentencing hearing as
long as the evidence was found to be reliable.
The court then stated that it would give defense coun-
sel an opportunity to review the images, captions, and
commentary. In response to defense counsel’s com-
ments that ‘‘I’m kind of put on the spot. I’m trying to
look at all of these before they’re submitted to the
court,’’ the court granted the defendant a ten minute
recess. After the recess, the state represented that the
parties had agreed to eliminate approximately one half
of the photographs, so the proffered exhibit now
included only ‘‘pictures that border on the issue of alco-
hol or [the defendant] being out of the state.’’ At this
point, defense counsel interjected, ‘‘[a]nd I would just
note, Judge, that none of the photos appear to be dated.
They’re undated. And I’m not sure there is any way to
prove that that was during the period of probation.’’
Defense counsel further indicated that the defendant’s
Facebook page was designed to be viewed by a limited
number of people, that the photographs were not neces-
sarily posted by the defendant herself, that the defen-
dant was of legal drinking age and that drinking alcohol
was not itself a violation of probation. The state
responded that the images depicted alcohol related
behavior, that this depiction ‘‘certainly leads to a rea-
sonable inference, if you’re drinking, that you may very
well be drinking and driving’’ and that several of the
photographs show the defendant in locations outside
of Connecticut. With respect to dating the photographs,
the state noted that the printed pages indicate when
the images were posted to Facebook. The state further
noted, apparently in reference to the fact that the defen-
dant appears to have light colored hair in some photo-
graphs and darker hair in others, that the defendant’s
hair became darker after her incarceration.
Thirty-six images were ultimately admitted into evi-
dence. They depict the defendant and/or the defendant’s
friends in various social settings; many demonstrate or
suggest alcohol consumption by the defendant. Seven
of the images are from a Facebook album associated
with the defendant’s account entitled ‘‘random old
pics,’’ and another five are from the defendant’s album
entitled ‘‘this is why im hot.’’ These twelve photographs
were posted on Facebook in 2009. Two of these photo-
graphs, both from the ‘‘random old pics’’ album, depict
the defendant with alcohol. Another two, from the same
album, appear to be taken at Yankee Stadium in New
York. The remaining twenty-four images, uploaded
between 2007 and 2009, were posted by other Facebook
users to their own albums. The defendant was ‘‘tagged’’
as appearing in these photographs; see footnote 1 of
this opinion; and these tagged photographs were then
viewable on a page of the defendant’s Facebook profile
displaying all of the photographs in which she
appeared.3 A number of these photographs show the
defendant consuming alcohol in social settings, includ-
ing on a boat in photographs from an album entitled
‘‘Boca Bashhhhh’’ posted in 2009.
After receiving this evidence and hearing statements
from the victim’s father and from a friend of the defen-
dant, the court indicated that it would have imposed
the full four year sentence had the defendant committed
an alcohol related violation of probation, but that the
limited severity of the infraction in this case made the
decision more difficult. The court then proceeded to
explain why a three year sentence was nonetheless
appropriate: ‘‘I’m looking at these pictures again and
all I can think of is where is the remorse? . . . [In]
every one of these pictures you look like a person that’s
completely forgotten about what has happened and
what led you to this situation today. . . . [W]here [the]
death of a young person is involved and you bring
unspeakable grief to his family, you don’t get a second
chance in my opinion. You had to do it right the first
time. . . .
‘‘I sat here all morning and I still at times did not
know what to do. I had to listen to everything to get a
whole picture. It’s difficult. I do believe that the benefi-
cial purposes of probation are no longer being served.
She is not an appropriate candidate for probation. She
went about her life consuming a large amount of alco-
hol, and if she was drinking like this as seen in the
pictures, and she was driving, she was driving. I’m not
saying she was driving while intoxicated . . . . Her not
doing two conditions of probation is egregious. I was
thinking about continuing her on probation with a jail
sentence, but I’m going to end this today.’’ The court
then terminated probation and sentenced the defendant
to three years of incarceration.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, rais-
ing several due process claims. The Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding, inter
alia, that the defendant’s claim that the Facebook photo-
graphs were unreliable was unpreserved and did not
merit review under Golding because the claimed viola-
tion was not of constitutional magnitude. State v.
Altajir, supra, 123 Conn. App. 687. This court thereafter
granted the defendant’s petition for certification to
appeal limited to the following questions: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court properly decline to review the defen-
dant’s claim that she was deprived of due process
because the sentencing court allowed the state to intro-
duce allegedly unreliable Facebook material into evi-
dence, which the court relied upon at sentencing, and
if so, whether the defendant was in fact deprived of
her due process rights?’’ State v. Altajir, 299 Conn. 902,
10 A.3d 520 (2010). We assume, without deciding, that
the defendant preserved her claim that the photographs
were unreliable because it is evident from the facts of
the present case that the defendant cannot establish
that the admission of the photographs deprived her of
due process. See State v. Cator, 256 Conn. 785, 791–92,
781 A.2d 285 (2001) (assuming, without deciding, pres-
ervation issue); State v. Haase, 243 Conn. 324, 338 n.12,
702 A.2d 1187 (1997) (same), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1111,
118 S. Ct. 1685, 140 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1998).
We begin by addressing the standards under which
we review the defendant’s due process claim.4 ‘‘A revo-
cation of probation hearing has two distinct compo-
nents . . . . A factual determination by a trial court as
to whether a probationer has violated a condition of
probation must first be made. If a violation is found, a
court must next determine whether probation should
be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation
are no longer being served. . . . Since there are two
distinct components of the revocation hearing, our stan-
dard of review differs depending on which part of the
hearing we are reviewing.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 104, 905 A.2d
1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491,
167 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2007).
In the present case, the defendant has admitted to
violations of the conditions of her probation and con-
tests only the trial court’s decision to revoke probation
and reimpose three years of her original prison sen-
tence. ‘‘The standard of review of the trial court’s deci-
sion at the [dispositional] phase of the revocation of
probation hearing is whether the trial court exercised its
discretion properly by reinstating the original sentence
and ordering incarceration. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is
required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest
or where injustice appears to have been done.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, 286 Conn.
367, 377, 944 A.2d 276 (2008).
In this exercise of broad discretion, however, the trial
court must continue to comport with the requirements
of due process. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that ‘‘[b]oth the probationer . . . and the
[s]tate have interests in the accurate finding of fact and
the informed use of discretion—the probationer . . .
to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away
and the [s]tate to make certain that it is neither unneces-
sarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation
nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the commu-
nity.’’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785, 93 S. Ct.
1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); id., 781–82 (applying due
process principles to probation revocation proceeding).
Our review of whether the trial court engaged in such
an ‘‘informed use of discretion’’; id., 785; is in turn gov-
erned by the well established standards for reviewing
a trial court’s exercise of similarly broad discretion at
sentencing in a criminal trial.5
It is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sen-
tencing ‘‘judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information he may consider or the source from
which it may come.’’ United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 446, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972). In
keeping with this principle, we have recognized that
‘‘[a] sentencing judge has very broad discretion in
imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and
in exercising that discretion he may and should consider
matters that would not be admissible at trial. . . . Gen-
erally, due process does not require that information
considered by the trial judge prior to sentencing meet
the same high procedural standard as evidence intro-
duced at trial. Rather, judges may consider a wide vari-
ety of information.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn.
5, 20, 912 A.2d 992 (2007).
We have cautioned, however, that ‘‘[t]he trial court’s
discretion . . . is not completely unfettered. As a mat-
ter of due process, information may be considered as
a basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indic-
ium of reliability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Eric M., 271 Conn. 641, 650, 858 A.2d 767 (2004).
As we have long recognized, in keeping with due pro-
cess, a defendant ‘‘may not be sentenced on the basis
of improper factors or erroneous information.’’ State v.
Thompson, 197 Conn. 67, 77, 495 A.2d 1054 (1985).
Further, ‘‘courts must be concerned not merely when
a sentencing judge has relied on demonstrably false
information, but [also] when the sentencing process
created a significant possibility that misinformation
infected the decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, ‘‘[a]s long as the sentencing
judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on
the information which he uses to fashion his ultimate
sentence, an appellate court should not interfere with
his discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Bletsch, supra, 281 Conn. 21.
In considering a claim that the trial court relied on
unreliable information at sentencing, we therefore con-
duct a two-pronged inquiry: first, did the information
at issue contain some minimal indicium of reliability;
second, if it did not, did the trial court substantially rely
on this improper information in fashioning its ultimate
sentence? See State v. Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 321, 507
A.2d 99 (1986) (‘‘the mere reference [by the sentencing
court] to information outside of the record does not
require a sentence to be set aside unless the defendant
shows: [1] that the information was materially false or
unreliable; and [2] that the trial court substantially
relied on the information in determining the sentence’’).
With respect to the threshold inquiry into reliability,
we note that ‘‘[t]here is no simple formula for determin-
ing what information considered by a sentencing judge
is sufficiently reliable to meet the requirements of due
process. The question must be answered on a case by
case basis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Eric M., supra, 271 Conn. 651. We have repeatedly
affirmed, however, a general principle relevant to this
case, namely, that ‘‘the absence of a denial itself pro-
vides an important [indicium] of reliability.’’ (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (‘‘[T]his appellant did not dispute the truthful-
ness of the allegations at sentencing. . . . We see no
reason to bar sentencing judges from considering rele-
vant information whose accuracy is not disputed.’’). In
State v. Anderson, 212 Conn. 31, 49–50, 561 A.2d 897
(1989), we highlighted the fact that ‘‘the defendant had
an opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing where
he could have disputed the court’s observations; how-
ever, he declined to do so. The absence of a denial itself
provides an important indicium of reliability.’’ Similarly,
in State v. Eric M., supra, 653, we commented: ‘‘In the
present case, the defendant has not established that
the statements in the article attributed to him were
materially false or unreliable. Significantly, he never
disputed having made the statements to the author, nor
did he take the opportunity to quarrel with the author’s
construal of his remarks. See United States v. Bass,
[supra, 121] (absence of denial itself provides important
indicium of reliability). Nor did he seek a continuance
to afford himself the opportunity to address the article.’’
See also State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 131–32, 505 A.2d
1242 (1986) (Healey, J., concurring) (suggesting that,
where sentencing court considered evidence of conduct
that defendant persistently denied and had not pleaded
guilty to, ‘‘[o]ne might also argue that his denial may
have attenuated somewhat the offered indicium of relia-
bility of otherwise inadmissible evidence’’). This
approach is in accord with a presumption applied under
the general rules of evidence: ‘‘When a statement, accu-
satory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of
an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may
be received into evidence as an admission on his part.
. . . Although evidence of silence in the face of an
accusation may be admissible under the ancient maxim
that silence gives consent the inference of assent may
be made only when no other explanation is consistent
with silence.’’6 (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522–23,
504 A.2d 480 (1986).
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the
particular facts of the present case. The evidence of
reliability proffered by the state here is, at best, limited,
and certainly would not be sufficient under the rules
of evidence at a trial. The state contends that under
the much less stringent standard for admissibility at
probation proceedings its uncontested representation
to the court that the defendant had darker colored hair
after her incarceration, consistent with her appearance
in some of the photographs, coupled with the presence
of upload dates on the photographs, provided an ade-
quate basis for the court to rely on the photographs as
depictions of the defendant’s behavior during proba-
tion.7 In refutation, however, the defendant has offered
even less. At no point did the defendant deny the state’s
clear and repeated assertion that these photographs
represented her behavior while on probation. Strikingly,
in her allocution the defendant made no attempt to
counter the state’s accusation that she appeared in
these photographs ‘‘again . . . worshipping at the altar
of alcohol and debauchery and lewd behavior’’ or to
respond to the court’s expressed bafflement that ‘‘she
still has the audacity to go back on Facebook and show
herself in a condition of being intoxicated.’’ Instead,
the defendant admitted, partially through counsel, that
she continued to drink alcohol and denied only the
suggestion that she ever drove after drinking.
Subsequent to the defendant’s allocution, the state
moved to admit the Facebook photographs at issue,
and again the defendant failed to deny that the behavior
in the photographs took place while she was on proba-
tion. In arguing that ‘‘I’m not sure there’s any way to
prove that [the behavior depicted in the photographs]
was during the period of probation,’’ the defendant
merely challenged the probative force of the evidence
itself, not the underlying truth to which the evidence
purportedly speaks. Neither before the trial court nor
in her appellate brief has the defendant claimed that
the Facebook photographs in fact depict her activities
exclusively prior to probation. See State v. Eric M.,
supra, 271 Conn. 653 (‘‘[s]ignificantly, [the defendant]
never disputed having made the statements to the
author, nor did he take the opportunity to quarrel with
the author’s construal of his remarks’’). The defendant
further failed to challenge the state’s characterization
of her hair color as a reliable basis for distinguishing
between photographs taken of her while on probation
and those taken prior to her incarceration. Finally,
although the defendant perhaps would not have had
sufficient time to fully assess each individual photo-
graph at the sentencing hearing, her failure to seek a
continuance in order to conduct such an analysis merely
reinforces the inference that the accuracy and timing
of the photographs were not subject to challenge. See
id. (‘‘[n]or did [the defendant] seek a continuance to
afford himself the opportunity to address the article’’).
Under these circumstances, because the state has
articulated an uncontradicted basis for determining
whether each of the challenged images depicted the
defendant before or during probation and because the
defendant has failed to contest that the photographs
do in fact depict her while on probation,8 we hold that
the photographs contained the minimal indicia of relia-
bility necessary to pass constitutional muster in the
context of a probation revocation hearing.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
‘‘Each [Facebook] user maintains a ‘profile,’ which is a webpage con-
taining basic information such as the individual’s year of graduation and
home town, as well as personal information, such as his or her name and
whether he or she is single or in a relationship (i.e., ‘relationship status’).
Users may inform others about what they are doing by changing the ‘current
status’ message that appears at the top of the profile. . . .
‘‘Facebook allows users to designate ‘friends.’ An individual who is invited
to be a member’s Facebook friend may either accept or reject the offer,
thus providing individual control over one’s list of friends. The user can
control how much information to post and who can view this information
by editing their privacy settings. Specific groups of people (a network or
friends) may be granted limited access to specific parts of the profile.
‘‘Facebook members can upload digital pictures into virtual photo albums.
A user can be ‘tagged’ in these pictures so that his or her name appears in
the caption as a link to his or her profile. If the individual does not want
to be associated with the picture, he or she can ‘untag’ it, thereby removing
the name and the link (though this does not remove the picture). Members
are able to post comments on photos, which appear as messages below the
picture.’’ T. Pempek et al., ‘‘College Students’ Social Networking Experiences
on Facebook,’’ 30 J. Applied Developmental Psychol. 227, 230 (2009). Addi-
tional details regarding aspects of Facebook directly relevant to this appeal
will be provided as necessary.
Due to the dynamic nature of Facebook and other such social network
sites, these details, as well as basic structural features of the social network,
are subject to frequent modification. Care should therefore be taken to
assess information relating to social network sites on a case-by-case basis,
with due attention to the nature of the site at the time relevant to the case.
Up-to-date information regarding Facebook may be found in the ‘‘help’’
section of the Facebook website, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=
260315770650470. Further explanations of Facebook related terminology
may be found in the website’s glossary, http://www.facebook.com/help/
glossary.
2
As we note elsewhere; see footnotes 1, 3 and 7 of this opinion; customiza-
ble privacy settings allow individual Facebook users to exercise considerable
control over the availability of information associated with their profiles.
Moreover, the social network’s general infrastructure, including these pri-
vacy settings, is highly dynamic and in many cases may be accurately
assessed only with reference to a limited time period.
3
Of these twenty-four photographs, sixteen appear to have been accessed
by viewing this page of the defendant’s Facebook profile; the remaining
eight photographs appear to have been gathered from albums on other
Facebook users’ pages rather than from the defendant’s own profile. It is
possible to infer that all but one of those eight photographs could be viewed
on the defendant’s profile because a hyperlink ‘‘tag’’ bearing her name
accompanies each photograph. The one photograph that bears no such tag
depicts the defendant but appears otherwise not to have been associated
at all with her Facebook profile.
As we previously have noted; see footnote 1 of this opinion; Facebook
is constantly changing. At the time of sentencing, a Facebook user could
place restrictions on who could ‘‘untag’’ a photograph, removing the link
between the user’s album and one’s own profile; a user was not able, how-
ever, to delete the photograph from the other user’s album to which it was
originally posted. See T. Pempek et al., ‘‘College Students’ Social Networking
Experiences on Facebook,’’ 30 J. Applied Developmental Psychol. 227,
230 (2009).
4
‘‘Although we note that [t]he due process provisions of the state and
federal constitutions generally have the same meaning and impose similar
constitutional limitations . . . in this case, [t]he defendant has not offered
any independent and adequate analysis under the state constitution. We
therefore confine our analysis to [her] claims under the federal constitution.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andresen, 256
Conn. 313, 318 n.5, 773 A.2d 328 (2001).
5
This court has indicated that ‘‘the disposition phase of a probation revoca-
tion proceeding is, in substance, largely indistinguishable from the sentenc-
ing that follows a criminal prosecution’’; State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339,
349, 703 A.2d 109 (1997); and the Appellate Court has applied this court’s
standard for reviewing discretionary consideration of evidence at sentenc-
ing, articulated in State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986), to
probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Young, 63 Conn. App.
794, 800, 778 A.2d 1015 (‘‘The [probation revocation] process, however, is
not so flexible as to be completely unrestrained; there must be some indica-
tion that the information presented to the court is responsible and has some
minimal indicia of reliability. State v. Huey, supra, [127].’’), cert. denied,
258 Conn. 903, 782 A.2d 140 (2001). Although this court has not yet had
occasion to consider this issue, the parties in the present case agree that
the criminal sentencing standard applies. We note, however, that, although
the due process requirements for criminal sentencing hearings and probation
revocation dispositional hearings are generally indistinguishable, the non-
criminal nature of probation proceedings does not give rise to identical
constitutional protections. See footnote 6 of this opinion (discussing self-
incrimination privilege in context of revocation of probation).
6
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has held with respect
to criminal trials: ‘‘The [g]overnment retains the burden of proving facts
relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant
in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. . . . By
holding [the] petitioner’s silence against her in determining the facts of the
offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissi-
ble burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled
self-incrimination.’’ (Citation omitted.) Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 330, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1999). This concern over self-
incrimination is not present, however, in the context of probation revocation:
‘‘Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of
due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. . . . Just as there is no right
to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.1, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 79
L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984).
7
The state also contended at oral argument before this court that the
mere fact that during her period of probation the defendant’s limited access
Facebook profile displayed images of her consuming alcohol, regardless of
when the photographs were taken, provided adequate warrant for consider-
ing those images. We reject this contention for several reasons. The state
offered no evidence that the images were viewable by the public at large,
and the defendant expressly declared that they were not public in this
manner. More, upon closer examination, it is clear that only two of the
alcohol related images at issue were uploaded by the defendant herself and
that a number of the other relevant images were accessed and printed not
by visiting the defendant’s own Facebook profile but by visiting the profiles
of other Facebook users. It is therefore only by inference, unsubstantiated
by evidence presented by the state, that the court could have gleaned that
these images likely appeared on the defendant’s profile as well as on the
profiles on which they were posted. Given the state’s complete failure to
substantiate its controverted characterization of the defendant’s Facebook
profile and the fragmentary nature of the evidence presented, the court
could not, as an ‘‘informed use of discretion’’; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411
U.S. 785; reasonably have determined, solely on the basis of the photographs
submitted to it, that the defendant’s Facebook profile represented a ‘‘shrine
to alcohol and celebrated consumption of alcohol and partying,’’ as the state
argues on appeal.
8
It is apparent that the defendant has light colored hair in a number of
the photographs submitted to the court, that some photographs in which
the defendant has dark colored hair are catalogued as ‘‘random old pics’’
and that the defendant does not appear in some of the photographs at all.
The defendant, however, does not renew on appeal her initial objection
that the court should have refrained from considering some or all of the
photographs because they are extraneous to the issue of the defendant’s
behavior on probation.