In re Jessica M.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJanuary 31, 2012
DocketSC18752
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; Harper
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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IN RE JESSICA M.*
(SC 18752)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella and Harper, Js.
Argued October 18, 2011—officially released January 31, 2012
Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Sarah Eagan
and, on the brief, Stacey Violante Cote, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).
Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Mary-Anne Ziewacz Mulholland, assistant
attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attor-
ney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (intervenor).
Opinion
ROGERS, C. J. The petitioner, Jessica M., appealed
to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing her petition seeking to have herself
adjudicated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth,
filed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (a).1 In re
Jessica M., 125 Conn. App. 584, 11 A.3d 689 (2010).
On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the trial court
improperly dismissed the petition as moot because, two
and one-half months after she filed it, she reached her
eighteenth birthday. Id., 586–87. The Appellate Court
affirmed the judgment of dismissal. Id., 588. We then
granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to
appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate
Court properly conclude that the trial court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition?’’ In
re Jessica M., 300 Conn. 917, 13 A.3d 1102 (2011). We
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court’s opinion sets forth the following
facts and procedural history. ‘‘On November 5, 2009,
[the] then seventeen year old [petitioner] filed a petition
in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford,
alleging that she was neglected and uncared for as
defined by General Statutes § 46b-120. On December
17, 2009, the department of children and families
(department) successfully moved to intervene in the
proceedings. The court also set a trial date of January
4, 2010, which was prior to [the petitioner’s] eigh-
teenth birthday.
‘‘On that date, the court continued the matter due to
(1) [the petitioner’s] failure to arrange for interpreters
for two witnesses and (2) its granting of a motion in
limine filed by the department. The court, on its own
motion, transferred the case to the Child Protection
Session in Middletown. Although a second trial date
before [the petitioner’s] eighteenth birthday was
offered, counsel for [the petitioner’s] mother was
unavailable for that day. A trial date was scheduled for
February 26, 2010, approximately five weeks after [the
petitioner] had reached the age of eighteen.
‘‘On February 5, 2010, the department filed a motion
to dismiss the petition. It argued that the court, specifi-
cally, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, lacked
jurisdiction over adults, individuals over the age of sev-
enteen. The department further claimed that the court
lacked statutory authority to adjudicate an individual
over the age of seventeen as neglected or uncared for,
even if the petition had been filed prior to the individu-
al’s eighteenth birthday. Last, the department argued
that [the petitioner’s] petition was moot.
‘‘The court heard oral argument on the motion to
dismiss and issued its memorandum of decision on
March 16, 2010. The court concluded that it lost subject
matter jurisdiction and that the matter had become
moot as of [the petitioner’s] ‘ceasing to be a child or
youth.’ Additionally, it stated that because the court was
unable to issue any order committing [the petitioner] to
the custody of the department, or transferring guardian-
ship over her to another person, the case was moot
and no exception to that doctrine applied. Accordingly,
the court granted the department’s motion to dismiss
the neglect and uncared-for petition.’’ In re Jessica M.,
supra, 125 Conn. App. 586–87.
In In re Jose B., 303 Conn. , A.3d (2012),
which was released on the same date as this opinion,
we concluded that the trial court lacks statutory author-
ity to adjudicate a person neglected or uncared-for pur-
suant to § 46b-129 (a) after the person reaches the age
of eighteen years and, therefore, the court necessarily
lacks statutory authority to provide dispositional relief
to such a person pursuant to § 46b-129 (j).2 We adopt
the reasoning and result of that opinion herein. We
conclude, therefore, that, in the present case, the trial
court lacked statutory authority both to adjudicate the
petitioner neglected or uncared-for after she reached
the age of eighteen years and to provide her with dispo-
sitional relief. We further conclude that, because the
trial court lacked such statutory authority, that court
properly concluded that the petition was rendered moot
when the petitioner reached her eighteenth birthday.
See Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque,
267 Conn. 116, 126–27, 836 A.2d 414 (2003) (case is
moot when ‘‘[i]ntervening circumstances have changed
the legal landscape . . . and the court cannot grant
the [petitioner] any practical relief’’). Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alter-
nate ground.3
This conclusion disposes of the petitioner’s claim
that the Appellate Court improperly declined to address
her claim that her petition was not moot because it
falls within the collateral consequences exception to
the mootness doctrine. See Williams v. Ragaglia, 261
Conn. 219, 226, 802 A.2d 778 (2002) (‘‘despite develop-
ments during the pendency of an appeal that would
otherwise render a claim moot, the court may retain
jurisdiction when a litigant shows that there is a reason-
able possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences
will occur’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Specifi-
cally, she claims that, because an adjudication of
neglect pursuant to § 46b-129 (a) would enable her to
seek special immigrant juvenile status from the federal
government, her claim for an adjudication of neglect
was not moot even if the trial court could not grant
dispositional relief pursuant to § 46b-129 (j). We have
concluded, however, that, not only did the trial court
lack statutory authority to provide dispositional relief
to the petitioner after she reached her eighteenth birth-
day, it also lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the
petitioner neglected or uncared-for. The collateral con-
sequences doctrine cannot confer statutory authority
on the trial court that is otherwise lacking. Accordingly,
we reject this claim.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79-3, the names of the parties involved in this appeal
are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for
inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order
of the Appellate Court.
1
General Statutes § 46b-129 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any selectman,
town manager, or town, city or borough welfare department, any probation
officer, or the Commissioner of Social Services, the Commissioner of Chil-
dren and Families or any child-caring institution or agency approved by the
Commissioner of Children and Families, a child or such child’s representative
or attorney or a foster parent of a child, having information that a child or
youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent, may file with the Superior
Court that has venue over such matter a verified petition plainly stating
such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court
as neglected, uncared-for or dependent, within the meaning of section 46b-
120 . . . .’’
2
General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon finding
and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or dependent,
the court may commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children
and Families. . . . The commissioner shall be the guardian of such child
or youth for the duration of the commitment, provided the child or youth
has not reached the age of eighteen years or, in the case of a child or youth
in full-time attendance in a secondary school, a technical school, a college
or a state-accredited job training program, provided such child or youth has
not reached the age of twenty-one years, by consent of such youth, or until
another guardian has been legally appointed . . . .’’
3
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition because the petitioner ‘‘failed to establish the
factual predicate required for jurisdiction under § 46b-129 (j).’’ In re Jessica
M., supra, 125 Conn. App. 588. We concluded in In re Jose B., however,
that the failure to establish an essential fact for obtaining relief under that
statute does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but
rather, implicates its statutory authority. In re Jose B., supra, 303 Conn. .