Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** CHRISTINE L. SAPKO v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT ET AL. (SC 18680) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Harper, Js. Argued October 26, 2011—officially released June 12, 2012 John J. Quinn, with whom, on the brief, was John J. Quinn, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff). Lawrence G. Widem, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attor- ney general, for the appellee (named defendant). Opinion PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Christine L. Sapko, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation review board (board) upholding the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner for the eighth district (commissioner) denying her claim for survivor’s benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-3061 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The plaintiff had sought survivor’s bene- fits following the death of her husband, Anthony S. Sapko (decedent), an employee of the named defen- dant, the state of Connecticut.2 The commissioner denied the plaintiff’s claim following the commission- er’s determination that the decedent’s simultaneous ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone, which had been prescribed for compensable work injuries, and Seroquel, which had been prescribed for an unre- lated case of major depression, constituted a supersed- ing cause of his death and, therefore, that the decedent’s compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. After the board upheld the commis- sioner’s decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the board incorrectly had con- cluded that the commissioner’s application of the super- seding cause doctrine was proper in light of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 446, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), which abrogated that doctrine in most tort contexts.3 The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that the board incorrectly had concluded that the superseding cause doctrine applied to the present case but concluded that this impropriety was harmless because the record otherwise supported the board’s determination that the commissioner properly had applied the law to the facts in deciding the issue of proximate cause. See Sapko v. State, 123 Conn. App. 18, 26, 30, 1 A.3d 250 (2010). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the follow- ing issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the determination of the compensation review board that the compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of the decedent’s death?’’ Sapko v. State, 298 Conn. 923, 4 A.3d 1229 (2010). We conclude, contrary to the predicate determination of the Appellate Court, that the board correctly con- cluded that the superseding cause doctrine applies to certain cases under the act and, further, that the com- missioner’s finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent’s compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts. We also reject the plaintiff’s claim that the commissioner’s find- ing is incompatible with our statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., 288 Conn. 392, 953 A.2d 28 (2008), that an injured employee is entitled to recovery under the act if he can demonstrate that his employment con- tributed to the injury ‘‘in more than a de minimus way.’’ Id., 413. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, albeit on the basis of different rea- soning. The facts, as found by the commissioner and accepted by the board, are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court: ‘‘The [plaintiff] is the dependent spouse of [the decedent]. She and the decedent were the parents of two minor children. On August 18, 2006, the decedent died. The decedent’s cause of death was the result of multiple drug toxicity due to the interaction of excessive doses of Oxycodone and Seroquel . . . . In addition to identifying the cause of death as multiple drug toxicity, the medical examiner’s report also indi- cated that the nature of the decedent’s death was an accident and not suicide. . . . ‘‘Until the time of his death, the decedent was employed as a correction officer for the state of Con- necticut. The decedent’s employment with the state began December 8, 1995, and followed his twenty-one year tenure as [a] police officer for the city of New Britain. ‘‘In the course of his employment as a correction officer, the decedent experienced four incidents [that] gave rise to claims for workers’ compensation benefits. [These incidents occurred on February 13, 2001, Sep- tember 25, 2005, December 10, 2005, and May 16, 2006.] Following the May 16, 2006 incident, the decedent remained out of work due to a compensable back injury. Between March 15, 2005, [and] August 1, 2006, the dece- dent was treated for back pain by . . . Mark Thimineur [a physician with] the Comprehensive Pain and Head- ache Treatment Center, LLC. During the period of this treatment the decedent was prescribed various medica- tions. The prescribed drugs included: Oxycodone, Zanaflex, Kadian, Celebrex, Roxicodone, Avinza, Lidod- erm patches and Duragesic. . . . The record before the [commissioner] reflected that the Comprehensive Pain and Headache Treatment Center, LLC, counseled the decedent on the proper use of the drugs prescribed for pain control and required the decedent to participate in a controlled substances agreement. . . . ‘‘Beginning in December, 1999, the decedent started treatment for major depression with . . . Edgardo D. Lorenzo, a psychiatrist. The decedent [went to] . . . Lorenzo [as a patient] until the time of [the decedent’s] death. The week prior to his death, the decedent com- plained to . . . Lorenzo of depression and racing thoughts. It was for these symptoms that . . . Lorenzo prescribed [the antipsychotic medication] Seroquel. ‘‘The record also indicated that, at the time of his death, the decedent’s level of Oxycodone was twenty times higher than the therapeutic dosage, and the level of Seroquel was in excess of five times the therapeutic dosage. The [commissioner] found that both drugs can be taken safely if taken in proper dosages.’’4 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sapko v. State, supra, 123 Conn. App. 21–23. ‘‘At the hearing before the commissioner, the parties presented the opinions of several medical profession- als. Marc J. Bayer, chief of the toxicology division at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine, stated that the decedent’s death was the result of the combined drug toxicity of Oxycodone and Seroquel. Unlike the conclusion of Frank Evangelista, an associ- ate medical examiner from the office of the chief medi- cal examiner, who concluded that the decedent’s death was accidental, Bayer concluded that there was insuffi- cient evidence to determine whether the decedent delib- erately killed himself or if his death was the accidental result of a deliberate act. He further noted that although the level of Oxycodone in the decedent’s system was twenty times higher than the therapeutic dosage, it was unlikely that such a dosage could have caused the dece- dent’s death in the absence of the Seroquel. [Bayer also testified that narcotic users do not usually take more Seroquel than prescribed because it is an antipsychotic drug that does not produce a comforting feeling or cause the user to become high.] The commissioner found Bayer to be credible and persuasive. ‘‘The commissioner also examined the deposition [testimony] of Lorenzo, the decedent’s psychiatrist. Lorenzo began treating the decedent on December 20, 1999, prior to any of the decedent’s compensable injur- ies, at which time he diagnosed the decedent with major depression. The decedent did not claim his treatment with Lorenzo as part of his workers’ compensation case, and Lorenzo’s treatment notes do not reflect a relation- ship between the decedent’s injuries and his need for [psychiatric] treatment. Lorenzo prescribed Seroquel to treat the decedent’s racing thoughts and depression and for mood stabilization on August 9, 2006, nine days prior to the decedent’s death. In Lorenzo’s view, the decedent’s death was accidental. The commissioner did not find Lorenzo to be credible. He explicitly disre- garded Lorenzo’s conclusion that the decedent’s work- place injuries made him more depressed. [The com- missioner also found that the decedent received repeated instructions and counseling regarding the proper use of the prescribed controlled substances and entered into a controlled substances agreement as part of his treatment.]’’ Id., 26–27. On the basis of this evidence, the commissioner found that there was no causal relationship between the dece- dent’s compensable injuries and his need for psychiatric treatment, including his treatment with Seroquel. He also concluded that the ‘‘[e]levated [level] of Oxycodone by itself did not cause [the decedent’s] death.’’ Rather, the commissioner found that the decedent’s ‘‘ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Seroquel, [al]though accidental, constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death.’’5 He also concluded that ‘‘[the decedent’s] work injuries of February 13, 2001, September 25, 2005, December 10, 2005, and May 16, 2006, were neither a substantial factor nor the proximate cause of [the decedent’s] death.’’6 The plaintiff appealed to the board from the decision of the commissioner, claiming that, in light of our abro- gation of the superseding cause doctrine in Barry, the commissioner improperly had relied on that doctrine in concluding that the decedent’s compensable injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The board disagreed, explaining that, because Barry was predi- cated on the change in our tort law away from contribu- tory negligence to a system of comparative fault and apportionment, Barry applies to negligence claims only. The board stated that, ‘‘[g]iven the strict liability concepts underpinning [the] . . . [a]ct . . . we do not think that Barry applies as [the plaintiff] argue[s] . . . .’’ The board further concluded that the record supported the commissioner’s finding that an outside causal agency, namely, the decedent’s ingestion of excessive quantities of prescribed medication, had intervened and broken the chain of causation between the decedent’s compensable injuries and his death. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the decision of the board, claiming, contrary to the determination of the board, that Barry had abrogated the superseding cause doctrine in workers’ compensa- tion cases and, therefore, that the board improperly had upheld the commissioner’s finding that the decedent’s ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Ser- oquel constituted a superseding cause of his death. The Appellate Court agreed that the commissioner’s applica- tion of the superseding cause doctrine was improper. Sapko v. State, supra, 123 Conn. App. 26. Specifically, the court determined that, ‘‘[a]lthough neither Barry nor its progeny directly addressed the question of whether the superseding cause doctrine had been abro- gated in workers’ compensation cases, [the] Supreme Court has since interpreted . . . Barry . . . to enu- merate the exceptions to [the court’s] abrogation of the doctrine . . . [as being] ‘limited to situations in which an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or criminal event supersedes the defendant’s tortious con- duct . . . .’ [Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 44, 946 A.2d 839 (2008)]. Although it remains possible that a workers’ compensation case could fit into one of the enumerated exceptions, [the court is] not faced with an intentional tort, force of nature or criminal event in the present case.’’ Sapko v. State, supra, 25–26. The Appellate Court also concluded, however, that the board’s improper reading of Barry was harmless because the record supported the board’s determina- tion that the commissioner properly had applied the law to the facts in deciding the issue of proximate cause. See id., 29–30. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘The board accepted the commissioner’s conclusion that the dece- dent’s accidental ingestion of excessive quantities of prescribed medication broke the chain of proximate causation. In the absence of any credible evidence tend- ing to show that the decedent’s depression and subse- quent prescription for Seroquel were related to his compensable injuries, that he purposely killed himself for some reason arising out of his compensable injuries or that the dosage of Oxycodone alone could have caused the decedent’s death, the causal link between his compensable injuries and his death simply becomes too attenuated to support a reasonable inference that the injuries and death were connected. The board’s conclusion correctly applied the law and did not rely on facts that were found without evidence or fail to include material facts that were admitted or undis- puted.’’ Id. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff raises two claims, both of which relate to the law of proximate causation. First, the plaintiff contends that, although the Appellate Court properly concluded that the superseding cause doctrine does not apply to cases arising under the act, the Appellate Court was incorrect in determining that the contrary conclusion of the board and the commis- sioner constituted harmless error.7 Second, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly failed to heed this court’s statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., supra, 288 Conn. 392, that ‘‘the substantial factor causation standard simply requires that the employ- ment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way.’’ Id., 412–13. According to the plaintiff, this require- ment is satisfied in the present case because it is undis- puted that the decedent would not have died but for his ingestion of Oxycodone, which he would not have been taking but for his compensable injuries.8 We conclude that the commissioner properly applied the superseding cause doctrine in finding that the dece- dent’s compensable work injuries were not the proxi- mate cause of his death. We further conclude that the plaintiff’s reliance on Birnie is misplaced. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth the principles that govern our review in workers’ com- pensation appeals. ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determin- ing the facts rests [with] the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . The conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incor- rect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . ‘‘It matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference [that] seems most rea- sonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Six v. Thomas O’Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 798–99, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996). Furthermore, ‘‘[i]t is well settled that, because the purpose of the act is to compensate employees for injuries without fault by imposing a form of strict liabil- ity on employers, to recover for an injury under the act a plaintiff must prove that the injury is causally connected to the employment. To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the claimed injury (1) arose out of the employment, and (2) in the course of the employment. . . . Proof that [an] injury arose out of the employment relates to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. . . . Proof that [an] injury occurred in the course of the employ- ment means that the injury must occur (a) within the period of the employment; (b) at a place the employee may reasonably be; and (c) while the employee is rea- sonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daubert v. Naugatuck, 267 Conn. 583, 588–89, 840 A.2d 1152 (2004); see also Kolo- miets v. Syncor International Corp., 252 Conn. 261, 272, 746 A.2d 743 (2000) (‘‘[t]he essential connecting link of direct causal connection between the personal injury and the employment must be established before the act becomes operative’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). ‘‘[I]n Connecticut traditional concepts of proximate cause constitute the rule for determining . . . causa- tion [in workers’ compensation cases]. . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the [employer’s] conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the [employee’s] injuries. . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied [the employee’s] injuries to the [employer’s con- duct]. . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 294 Conn. 132, 141–42, 982 A.2d 157 (2009). As we previously have indicated, ‘‘[t]his court has defined proximate cause as [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 606, 662 A.2d 753 (1995). ‘‘Because actual causation, in theory, is virtually lim- itless, the legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the causal continuum tortfea- sors will be held liable for the consequences of their actions. . . . The fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligent conduct.’’ (Citation omitted.) First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999). ‘‘The question of proximate causation . . . belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue. . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., supra, 611. I We first address the plaintiff’s contention that, although the Appellate Court properly determined, in light of Barry, that the board was incorrect in conclud- ing that the commissioner properly had applied the superseding cause doctrine in resolving the plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the act, the Appellate Court wrongly determined that the impropriety was harm- less.9 We reject the plaintiff’s contention that the super- seding cause doctrine does not apply to cases under the act and we further conclude that the commissioner properly applied that doctrine to the facts of the pres- ent case. In Barry, a product liability case, we considered whether the superseding cause doctrine had outlived its usefulness in our modern system of torts, which is based on comparative fault and apportionment. As we explained in Barry, ‘‘[t]he function of the [superseding cause] doctrine is to define the circumstances under which responsibility may be shifted entirely from the shoulders of one person, who is determined to be negli- gent, to the shoulders of another person, who may also be determined to be negligent, or to some other force. . . . Thus, the doctrine . . . serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely else- where. . . . If a third person’s negligence is found to be the superseding cause of the . . . injuries, that neg- ligence, rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injur- [ies]. . . . ‘‘Even if a plaintiff’s injuries are in fact caused by a defendant’s negligence, a superseding cause may break that causal connection if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant’s negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any degree, produces the injury; or it must be the noncon- curring culpable act of a human being who is legally responsible for such act. . . . If a defendant’s negli- gence was a substantial factor in producing the plain- tiff’s injuries, the defendant would not be relieved from liability for those injuries even though another force concurred to produce them.’’ (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 434–35. In Barry, ‘‘[w]e [took the] opportunity to clarify our approach to the doctrine of superseding cause and its continuing validity in our tort jurisprudence. . . . [W]e conclude[d] that the doctrine . . . no longer serve[d] a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. . . . [We explained] that under those circumstances, super- seding cause instructions serve to complicate what is fundamentally a proximate cause analysis. Specifically, we [stated] that, because our statutes allow for appor- tionment among negligent defendants; see General Stat- utes § 52-572h;10 and because Connecticut is a compara- tive negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52- 572o;11 the simpler and less confusing approach to cases, such as [Barry], [in which] the jury must deter- mine which, among many, causes contributed to the [plaintiff’s] injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than [to allow] the [defendant] to raise a defense of superseding cause.’’ Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 436–39. We also noted that, in addition to possibly confusing the jury, a separate instruction on the superseding cause doctrine was unnecessary because ‘‘the term supersed- ing cause merely describes more fully the concept of proximate cause when there is more than one alleged act of negligence, and is not functionally distinct from the determination of whether an act is a proximate cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.’’ Id., 440. Indeed, we explained that ‘‘[a] superseding cause is, by definition, one that is not reasonably foreseeable. As a result, the doctrine in today’s world adds nothing to the requirement of foreseeability that is not already inherent in the requirement of causation. . . . [Accord- ingly] it [is] proper for the trial court to instruct only on proximate causation because the substance of the doctrine of superseding cause [is] fully explained in the instruction on proximate cause.’’12 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 445. We also emphasized in Barry, however, that ‘‘[o]ur conclusion that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful purpose is limited to the situation in cases, such as [Barry], [in which] a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence. Our conclusion does not necessarily affect those cases [in which] the defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event super- sedes its tortious conduct. . . . Nor does our conclu- sion necessarily affect the doctrine of superseding cause in the area of criminal law. . . . We leave those questions to cases that squarely present them.’’ (Cita- tions omitted.) Id., 439 n.16. Subsequently, in Archam- bault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., supra, 287 Conn. 20, we stated that the superseding cause doctrine was ‘‘largely abandoned in Barry in favor of comparative and contributory negligence’’; id., 45; subject only to certain narrow exceptions, namely, ‘‘situations in which an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or criminal event supersedes the defendant’s tortious con- duct . . . .’’ Id., 44. It is this language that the Appellate Court relied on in concluding, like the plaintiff, that, because workers’ compensation cases were not included on Archam- bault’s enumerated list of exceptions, this court did not intend to exempt them from Barry’s purview. In Barry, however, this court abrogated the superseding cause doctrine for negligence cases only because, in those cases, a jury is tasked with apportioning liability in accordance with our comparative fault and apportion- ment statutes. We simply did not consider whether the doctrine should be abolished in workers’ compensation cases. Upon consideration of that question in the pre- sent case, we agree with the board that the concerns that caused us to abrogate the doctrine in Barry simply are not implicated in our workers’ compensation scheme, which, in contrast to our comparative negli- gence tort scheme, is a no-fault compensation system that imposes a form of strict liability on employers. See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672, 748 A.2d 834 (2000) (‘‘[t]he purpose of the [act] . . . is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault’’ [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers’ compen- sation cases); O’Connor v. O’Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers’ compensation scheme ‘‘eschews investigation into the possible negligence of the [employer’s] conduct and limits the amount of dam- ages the [employee] . . . may recover’’). Furthermore, as our previous discussion makes clear, we abrogated the superseding cause doctrine in Barry not because the concept of superseding cause is inher- ently incompatible with our proximate cause jurispru- dence but out of concern that a separate instruction concerning the doctrine might confuse jurors by caus- ing them to ignore or discount the comparative fault and apportionment principles underlying §§ 52-572h and 52- 572o. Workers’ compensation cases, however, are not decided by juries but, rather, by trial commissioners. In such cases, there is not the same concern that the trier of fact will be confused by the concept of a super- seding cause in deciding the element of causation. In the present case, therefore, we may assume that, when the commissioner referred to the decedent’s accidental overdose as a ‘‘superseding cause’’ of his death, his use of the term accurately reflected his finding as to the causal effect of the decedent’s ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Seroquel, that is, that it broke the chain of causation between the decedent’s compensable work injuries and his death. The commissioner’s application of the superseding cause doctrine is in accord with the approach advocated by Professor Arthur Larson for determining causation when an employee, having suffered a compensable pri- mary injury during the course of his employment, later sustains a second injury outside the course of employ- ment for which the employee seeks compensation, claiming that the second injury relates back to the pri- mary injury in a sufficiently direct way. Professor Lar- son explains: ‘‘A distinction must be observed between causation rules affecting the primary injury . . . and causation rules that determine how far the range of compensable consequences is carried, once the primary injury is causally connected with the employment. As to the primary injury, it has been shown that the ‘arising’ test is a unique one quite unrelated to common-law concepts of legal cause, and . . . the employee’s own contributory negligence is ordinarily not an intervening cause preventing initial compensability.13 But when the question is whether compensability should be extended to a subsequent injury or aggravation related in some way to the primary injury, the rules that come into play are essentially based [on] the concepts of ‘direct and natural results,’ and of [the employee’s] own conduct as an independent intervening cause.’’14 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation (2011) § 10.01, p. 10- 2. ‘‘The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury.’’ Id., pp. 10-2 through 10-3. Professor Larson further explains that, when a subsequent injury or aggravation of the primary injury arises out of what he describes as a ‘‘quasi- course’’ of employment activity,15 such as a trip to the doctor’s office for treatment of the primary injury, ‘‘the chain of causation should not be deemed broken by mere negligence in the performance of that activity . . . but only by intentional conduct which may be regarded as expressly or impliedly forbidden by the employer.’’ Id., § 10.5, p. 10-11. Consequently, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the primary injury are compensable. Thus, for example, an injured worker may recover for a new injury or an aggravation of a compensable injury resulting from medical treatment on the theory that the initial injury is the cause of all that follows. ‘‘When, however, the injury following the initial com- pensable injury does not arise out of a quasi-course activity, as when [an employee] with an injured hand engages in a boxing match, the chain of causation may be deemed [to be] broken by either intentional or negli- gent [employee] misconduct.’’ Id. Thus, Professor Lar- son explains that ‘‘compensability can be defeated by a certain degree of employee misconduct, and . . . that degree is something beyond simple negligence, and can best be described as an intentional violation of an express or implied prohibition in the matter of per- forming the act.’’ Id., p. 10-12. Professor Larson notes that ‘‘[o]ne advantage of the test of implied prohibition is that it can be reduced to two reasonably measurable requirements: The first is that the employer would have forbidden the act if it had had an opportunity to express itself on the subject; the second is that the employee knew or should have known of this fact.’’ Id. ‘‘As to what constitutes [employee] negligence, in these cases it often takes the form of rashly undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the risk created by the weakened member . . . .’’16 Id., § 10.06 [3], p. 10-17. Professor Larson provides several examples of subse- quent injury cases in which the reviewing court deter- mined that the fact finder reasonably had concluded that the chain of causation was broken by an intervening superseding cause. Of particular relevance to the pres- ent case is Carr v. Unit No. 8169/Midwestern Distribu- tion, 237 Kan. 660, 703 P.2d 751 (1985), in which the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that an employee’s hospitalization and medical treatment, which resulted from his overdose of pain medication that he was taking to treat a compensable injury, were not, as a matter of law, the direct and natural results of the primary injury. Id., 666; see also 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 10.04, p. 10-9 n.5. He also cites Williams v. White Castle Sys- tems, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 231 (Ky. 2005), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s determination that an employee’s drug overdose, fol- lowing surgery for a primary injury, was an indepen- dent, intervening cause of his death. Id., 235–36; see also 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 10.09 [4], p. 10- 28 n.24. As in the present case, the decedent in Williams died from multiple drug toxicity resulting from his ingestion of excessive quantities of drugs, only some of which he was taking for a compensable injury.17 See Williams v. White Castle Systems, Inc., supra, 233. In In re Death of Sade, 649 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1982), another case directly on point, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination that an employ- ee’s death was not the direct and natural consequence of his compensable arm injury but, instead, resulted from his voluntary, simultaneous ingestion of excessive quantities of pain medication and alcohol. Id., 540–41. As in the present case, the employee in that case had been taking the pain medication to treat a compensable injury. See id., 540. The court nevertheless determined that the employee’s conduct in consuming excessive quantities of that medication together with excessive quantities of alcohol intervened to break the chain of causation. See id., 540–41. Although this court has never expressly adopted the direct and natural consequence rule for subsequent injury cases, our case law indicates that we effectively have applied the rule in assessing the scope of an employer’s liability in those cases. See, e.g., Dehron v. Clark, 122 Conn. 592, 597, 191 A. 526 (1937) (concluding that intervening cause broke chain of proximate cause and citing cases from other jurisdictions in which com- pensation was denied when ‘‘a new injury, or the aggra- vation of the original injury resulting from medical or surgical treatment, was not directly traceable to the original injury, but arose instead from the intervention of an independent cause’’); Lemieux v. Highland Dairy Co., 121 Conn. 483, 484, 185 A. 433 (1936) (concluding ‘‘that the chain of causation between the injuries suf- fered at the time of the [work-related] accident and the death was broken by the [intervening] appendicitis . . . [such] that there was no unbroken chain of causation between the death and the accident’’); see also Imbrogno v. Stamford Hospital, 28 Conn. App. 113, 119, 612 A.2d 82 (‘‘temporary total disability benefits were denied on the basis of an intervening event, unre- lated to the compensable injury, which broke the chain of causation linked to the original, compensable injury’’), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920, 615 A.2d 507 (1992). Thus, in subsequent injury cases involving multi- ple causes, the concept of a superseding causal agent breaking the chain of proximate causation is not foreign to our jurisprudence. Our research reveals, moreover, that the direct and natural consequence rule is utilized in many if not most jurisdictions for determining causation in subsequent injury cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Pike County Commis- sion, 740 So. 2d 1080, 1084 (Ala. 1999); Parris-Eastlake v. State, 26 P.3d 1099, 1105 and n.21 (Alaska 2001); Lou Grubb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 174 Ariz. 23, 26, 846 P.2d 836 (App. 1992); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark. App. 132, 134–35, 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Colo. 1985); Korsak v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 94 Haw. 297, 305, 12 P.3d 1238 (2000); Nance v. Harvey County, 263 Kan. 542, 549, 952 P.2d 411 (1997); Addington Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, 947 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Ky. App. 1997); Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 273, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953); Meils ex rel. Meils v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 1984); Warpinski v. State Industrial Ins. System, 103 Nev. 567, 569, 747 P.2d 227 (1987); Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co., 8 N.C. App. 604, 610–11, 175 S.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 112 (1970); Anderson v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Tenn. 2008); Wilson v. Workers’ Compensation Commissioner, 174 W. Va. 611, 616, 328 S.E.2d 485 (1984). We agree with these courts that the rule provides the best framework for analyzing the element of proximate cause in cases involving a subsequent injury or an aggravation of an earlier, primary injury. It also accords with the approach that our own courts have utilized in deciding these questions, if not in name then in substance. It bears emphasis, however, as Professor Larson notes, that ‘‘[d]ecisions in these sorts of cases are neces- sarily fact driven’’; 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 10.04, p. 10-10.2; and, therefore, results will vary depending on the case. Consequently, whether a suffi- cient causal connection exists between the employment and a subsequent injury is, in the last analysis, a question of fact for the commissioner. It is axiomatic that, in reaching that determination, the commissioner often is required to ‘‘draw an inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. [As we previously have explained] [t]he propriety of that inference . . . is vital to the validity of the order subsequently entered. But the scope of judicial review of that inference is sharply limited . . . . If supported by evidence and not incon- sistent with the law, the . . . [c]ommissioner’s infer- ence that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the . . . [c]ommissioner is factually questionable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539–40, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). Only if no reasonable fact finder could have resolved the proximate cause issue as the commissioner resolved it will the commissioner’s decision be reversed by a reviewing court. We note, finally, that a related principle also bears on the issue of whether there exists the requisite causal connection between the primary injury and the subse- quent injury. Unless causation under the facts is a mat- ter of common knowledge, the plaintiff has the burden of introducing expert testimony to establish a causal link between the compensable workplace injury and the