Sapko v. State
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJune 12, 2012
DocketSC18680
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Harper
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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CHRISTINE L. SAPKO v. STATE OF
CONNECTICUT ET AL.
(SC 18680)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Harper, Js.
Argued October 26, 2011—officially released June 12, 2012
John J. Quinn, with whom, on the brief, was John
J. Quinn, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Lawrence G. Widem, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former
attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attor-
ney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion
PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Christine L. Sapko, appeals
from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which
affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation
review board (board) upholding the decision of the
workers’ compensation commissioner for the eighth
district (commissioner) denying her claim for survivor’s
benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-3061 of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes
§ 31-275 et seq. The plaintiff had sought survivor’s bene-
fits following the death of her husband, Anthony S.
Sapko (decedent), an employee of the named defen-
dant, the state of Connecticut.2 The commissioner
denied the plaintiff’s claim following the commission-
er’s determination that the decedent’s simultaneous
ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone, which
had been prescribed for compensable work injuries,
and Seroquel, which had been prescribed for an unre-
lated case of major depression, constituted a supersed-
ing cause of his death and, therefore, that the decedent’s
compensable work injuries were not the proximate
cause of his death. After the board upheld the commis-
sioner’s decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate
Court, claiming that the board incorrectly had con-
cluded that the commissioner’s application of the super-
seding cause doctrine was proper in light of Barry v.
Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 446, 820
A.2d 258 (2003), which abrogated that doctrine in most
tort contexts.3 The Appellate Court agreed with the
plaintiff that the board incorrectly had concluded that
the superseding cause doctrine applied to the present
case but concluded that this impropriety was harmless
because the record otherwise supported the board’s
determination that the commissioner properly had
applied the law to the facts in deciding the issue of
proximate cause. See Sapko v. State, 123 Conn. App.
18, 26, 30, 1 A.3d 250 (2010). We granted the plaintiff’s
petition for certification to appeal limited to the follow-
ing issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the
determination of the compensation review board that
the compensable work injuries were not the proximate
cause of the decedent’s death?’’ Sapko v. State, 298
Conn. 923, 4 A.3d 1229 (2010).
We conclude, contrary to the predicate determination
of the Appellate Court, that the board correctly con-
cluded that the superseding cause doctrine applies to
certain cases under the act and, further, that the com-
missioner’s finding that superseding events broke the
chain of proximate causation between the decedent’s
compensable work injuries and his death constituted
a proper application of the law to the facts. We also
reject the plaintiff’s claim that the commissioner’s find-
ing is incompatible with our statement in Birnie v.
Electric Boat Corp., 288 Conn. 392, 953 A.2d 28 (2008),
that an injured employee is entitled to recovery under
the act if he can demonstrate that his employment con-
tributed to the injury ‘‘in more than a de minimus way.’’
Id., 413. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Court, albeit on the basis of different rea-
soning.
The facts, as found by the commissioner and
accepted by the board, are set forth in the opinion of
the Appellate Court: ‘‘The [plaintiff] is the dependent
spouse of [the decedent]. She and the decedent were
the parents of two minor children. On August 18, 2006,
the decedent died. The decedent’s cause of death was
the result of multiple drug toxicity due to the interaction
of excessive doses of Oxycodone and Seroquel . . . .
In addition to identifying the cause of death as multiple
drug toxicity, the medical examiner’s report also indi-
cated that the nature of the decedent’s death was an
accident and not suicide. . . .
‘‘Until the time of his death, the decedent was
employed as a correction officer for the state of Con-
necticut. The decedent’s employment with the state
began December 8, 1995, and followed his twenty-one
year tenure as [a] police officer for the city of New
Britain.
‘‘In the course of his employment as a correction
officer, the decedent experienced four incidents [that]
gave rise to claims for workers’ compensation benefits.
[These incidents occurred on February 13, 2001, Sep-
tember 25, 2005, December 10, 2005, and May 16, 2006.]
Following the May 16, 2006 incident, the decedent
remained out of work due to a compensable back injury.
Between March 15, 2005, [and] August 1, 2006, the dece-
dent was treated for back pain by . . . Mark Thimineur
[a physician with] the Comprehensive Pain and Head-
ache Treatment Center, LLC. During the period of this
treatment the decedent was prescribed various medica-
tions. The prescribed drugs included: Oxycodone,
Zanaflex, Kadian, Celebrex, Roxicodone, Avinza, Lidod-
erm patches and Duragesic. . . . The record before the
[commissioner] reflected that the Comprehensive Pain
and Headache Treatment Center, LLC, counseled the
decedent on the proper use of the drugs prescribed for
pain control and required the decedent to participate
in a controlled substances agreement. . . .
‘‘Beginning in December, 1999, the decedent started
treatment for major depression with . . . Edgardo D.
Lorenzo, a psychiatrist. The decedent [went to] . . .
Lorenzo [as a patient] until the time of [the decedent’s]
death. The week prior to his death, the decedent com-
plained to . . . Lorenzo of depression and racing
thoughts. It was for these symptoms that . . . Lorenzo
prescribed [the antipsychotic medication] Seroquel.
‘‘The record also indicated that, at the time of his
death, the decedent’s level of Oxycodone was twenty
times higher than the therapeutic dosage, and the level
of Seroquel was in excess of five times the therapeutic
dosage. The [commissioner] found that both drugs can
be taken safely if taken in proper dosages.’’4 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Sapko v. State, supra, 123
Conn. App. 21–23.
‘‘At the hearing before the commissioner, the parties
presented the opinions of several medical profession-
als. Marc J. Bayer, chief of the toxicology division at
the University of Connecticut School of Medicine,
stated that the decedent’s death was the result of the
combined drug toxicity of Oxycodone and Seroquel.
Unlike the conclusion of Frank Evangelista, an associ-
ate medical examiner from the office of the chief medi-
cal examiner, who concluded that the decedent’s death
was accidental, Bayer concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to determine whether the decedent delib-
erately killed himself or if his death was the accidental
result of a deliberate act. He further noted that although
the level of Oxycodone in the decedent’s system was
twenty times higher than the therapeutic dosage, it was
unlikely that such a dosage could have caused the dece-
dent’s death in the absence of the Seroquel. [Bayer also
testified that narcotic users do not usually take more
Seroquel than prescribed because it is an antipsychotic
drug that does not produce a comforting feeling or
cause the user to become high.] The commissioner
found Bayer to be credible and persuasive.
‘‘The commissioner also examined the deposition
[testimony] of Lorenzo, the decedent’s psychiatrist.
Lorenzo began treating the decedent on December 20,
1999, prior to any of the decedent’s compensable injur-
ies, at which time he diagnosed the decedent with major
depression. The decedent did not claim his treatment
with Lorenzo as part of his workers’ compensation case,
and Lorenzo’s treatment notes do not reflect a relation-
ship between the decedent’s injuries and his need for
[psychiatric] treatment. Lorenzo prescribed Seroquel to
treat the decedent’s racing thoughts and depression and
for mood stabilization on August 9, 2006, nine days
prior to the decedent’s death. In Lorenzo’s view, the
decedent’s death was accidental. The commissioner did
not find Lorenzo to be credible. He explicitly disre-
garded Lorenzo’s conclusion that the decedent’s work-
place injuries made him more depressed. [The com-
missioner also found that the decedent received
repeated instructions and counseling regarding the
proper use of the prescribed controlled substances and
entered into a controlled substances agreement as part
of his treatment.]’’ Id., 26–27.
On the basis of this evidence, the commissioner found
that there was no causal relationship between the dece-
dent’s compensable injuries and his need for psychiatric
treatment, including his treatment with Seroquel. He
also concluded that the ‘‘[e]levated [level] of Oxycodone
by itself did not cause [the decedent’s] death.’’ Rather,
the commissioner found that the decedent’s ‘‘ingestion
of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Seroquel,
[al]though accidental, constitute[d] a superseding cause
of his death.’’5 He also concluded that ‘‘[the decedent’s]
work injuries of February 13, 2001, September 25, 2005,
December 10, 2005, and May 16, 2006, were neither
a substantial factor nor the proximate cause of [the
decedent’s] death.’’6
The plaintiff appealed to the board from the decision
of the commissioner, claiming that, in light of our abro-
gation of the superseding cause doctrine in Barry, the
commissioner improperly had relied on that doctrine
in concluding that the decedent’s compensable injuries
were not the proximate cause of his death. The board
disagreed, explaining that, because Barry was predi-
cated on the change in our tort law away from contribu-
tory negligence to a system of comparative fault and
apportionment, Barry applies to negligence claims
only. The board stated that, ‘‘[g]iven the strict liability
concepts underpinning [the] . . . [a]ct . . . we do not
think that Barry applies as [the plaintiff] argue[s]
. . . .’’ The board further concluded that the record
supported the commissioner’s finding that an outside
causal agency, namely, the decedent’s ingestion of
excessive quantities of prescribed medication, had
intervened and broken the chain of causation between
the decedent’s compensable injuries and his death.
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from
the decision of the board, claiming, contrary to the
determination of the board, that Barry had abrogated
the superseding cause doctrine in workers’ compensa-
tion cases and, therefore, that the board improperly had
upheld the commissioner’s finding that the decedent’s
ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Ser-
oquel constituted a superseding cause of his death. The
Appellate Court agreed that the commissioner’s applica-
tion of the superseding cause doctrine was improper.
Sapko v. State, supra, 123 Conn. App. 26. Specifically,
the court determined that, ‘‘[a]lthough neither Barry
nor its progeny directly addressed the question of
whether the superseding cause doctrine had been abro-
gated in workers’ compensation cases, [the] Supreme
Court has since interpreted . . . Barry . . . to enu-
merate the exceptions to [the court’s] abrogation of the
doctrine . . . [as being] ‘limited to situations in which
an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or
criminal event supersedes the defendant’s tortious con-
duct . . . .’ [Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern,
Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 44, 946 A.2d 839 (2008)]. Although
it remains possible that a workers’ compensation case
could fit into one of the enumerated exceptions, [the
court is] not faced with an intentional tort, force of
nature or criminal event in the present case.’’ Sapko v.
State, supra, 25–26.
The Appellate Court also concluded, however, that
the board’s improper reading of Barry was harmless
because the record supported the board’s determina-
tion that the commissioner properly had applied the
law to the facts in deciding the issue of proximate cause.
See id., 29–30. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘The board
accepted the commissioner’s conclusion that the dece-
dent’s accidental ingestion of excessive quantities of
prescribed medication broke the chain of proximate
causation. In the absence of any credible evidence tend-
ing to show that the decedent’s depression and subse-
quent prescription for Seroquel were related to his
compensable injuries, that he purposely killed himself
for some reason arising out of his compensable injuries
or that the dosage of Oxycodone alone could have
caused the decedent’s death, the causal link between
his compensable injuries and his death simply becomes
too attenuated to support a reasonable inference that
the injuries and death were connected. The board’s
conclusion correctly applied the law and did not rely
on facts that were found without evidence or fail to
include material facts that were admitted or undis-
puted.’’ Id.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff raises two claims,
both of which relate to the law of proximate causation.
First, the plaintiff contends that, although the Appellate
Court properly concluded that the superseding cause
doctrine does not apply to cases arising under the act,
the Appellate Court was incorrect in determining that
the contrary conclusion of the board and the commis-
sioner constituted harmless error.7 Second, the plaintiff
contends that the Appellate Court improperly failed to
heed this court’s statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat
Corp., supra, 288 Conn. 392, that ‘‘the substantial factor
causation standard simply requires that the employ-
ment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute to the
development of the injury in more than a de minimis
way.’’ Id., 412–13. According to the plaintiff, this require-
ment is satisfied in the present case because it is undis-
puted that the decedent would not have died but for
his ingestion of Oxycodone, which he would not have
been taking but for his compensable injuries.8
We conclude that the commissioner properly applied
the superseding cause doctrine in finding that the dece-
dent’s compensable work injuries were not the proxi-
mate cause of his death. We further conclude that the
plaintiff’s reliance on Birnie is misplaced. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth
the principles that govern our review in workers’ com-
pensation appeals. ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determin-
ing the facts rests [with] the commissioner, the trier of
facts. . . . The conclusions drawn by him from the
facts found must stand unless they result from an incor-
rect application of the law to the subordinate facts or
from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from
them. . . .
‘‘It matters not that the basic facts from which the
[commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed
rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial
that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences.
The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of
initially selecting the inference [that] seems most rea-
sonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may
not be disturbed by a reviewing court.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Six v. Thomas
O’Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 798–99, 669 A.2d
1214 (1996).
Furthermore, ‘‘[i]t is well settled that, because the
purpose of the act is to compensate employees for
injuries without fault by imposing a form of strict liabil-
ity on employers, to recover for an injury under the
act a plaintiff must prove that the injury is causally
connected to the employment. To establish a causal
connection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
claimed injury (1) arose out of the employment, and
(2) in the course of the employment. . . . Proof that
[an] injury arose out of the employment relates to the
time, place and circumstances of the injury. . . . Proof
that [an] injury occurred in the course of the employ-
ment means that the injury must occur (a) within the
period of the employment; (b) at a place the employee
may reasonably be; and (c) while the employee is rea-
sonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing
something incidental to it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Daubert v. Naugatuck, 267
Conn. 583, 588–89, 840 A.2d 1152 (2004); see also Kolo-
miets v. Syncor International Corp., 252 Conn. 261,
272, 746 A.2d 743 (2000) (‘‘[t]he essential connecting
link of direct causal connection between the personal
injury and the employment must be established before
the act becomes operative’’ [internal quotation marks
omitted]).
‘‘[I]n Connecticut traditional concepts of proximate
cause constitute the rule for determining . . . causa-
tion [in workers’ compensation cases]. . . . [T]he test
of proximate cause is whether the [employer’s] conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the [employee’s]
injuries. . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the
burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that
tied [the employee’s] injuries to the [employer’s con-
duct]. . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an
injury is determined by looking from the injury to the
negligent act complained of for the necessary causal
connection.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet
Geo, Inc., 294 Conn. 132, 141–42, 982 A.2d 157 (2009).
As we previously have indicated, ‘‘[t]his court has
defined proximate cause as [a]n actual cause that is a
substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 606, 662 A.2d 753 (1995).
‘‘Because actual causation, in theory, is virtually lim-
itless, the legal construct of proximate cause serves to
establish how far down the causal continuum tortfea-
sors will be held liable for the consequences of their
actions. . . . The fundamental inquiry of proximate
cause is whether the harm that occurred was within
the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s
negligent conduct.’’ (Citation omitted.) First Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter
Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999).
‘‘The question of proximate causation . . . belongs to
the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual
issue. . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when
the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach
only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable
disagreement the question is one to be determined by
the trier as a matter of fact.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc., supra, 611.
I
We first address the plaintiff’s contention that,
although the Appellate Court properly determined, in
light of Barry, that the board was incorrect in conclud-
ing that the commissioner properly had applied the
superseding cause doctrine in resolving the plaintiff’s
claim for benefits under the act, the Appellate Court
wrongly determined that the impropriety was harm-
less.9 We reject the plaintiff’s contention that the super-
seding cause doctrine does not apply to cases under
the act and we further conclude that the commissioner
properly applied that doctrine to the facts of the pres-
ent case.
In Barry, a product liability case, we considered
whether the superseding cause doctrine had outlived
its usefulness in our modern system of torts, which is
based on comparative fault and apportionment. As we
explained in Barry, ‘‘[t]he function of the [superseding
cause] doctrine is to define the circumstances under
which responsibility may be shifted entirely from the
shoulders of one person, who is determined to be negli-
gent, to the shoulders of another person, who may also
be determined to be negligent, or to some other force.
. . . Thus, the doctrine . . . serves as a device by
which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying
another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from
liability by shifting the causation element entirely else-
where. . . . If a third person’s negligence is found to
be the superseding cause of the . . . injuries, that neg-
ligence, rather than the negligence of the party
attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause,
is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injur-
[ies]. . . .
‘‘Even if a plaintiff’s injuries are in fact caused by a
defendant’s negligence, a superseding cause may break
that causal connection if it so entirely supersedes the
operation of the defendant’s negligence that it alone,
without his negligence contributing thereto in any
degree, produces the injury; or it must be the noncon-
curring culpable act of a human being who is legally
responsible for such act. . . . If a defendant’s negli-
gence was a substantial factor in producing the plain-
tiff’s injuries, the defendant would not be relieved from
liability for those injuries even though another force
concurred to produce them.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel
Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 434–35.
In Barry, ‘‘[w]e [took the] opportunity to clarify our
approach to the doctrine of superseding cause and its
continuing validity in our tort jurisprudence. . . . [W]e
conclude[d] that the doctrine . . . no longer serve[d]
a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant
claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party
cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. . . .
[We explained] that under those circumstances, super-
seding cause instructions serve to complicate what is
fundamentally a proximate cause analysis. Specifically,
we [stated] that, because our statutes allow for appor-
tionment among negligent defendants; see General Stat-
utes § 52-572h;10 and because Connecticut is a compara-
tive negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-
572o;11 the simpler and less confusing approach to
cases, such as [Barry], [in which] the jury must deter-
mine which, among many, causes contributed to the
[plaintiff’s] injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate
cause rather than [to allow] the [defendant] to raise a
defense of superseding cause.’’ Barry v. Quality Steel
Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 436–39.
We also noted that, in addition to possibly confusing
the jury, a separate instruction on the superseding cause
doctrine was unnecessary because ‘‘the term supersed-
ing cause merely describes more fully the concept of
proximate cause when there is more than one alleged
act of negligence, and is not functionally distinct from
the determination of whether an act is a proximate
cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.’’ Id., 440.
Indeed, we explained that ‘‘[a] superseding cause is, by
definition, one that is not reasonably foreseeable. As a
result, the doctrine in today’s world adds nothing to
the requirement of foreseeability that is not already
inherent in the requirement of causation. . . . [Accord-
ingly] it [is] proper for the trial court to instruct only
on proximate causation because the substance of the
doctrine of superseding cause [is] fully explained in the
instruction on proximate cause.’’12 (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 445.
We also emphasized in Barry, however, that ‘‘[o]ur
conclusion that the doctrine of superseding cause no
longer serves a useful purpose is limited to the situation
in cases, such as [Barry], [in which] a defendant claims
that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent
negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence.
Our conclusion does not necessarily affect those cases
[in which] the defendant claims that an unforeseeable
intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event super-
sedes its tortious conduct. . . . Nor does our conclu-
sion necessarily affect the doctrine of superseding
cause in the area of criminal law. . . . We leave those
questions to cases that squarely present them.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.) Id., 439 n.16. Subsequently, in Archam-
bault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., supra, 287 Conn.
20, we stated that the superseding cause doctrine was
‘‘largely abandoned in Barry in favor of comparative
and contributory negligence’’; id., 45; subject only to
certain narrow exceptions, namely, ‘‘situations in which
an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or
criminal event supersedes the defendant’s tortious con-
duct . . . .’’ Id., 44.
It is this language that the Appellate Court relied on
in concluding, like the plaintiff, that, because workers’
compensation cases were not included on Archam-
bault’s enumerated list of exceptions, this court did not
intend to exempt them from Barry’s purview. In Barry,
however, this court abrogated the superseding cause
doctrine for negligence cases only because, in those
cases, a jury is tasked with apportioning liability in
accordance with our comparative fault and apportion-
ment statutes. We simply did not consider whether the
doctrine should be abolished in workers’ compensation
cases. Upon consideration of that question in the pre-
sent case, we agree with the board that the concerns
that caused us to abrogate the doctrine in Barry simply
are not implicated in our workers’ compensation
scheme, which, in contrast to our comparative negli-
gence tort scheme, is a no-fault compensation system
that imposes a form of strict liability on employers. See,
e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672, 748
A.2d 834 (2000) (‘‘[t]he purpose of the [act] . . . is to
provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in
the course of employment, regardless of fault’’ [citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also
Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775,
782, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative
negligence statute is inapplicable to workers’ compen-
sation cases); O’Connor v. O’Connor, 201 Conn. 632,
654, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers’ compensation scheme
‘‘eschews investigation into the possible negligence of
the [employer’s] conduct and limits the amount of dam-
ages the [employee] . . . may recover’’).
Furthermore, as our previous discussion makes clear,
we abrogated the superseding cause doctrine in Barry
not because the concept of superseding cause is inher-
ently incompatible with our proximate cause jurispru-
dence but out of concern that a separate instruction
concerning the doctrine might confuse jurors by caus-
ing them to ignore or discount the comparative fault and
apportionment principles underlying §§ 52-572h and 52-
572o. Workers’ compensation cases, however, are not
decided by juries but, rather, by trial commissioners.
In such cases, there is not the same concern that the
trier of fact will be confused by the concept of a super-
seding cause in deciding the element of causation. In
the present case, therefore, we may assume that, when
the commissioner referred to the decedent’s accidental
overdose as a ‘‘superseding cause’’ of his death, his use
of the term accurately reflected his finding as to the
causal effect of the decedent’s ingestion of excessive
quantities of Oxycodone and Seroquel, that is, that it
broke the chain of causation between the decedent’s
compensable work injuries and his death.
The commissioner’s application of the superseding
cause doctrine is in accord with the approach advocated
by Professor Arthur Larson for determining causation
when an employee, having suffered a compensable pri-
mary injury during the course of his employment, later
sustains a second injury outside the course of employ-
ment for which the employee seeks compensation,
claiming that the second injury relates back to the pri-
mary injury in a sufficiently direct way. Professor Lar-
son explains: ‘‘A distinction must be observed between
causation rules affecting the primary injury . . . and
causation rules that determine how far the range of
compensable consequences is carried, once the primary
injury is causally connected with the employment. As
to the primary injury, it has been shown that the ‘arising’
test is a unique one quite unrelated to common-law
concepts of legal cause, and . . . the employee’s own
contributory negligence is ordinarily not an intervening
cause preventing initial compensability.13 But when the
question is whether compensability should be extended
to a subsequent injury or aggravation related in some
way to the primary injury, the rules that come into play
are essentially based [on] the concepts of ‘direct and
natural results,’ and of [the employee’s] own conduct
as an independent intervening cause.’’14 1 A. Larson &
L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation (2011) § 10.01, p. 10-
2. ‘‘The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an
aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct
injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural
result of a compensable primary injury.’’ Id., pp. 10-2
through 10-3. Professor Larson further explains that,
when a subsequent injury or aggravation of the primary
injury arises out of what he describes as a ‘‘quasi-
course’’ of employment activity,15 such as a trip to the
doctor’s office for treatment of the primary injury, ‘‘the
chain of causation should not be deemed broken by
mere negligence in the performance of that activity
. . . but only by intentional conduct which may be
regarded as expressly or impliedly forbidden by the
employer.’’ Id., § 10.5, p. 10-11. Consequently, all the
medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the
primary injury are compensable. Thus, for example, an
injured worker may recover for a new injury or an
aggravation of a compensable injury resulting from
medical treatment on the theory that the initial injury
is the cause of all that follows.
‘‘When, however, the injury following the initial com-
pensable injury does not arise out of a quasi-course
activity, as when [an employee] with an injured hand
engages in a boxing match, the chain of causation may
be deemed [to be] broken by either intentional or negli-
gent [employee] misconduct.’’ Id. Thus, Professor Lar-
son explains that ‘‘compensability can be defeated by
a certain degree of employee misconduct, and . . .
that degree is something beyond simple negligence, and
can best be described as an intentional violation of an
express or implied prohibition in the matter of per-
forming the act.’’ Id., p. 10-12. Professor Larson notes
that ‘‘[o]ne advantage of the test of implied prohibition
is that it can be reduced to two reasonably measurable
requirements: The first is that the employer would have
forbidden the act if it had had an opportunity to express
itself on the subject; the second is that the employee
knew or should have known of this fact.’’ Id. ‘‘As to
what constitutes [employee] negligence, in these cases
it often takes the form of rashly undertaking a line
of action with knowledge of the risk created by the
weakened member . . . .’’16 Id., § 10.06 [3], p. 10-17.
Professor Larson provides several examples of subse-
quent injury cases in which the reviewing court deter-
mined that the fact finder reasonably had concluded
that the chain of causation was broken by an intervening
superseding cause. Of particular relevance to the pres-
ent case is Carr v. Unit No. 8169/Midwestern Distribu-
tion, 237 Kan. 660, 703 P.2d 751 (1985), in which the
Kansas Supreme Court concluded that an employee’s
hospitalization and medical treatment, which resulted
from his overdose of pain medication that he was taking
to treat a compensable injury, were not, as a matter of
law, the direct and natural results of the primary injury.
Id., 666; see also 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 10.04,
p. 10-9 n.5. He also cites Williams v. White Castle Sys-
tems, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 231 (Ky. 2005), in which the
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s
determination that an employee’s drug overdose, fol-
lowing surgery for a primary injury, was an indepen-
dent, intervening cause of his death. Id., 235–36; see
also 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 10.09 [4], p. 10-
28 n.24. As in the present case, the decedent in Williams
died from multiple drug toxicity resulting from his
ingestion of excessive quantities of drugs, only some
of which he was taking for a compensable injury.17 See
Williams v. White Castle Systems, Inc., supra, 233. In
In re Death of Sade, 649 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1982), another
case directly on point, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld the trial court’s determination that an employ-
ee’s death was not the direct and natural consequence
of his compensable arm injury but, instead, resulted
from his voluntary, simultaneous ingestion of excessive
quantities of pain medication and alcohol. Id., 540–41.
As in the present case, the employee in that case had
been taking the pain medication to treat a compensable
injury. See id., 540. The court nevertheless determined
that the employee’s conduct in consuming excessive
quantities of that medication together with excessive
quantities of alcohol intervened to break the chain of
causation. See id., 540–41.
Although this court has never expressly adopted the
direct and natural consequence rule for subsequent
injury cases, our case law indicates that we effectively
have applied the rule in assessing the scope of an
employer’s liability in those cases. See, e.g., Dehron v.
Clark, 122 Conn. 592, 597, 191 A. 526 (1937) (concluding
that intervening cause broke chain of proximate cause
and citing cases from other jurisdictions in which com-
pensation was denied when ‘‘a new injury, or the aggra-
vation of the original injury resulting from medical or
surgical treatment, was not directly traceable to the
original injury, but arose instead from the intervention
of an independent cause’’); Lemieux v. Highland Dairy
Co., 121 Conn. 483, 484, 185 A. 433 (1936) (concluding
‘‘that the chain of causation between the injuries suf-
fered at the time of the [work-related] accident and the
death was broken by the [intervening] appendicitis . . .
[such] that there was no unbroken chain of causation
between the death and the accident’’); see also
Imbrogno v. Stamford Hospital, 28 Conn. App. 113,
119, 612 A.2d 82 (‘‘temporary total disability benefits
were denied on the basis of an intervening event, unre-
lated to the compensable injury, which broke the chain
of causation linked to the original, compensable
injury’’), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920, 615 A.2d 507
(1992). Thus, in subsequent injury cases involving multi-
ple causes, the concept of a superseding causal agent
breaking the chain of proximate causation is not foreign
to our jurisprudence.
Our research reveals, moreover, that the direct and
natural consequence rule is utilized in many if not most
jurisdictions for determining causation in subsequent
injury cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Pike County Commis-
sion, 740 So. 2d 1080, 1084 (Ala. 1999); Parris-Eastlake
v. State, 26 P.3d 1099, 1105 and n.21 (Alaska 2001); Lou
Grubb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 174
Ariz. 23, 26, 846 P.2d 836 (App. 1992); Preway, Inc. v.
Davis, 22 Ark. App. 132, 134–35, 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Colo.
1985); Korsak v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group,
Inc., 94 Haw. 297, 305, 12 P.3d 1238 (2000); Nance v.
Harvey County, 263 Kan. 542, 549, 952 P.2d 411 (1997);
Addington Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, 947 S.W.2d 421,
423 (Ky. App. 1997); Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338
Mich. 265, 273, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953); Meils ex rel. Meils
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 355 N.W.2d 710,
715 (Minn. 1984); Warpinski v. State Industrial Ins.
System, 103 Nev. 567, 569, 747 P.2d 227 (1987); Starr
v. Charlotte Paper Co., 8 N.C. App. 604, 610–11, 175
S.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 112 (1970); Anderson
v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Tenn. 2008);
Wilson v. Workers’ Compensation Commissioner, 174
W. Va. 611, 616, 328 S.E.2d 485 (1984). We agree with
these courts that the rule provides the best framework
for analyzing the element of proximate cause in cases
involving a subsequent injury or an aggravation of an
earlier, primary injury. It also accords with the approach
that our own courts have utilized in deciding these
questions, if not in name then in substance.
It bears emphasis, however, as Professor Larson
notes, that ‘‘[d]ecisions in these sorts of cases are neces-
sarily fact driven’’; 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra,
§ 10.04, p. 10-10.2; and, therefore, results will vary
depending on the case. Consequently, whether a suffi-
cient causal connection exists between the employment
and a subsequent injury is, in the last analysis, a question
of fact for the commissioner. It is axiomatic that, in
reaching that determination, the commissioner often is
required to ‘‘draw an inference from what he has found
to be the basic facts. [As we previously have explained]
[t]he propriety of that inference . . . is vital to the
validity of the order subsequently entered. But the
scope of judicial review of that inference is sharply
limited . . . . If supported by evidence and not incon-
sistent with the law, the . . . [c]ommissioner’s infer-
ence that an injury did or did not arise out of and in
the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing
court can then set aside that inference because the
opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor
can the opposite inference be substituted by the court
because of a belief that the one chosen by the . . .
[c]ommissioner is factually questionable.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings
Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539–40, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). Only
if no reasonable fact finder could have resolved the
proximate cause issue as the commissioner resolved
it will the commissioner’s decision be reversed by a
reviewing court.
We note, finally, that a related principle also bears
on the issue of whether there exists the requisite causal
connection between the primary injury and the subse-
quent injury. Unless causation under the facts is a mat-
ter of common knowledge, the plaintiff has the burden
of introducing expert testimony to establish a causal
link between the compensable workplace injury and
the