Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER ET AL. v. COMPUTERS PLUS CENTER, INC., ET AL. (SC 19029) (SC 19030) (SC 19031) Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh and Robinson, Js. Argued January 3—officially released September 3, 2013 Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney general, with whom were Peter R. Huntsman, assistant attorney gen- eral, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, for the appel- lants-appellees (plaintiffs). Brett J. Boskiewicz and James A. Wade, for the appel- lees-appellants (defendants). Opinion NORCOTT, J. The principal issue in this appeal is whether, by bringing a cause of action against a private party, the state of Connecticut waives its sovereign immunity for all counterclaims against it, including those seeking monetary damages. The plaintiffs, the Department of Information Technology and its Chief Information Officer,1 appeal2 from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, awarding the named defendant, Computers Plus Center, Inc.,3 $18.3 million on a counterclaim alleging that the department had violated its right to procedural due process. On appeal, the department claims, inter alia, that the trial court: (1) should not have allowed the defendant to proceed with any counterclaim seeking monetary dam- ages because sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over such counterclaims; and (2) made several improper evidentiary rulings dur- ing the trial. The defendant cross appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) reduced the amount of the jury’s verdict in its favor from $18.3 million to $1.83 million; and (2) determined that the doctrine of absolute immunity bars common-law defamation claims against government officials. We conclude that the trial court improperly determined that the department had waived the state’s sovereign immunity regarding the defen- dant’s counterclaims and, accordingly, reverse the judg- ment of the trial court in favor of the defendant on the procedural due process counterclaim. We further conclude that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were not improper and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. Finally, because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter juris- diction over the defendant’s counterclaims, we dismiss the defendant’s cross appeals as moot. The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and relevant procedural history. The present case arises from disputes between the department and the defendant, a computer equip- ment supplier, in connection with two contracts under which the defendant had agreed to provide computer servers for the department and the Department of Transportation (server contracts), and a contract under which the defendant had agreed to provide personal computers to state agencies on an as needed basis (com- puter contract). After the memory in the servers that the defendant had supplied under the server contracts malfunctioned in the summer of 2002, the department began to suspect that the defendant deliberately sup- plied equipment that failed to comply with the relevant contract specifications, despite the defendant’s prompt remediation of the memory malfunctions. In August, 2002, the department determined that the defendant was not a ‘‘responsible’’ bidder as that term is defined in General Statutes § 4a-59 (a),4 rejected its pending invitation to the defendant seeking a bid on a contract to provide an additional computer server for the Department of Education, and requested that the defendant certify that all of the equipment supplied to the state by the defendant over the previous four years complied with the relevant contract specifications. Because the defendant was not able to complete its review of all of the contract awards and purchase orders from the requested time period in the time frame that the department had set forth, however, it simply replied that it believed that it ‘‘ha[d] always . . . adhered to all the terms and conditions of each contract award’’ and requested the department, ‘‘[s]hould [it] find any other violations other than [the server memory viola- tion],’’ to ‘‘bring them to [the defendant’s] attention and [it would] take immediate action.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Unsatisfied with the defendant’s response, the department performed a physical audit of all of the computers that the defendant had supplied under the computer contract. In conducting this audit, the depart- ment discovered that many of those computers con- tained only an integrated network interface card while, in the department’s view, the contract specifications required both an integrated and a stand alone network interface card. On the basis of its findings during its audit, in December, 2002, the department notified the auditor of public accounts and the state comptroller of ‘‘apparently pervasive contract irregularities’’ with the defendant, and also requested that the Commissioner of Public Safety ‘‘conduct a more thorough review’’ of the defendant’s activities in relation to the computer contract. Shortly thereafter, the department terminated the computer contract with the defendant, citing, as rea- sons for the contract termination, that it was a financial burden to the state and that the purchasing process had not achieved the expected cost savings.5 Over the following several months, the department began refus- ing to award contracts to the defendant, even when it was the lowest bidder and, in some cases, refused even to acknowledge the defendant’s bids. When the defen- dant asked the department to clarify its status as a bidder during this time period, the department indicated that the defendant was ‘‘not prohibited from responding’’ to invitations to bid, but emphasized that the standard bid terms and conditions indicated that ‘‘[a]ward[s] will be made to the lowest responsible quali- fied bidder.’’ In addition, in March, 2003, the department issued a notice to ‘‘[a]ll [u]sing [s]tate [a]gencies’’ indi- cating that it had discovered ‘‘certain performance fail- ures’’ because the defendant had deviated from certain contract specifications, ‘‘charged the [s]tate for parts ordered but not delivered . . . and failed to properly credit the [s]tate for substitute parts.’’ The department further stated, in that notice, that the ‘‘substitution of generic parts . . . also occurred on a prior contract involving servers,’’ and the state, therefore, ‘‘recom- mend[ed] that [the agencies] exercise appropriate cau- tion if [they] contemplate[d] purchasing from [the defendant] under [their] direct purchasing authority.’’ Around the same time, state police officers obtained and executed search warrants at the defendant’s office and the personal residence of Gina Kolb, the defen- dant’s president.6 On the basis of evidence obtained during those searches, and the department’s internal audit and investigations, in April, 2004, the department decided to bring the present litigation against the defen- dant. The department held a press conference with the attorney general and the chief state’s attorney announc- ing the commencement of this civil action against the defendant and issued a press release to similar effect. This announcement received significant media atten- tion, and the defendant’s other customers thereafter began cancelling their contracts with the defendant. Given that the department also declined to award the defendant bids on new contracts during this time period, the defendant was unable to continue operating its business, and ultimately ceased operations in 2005. On April 8, 2004, the department filed this action against the defendant,7 alleging breach of contract and fraud claims premised on allegations that the defendant intentionally provided computers that did not comply with the specifications set forth in the computer con- tract. The department also asserted claims for breach of contract and fraud premised on allegations that the defendant provided the state with computer servers that contained generic, after market memory when the server contracts required factory- installed memory.8 The defendant filed an amended counterclaim in response, wherein it alleged that the department: (1) took the defendant’s property, namely its business expectancy in the computer contract, without just com- pensation in violation of article first, § 11, of the Con- necticut constitution (takings counterclaim); (2) deprived the defendant of its liberty interest to pursue its business without due process of law in violation of article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution (procedural due process counterclaim); and (3) defamed the defendant by publicly suggesting that it had engaged in improper conduct in its dealings with the department (defamation counterclaim), and sought, inter alia,9 monetary damages and a jury trial. The department then moved to dismiss the defendant’s tak- ings and procedural due process counterclaims on the basis of the state’s sovereign immunity, and the defama- tion counterclaim on the basis of absolute immunity. On November 27, 2007, the trial court, Shortall, J., denied the department’s motion to dismiss both the takings and the procedural due process counterclaims, concluding that, by asserting claims against the defen- dant, the department had waived the state’s sovereign immunity for any related counterclaims. Judge Shortall cited State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 12, 69 A. 1028 (1908), and noted that, ‘‘[f]or almost 100 years, it has been the law that, when the state sues a party, it ‘open[s] the door to any defense or cross complaint germane to the matter in controversy.’ ’’ Judge Shortall further stated that, ‘‘[t]his rule was announced in Kilburn, an equitable action, but no reason appears why it should be limited to suits in equity and not actions at law, and other courts have not so limited it.’’10 Because Judge Shortall determined that the defendant’s constitutional counter- claims arose out of the same controversy giving rise to the department’s action against the defendant, he concluded that the department had waived the state’s sovereign immunity regarding those claims. Judge Shortall also denied the department’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of absolute immunity, the defendant’s defa- mation counterclaim because the majority of the alleg- edly false statements made by the department were alleged to have been made outside of judicial proceed- ings and, therefore, were not entitled to absolute immunity. Thereafter, the defendant filed a second amended counterclaim, wherein it reiterated its takings and pro- cedural due process counterclaims, recharacterized its defamation counterclaim as one for trade libel, and added claims that the department: (1) breached the computer contract by terminating it early when the defendant was ready, willing and able to perform; (2) breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating the computer contract early and engaging in conduct that impugned the defendant’s integrity and reputation; and (3) violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42- 110 et seq., by terminating the computer contract early and impugning the defendant’s integrity and reputa- tion.11 On May 13, 2008, the department moved to strike the defendant’s second amended counterclaim in its entirety.12 On September 16, 2008, the trial court, Shortall, J., granted the department’s motion to strike the defendant’s second amended counterclaim with respect to both the takings counterclaim and the CUTPA counterclaim, but denied the motion regarding the remainder of the claims presented therein.13 The defendant then filed a fourth amended counter- claim,14 removing its takings and CUTPA counterclaims, and leaving its procedural due process, trade libel, breach of contract, and breach of good faith and fair dealing counterclaims. Thereafter, this case was trans- ferred to the complex litigation docket in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the department’s claims alleging breach of contract and fraud, along with the defendant’s counterclaims alleging deprivation of pro- cedural due process, trade libel, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, were tried before the jury. After the presentation of evidence, during the charging conference, the trial court, Stevens, J.,15 granted the department’s motion for a directed verdict as to the defendant’s trade libel counterclaim, concluding that the allegedly defamatory statements were made by agency heads of the executive branch in the performance of their official duties and, therefore, protected under the doctrine of absolute immunity. The remainder of the department’s claims and the defendant’s counterclaims were then submitted to the jury. The jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the department’s claims except for the claim that the defendant had breached the server contract regarding the servers that it had agreed to provide for the Depart- ment of Transportation. Although the jury found that the defendant had breached the Department of Trans- portation server contract by failing to provide the con- tractually required factory installed, Dell certified memory in the computer servers, however, it did not award the department any damages on that claim. Regarding the defendant’s counterclaims, the jury found that the department had violated the defendant’s liberty interest in pursuing its business in violation of the defendant’s procedural due process rights by effec- tively disqualifying it from bidding on state contracts without providing the opportunity to contest the removal of its ‘‘responsible bidder’’ status. The jury then awarded $18.3 million in damages, the full value of the defendant’s business, on the procedural due process counterclaim.16 The jury also found that the department had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ‘‘by refusing to meet [with the defendant] to discuss any alleged issues or concerns . . . about [the defendant’s] performance of the [computer] contract’’ and by ‘‘engag- ing in a pattern of conduct that harmed [the defendant’s] reputation and impugned [the defendant’s] integrity,’’ but did not award the defendant any damages on that counterclaim. Finally, the jury found in favor of the department on the defendant’s breach of contract coun- terclaim, determining that the department had not breached the computer contract by terminating it early. Thereafter, the department made several motions to set aside the verdict, including a motion to set aside the verdict regarding all of the department’s claims on which the jury had found in favor of the defendant and regarding the defendant’s procedural due process counterclaim, arguing that the trial court had improp- erly: (1) allowed the presentation of prejudicial and irrelevant evidence to the jury; and (2) precluded the department from presenting evidence that Kolb applied for and accepted accelerated rehabilitation as a means of resolving the criminal charges against her. The trial court denied these motions. The department also made a number of other post- verdict motions regarding the defendant’s procedural due process counterclaim, including: (1) a renewed motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdic- tion over that counterclaim; (2) a motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, inter alia, that any waiver of the state’s sover- eign immunity was limited to counterclaims sounding in recoupment and did not permit an affirmative award of damages against the department; and (3) a motion to reduce the $18.3 million verdict, arguing, inter alia, that the award was not supported by the evidence and was the result of the jury’s inflammation and prejudice, as evidenced by its attempt to award ‘‘plus punitive damages,’’ despite the trial court’s specific instruction not to consider punitive damages for that counterclaim. See footnote 16 of this opinion. The trial court denied the department’s renewed motion to dismiss and the motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment not- withstanding the verdict, but granted its motion to reduce the verdict. Accordingly, the trial court ordered a remittitur reducing the jury’s damages award to $1.83 million, concluding that the $18.3 million award ‘‘manifest[ed] a shocking injustice indicating that the jury’s award . . . was influenced by partiality or mistake. The sense that the jury was moved by an erroneous or inflamed view in regard to . . . damages [was] further evi- denced by the jury’s conclusion that punitive damages should be imposed in addition to the $18.3 million com- pensatory award.’’ The defendant refused to accept the reduced award and, on July 12, 2010, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict on all of the department’s claims and the defendant’s counterclaims, with the exception of the jury’s determi- nation of damages as to the defendant’s procedural due process counterclaim. The trial court then set aside the jury’s $18.3 million damages verdict and ordered a new trial on the defendant’s procedural due process counter- claim as to damages only. The present appeals and cross appeals followed. On appeal, the department claims, inter alia,17 that: (1) sovereign immunity bars awards of monetary damages against the state and jury trials on claims against the state without statutory authority; and (2) the trial court’s admission of evidence that was irrelevant and prejudicial to the department, coupled with its exclu- sion of crucial evidence that was favorable to the department, likely inflamed the jury and tainted its ver- dict. We address these claims in turn.18 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I We begin with the department’s claim that the trial court improperly determined that, by initiating the pres- ent action against the defendant, it waived the state’s sovereign immunity for all counterclaims, including those seeking monetary damages. Specifically, the department claims that the trial court improperly expanded the judicially created exception to sovereign immunity set forth in State v. Kilburn, supra, 81 Conn. 12, wherein this court allowed a defendant to advance equitable counterclaims in response to the state’s equi- table foreclosure action.19 The department argues that, not only are courts required to construe exceptions to sovereign immunity narrowly—which would limit the application of Kilburn to equitable actions—but the adoption of article eleventh, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution20 and the subsequent creation of the Office of the Claims Commissioner also indicate that the legis- lature did not intend state agencies to have the authority to waive the state’s sovereign immunity as to any and all counterclaims for monetary damages simply by ini- tiating litigation against private parties. Finally, citing Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians, 282 Conn. 130, 918 A.2d 880 (2007), the department argues that any waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity by an agency’s initiation of litigation should be limited to ‘‘counter- claims that arise out of the same transaction or occur- rence as the sovereign’s suit but only to the extent [that] those counterclaims are used to offset the government’s affirmative claims and limit its recovery.’’21 In response, the defendant argues that, despite this court’s acknowledgment of the equitable nature of the claims presented in State v. Kilburn, supra, 81 Conn. 12, the application of that case has never been expressly limited to equitable causes of action. The defendant further asserts that the creation of the Office of the Claims Commissioner, and the procedure for seeking permission from the legislature to bring claims against the state as a plaintiff—in the absence of litigation initiated by the state—is irrelevant to whether the state waives its sovereign immunity for counterclaims asserted by a defendant when the state initiates litiga- tion. We agree with the department, and conclude that the state does not waive its sovereign immunity for counterclaims seeking monetary damages simply by initiating litigation against a private party. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly denied the department’s motions to dismiss the defendant’s proce- dural due process counterclaim on the basis of sover- eign immunity. ‘‘The standard of review for a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determi- nation] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). In addition, ‘‘[s]ov- ereign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter juris- diction over a case, and therefore [also] presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. . . . In so doing, we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law. . . . Not only have we recog- nized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer repre- sents the state is, in effect, against the state. . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly con- strued under our jurisprudence.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Ser- vices, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). Finally, we observe that, ‘‘[i]n its pristine form the doctrine of sovereign immunity would exempt the state from suit entirely, because the sovereign could not be sued in its own courts and there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. . . . This absolute bar of actions against the state [however] has been greatly modified both by statutes effectively consenting to suit in some instances as well as by judicial decisions in others.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). For example, we have held that the doctrine of sover- eign immunity does not prevent a claimant from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for allegations that a state official is acting either pursuant to an unconstitu- tional statute or in excess of his authority. See, e.g., Gold v. Rowland, supra, 296 Conn. 212; Doe v. Heintz, supra, 31. This is so because individuals have an important interest in being protected from improper governmental action and the state has no interest in allowing such activity to continue such that a court’s action to curb that activity would interfere with the state’s legitimate governmental functions. See Gold v. Rowland, supra, 214; see also Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 487–88, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). We have expressly limited the exceptions to sover- eign immunity for when a state official acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute or in excess of his author- ity to actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, however, because ‘‘a court may fashion these remedies in such a manner as to minimize disruption to govern- ment and to afford an opportunity for voluntary compli- ance with the judgment. . . . We have adjudicated the rights of the parties in such cases acting on the presump- tion that other governmental departments will accede to our interpretation of the applicable law.’’ (Citation omitted.) Doe v. Heintz, supra, 204 Conn. 32. In contrast, ‘‘[a] money judgment . . . is directly enforceable, with- out further court intervention, against any property of the judgment debtor that is not statutorily exempt. . . . [Therefore, even] where the monetary award is so mini- mal as the sum a prevailing party would be entitled to receive as taxable costs . . . this court has refused to sanction a monetary judgment against the state in the absence of explicit statutory authority.’’ (Citation omit- ted; emphasis added.) Id.; see also, e.g., Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 321 (‘‘the exception to sovereign immunity for actions in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, applies only to actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, not those seeking monetary damages’’). Because there is no dispute that there is no applicable statutory waiver of immunity in the present case, we must determine whether the department waived the state’s sovereign immunity by initiating the present litigation and volunta- rily invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. A We begin with the department’s contention that the trial court, Shortall, J., improperly concluded that State v. Kilburn, supra, 81 Conn. 12, articulated a rule under which the state subjects itself to any and all related counterclaims that a defendant may wish to bring when it initiates litigation. Specifically, the department takes issue with Judge Shortall’s conclusion that, although Kilburn involved an equitable action, ‘‘no reason appears why it should be limited to suits in equity and not actions at law, and other courts have not so limited it.’’ The department argues that, by emphasizing the equitable nature of the claims presented in Kilburn and the equitable principles underlying the rationale for the exception to sovereign immunity recognized in that case, this court intended to limit the application of that exception to cases involving equitable claims. The defendant responds, however, that this court’s recogni- tion of the equitable nature of the claims presented in Kilburn did nothing to abridge our conclusion that, by bringing a foreclosure action against a city, the state ‘‘opened the door to any defense or cross-complaint germane to the matter in controversy, that the city may see fit to interpose.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Kil- burn, supra, 12. In Kilburn, the state had obtained a mortgage on a parcel of property located in city of Hartford (city) to secure a loan from the state’s school fund. Id., 11. Thereafter, the city obtained liens upon the same prop- erty for a sewer assessment and an assessment for the expense of removing snow from the sidewalks on the property, which, pursuant to General Statutes (1902 Rev.) § 1954, had priority over mortgages to private individuals previously existing and recorded. Id. When the state sought to foreclose its mortgage upon the property, the city, which, as a lienholder on the prop- erty, was made a defendant in the foreclosure action, filed a cross complaint claiming that its sewer and snow removal assessment liens had priority over the state’s mortgage under § 1954. Id., 10. The state moved to dis- miss the city’s cross complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity. Id. This court concluded that, ‘‘[t]his action being an equitable one, the [s]tate, by bringing it, opened the door to any defense or cross-complaint germane to the matter in controversy, that the city might see fit to interpose. A sovereign who asks for equity must do equity.’’ Id., 12. The court further concluded, however, that there was ‘‘no equity in favor of the city’’ and that liens for municipal assessments may override a prior mortgage to a private individual, but they could not take priority over a prior mortgage to the state. Id., 12–13. The court, therefore, ordered the trial court to grant the state’s motion to dismiss the city’s cross com- plaint. Id., 13. In our view, this court’s emphasis on the equitable nature of Kilburn provided the foundation for its will- ingness to consider the defendant’s equitable counter- claims in that case.22 Given that this court construes exceptions to sovereign immunity narrowly; see, e.g., Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349–50; and the emphasis that this court placed on the equitable nature of the claims raised in Kilburn by qualifying the sentence in which the court set forth the items to which the state had ‘‘opened the door’’ by initiating the foreclosure action with the phrase: ‘‘[t]his action being an equitable one,’’ and fur- ther justifying its conclusion by stating that ‘‘[a] sover- eign who asks for equity must do equity’’; State v. Kilburn, supra, 81 Conn. 12; we conclude that the appli- cability of the exception to sovereign immunity recog- nized in Kilburn was intended to extend only to suits in equity and the related equitable counterclaims that would allow the court to make a full determination of the equities in that case. The defendant contends, however, that subsequent cases citing Kilburn demonstrate that the applicability of the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in that case has not been limited to actions in equity or equitable counterclaims, and argues that it should also apply to counterclaims for monetary damages. For this proposition, the defendant relies on Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468–70, 572 A.2d 357 (1990), State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 136 Conn. 157, 160 n.1, 70 A.2d 109 (1949), Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 217, 219–20, 175 A. 582 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 46, 478 A.2d 601 (1984), Isaacs v. Ottaviano, 65 Conn. App. 418, 421–23, 783 A.2d 485 (2001), Univer- sity of Connecticut v. Wolf, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 26, 2004) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 148), and State v. Lex Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 4259 (December 1, 1995) (15 Conn. L. Rptr. 611). None of the cases on which the defendant relies, however, sup- port its argument that Kilburn provides the authority under which its counterclaims survive sovereign immunity. First, the defendant contends that Reilly v. State, supra, 119 Conn. 219–20, ‘‘first applied Kilburn in an action for money damages . . . .’’ In Reilly, the state brought an action against a trustee who had failed to pay the state for the support of an inmate of the Connecticut state hospital as required by the trust. Id., 218–19. The trustee refused to participate in the litigation, and the state obtained a default judgment against the trustee in the amount of the state’s expenditures for the inmate’s support plus costs. Id., 219. Thereafter, the trustee brought a writ of error attacking the judgment of the trial court. Id. In response, the state filed a plea in abatement claiming that the writ of error was barred by sovereign immunity because a writ of error, as opposed to an appeal, is a new cause of action, and the state had not agreed to become a party in that ‘‘new’’ case. Id. This court rejected the state’s claims, concluding that a writ of error is, like an appeal, a direct attack on the underlying judgment and, therefore, was not a new action for which the trustee, as the plaintiff in error, was required to obtain the state’s consent to be sued. Id., 220. Accordingly, the court concluded that ‘‘[w]hen the [s]tate brought the original action it waived its [sovereign] immunity as regards this writ of error just as much as it would have waived it had the plaintiff in error appealed.’’ Id., 221. In reaching its conclusion, the court in Reilly observed that Kilburn had indicated that, ‘‘if the [s]tate itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject-matter of the action.’’ (Emphasis added.) Reilly v. State, supra, 119 Conn. 219. This observation, however, was unnecessary to its conclusion that, ‘‘by bringing an action, the [s]tate subjects itself to the procedure established for its final and complete disposition in the courts, by way of appeal or otherwise.’’ Id., 220. Therefore, not only was the Reilly court’s reference to Kilburn dicta, but its use of the term ‘‘proper cross demands’’ to describe the court’s holding in Kilburn, did not extend the type of allowable counterclaims beyond the equitable counterclaim that did not impact the state fisc approved of in Kilburn. This is particularly true given that the state, not the defendant, sought monetary damages in Reilly. Accord- ingly, Reilly does not, as the defendant contends, stand for the proposition that, when the state initiates a cause of action—legal or equitable—it opens the door to any and all potential counterclaims. On the contrary, all that Reilly stands for is the proposition that, when the state brings a cause of action, it waives its sovereign immunity with respect to the procedure established for the action’s final and complete disposition in the courts, including an appeal or a writ of error. Next, the defendant argues that this court again relied on Kilburn in recognizing ‘‘the significance of the state having commenced suit against a contractor and its insurer for costs incurred to complete a road construc- tion project’’ in State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 136 Conn. 157. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the Deliso Construction Company, Inc. (Deliso Construction) had been contracted to perform a road construction project for the state. Id., 164. After Deliso Construction began work on the project, how- ever, it discovered that the excavation required far exceeded the estimate from the state on which its bid was based. Id. When its efforts to revise the contract price for the project failed, Deliso Construction stopped work and rescinded the contract. Id., 165. Thereafter, the state hired another contractor to complete the proj- ect and brought an action against Deliso Construction to recover the excess cost of completion. Id., 159, 165. Deliso Construction filed a counterclaim in which it sought to recover the reasonable value of work that it had completed before rescinding the contract. Id., 159–60. In a footnote, this court noted that Deliso Con- struction ‘‘was authorized by the General Assembly to sue the state on its claim’’ but opined that ‘‘[t]he special authority so given was unnecessary . . . [because] ‘if the [s]tate itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject-matter of the action.’ Reilly v. State, [supra, 119 Conn. 219].’’ State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 160 n.1. The defendant contends that the statement contained within the first footnote of Hartford Accident & Indem- nity Co. indicates this court’s recognition of a waiver of sovereign immunity for counterclaims for monetary damages whenever the state brings an action. The defendant, however, overstates the import of this foot- note. First, because the question before the court in that case was whether Deliso Construction was entitled to rescind the contract on the ground that the state had misrepresented the scope of the job, and because the legislature had expressly waived sovereign immunity regarding the counterclaim, giving the court subject matter jurisdiction over that claim, our statement that such permission was unnecessary was merely dicta. Furthermore, although Deliso Construction sought to obtain money from the state in its counterclaim, it merely sought to recover the fair market value of work that it had completed, a claim premised on quantum meruit, an equitable theory of recovery. See Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, 307 Conn. 582, 587 n.9, 57 A.3d 730 (2012) (‘‘[q]uantum meruit is an equitable remedy to provide restitution for the reasonable value of services despite an unenforceable contract’’). There- fore, the statement made by this court in Hartford Acci- dent & Indemnity Co. indicating that the legislative permission for the counterclaim was unnecessary does not support the defendant’s claim that there is an excep- tion to sovereign immunity that permits legal counter- claims seeking monetary damages. Furthermore, Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 214 Conn. 468–70, is also inapposite to the present case. In Lacasse, the question before the court was whether the accidental failure of suit statute applied in a case where the state had expressly waived its sovereign immunity under the highway defect statute, General Statutes § 13a-144. Id., 468. Although this court quoted Kilburn in Lacasse, that quotation was merely an example of the concept that, once involved in a civil action, the state enjoys the same procedural status as any other litigant and, therefore, does not support the proposition that the state waives sovereign immunity entirely by initiating litigation.23 Indeed, given that the state was the defendant in Lacasse, not only had sovereign immunity been waived by statute, but there also was no question as to whether the state could impliedly waive sovereign immunity by initiating litigation. See id., 468–69. The defendant’s reliance on Isaacs v. Ottaviano, supra, 65 Conn. App. 423, is similarly misplaced. Although, in Isaacs, the Appellate Court stated that, ‘‘[t]o allow the state to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to seek to establish that a defendant is liable to it and yet allow it to shield itself from a counterclaim by way of sovereign immunity would be patently unfair,’’ it went on to conclude that ‘‘[t]hat rationale simply does not apply here . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Indeed, the state did not initiate the litigation in Isaacs either. Thus, the Appellate Court’s observation regarding the effect of bringing suit not only is not binding on this court, but al