Francis v. Fonfara
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJanuary 3, 2012
DocketSC18480
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Eveleigh and
Harper
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
******************************************************
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the
beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will
be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the
date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative
date for the beginning of all time periods for filing
postopinion motions and petitions for certification is
the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.
In no event will any such motions be accepted before
the ‘‘officially released’’ date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the
event of discrepancies between the electronic version
of an opinion and the print version appearing in the
Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con-
necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the
latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official
Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service
and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes
of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of
the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro-
duced and distributed without the express written per-
mission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
******************************************************
ERNEST FRANCIS v. JOHN W. FONFARA ET AL.
(SC 18480)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.
Argued October 21, 2011—officially released January 3, 2012
Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P. Lev-
esque and, on the brief, Dana M. Hrelic, for the plaintiff
in error.
Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former
attorney general, for the defendant in error.
Opinion
EVELEIGH, J. The sole issue in this writ of error is
whether the plaintiff in error, State Marshal Lisa H.
Stevenson (plaintiff), was entitled to a fee for copies
of a complaint handled in connection with her service
of process in a civil action pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-261 (a) (2),1 despite the fact that she did not person-
ally make the copies. We conclude that the defendant
in error, the trial court, improperly denied the plaintiff’s
request for fees and, accordingly, we grant the writ
of error.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The named plaintiff in the underly-
ing action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in the judicial district of Hartford against
all 185 members of the Connecticut General Assembly,
including the named defendant, John W. Fonfara. Fran-
cis sought and received a waiver of the entry fee and
the process server’s service fees pursuant to Practice
Book § 8-2,2 including a fee for copies pursuant to § 52-
261 (a) (2). As the result of this waiver, the state, pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 52-259b,3 was responsible for
paying the process server’s fees. After receiving a box
from Francis with a sufficient quantity of copies to
serve all 185 defendants, the plaintiff inquired with the
office of the attorney general and received direction on
how to address the service of process. Thereafter, the
plaintiff properly effectuated service on all 185 defen-
dants by leaving process for each with an associate
attorney general, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-64.4
The plaintiff did not make the copies; Francis’ son had
them made at his expense. The copies complied, how-
ever, with the requirements of § 52-64 in that the plain-
tiff confirmed that each was exactly the same as the
original, and thereon endorsed her attestation that each
was a true copy of the original. Subsequently, the plain-
tiff submitted an invoice claiming fees of, inter alia,
$900 for copies of the complaint.5
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on its
own motion to review the fees charged by the plaintiff.
The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum of
decision in which it allowed the plaintiff’s requested
service, mileage, and endorsement fees, but disallowed
the $900 fee for copies. This writ of error followed.6
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
disallowed the fee for copies because, although the trial
court properly determined that § 52-261 (a) (2) was
ambiguous, it failed to consider relevant and compelling
legislative history when it considered extratextual evi-
dence of the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff con-
tends that the legislative history demonstrates a clearly
expressed intent for process servers to be paid the fee
for copies, regardless of whether they actually make
the copies. The trial court now contends, contrary to
its memorandum of decision, that § 52-261 (a) (2) is
plain and unambiguous when read in context.
According to the trial court, § 52-261 (a) requires pay-
ment only for services actually performed, including
the making of copies. Therefore, the trial court further
contends that, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z,7 we
may not consider extratextual sources to determine
legislative intent, but must enforce the plain meaning
of the statute. The trial court further responds that,
even if we find that the language of § 52-261 (a) (2) is
not plain and unambiguous, it nevertheless properly
exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the
requested fee for copies. We agree with the plaintiff
and conclude that the fee for copies is not contingent
upon the process server personally making the copies.8
Whether § 52-261 (a) (2) entitles a process server to
the fee for copies, even if she has not personally made
the copies, is a question of statutory interpretation
‘‘over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The prin-
ciples that govern statutory construction are well estab-
lished. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent
intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek
to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning
. . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
after examining such text and considering such relation-
ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-
textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and
unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance
to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332–33, 984 A.2d
684 (2009). ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is whether
the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.3d 290 (2010).
Section 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The
following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (2) for
copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of endorse-
ments, one dollar per page, not to exceed a total amount
of nine hundred dollars in any particular matter . . . .’’
The trial court now contends that the only reasonable
interpretation of the statute is that the process server
claiming the statutory fee for copies personally must
make the copies in order to be paid, because to con-
clude otherwise would lead to the absurd result that
the fee could be paid for doing absolutely nothing. The
plaintiff contends that it would be reasonable to con-
clude that the fee is due regardless of who makes the
copies, because the fee for copies also compensates
the process server for handling and reviewing the copies
to ensure accuracy. We find both interpretations rea-
sonable, and, accordingly, we conclude that the statute
is ambiguous.
It is significant that this subdivision of the statute
does not employ a gerund, as other subdivisions of the
statute do, to specify for which act, if any, compensation
shall be paid. For example, almost all of the other subdi-
visions of § 52-261 (a) suggest a necessary action to
qualify for the fee, such as ‘‘taking,’’ ‘‘service,’’
‘‘removal,’’ ‘‘levy,’’ ‘‘causing,’’ ‘‘committing,’’ and ‘‘sum-
moning and attending . . . .’’9 Subdivision (2) of § 52-
261 (a) does not provide a fee ‘‘for making copies,’’ ‘‘for
copying’’ or ‘‘for ensuring the accuracy of copies,’’ nor
does it expressly reference expense reimbursement, as
do subdivisions (5), (7), (8) and (10) of the statute.10
Only one other subdivision is similarly silent as to
action; General Statutes § 52-261 (a) (3); and provides
fees ‘‘for endorsements, forty cents per page or fraction
thereof . . . .’’
In accordance with the requirements of § 1-2z, we
also look to related statutes in construing § 52-261,
which provide for payment for fees and expenses of
persons serving civil process. Chapter 896, General Stat-
utes § 52-45a et seq., governs civil process. Chapter 896
requires that ‘‘a proper officer’’ must serve on each
defendant a ‘‘true and attested copy’’ of process.11 See,
e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-57, 52-59b, 52-59c, 52-63 and
52-64. Nowhere in that chapter, however, is there a
requirement that copies be made by the process server.
Because it is clear that a copy of the complaint must
be ‘‘true and attested,’’ but the statutes are silent as
to any requirement of who must make a copy, it is
reasonable to conclude that the statutory fee for copies
is intended to compensate the process server for han-
dling and reviewing each copy to ensure that it is a true
copy of the original, regardless of whether the copy
was made by the process server. Contrary to the trial
court’s contention that making the copy is the only
plausible task related to the service of copies of com-
plaints and writs, handling and ensuring that a copy is
true are acts required of the process server for each
copy, regardless of whether the process server makes
the copy.
Although this analysis strongly indicates that the fee
for copies is compensation for handling and ensuring
copies of complaints and writs are true, whatever that
may entail, and therefore in compliance with chapter
896, we nevertheless acknowledge that the interpreta-
tion advanced by the trial court is reasonable, as well.
Because it is clear that the legislature can indicate a
necessary action, or condition payment on the showing
of incurred expenses, it is reasonable to conclude, as
the plaintiff now contends, that the fee for copies is to
compensate the process server for handling copies of
writs and complaints, regardless of whether the copies
were made by the process server. Because the fee is
calculated per page of each copy, it is also reasonable
to conclude, as the trial court contends, that it is not
a fee for handling and delivery, but compensation for
expenses incurred in creation of each copy. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the statute is subject to multiple
competing reasonable interpretations, and accordingly
is ambiguous. Therefore, in accordance with § 1-2z, we
review the legislative history of § 52-261.
In 1981, the legislature adopted an amendment to
§ 52-261 that, inter alia, increased the fee for copies
from sixty cents per page to $1 per page. See Public
Acts 1981, No. 81-80, § 1. The role of the process server
and the fee for copies were expressly discussed, first
at a judiciary committee hearing,12 and later on the floor
of the House of Representatives.13 In both sessions,
there was a clear legislative intent expressed that, in
accordance with the custom and practice then existing,
the fee for copies be paid regardless of who actually
makes the copies, and as compensation for the process
server’s job of ensuring the accuracy of the copies. Our
review of the remaining legislative history and geneal-
ogy of the statute has revealed no evidence to support
a contrary interpretation.14 Such clear evidence of legis-
lative intent, particularly when considered in concert
with the weight of the textual evidence supplied by
chapter 896, leaves no doubt that the fee for copies
under § 52-261 (a) (2) is not contingent upon the process
server’s making the copies.
The trial court contends, however, that it retains dis-
cretion in awarding fees for service of process and
urges us to affirm its refusal to order the fee for copies
as an exercise of that discretion. The plaintiff responds
that the trial court’s interpretation of § 52-261 (a) (2)
was a misapplication of the law and thereby constitutes
an abuse of discretion. We agree with the plaintiff. There
is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s
decision to deny the requested fee for copies was an
exercise of discretion, rather than a misapplication of
the law.
In determining whether a trial court may exercise its
discretion in determining the fee for copies, or whether
our interpretation of the statute compels the court to
award the fee for copies, we note that § 52-261 (a)
provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he following fees shall
be allowed and paid . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘[A]lthough we have often stated [that] [d]efinitive
words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legisla-
tive mandates of a nondirectory nature . . . we also
have noted that the use of the word shall, though signifi-
cant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty.
. . . Furthermore, a requirement stated in affirmative
terms unaccompanied by negative words, as in the pre-
sent case, generally is not viewed as mandatory.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 428
(2005). ‘‘While we generally will not look for interpreta-
tive guidance beyond the language of the statute when
the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous
. . . our past decisions have indicated that the use of
the word shall, though significant, does not invariably
create a mandatory duty. . . . The test we have
adopted for determining whether such a statutory
requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the
prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing
to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates
to matter material or immaterial—to matters of conve-
nience or of substance. . . . If it is a matter of conve-
nience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a
matter of substance, the statutory provision is manda-
tory. . . . A statutory provision that is directory pre-
scribes what shall be done but does not invalidate action
upon a failure to comply.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner’s Assn.
v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152–53, 561 A.2d 1373
(1989).
In light of our preceding analysis, the use of the word
shall in § 52-261 is sufficiently plain and unambiguous
that further analysis to determine the nature of the duty
is unnecessary. The statute provides for payment of
specific fees for the service of process and, where the
court has discretion in determining the amount to be
paid, the court’s discretion is expressed clearly in the
statutory text. For example, § 52-261 (a) provides in
relevant part: ‘‘[F]or summoning grand jurors, such
[process server] shall receive only such [process
server’s] actual expenses and such reasonable sum for
services as are taxed by the court. . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) Section 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (5)
for the removal and custody of such liquors so seized,
reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is plain that the legis-
lature intended that a process server has a right to be
paid a specified fee for all pages of copies of writs and
complaints served, but that the court has discretion to
determine a reasonable fee for a variety of other
services.
We have previously held that a trial court had abused
its discretion, in the context of an equitable action, by
awarding excessive process server mileage fees under
§ 52-261 (a). Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249
Conn. 1, 29–30, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).15 Danbury is dis-
tinguishable because in equitable actions the court must
exercise its discretion in awarding costs.16 Not only is
the present matter at law rather than in equity, but the
issue is not the awarding of costs, but the calculation
of them. In Danbury, we did not examine the court’s
calculation of the fee to determine whether it con-
formed with § 52-261. Accordingly, any reliance upon
our analysis of the § 52-261 (a) mileage fee in Danbury
for the proposition that the calculation of fees for copies
under § 52-261 (a) (2) is discretionary, is misplaced.
The writ of error is granted, the judgment is reversed
and the case is remanded with direction to award the
plaintiff the requested fee for copies of $900.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
General Statutes § 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[E]ach officer
or person who serves process, summons or attachments shall receive a fee
of not more than thirty dollars for each process served and an additional
fee of thirty dollars for the second and each subsequent service of such
process, except that such officer or person shall receive an additional fee
of ten dollars for each subsequent service of such process at the same
address . . . . Each such officer or person shall also receive the fee set
by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each
mile of travel, to be computed from the place where such officer or person
received the process to the place of service, and thence in the case of civil
process to the place of return. If more than one process is served on one
person at one time by any such officer or person, the total cost of travel
for the service shall be the same as for the service of one process only.
. . . The following fees shall be allowed and paid: (1) For taking bail or
bail bond, one dollar; (2) for copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of
endorsements, one dollar per page, not to exceed a total amount of nine
hundred dollars in any particular matter; (3) for endorsements, forty cents
per page or fraction thereof; (4) for service of a warrant for the seizure of
intoxicating liquors . . . twenty dollars; (5) for the removal and custody
of such liquors so seized, reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars; (6) for
the levy of an execution . . . fifteen per cent on the amount of the execu-
tion, provided the minimum fee for such execution shall be thirty dollars; (7)
on the levy of an execution on real property . . . reasonable and customary
expenses; (8) for causing an execution levied on real property to be recorded,
fees for travel, twenty dollars and costs; (9) for services on an application
for the sale of personal property attached, or in selling mortgaged property
foreclosed under a decree of court, the same fees as for similar services
on executions; (10) for committing any person to a community correctional
center, in civil actions, twenty-one cents a mile for travel, from the place
of the court to the community correctional center, in lieu of all other
expenses; and (11) for summoning and attending a jury for reassessing
damages or benefits on a highway, three dollars a day. The court shall tax
as costs a reasonable amount for the care of property held by any officer
under attachment or execution. The officer serving any attachment or execu-
tion may claim compensation for time and expenses of any person, in
keeping, securing or removing property taken thereon, provided such officer
shall make out a bill. The bill shall specify the labor done, and by whom,
the time spent, the travel, the money paid, if any, and to whom and for
what. The compensation for the services shall be reasonable and customary
and the amount of expenses and shall be taxed by the court with the costs.’’
(Emphasis added.)
2
Practice Book § 8-2 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Prior to the commence-
ment of an action, or at any time during its pendency, a party may file with
the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, or in which the party
intends to return a writ, summons and complaint, an application for waiver
of fees payable to the court and for payment by the state of the costs of
service of process. . . .’’
3
General Statutes § 52-259b (a) provides: ‘‘In any civil or criminal matter,
if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees
payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall
waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by
the state.’’
4
General Statutes § 52-64 provides: ‘‘Service of civil process in any civil
action or proceeding maintainable against or in any appeal authorized from
the actions of, or service of any foreign attachment or garnishment author-
ized against, the state or against any institution, board, commission, depart-
ment or administrative tribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent
or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission,
department or administrative tribunal, as such, may be made by a proper
officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the
declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the Attorney General’s
office in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested copy of the process,
including the summons and complaint, by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the Attorney General at the Attorney General’s office in
Hartford.’’
5
It is uncontested that if the plaintiff is due the fee for copies she handled
and confirmed to be accurate, even if she did not make them, the $900 fee
was correctly calculated. More than 900 pages of copies, the maximum
number for which the $1 fee for copies applies under § 52-261 (a) (2), were
handled and confirmed by the plaintiff in order to serve individual copies
of the original seven page complaint on the 185 defendants.
6
After the deadline to file an appeal expired pursuant to Practice Book
§ 63-1, the plaintiff filed with this court a motion pursuant to Practice Book
§§ 60-2 and 60-3 for permission to file a late writ of error and a writ of error.
We granted the motion for permission to file, and the plaintiff’s writ was
thereafter filed.
7
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
8
The plaintiff further contends that if we agree with the trial court that
§ 52-261 (a) (2) clearly and unambiguously indicates that a process server
may not charge a fee for copies she did not make, and, accordingly, that § 1-
2z precludes this court from referring to extratextual evidence of statutory
meaning, § 1-2z is unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine of separation
of powers. The trial court responds that § 1-2z is constitutional because the
power to establish rules of statutory construction does not lie exclusively
within the control of the judicial branch or significantly interfere with the
orderly conduct of the court’s judicial functions. In light of our conclusion
that § 52-261 (a) (2) is ambiguous, we need not, and in fact, cannot, resolve
the plaintiff’s claim that § 1-2z is unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine
of separation of powers. To do so would result in nothing more than an
advisory opinion, and ‘‘[w]e have consistently held that we do not render
advisory opinions. . . . [W]here the question presented is purely academic,
we must refuse to entertain the appeal.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven,
Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6–7, 688 A.2d
314 (1997).
9
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
10
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
11
Under General Statutes § 52-50, a ‘‘proper officer’’ means a ‘‘state mar-
shal, a constable or other proper officer authorized by statute, or, subject
to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, to an indifferent person.’’
For clarity and convenience, in this opinion we refer to anyone authorized
to serve process under § 52-50 as a process server.
12
The following exchange took place in the judiciary committee between
Representative Antonina Parker and Senator Joseph Flynn:
‘‘[Representative Parker]: . . . Do [process servers] know . . . [w]hat
they are serving?
‘‘[Senator Flynn]: Yes, they do know what papers they are serving and
the reason why they have to know is that on the paper that is actually
served on the defend[a]nt, they must make an endorsement on the back of
it stating that this is a true copy of the original. Their job is to serve an
exact copy of whatever the original writ or process is the subject of the
lawsuit. So they would know what the particular kind of process they were
serving even if they might not understand all the implications of it, they’d
at least have to know that the copy served on the defend[a]nt met in every
particular the exact text of the original document.’’ (Emphasis added.) Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Committee, Pt. 3, 1981 Sess.,
p. 811.
13
The following exchange occurred on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives between Representative R. E. Van Norstrand and Representative
Richard Tulisano:
Representative Van Norstrand asked: ‘‘If the plaintiff, or presumably the
plaintiff’s attorney, supplies the copies is there to be a charge under this
[s]tatute?’’ 24 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1981 Sess., p. 1668.
Representative Tulisano responded: ‘‘I believe they charge the same no
matter who provides the copies. I think that’s the custom that exists now
and they charge it no matter who provides it. So I anticipate that would
continue.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., pp. 1668–69.
14
Indeed, counsel for the trial court conceded at oral argument before
this court that, prior to rendering its decision, it did not review either the
1981 legislative history nor similarly compelling 1961 legislative history. See
Public Acts 1961, No. 311 (removing language added earlier in session;
Public Acts 1961, No. 122; that permitted fee for copies only ‘‘if prepared
by the sheriff or person making such service’’). To its credit, the trial court
does not now argue that the legislative history of § 52-261 plausibly indicates
that the legislature intended for the fee for copies to be allowed only if the
process server makes copies.
15
In Danbury, the trial court awarded the plaintiff approximately $170,000
in sheriff’s fees for the service of 111 writs and 111 lis pendens. In order
to arrive at this amount, the court agreed to charge the defendant, for each
of the 111 foreclosure actions, the mileage for delivery of all 111 writs and
all 111 lis pendens as if each had been separately delivered. Danbury v.
Dana Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 3, 10–11. Unsurprisingly, we found
that awarding such costs against the defendant was an abuse of the trial
court’s equitable discretion. Id., 21–22. In the present matter, the plaintiff
properly billed a mere $10.09 for mileage, despite delivering separate com-
plaints on 185 defendants in one trip. Regardless of her ability to economize
on travel by making a single trip to serve all defendants, it remains a fact
that in order to serve all 185 defendants in the underlying matter, the plaintiff
was required to handle and ensure all 185 copies of the complaint that were
served were true copies. It is not unfair to observe that a process server’s
job is more burdensome, rather than less, when she does not personally
make the copies of a complaint or writ. Accordingly, she earned her fee for
each one. Although there may be a compelling policy argument that where
multiple defendants are served through the office of the attorney general
that the statutory fee charged for copies is too high, or that separate copies
of complaints are not necessary, or that the fee for copies should be due
only to process servers who make the copies, those arguments must be
addressed to the legislature, not the courts. ‘‘[T]his court is precluded from
substituting its own ideas of what might be a wise provision in place of a
clear expression of legislative will.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, 275 Conn. 105, 161, 881 A.2d 937 (2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1913, 164 L. Ed. 2d 664 (2006).
16
See Practice Book § 18-15.