Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY v. LEXINGTON HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., ET AL. (SC 18681) (SC 18682) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella and Eveleigh, Js. Argued November 30, 2012—officially released June 18, 2013* Jeffrey R. Babbin, with whom were Amber J. Hines and, on the brief, Michael Menapace, for the appellant- appellee in Docket No. SC 18681 and cross appellant in Docket No. SC 18682 (plaintiff). Sean K. McElligott, with whom were Van A. Stark- weather and Brian J. Ladouceur, Jr., for the appellees- appellants in Docket No. SC 18681 (defendant Marion J. Boynton, coadministratrix of the estate of Elizabeth M. Arata, et al.). Philip J. O’Connor, for the appellee-appellant in Docket No. SC 18681 and cross appellee in Docket No. SC 18682 (defendant Nationwide Health Properties, Inc.). Opinion ROGERS, C. J. This case requires us to interpret vari- ous provisions of a professional liability insurance pol- icy to determine the amount of coverage available when the same general event has given rise to a large number of claimants against the policy. On February 26, 2003, multiple residents of Greenwood Health Center (Green- wood), a Hartford nursing home, tragically died or were injured when the facility was set ablaze by another resident and rescue efforts by staff members fell short. As a result, thirteen negligence actions seeking damages for wrongful death or serious bodily injury were filed by some of the victims’ personal representatives against Greenwood, Nationwide Health Properties, Inc. (Nationwide),1 the owner and lessor of the property housing Greenwood, Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc. (Lexington Healthcare), the lessee of that property, and Lexington Highgreen Holding, Inc. (Highgreen), the operator of Greenwood. This case concerns the amount of liability insurance coverage available for these claims. The plaintiff, Lexington Insurance Company,2 brought this declaratory judgment action against Lex- ington Healthcare, which is the insured party under a general and professional liability insurance policy issued by the plaintiff, as well as Highgreen, Nationwide and the victims’ personal representatives3 (individual defendants).4 Nationwide and most of the individual defendants each filed counterclaims in regard to the policy, also seeking declaratory judgments. Following the parties’ filing of cross motions for summary judg- ment, the trial court determined the amount of coverage available under the policy and rendered judgment accordingly. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court determining the available coverage. The plaintiff claims that the trial court misconstrued the policy lan- guage pertaining to ‘‘related medical incidents’’ and the endorsement relating to the ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]olicy [l]imit,’’ thereby providing more coverage for the indi- vidual defendants’ claims than that to which they were entitled. Four of the individual defendants have cross appealed,5 claiming that the trial court’s interpretation of the policy’s self-insured retention endorsement resulted in an improper reduction of the available cover- age. We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court misconstrued the policy language concerning related medical incidents, but agree with its claim that the court improperly interpreted the endorsement relat- ing to the aggregate policy limit. We further agree with the individual defendants that the court improperly applied the self-insured retention endorsement to reduce the available coverage. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.6 The following facts and procedural history are rele- vant to these appeals. The individual defendants, in the underlying actions, each alleged multiple and varying specifications of negligence against Lexington Health- care and Highgreen. Some of the individual defendants’ claims related to Lexington Healthcare’s and High- green’s choice to admit into Greenwood the individual who had started the fire and, thereafter, their failure to place, supervise and treat her properly and to disal- low her from possessing cigarette lighters or smoking cigarettes independently. Other of the individual defen- dants’ claims concerned general safety and emergency failures including, but not limited to: insufficient staffing; inadequate sprinklers, fire extinguishers and smoke detectors; lack of training in fire response and evacuation procedures; neglect to adhere to relevant rules, codes and standards; and a dangerously con- structed, equipped and furnished facility. Specific alle- gations of negligence on the night of the fire also were raised, such as staff members’ failures to respond prop- erly to the fire by employing fire extinguishers and by closing particular doors and windows. The policy issued by the plaintiff to Lexington Health- care provided both general liability and professional liability coverage for Lexington Healthcare’s seven nursing home facilities, one of which was Greenwood. It is undisputed on appeal that only the professional liability coverage is applicable to the individual defen- dants’ negligence claims. As to the amount of coverage available for those claims, the trial court found that: (1) for purposes of applying the policy’s $500,000 per medical incident limit for professional liability cover- age, the acts, errors or omissions underlying each indi- vidual defendant’s injuries or death constituted separate medical incidents and did not collectively com- prise related medical incidents, in which case a single $500,000 limit would have applied; (2) the total amount of professional liability coverage available under the policy for all of the individual defendants’ claims was the $10 million ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]olicy [l]imit’’ provided via an endorsement to the policy, rather than the $1 million ‘‘[a]ggregate [l]imit’’ for professional liability coverage stated in the policy declarations; and (3) a $250,000 ‘‘[s]elf [i]nsured [r]etention per [o]ccurrence’’ described in another endorsement to the policy applied to reduce the $500,000 per medical incident coverage to $250,000 per medical incident. This appeal and cross appeal followed. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court’s first two policy interpretations were improper, while the individual defendants take issue with the court’s third interpretation. ‘‘As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. Summary judgment shall be ren- dered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characteriza- tion of the rulings made by the trial court. . . . When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its con- clusions are legally and logically correct and find sup- port in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 389, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). The general principles that guide our review of insur- ance contract interpretations are well settled. ‘‘[C]on- struction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo. . . . An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract . . . . In accordance with those prin- ciples, [t]he determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to pro- vide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the par- ties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. . . . Under those circumstances, the policy is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . When interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result. . . . ‘‘In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective perception of the terms. . . . As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . . Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the insurance company drafted the policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn., 302 Conn. 639, 643, 31 A.3d 1004 (2011). We now turn to the claims raised on appeal. Addi- tional facts and procedural history will be provided where pertinent to those claims. I The plaintiff claims first that the trial court improp- erly interpreted the phrase ‘‘related medical incidents’’ as used in the policy, thereby affording greater coverage for the individual defendants’ claims than the parties to the policy had intended. According to the plaintiff, the individual defendants’ claims arose from ‘‘related medical incidents,’’ because all of their injuries or deaths stemmed from the same root cause, namely, the admission of the individual who started the fire to Greenwood and the failure to supervise her properly. The plaintiff argues, therefore, that a single policy limit applies to all of the individual defendants’ claims collec- tively rather than to each claim individually. We are not persuaded. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant. The declarations page of the policy pro- vides that there shall be a $500,000 limit for professional liability coverage for ‘‘[e]ach [m]edical [i]ncident.’’ ‘‘Medical [i]ncident’’ is defined by the policy as ‘‘any act, error or omission in the providing of or failure to provide professional services.’’ ‘‘Professional [s]er- vices,’’ in turn, are defined in relevant part as ‘‘[m]edical, surgical, dental, nursing or other health care services including but not limited to the furnishing of food or beverages in connection with such services . . . .’’ Finally, within the section of the professional liability part of the policy captioned ‘‘LIMITS OF INSURANCE,’’ the following is provided: ‘‘All claims arising from con- tinuous, related, or repeated medical incidents shall be treated as arising out of one medical incident. Only the [p]olicy in effect when the first such claim is made shall apply to all such claims.’’ (Emphasis added.) The parties do not dispute that the individual defen- dants’ claims arise from medical incidents, namely, Lex- ington Healthcare’s acts, errors and omissions in providing, or failing to provide, professional services, as defined by the policy. They differ, however, as to whether those medical incidents properly may be char- acterized as ‘‘related’’ such that a single, $500,000 per medical incident coverage limit applies to all of the individual defendants’ claims. The trial court, after examining the policy, first found that the term ‘‘related’’ was ambiguous in that it could refer to either a narrow or broad range of connections. In the context of the present dispute, ‘‘related’’ could contemplate, on the one hand, different but connected services delivered to a particular [individual defen- dant],’’ or, on the other hand, ‘‘similar or related services delivered to a number of [individual defendants].’’ More to the point, ‘‘related’’ could encompass all of the acts, errors or omissions that collectively led to a particular individual defendant’s injuries or death, i.e., the con- nected array of failures that exposed that individual to the fire, then prevented him or her from being rescued or otherwise protected from the fire’s effects. Alterna- tively, ‘‘related’’ could be construed more expansively as encompassing similar acts, errors or omissions that ended up harming all of the individual defendants, in particular, the admission of, and failure to supervise, the individual who started the fire. Because of this ambiguity, the trial court construed the policy in favor of providing broader coverage to the insured, concluding that the allegations underlying the individual defendants’ claims were not ‘‘related’’ and, therefore, did not constitute a single ‘‘medical incident’’ within the meaning of the policy limitation. Conse- quently, the trial court held, the $500,000 per medical incident limit applied to each individual defendant’s claim separately and not to all of those claims collec- tively. The court reasoned further that Lexington Healthcare owed separate duties to each individual defendant, each of whom was differently situated and had different service needs, and that, during the fire and subsequent evacuation, Lexington Healthcare had failed to take appropriate action as to each individual defendant in different and distinct ways.7 The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court improperly found that the term ‘‘related’’ is ambiguous. According to the plaintiff, related unambiguously has a broad meaning and, as applied to this case, requires aggregation of the individual defendants’ claims because all of those claims ‘‘have a causal or logical connection’’ to the same source, namely, ‘‘the alleged failure to supervise the patient who started the fire and the resultant fire.’’ Nationwide and the individual defendants argue, to the contrary, that the phrase ‘‘related . . . medical incidents’’ is vague and ambigu- ous and, therefore, must be construed in favor of provid- ing more coverage to Lexington Healthcare. Moreover, according to Nationwide and the individual defendants, the individual defendants’ claims arose from different medical incidents because Lexington Healthcare owed each individual defendant a separate duty, committed different acts of negligence as to each and caused each discrete harm. We agree with Nationwide and the indi- vidual defendants that the acts, errors and omissions underlying the individual defendants’ claims are not ‘‘related’’ within the meaning of the policy. We address at the outset the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court improperly concluded that the term related is ambiguous because several other courts have determined the term to be unambiguous, and decisions which have found the term to be ambiguous have been undermined by later decisions, from the same or differ- ent courts, which hold that related is unambiguous. We are not persuaded by this argument, because ‘‘[c]ontext is often central to the way in which policy language is applied; the same language may be found both ambigu- ous and unambiguous as applied to different facts.’’ Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. Executive Risk Indem- nity, Inc., 407 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2005). Language in an insurance contract, therefore, must be construed ‘‘in the circumstances of [a particular] case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous [or unambiguous] in the abstract.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 4th 854, 867, 855 P.2d 1263, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691 (1993); see also Doe v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins. Exchange, 234 Ill. App. 3d 129, 137, 599 N.E.2d 983 (‘‘[i]n determining whether there is an ambiguity, the clause must be read within its factual context’’), appeal denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992). In sum, the same policy provision may ‘‘shift between clarity and ambiguity with changes in the event at hand’’; (internal quotation marks omit- ted) Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 868; and one court’s determina- tion that the term related was unambiguous, in the specific context of the case that was before it, is not dispositive of whether the term is clear in the context of a wholly different matter. Turning to the term at issue, ‘‘related’’ generally is defined8 as ‘‘connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation,’’ with ‘‘relation’’ meaning ‘‘an aspect or quality . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New Interna- tional Dictionary (2002); see also Random House Dic- tionary (2013) (defining related as ‘‘associated; connected’’); Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) (defining related as ‘‘standing in relation; connected; allied; akin’’). Courts of other jurisdictions, considering these or similar definitions, have opined that the term related covers a broad range of connections, both causal and logical. See, e.g., Bay Cities Paving & Grad- ing, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 5 Cal. 4th 868; American Commerce Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Minne- sota Mutual Fire & Casualty Co., 551 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1996); Columbia Casualty Co. v. CP National, Inc., 175 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 2004). At the same time, however, they have recognized that discrete events have the potential to be linked in myriad ways, and at some point, a line must be drawn to prevent aggregation of events whose connections to each other are simply too weak. In such cases, ‘‘a relationship between [the] two claims, though perhaps ‘logical,’ might be so attenuated or unusual that an objectively reasonable insured could not have expected they would be treated as a single claim under the policy.’’ Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 873; see also American Commerce Ins. Bro- kers, Inc. v. Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 228. When ‘‘a logical connection [becomes] too tenuous reasonably to be called a relationship . . . the rule of restrictive reading of broad language [in favor of the insured] would come into play.’’ Gregory v. Home Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1989). ‘‘[A] term [specifically, related acts] should be found unambigu- ous if the facts of the case comfortably fit within the commonly accepted definition of the concept, but may be ambiguous if the facts fall on the margins of a broad reading.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) High- woods Properties, Inc. v. Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc., supra, 407 F.3d 924. Applying the foregoing definitions and their associ- ated limits to the specific allegations of negligence raised by the individual defendants, we are not con- vinced that the various acts, errors and omissions alleged by each individual defendant are so readily asso- ciated with those alleged by the others that collectively, they fit comfortably within the realm of connection contemplated by the parties to the policy when they agreed to aggregate related medical incidents. Each individual defendant has raised multiple allegations of negligence, in some cases upwards of twenty. Although some allegations pertain to negligent supervision of the individual who started the fire, others aver a wide variety of different safety and response failures by Lex- ington Healthcare. Because each individual defendant was differently situated in terms of his or her proximity to the fire and resultant smoke, access to an exit, and personal health and mobility issues, the particular array of negligent shortcomings that ultimately led to his or her injury or death necessarily varied. Additionally, to the extent similar acts, errors or omissions appear across multiple complaints, they nevertheless are alleged to have caused multiple, distinct losses to differ- ent individuals. Overall, the medical incidents underly- ing the individual defendants’ claims are as dissimilar as they are alike. In sum, it is far from clear from the policy’s use of the term ‘‘related,’’ with no more specific definition of that term provided, that the parties intended multiple losses suffered by multiple people, each caused by a unique constellation of negligent acts, errors and omissions, to be aggregated into a single loss, for purposes of coverage limits, simply because they shared a common, precipitating factor. Conse- quently, like the trial court, we construe the term in favor of providing more coverage, and hold that the individual defendants’ claims do not arise from related medical incidents. Although we are unable to locate any other case directly on point, our conclusion is consistent with deci- sions from other jurisdictions considering whether claims, acts, omissions or incidents are related for pur- poses of determining coverage limits in a professional liability policy. Overall, although courts have employed a variety of analytical approaches; see Scott v. Ameri- can National Fire Ins. Co., 216 F. Sup. 2d 689, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing various approaches); they have tended to reach fairly predictable results, in partic- ular on the factor of loss. To begin, when there are multiple acts of negligence by an insured that all pertain to the same general undertaking and also contribute to the same loss, those acts typically are found to be related. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Brooks, 698 So. 2d 763, 764–65 (Ala. 1997) (attorney’s negligent preparation of four quitclaim deeds and power of attor- ney for same client were series of ‘‘related acts’’ because they all led to single result, loss of title to same prop- erty); Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 5 Cal. 4th 866–73 (attorney’s failure to serve stop notice on construction project lend- ers and to file timely foreclosure action were ‘‘related acts, errors or omissions’’ because both failures arose from same transaction, collection of single debt, and resulted in same injury, loss of debt); Paradigm Ins. Co. v. P & C Ins. Systems, 747 So. 2d 1040, 1042–43 (Fla. App. 2000) (insurance agency’s negligent failure to procure primary liability insurance for client and its subsequent failure to notify excess insurance carrier of client’s claim were ‘‘related acts’’ because they both pertained to loss of coverage for same $2 million judg- ment against client); Columbia Casualty Co. v. CP National, Inc., supra, 175 S.W.3d 348 (physicians’ misin- terpretation of X ray and failure to advise of need for follow-up X ray comprised ‘‘related medical incidents’’ when both led to same outcome, patient’s death from belatedly diagnosed lymphoma).9 Conversely, multiple acts of negligence by an insured usually are held to be unrelated when, although con- nected by some aspect, they have caused distinctly dif- ferent damages. In some instances, acts are held to be unrelated when they have caused different losses to the same party. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 553–54 (5th Cir. 1990) (attorney’s repeated wrongful advice to bank to make loans in excess of regulatory maximum was not ‘‘series of related acts’’ because precise character of wrongful advice varied and results were discrete losses on seven different loans), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S. Ct. 1387, 113 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1991); Kopelowitz v. Home Ins. Co., 977 F. Sup. 1179, 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (attorney’s failure to perfect client’s security interest and his subse- quent mishandling of bankruptcy proceedings on cli- ent’s behalf were not ‘‘related acts, errors or omissions’’ because resulting claims involved ‘‘distinct facts and possible damages’’); Doe v. Illinois State Medical Inter- Ins. Exchange, supra, 234 Ill. App. 3d 133–37 (physi- cian’s multiple, distinct errors in course of treating patient for diabetes were not ‘‘related acts or omissions’’ where patient developed pancreatitis, which also was improperly treated, necessitating multiple surgeries on multiple organs, during which patient contracted hepa- titis and HIV from blood transfusions); Medical Mal- practice Joint Underwriting Assn. of Rhode Island v. Lyons, Docket No. PC 00-5583, 2004 WL 3190049, *6–7 (R.I. Super. December 17, 2004) (physician’s ongoing treatment failures in respect to patient’s two separate maladies were not ‘‘ ‘related acts or omissions’ ’’).10 In other cases, courts have concluded that acts are unrelated when they cause different losses to different parties.11 See, e.g., Argent Financial Group, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, Docket No. Civ. A. 04-2323, 2005 WL 2304515, *9 (W.D. La. August 21, 2005) (five claims made against securities broker for breach of fiduciary duty did not concern ‘‘related . . . wrongful acts’’ when they involved different customers, transactions and types of wrongdoing); Scott v. Ameri- can National Fire Ins. Co., supra, 216 F. Sup. 2d 693–95 (attorney’s negligence in incorporating business, assigning it property rights and performing due dili- gence as to value of property rights were not ‘‘related acts, errors and omissions’’ when he owed different duties to three claimants, corporation and two of its investors, each of whom suffered different and discrete harms); National Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Holmes & Graven, 23 F. Sup. 2d 1057, 1069–70 (D. Minn. 1998) (separate claims of housing authority and project bond trustee against attorney pertaining to his negligent preparation of documents in connection with housing project financing did not arise out of ‘‘ ‘related acts, errors or omissions’ ’’ because each claimant’s loss dif- fered as to both type and amount); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Chong, 787 F. Sup. 183, 188 (D. Kan. 1992) (attorney’s multiple errors in representing three codefendants in criminal matter were not ‘‘ ‘series of related wrongful acts’ ’’ when there were several dis- crete omissions and actions by attorney which resulted in different losses to each codefendant); Beale v. Ameri- can National Lawyers Ins. Reciprocal, 379 Md. 643, 666–67, 843 A.2d 78 (2004) (attorney’s separate but simi- lar errors in representing five children in lead paint action were not ‘‘related . . . professional services’’ because he owed separate duties to each child and caused distinct damages as to each child).12 To summarize, we conclude that the phrase related medical incidents does not clearly and unambiguously encompass incidents in which multiple losses are suf- fered by multiple people, when each loss has been caused by a unique set of negligent acts, errors or omis- sions by the insured, even though there may be a com- mon precipitating factor. Moreover, cases from other jurisdictions construing similar policy language gener- ally hold that when multiple losses are caused, to either the same or multiple parties, the causative acts are not related. Guided by those decisions and the rule requiring any ambiguity in an insurance policy to be construed in favor of affording greater coverage, we conclude that the acts, errors or omissions underlying the individual defendants’ claims against Lexington Healthcare are not related medical incidents under the terms of the policy. Accordingly, a separate per medical incident coverage limit applies to each individual defen- dant’s claim. II The plaintiff also claims that the trial court improp- erly concluded that the policy provides a total of $10 million in professional liability coverage for all of the individual defendants’ claims, rather than a total of only $1 million. According to the plaintiff, the trial court improperly interpreted a $10 million ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]ol- icy [l]imit’’ provided by an endorsement to the policy as superseding the $1 million ‘‘[a]ggregate [l]imit’’ for professional liability coverage that is listed in the policy declarations. Nationwide and the individual defendants argue that the trial court properly interpreted the policy as affording a total of $10 million in professional liability coverage for all of the individual defendants’ claims. We agree with the plaintiff that only $1 million of profes- sional liability coverage is available for all of the individ- ual defendants’ claims. The following additional facts are relevant. On the declarations page of the policy, under the heading of ‘‘LIMITS OF INSURANCE,’’ the following provisions are included: ‘‘(a) Healthcare Professional Liability ‘‘Aggregate Limit $1,000,000 ‘‘Each Medical Incident $ 500,000 . . . ‘‘(b) Healthcare General Liability ‘‘Aggregate Limit $1,000,000 . . . ‘‘Each Occurrence Limit $ 500,000 . . . .’’ As we previously noted, it is undisputed that only pro- fessional liability coverage is available for the individual defendants’ claims. The policy includes separate coverage parts outlining the terms of professional liability coverage and general liability coverage, entitled, respectively, ‘‘Healthcare Professional Liability Claims Made Coverage Part for Long Term Care Facilities’’ and ‘‘Healthcare General Liability Claims Made Coverage Part for Long Term Care Facilities.’’ Section IV of the professional liability part of the policy provides in relevant part: ‘‘IV. LIMITS OF INSURANCE ‘‘A. The Limits of Insurance shown in the Declarations for Healthcare Professional Liability for Long Term Care Facilities and the rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of the number of: ‘‘1. Insureds; ‘‘2. Claims made or suits brought; or ‘‘3. Persons or organizations making claims or bring- ing suits. ‘‘B. The Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay for the sum of all damages under this Coverage Part.’’13 The policy also contains a number of endorsements, including endorsement no. 3, which provides in rele- vant part:14 ‘‘II. AGGREGATE LIMITS PER LOCATION . . . ‘‘A. HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COV- ERAGE PART FOR LONG TERM CARE FACILITIES, Section IV. Limits of Insurance, Item B. is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: ‘‘The Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay for the sum of all damages under this Coverage Part. The Aggregate Limit shall apply separately to each location owned or rented by you.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Thus, part II A of endorsement no. 3 amends § IV of the professional liability part of the policy, previously recited, to add the following sentence to subsection B: ‘‘The Aggregate Limit shall apply separately to each location owned or rented by you.’’15 Endorsement no. 3 also amends the definitions sec- tion of the policy, which applies to both the general and professional liability parts, to add the following definition: ‘‘Location means premises involving the same operations of the Named Insured using the same or connecting lots, or premises involving the same oper- ations of the Named Insured whose connection is inter- rupted only by a street, roadway, waterway or right-of- way of a railroad.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Endorsement no. 3 provides further that ‘‘[t]he policy is amended’’ with the following language: ‘‘The Aggre- gate Policy Limit stated below is the most we will pay for any annual period for the sum of all damages payable under the HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART FOR LONG TERM CARE FACILI- TIES and the HEALTHCARE GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART FOR LONG TERM CARE FACILITIES. ‘‘AGGREGATE POLICY LIMIT: $10,000,000.’’ (Emphasis in original.) At its conclusion, endorsement no. 3 provides that ‘‘[a]ll other terms, conditions and exclusions of the [p]olicy remain unchanged.’’ Finally, another endorsement to the policy, endorse- ment no. 2, which is captioned ‘‘Schedule of Locations Endorsement,’’ provides that ‘‘[t]he Policy is amended as follows: The insurance provided by [the] . . . HEALTHCARE GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART [and the] HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIA- BILITY COVERAGE PART shall be limited to the follow- ing location(s), unless otherwise provided for within the Policy . . . .’’ Thereafter, seven Connecticut addresses are listed, one of which is the address for Greenwood. After examining endorsement no. 3 of the policy, the trial court concluded that the total amount of profes- sional liability coverage available for the individual defendants’ claims clearly and unambiguously was $10 million and not $1 million. In reaching its conclusion, the court equated the term ‘‘[a]ggregate [l]imit’’ with the term ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]olicy [l]imit,’’ thus reading § IV B of the professional liability part of the policy, as modified by endorsement no. 3, as providing $10 million of professional liability coverage for each of the seven insured locations. The court reasoned that aggregate limit was undefined by the policy, and it attributed any difference in the two terms to the use of shorthand or a scrivener’s error. Furthermore, according to the trial court, ‘‘the [$1 million] aggregate limit [for professional liability coverage] found in the declarations is irrele- vant,’’ because it had been altered by endorsement no. 3. We agree with the trial court’s assessment of the policy as clear and unambiguous, but disagree with its conclusions. The trial court’s interpretation of the pol- icy is incorrect for the following reasons. First, the court improperly equated the different terms aggregate limit and aggregate policy limit when no compelling reason existed to do so. Typically, when different terms are employed within the same writing, different mean- ings are intended. Cf. Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 217, 38 A.3d 1183 (applying rule in statutory construction), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). Using the ordinary meanings of its component words,16 the phrase ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]olicy [l]imit,’’ which appears only in endorsement no. 3, clearly conveys that the amount specified, $10 million, is the maximum amount of insurance available under the entire policy when claims for both general liability and professional liability coverage, at all insured locations, are com- bined.17 Additionally, that endorsement explicitly pro- vides that the ‘‘[a]ggregate [p]olicy [l]imit’’ is the most the plaintiff will pay annually for the sum of all damages under both the general liability and professional liability parts of the policy. In contrast, the term ‘‘[a]ggregate [l]imit’’ appears both in the declarations page, directly beneath the head- ing, ‘‘Healthcare Professional Liability,’’ and in § IV B of the professional liability part of the policy, both prior to and following its amendment by endorsement no. 3. By virtue of its placement and the absence of the word ‘‘policy,’’ the term ‘‘[a]ggregate [l]imit’’ logically means the total amount available for professional liability cov- erage only, at a particular location.18 Next, in reading the policy as it did, the trial court rendered the portion of the declarations page pertaining to aggregate limits superfluous, referring to it as ‘‘irrele- vant,’’ instead of attempting to read the declarations in conjunction with endorsement no. 3 to see if each part of the policy could be given effect. ‘‘A rider or endorse- ment is a writing added or attached to a policy or certifi- cate of insurance which expands or restricts its benefits or excludes certain conditions from coverage. 2 L. Russ & T. Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. 2005) § 18:17, p. 18-24. When properly incorporated into the policy, the policy and the rider or endorsement together constitute the contract of insurance, and are to be read together to determine the contract actually intended by the parties. Id., p. 18-26.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Santani- ello, 290 Conn. 81, 93, 961 A.2d 387 (2009). ‘‘[I]n constru- ing an endorsement to an insurance policy, the endorsement and policy must be read together, and the policy remains in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 806, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). By its plain terms, the portion of endorsement no. 3 providing for an aggregate policy limit for general and professional liability coverage does not purport to alter or supersede any specific, preexisting part of the policy, but only to ‘‘amend’’ the policy as a whole. Conse- quently, it is most reasonably read as an addition to the policy, made necessary by the simultaneous addition of endorsement no. 2, which extends the general and professional liability coverage afforded by the policy to seven different insured locations. In contrast, a different portion of endorsement no. 3 provides clearly that § IV B of the professional liability portion of the policy is ‘‘deleted’’ and ‘‘replaced’’ with the substitute language that was then set forth.19 That substitute language makes clear that the $1 million aggregate limit for professional liability coverage stated in the declarations remains in effect, but applies ‘‘separately to each location . . . .’’ Endorsement no. 3 concludes by verifying that ‘‘[a]ll other terms, conditions and exclusions of the [p]olicy remain unchanged.’’ In short, nothing in endorsement no. 3 suggests that the aggregate limits shown in the declarations have been altered, or rendered irrelevant, other than to make clear that they apply separately to each location. Accordingly, the $1 million aggregate limit for professional liability coverage remains in effect, but applies separately to each insured location. ‘‘To the extent that an interpretation makes another term or provision meaningless, that interpretation should be rejected in favor of an interpretation that preserves meaning.’’ 1 J. Thomas & F. Mootz, New Appleman on Insurance Law (Library Ed. 2011) § 5.03 [1], p. 5-31. ‘‘We previously have recognized the canon of construction of insurance policies that a policy should not be interpreted so as to render any part of it superfluous. . . . [W]e have consistently stated that [i]f it is reasonably possible to do so, every provision of an insurance policy must be given operative effect . . . because parties ordinarily do not insert meaning- less provisions in their agreements. . . . Since it must be assumed that each word contained in an insurance policy is intended to serve a purpose, every term wi