Rettig v. Woodbridge
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledApril 24, 2012
DocketSC18312, SC18422
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Eveleigh; Harper
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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JUDY RETTIG ET AL. v. TOWN
OF WOODBRIDGE ET AL.
(SC 18312)
(SC 18422)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Harper, Js.
Argued December 2, 2011—officially released April 24, 2012
David N. Rosen, with whom was Maureen E. Driscoll,
for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.).
Thomas R. Gerarde, with whom was Bethany B.
Karas, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Michael F. O’Connor, with whom, on the brief, was
Scott R. Ouellette, for the appellees (defendant town of
Orange et al.).
Opinion
PALMER, J. The dispositive issue in these consoli-
dated appeals1 is whether an employee of a municipal
district established pursuant to General Statutes § 7-
3302 is an employee of the towns comprising the district
for purposes of General Statutes § 31-284 (a),3 the exclu-
sivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act
(act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The named plain-
tiff, Judy Rettig,4 appeals5 from the judgment rendered
by the trial court in favor of the named defendant,
the town of Woodbridge, and the defendant towns of
Bethany, Orange and Prospect, among other defen-
dants.6 The plaintiff commenced this action against the
defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n,7
seeking damages for injuries that she sustained when
she slipped and fell in the course of her employment
as an animal control officer for the district animal con-
trol. The district animal control was established by the
defendants pursuant to § 7-330, which permits two or
more towns to form a ‘‘district’’ for the performance of
any municipal function that the member towns may,
under any provision of the General Statutes, perform
separately. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial
court incorrectly concluded that the defendants were
her employer and, therefore, that her claims were
barred by the exclusivity provision of the act. We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.8
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. In
1988, in accordance with the provisions of General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 1987) § 22-331a (a),9 the defendants
entered into an agreement to establish a regional dog
pound at 135 Bradley Road in the town of Woodbridge.
Under that agreement, the defendants agreed to be
served by a regional canine control officer provided by
the state department of agriculture. In 1992, the state
notified the defendants that it no longer would provide
an animal control officer for the region. In light of the
state’s withdrawal of support, the defendants dissolved
the regional dog pound and converted it to a municipal
district in accordance with § 7-330. Under the municipal
animal control district agreement entered into by the
defendants, the animal control facility that had served
as the regional dog pound continued to serve as the
animal control facility for the newly formed district,
with each town paying its proportionate share of the
cost of maintaining that facility. With respect to the
governance, staffing and finance of the district animal
control, the agreement provided in relevant part: ‘‘The
affairs of the [d]istrict hereby established shall be man-
aged by a [b]oard consisting of two (2) members from
each constituent municipality, appointed by the [b]oard
of [s]electmen, the [t]own [c]ouncil, or [b]oard of
[a]ldermen for each [t]own, as applicable. . . .
‘‘Current operating expenses for the [d]istrict shall
be borne by each [t]own in proportion to the following
percentages, which are calculated based upon the 1990
census: [Bethany, 13.9 percent; Orange, 38.7 percent;
Woodbridge, 23.9 percent; and Prospect, 23.5 per-
cent]. . . .
‘‘Each [t]own hereby agrees to make a yearly budget
appropriation sufficient to pay its financial obligations
under this [a]greement, upon a payment schedule
agreed to by at least three of the four chief elected
officials of the member [t]owns.
‘‘Each annual operating budget must be approved by
the [d]istrict [b]oard and by the chief elected officials
of at least three of the four member [t]owns. . . .
‘‘The [d]istrict is formed to furnish or provide, for the
joint use and benefit of the member [t]owns, services,
personnel, facilities, equipment and other property or
resources for the purpose of administering and enforc-
ing the laws relating to dogs and other animals. The
[d]istrict shall be served by a [d]istrict animal control
officer and such assistants as shall be deemed necessary
by the [d]istrict [b]oard, to be appointed by the [d]istrict
[b]oard, who shall also be appointed by the proper
appointing authority in each [t]own as the municipal
control officer or such assistants in such member
[t]own for the administration and enforcement of laws
related to dogs and other animals within the limits of
all member [t]owns. The working conditions, compen-
sation, benefits, personnel rules, appointment and
removal of such animal control officer or assistants
. . . shall be determined solely by the [d]istrict [b]oard.
The [b]oard is hereby authorized to sell, lease, acquire,
contract for and otherwise arrange for the real or per-
sonal property, equipment and services necessary or
advisable for the conduct of the [d]istrict’s business;
subject, however, to the budget approval process set
forth . . . above, and subject also to the further pro-
viso that any expenditure in excess of [$2000] shall be
subject to the prior written approval of at least three
of the respective chief elected officials of the mem-
ber [t]owns.’’
The plaintiff was hired by the district animal control
in 2001 to serve as its animal control officer. In accor-
dance with the provisions of the municipal animal con-
trol district agreement, the district animal control paid
her salary and benefits out of its budget and purchased
workers’ compensation insurance on her behalf. On
January 9, 2005, while in the course of performing her
duties, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the driveway of
the district animal control, sustaining a serious ankle
injury, among other injuries. The plaintiff filed a timely
workers’ compensation claim against the district animal
control, which it accepted and ultimately settled for
$800,000. The plaintiff also commenced this action
against the defendants pursuant to § 52-557n, alleging,
inter alia, negligence and nuisance. The defendants
asserted several special defenses, including that the
plaintiff’s claims were barred (1) by the exclusivity pro-
vision of the act, (2) pursuant to the exclusivity of the
remedy provided under the highway defect statute; see
General Statutes § 13a-149; and (3) under § 52-557n,
which limits the liability of municipalities under certain
circumstances. The defendants subsequently filed
motions for summary judgment, relying on the claims
raised in their special defenses.
In opposing the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the exclu-
sivity provision of the act does not bar her claims
because the defendants lacked the requisite control
over her employment to satisfy the jurisdictional stan-
dard of an employer under the act. See Doe v. Yale
University, 252 Conn. 641, 680–81, 748 A.2d 834 (2000)
(‘‘[t]he right to control test determines the [relationship
between a worker and a putative employer] by asking
whether the putative employer has the right to control
the means and methods used by the worker in the
performance of his or her job’’ [internal quotation marks
omitted]). In support of this contention, the plaintiff
relied primarily on the municipal animal control district
agreement, pursuant to which the defendants had
agreed to delegate to the district animal control board
(district board) sole control over the terms and condi-
tions of her employment. The plaintiff noted that, under
that agreement, the district board had exclusive author-
ity to set her hours, assign her duties, supervise her
work, fix her salary and determine her benefits. The
plaintiff maintained that, to the extent that the munici-
pal animal control district agreement did not establish
conclusively that the district animal control was her
employer rather than the defendants, it at least raised
a genuine issue of material fact as to that issue sufficient
to survive a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court disagreed, concluding that the district
board was analogous to a municipal board of education.
The trial court explained that, under Wallingford v.
Board of Education, 152 Conn. 568, 573, 210 A.2d 446
(1965), members of a local board of education are
deemed to be officers of the municipality they serve,
whereas employees of the district board are considered
employees of the municipalities served by the district
board. The court further observed that, in Mase v. Meri-
den, 164 Conn. 65, 66–67, 316 A.2d 754 (1972), this court
relied on Wallingford in concluding that, for purposes
of applying the exclusivity provision of the act, an
employee of a local board of education was an employee
of the town served by the board. The trial court rea-
soned that, ‘‘[i]nasmuch as the legislature has deemed
local and regional boards of education identical, there
is no logical reason to conclude that an employee of a
regional board of education would not be an employee
of the towns that participate in the regional board of
education.’’ The trial court also explained that, ‘‘[j]ust
as members of the [district] board . . . are officers of
the towns they serve, so, too, are the employees of the
district animal control facility employees of the towns
participating in the facility.’’ Having determined that
the plaintiff’s claims were controlled by Mase, the trial
court did not reach the defendants’ other special
defenses. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff renews her argument that the
act is inapplicable to her claims because the record
makes clear that she and the defendants were never in
an employment relationship. The plaintiff contends that
the trial court, in reaching a contrary conclusion, mis-
construed Mase as having created an exception to the
right to control test set forth in Doe. The plaintiff main-
tains that, although Mase held that employees of a local
board of education are employees of the town served
by the board, that holding was limited to cases in which
a municipality, pursuant to its authority under the Home
Rule Act, General Statutes § 7-188, can impose the civil
service requirements of its town charter on board
employees. The plaintiff further argues that, because
she is not subject to the civil service requirements of the
defendant towns, the reasoning in Mase is inapplicable.
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the trial court, in
addition to misconstruing our holding in Mase, extrapo-
lated several principles from the case that are unwar-
ranted, including that the district board is analogous
to a municipal board of education, that employees of
a regional board of education necessarily would be
considered employees of each of the municipalities
comprising the region, and that the same rules that
apply to local boards of education should apply to dis-
trict boards. The plaintiff proffers several reasons as
to why these principles are unfounded. We find none
of the plaintiff’s arguments persuasive and conclude
that the trial court correctly determined that an
employee of the district animal control is an employee
of the municipalities served by the district for purposes
of the exclusivity provision of the act.10
We begin our review of the plaintiff’s claim by setting
forth certain relevant statutory provisions. General Stat-
utes § 7-193 (b) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[e]ach
municipality may have any municipal officers, depart-
ments, boards, commissions and agencies which are
specifically allowed by the general statutes or which
are necessary to carry out any municipal powers, duties
or responsibilities under the general statutes. . . .’’ One
such municipal responsibility is the duty to maintain a
dog pound or, alternatively, to participate in a regional
dog pound. See General Statutes § 22-336. Under Gen-
eral Statutes § 7-330, ‘‘[a]ny two or more towns, cities
or boroughs may . . . vote to form a district for the
performance of any municipal function which the con-
stituent municipalities of such district may, under any
provision of the general statutes or of any special act,
perform separately. The affairs of any such district shall
be managed by a board consisting of two members from
each constituent municipality appointed by the board
of selectmen of towns, the council or board of aldermen
of cities and the board of burgesses of boroughs.’’ Under
General Statutes § 7-331, ‘‘[t]he proportional share of
each constituent municipality of the indebtedness and
current expenditures of the district for its projects
under the provisions of sections 7-330 to 7-332, inclu-
sive, shall be determined by the board, which board
shall have all the powers and duties with regard to such
projects as such constituent municipalities would have
severally.’’ Under General Statutes § 7-332, a municipal-
ity ‘‘may, by vote of its legislative body, elect to with-
draw from such district, but such withdrawal shall not
be effective until six months after such vote, nor shall
such withdrawal relieve such municipality of any liabil-
ity which it incurred as a member of such district.’’
This appeal also implicates the workers’ compensa-
tion statutes and, in particular, the exclusivity provision
of the act. ‘‘The purpose of the [act] . . . is to provide
compensation for injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment, regardless of fault. . . . Under
the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring
a common law action against the employer, thereby
limiting the employer’s liability to the statutory amount.
. . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or
her losses without having to prove liability. . . . In a
word, these statutes compromise an employee’s right
to a common law tort action for work related injuries
in return for relatively quick and certain compensation.
. . . The intention of the framers of the act was to
establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method
for determining claims for compensation.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale
University, supra, 252 Conn. 672.
‘‘The entire statutory scheme of the [act] is directed
toward those who are in the employer-employee rela-
tionship as those terms are defined in the act and dis-
cussed in our cases. That relationship is threshold to
the rights and benefits under the act . . . . Just as a
claimant may invoke the act’s remedies only if the claim-
ant satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of an
employee as set forth in [General Statutes] § 31-275 (9)
. . . only those defendants who satisfy the requisite
jurisdictional standard of an employer as set forth in
§ 31-275 (10) may successfully assert the exclusivity of
the act as a bar to a common-law action by an alleged
employee.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 680. ‘‘In short, if the defendant was the
plaintiff’s employer, the plaintiff [is] relegated to the
remedies afforded by the [act].’’ Velardi v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc., 178 Conn. 371, 376, 423 A.2d 77 (1979).
We now turn to the specific question raised by the
plaintiff’s claim, that is, can she recover damages
against the defendants for injuries arising out of her
employment or is she barred from doing so by the
exclusivity provision of the act? Although this question
presents an issue of first impression for this court, our
answer is dictated by our prior precedent. We pre-
viously have held ‘‘that members of a local board of
education are officers of the town they serve and that
the persons employed by them in the performance of
their statutory functions are employees of the town.’’
Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 259–60, 438 A.2d
88 (1980); accord Wallingford v. Board of Education,
supra, 152 Conn. 573. In Mase v. Meriden, supra, 164
Conn. 66–67, we relied on this principle in affirming
the trial court’s determination that the negligence action
of the plaintiff, Rickey P. Mase, was barred by the exclu-
sivity provision of the act. Mase, a nonprofessional
employee of the Meriden board of education, had
brought the action against the city of Meriden (city) to
recover for injuries that he sustained when he slipped
and fell in the course of his employment. Id., 66. Follow-
ing the accident, the board paid Mase workers’ compen-
sation benefits under a policy that it had purchased on
behalf of its employees. See id. In reliance on this court’s
statement in Wallingford that employees of a board of
education are employees of the town served by the
board, the trial court in Mase granted the city’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Mase’s claim
was barred by the exclusivity of the act. See Mase v.
Meriden, Superior Court, New Haven County at New
Haven, Docket No. 12 21 39 (March 7, 1972). In doing so,
the trial court observed, contrary to Mase’s contentions,
that it was ‘‘of no moment’’ that the Meriden board of
education ‘‘may have purchased [workers’] [c]ompensa-
tion coverage for persons hired by it . . . . The pre-
mium was obviously paid with [money] supplied by the
[c]ity . . . .’’ Id.
In a per curiam opinion, we upheld the trial court’s
determination, stating: ‘‘In Wallingford v. Board of Edu-
cation, [supra, 152 Conn. 573–74], we specifically held
that although [local] boards of education are agencies
of the state in charge of education in the towns, mem-
bers of the board of education are, nevertheless, also
officers of the town and that persons employed by the
board in the performance of its statutory functions are
employees of the town and are thus subject to the
provisions of the town charter relating to civil service.
Our holding in the Wallingford case that persons
employed by the board of education are town employ-
ees was not limited only to situations [in which] there
was a requirement that the board select its nonprofes-
sional employees under those civil service require-
ments.’’ Mase v. Meriden, supra, 164 Conn. 67.
In the present case, the plaintiff contends that Mase
does not control her claim because, among other rea-
sons, the employment relationship that was found to
exist in Mase was predicated on the city’s right to
require the Meriden board of education to comply with
the civil service requirements of the city charter. See
id. The plaintiff argues that, because she is not subject
to the civil service requirements of any of the defendant
towns, they lack the requisite control over her employ-
ment to satisfy the jurisdictional standard of an
employer under Mase. We disagree.
No doubt because we viewed the employment rela-
tionship in Mase to be self-evident, we did not engage
in a lengthy analysis of the issue, nor did we directly
address Mase’s arguments to the contrary. Notwith-
standing the rather summary nature of our opinion in
Mase, however, we explicitly stated that the holding in
Wallingford, on which the trial court in Mase relied in
concluding that Mase was a city employee, ‘‘was not
limited only to situations [in which] there was a
requirement that the board select its nonprofessional
employees [in accordance with the] civil service
requirements [of the city].’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Our
review of the record in that case indicates that this
statement was made in response to Mase’s claim on
appeal that the trial court’s reliance on Wallingford was
misplaced because Wallingford did not involve a claim
for workers’ compensation benefits but, rather, whether
the Wallingford town charter authorized the town of
Wallingford to control the manner in which its local
board of education hired its nonprofessional staff.11 See
Mase v. Meriden, Conn. Supreme Court Records &
Briefs, October Term, 1972, Pt. 1, Plaintiff’s Brief pp.
4–6. Mase contended, therefore, that, when the court
in Wallingford stated that a board of education
employee is an employee of the town served by the
board, it was not in the context of deciding whether
an employment relationship existed under the act, and
the court did not apply the right to control test in decid-
ing the issue. See id., p. 6. Mase further contended that,
in applying the right to control test to the facts of his
case, it was clear that he and the city were not in
an employment relationship because the city did not
exercise any control over the terms of his employment.
See id., p. 5. Specifically, Mase argued that the board,
as an agent of the state, ‘‘employed [him], directed his
activities, and had the power to fire him,’’ whereas ‘‘[t]he
[c]ity . . . had no power to hire, fire, or direct him in
his duties.’’ Id.
By way of rebuttal, the city argued that the trial court
correctly had concluded, in reliance on Wallingford,
that the city exercised control over Mase through its
officers on the board, which was sufficient to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements of an employer under
the act. Id., Defendant’s Brief pp. 2–4. When read in
context of the parties’ arguments, therefore, it is appar-
ent that our statement in Mase that the holding in Wall-
ingford was not limited to cases in which a municipality
has authority under its charter to prescribe the manner
in which a board hires its nonprofessional staff was
intended to indicate our agreement with the city that
the requirements of the act were met in Mase not
because the city possessed independent authority over
Mase’s employment but because the members of the
board, as officers of the city, exercised their authority
on behalf of the city. See, e.g., Cheshire v. McKenney,
supra, 182 Conn. 259 (‘‘The members of local boards
of education are invested with the powers of their office
by municipal action. They are either elected by local
constituencies . . . or, pursuant to the town charter,
are appointed by an elected officer or body of the munic-
ipality.’’ [Citation omitted.]). We can perceive of no
reason why the same reasoning should not apply to the
present case. Just as local boards of education exercise
their authority on behalf of the municipalities they
serve, so, too, do the members of the district board
exercise their authority on behalf of the defendant
towns.
Indeed, it bears emphasis that the issue of whether
an employee of a municipal board is also an employee
of the municipality served by the board has arisen only
in the context of boards of education. That the issue
has arisen at all stems from the fact that ‘‘our jurispru-
dence has created a dichotomy in which local boards
of education are agents of the state for some purposes
and agents of the municipality for others.’’ Purzycki v.
Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 112, 708 A.2d 937 (1998); see
also Board of Education v. New Haven, 237 Conn. 169,
181, 676 A.2d 375 (1996) (‘‘A local board of education
acts as an agent of the state when it performs those
duties delegated to it by the state. . . . A board of
education acts as an agent of its respective municipality
when it performs those functions originally entrusted
by the state to the municipality that the municipality
has subsequently delegated to the board of education;
e.g., the construction of schools or the acquisition of
capital equipment. While acting as an agent of the
municipality, the local boards of education must comply
with the municipality’s charter, ordinances and estab-
lished fiscal procedures.’’ [Citations omitted.]).
Thus, on those few occasions when we have consid-
ered the issue, it has been in connection with an effort—
either by the employee of a board of education or by
a board of education itself—to exploit this dichotomy
to some advantage by claiming that board of education
employees are employees of the board alone rather
than the municipality served by the board. See, e.g.,
Board of Education v. State Employees Retirement
Commission, 210 Conn. 531, 543–45, 556 A.2d 572
(1989) (determining whether board of education
employees were employees of municipality such that
their wages were subject to social security taxation);
Cheshire v. McKenney, supra, 182 Conn. 257–61 (deter-
mining whether board of education employee was
employee of municipality and therefore subject to local
charter provision prohibiting municipal employees
from serving as members of town council); Mase v.
Meriden, supra, 164 Conn. 66–67 (determining whether
board of education employee was employee of munici-
pality for purposes of applying exclusivity provision of
act). We rejected this claim in each of the foregoing
cases, concluding that the board’s dual agency in no way
undercut the employer-employee relationship between
the municipality and the board’s employees. See Board
of Education v. State Employees Retirement Commis-
sion, supra, 545; Cheshire v. McKenney, supra, 261;
Mase v. Meriden, supra, 67.
There is, of course, no similar dichotomy in the pre-
sent case. When the district board carries out its duties
pursuant to the provisions of § 7-330 and the municipal
animal control district agreement, it does so solely on
behalf of the defendant towns, pursuant to the authority
delegated to it by those towns. See General Statutes
§ 7-331 (district board ‘‘shall have all the powers and
duties with regard to [district] projects as such constit-
uent municipalities would have severally’’). Accord-
ingly, to the extent that the plaintiff contends that Mase
is inapplicable to the present case because of the unique
nature of boards of education relative to the straightfor-
ward nature of other municipal boards, that contention
is without merit. Whatever differences exist between
them clearly militate in favor of our conclusion that the
defendants and the plaintiff were in an employment
relationship.12
We also are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the structure of the district animal control
‘‘reflects policy choices that . . . are inconsistent with
a finding that the towns were [the] plaintiff’s employer.’’
Specifically, the plaintiff contends that, by organizing
the district animal control so that its employees were
employees of the district animal control rather than of
each of the individual towns, the defendants ‘‘insulated
themselves from a series of burdens that they quite
reasonably thought it [was] very useful to avoid. These
burdens include [financial] obligations both to [the]
plaintiff and for [the] plaintiff’s conduct that might
potentially injure others.’’ The plaintiff does not explain,
however, and we are unable to discern, how the defen-
dants have insulated themselves from any of the bur-
dens that she describes in light of the fact that, under
both the municipal animal control district agreement
and § 7-331, the defendants are wholly liable for all of
the expenses of the district animal control, including
the expenses relating to the plaintiff’s employment.13
We also find no merit in the plaintiff’s contention that,
because district animal control employees are not
employees of each of the towns individually and, there-
fore, are not entitled to participate in the pension plans
of any of the individual towns or to receive the same
benefits as persons employed by the towns, she and
the defendants were not in an employer-employee rela-
tionship. The fact that the plaintiff’s employment was
structured so that she served as an employee of the
district animal control rather than of any one of the
individual towns simply reflects the practical realities
of establishing and administering such a regional dis-
trict. The manner in which the employment arrange-
ment is structured pales in significance to the fact that
the defendant towns control the district board and the
budget, the fact that they are liable for all expenses
and debts incurred by the district animal control, and
the fact that they created the district animal control,
as expressly authorized by § 7-330, solely for the pur-
pose of avoiding duplication of animal control services
in the discharge of their statutory duty to provide
such services.
Finally, it is axiomatic that municipal boards and
agencies are extensions of the towns they serve, created
for the purpose of performing those functions that
towns are statutorily required or permitted to perform.
See, e.g., General Statutes § 7-193 (b) (‘‘[e]ach munici-
pality may have any municipal officers, departments,
boards, commissions and agencies which are specifi-
cally allowed by the general statutes or which are neces-
sary to carry out any municipal powers, duties or
responsibilities under the general statutes’’). They are,
in effect, alter egos of the towns. The district animal
control is no different. Indeed, the only thing that distin-
guishes it from a single-municipality agency or board,
tasked with performing the same quintessentially
municipal function, is that the district animal control
serves more than one town. That its structure or organi-
zation may differ on account of this fact does not alter
its fundamental character as an agent of the defendant
towns.14 Nor does it alter the fundamental nature of the
relationship between the defendant towns and district
animal control employees as that of employer and
employee.
To conclude otherwise, as the trial court aptly
explained, ‘‘would subject a town [that] participates in
a municipal district to liability for a worker’s on-the-
job injury claim twice, once through assessment for
sums to provide workers’ compensation coverage
through the district and then directly for the injury
itself. [This] cannot be the intent of the legislature in
providing for the regionalization of municipal services.
The obvious purpose of the statutes . . . allowing the
regionalization of services by towns, which, because of
their size, would make the individual provision of such
service by one town alone economically unfeasible,
would be defeated if such regionalization would operate
to strip the town of the protections it would have had
if it provided the service alone.’’
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the trial
court that the defendants are the plaintiff’s employer
for purposes of the act, and, therefore, the plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
act. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and we
reject the plaintiff’s claim in Docket No. SC 18422.
Because the claim in Docket No. SC 18312 is controlled
by our resolution of the appeal in Docket No. SC 18422;
see footnote 8 of this opinion; we reject the claim in
Docket No. SC 18312 as well.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
The consolidated appeals that are the subject of this opinion are Docket
No. SC 18422, which was filed by the named plaintiff, Judith Rettig, and
Docket No. SC 18312, which was filed by the plaintiff Christine Santoro. As
we explain more fully hereinafter; see footnote 8 of this opinion; our resolu-
tion of the appeal in Docket No. SC 18422 is dispositive of the appeal in
Docket No. SC 18312. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this
opinion are to the appeal in Docket No. SC 18422.
2
General Statutes § 7-330 provides: ‘‘Any two or more towns, cities or
boroughs may, by vote of their legislative bodies, vote to form a district for
the performance of any municipal function which the constituent municipali-
ties of such district may, under any provision of the general statutes or of
any special act, perform separately. The affairs of any such district shall be
managed by a board consisting of two members from each constituent
municipality appointed by the board of selectmen of towns, the council or
board of aldermen of cities and the board of burgesses of boroughs. Any
town, city or borough having a population of more than five thousand
inhabitants as determined by the last-completed federal census shall be
entitled to one additional representative for each additional five thousand
population or part thereof. The board shall, at its first meeting, determine
by lot which members shall serve for one, two or three years, provided the
terms of office of not more than fifty per cent of the board shall expire in
any one year. Thereafter, the terms of office shall be for three years. Such
board shall choose by ballot from its membership a chairman, a secretary
and a treasurer. Such treasurer shall give bond to the board to the satisfaction
of its members, the cost of such bond to be borne by the board.’’
3
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides: ‘‘An employer who complies with
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any
action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee
arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death
resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure
compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that
compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused
by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his
intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any
representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal
injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other
than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section
shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer,
additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing
any agreement for additional compensation.’’
4
Christine Santoro also is a plaintiff. In addition, the district animal control
intervened as a plaintiff. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Rettig, the
named plaintiff, as the plaintiff throughout this opinion.
5
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the
trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
6
The complaint also named as defendants Advanced Paving and Excavat-
ing, Inc., as well as the following officers of the defendant towns: Warren
Connors; Robert Chatfield; Edwin Lieberman; Clifford Rosson; Amey Mar-
rella; Judith Schwartz; Joseph Calistro; Christian Sorenson; James Sabshin;
Edward Sheehy; Steven Bortner; Mitchell Goldblatt; James Zeoli; Joseph
Blake; Richard Meisenheimer; Dorothy Berger; Ralph Okenquist; Patricia
Pearson; Roy Cuzzocreo; Derrylyn Gorski; Steven Thornquist; and Walter
Briggs. Prior to judgment, the plaintiff withdrew her claims against Advanced
Paving and Excavating, Inc. All of the original defendants except Advanced
Paving and Excavating, Inc., are parties to this appeal. In the interest of
simplicity, all references to the defendants in this opinion are to the defen-
dant towns.
7
General Statutes § 52-557n provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Except as
otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable
for damages to person or property caused by . . . (C) acts of the political
subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation
of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages
resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective
road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149. (2) Except as otherwise
provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for
damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any
employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual
malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require
the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority
expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’
8
Because we reject the plaintiff’s claim in the appeal corresponding to
Docket No. SC 18422, and because the claim in the appeal corresponding
to Docket No. SC 18312 is derivative of the claim in Docket No. SC 18422,
the claim in Docket No. SC 18312 also must fail. Christine Santoro, who
filed the appeal in Docket No. SC 18312, was joined in a civil union with
the plaintiff on April 9, 2006, and asserted a claim for loss of consortium
against the defendants in the plaintiff’s action. The trial court granted the
defendants’ motions to strike Santoro’s claim on the ground that Santoro
and the plaintiff had not been joined in a civil union when the plaintiff
sustained her injuries. Santoro appealed but acknowledged that her loss of
consortium claim is derivative of the plaintiff’s claims and, therefore, that
she cannot prevail on appeal if we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusivity provision
of the act. Because we reject the plaintiff’s claim in Docket No. SC 18422,
we reject Santoro’s claim in Docket No. SC 18312. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
9
General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 22-331a (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘Any two or more contiguous towns each of which has a population of less
than twenty-five thousand, and which have or will provide a dog pound
facility within their region, by action of their legislative bodies, may agree
to be served by a regional canine control officer. Upon certification of such
agreement to the commissioner with assurances from the towns so certifying
that they will provide and continue to provide adequate facilities, the com-
missioner may, after giving due regard to the regional aspects of the proposed
facilities and whether the proposed region would be in the best interests
of the towns so certifying, establish such region. Upon establishing such
region, the commissioner shall appoint a full-time regional canine control
officer and such assistants as are deemed necessary to administer and
enforce the laws relating to dogs. . . . All costs of maintaining and operating
such pounds and administering and enforcing the laws relating to dogs
within such regions shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (b).’