Wilcox v. Schwartz
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledFebruary 7, 2012
DocketSC18607
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Eveleigh; Vertefeuille
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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KRISTY WILCOX ET AL. v. DANIEL S.
SCHWARTZ ET AL.
(SC 18607)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued March 17, 2011—officially released February 7, 2012
Frank H. Santoro, with whom, on the brief, was Jona-
than A. Kocienda, for the appellants (defendants).
Steven J. Errante, with whom, on the brief, was Mar-
isa A. Bellair, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
PALMER, J. This certified appeal arises out of a medi-
cal malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, Kristy
Wilcox and Timothy Wilcox,1 against the defendants,
Daniel S. Schwartz, a general surgeon, and his employer,
CBS Surgical Group, P.C., alleging that Schwartz negli-
gently performed laparoscopic gallbladder surgery on
Kristy Wilcox (Wilcox). The trial court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the writ-
ten opinion of a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ that
accompanied the certificate of good faith, as mandated
by General Statutes § 52-190a (a),2 did not satisfy the
‘‘detailed basis’’ requirement of § 52-190a (a) because
it failed to explain the particular manner in which
Schwartz had breached the standard of care. The plain-
tiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed
the judgment of the trial court. Wilcox v. Schwartz, 119
Conn. App. 808, 817, 990 A.2d 366 (2010). We granted the
defendants’ petition for certification to appeal limited to
the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court prop-
erly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the present
case for failure to comply with the ‘detailed basis’
requirement of . . . § 52-190a (a)?’’ Wilcox v.
Schwartz, 296 Conn. 908, 909, 993 A.2d 469 (2010). We
answer that question in the affirmative and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.3
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The
[plaintiffs] alleged that on March 12, 2006, Wilcox under-
went a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed by
Schwartz for treatment of gallbladder disease. The
[plaintiffs] further alleged that Schwartz performed the
procedure negligently, causing Wilcox to suffer ‘severe,
painful and permanent injuries.’ The plaintiffs claimed
that Schwartz breached the applicable standard of care
in that he . . . (1) ‘failed to [ensure] the adequate and
accurate identification of [Wilcox’s] internal anatomy
prior to proceeding with the laparoscopic cholecystec-
tomy,’ (2) ‘failed to prevent injury to [Wilcox’s] biliary
structures during the laparoscopic cholecystectomy’
and (3) ‘failed to accurately document the surgical pro-
cedure . . . .’ ’’ Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn.
App. 810–11.
‘‘The [plaintiffs’] two count complaint stated claims
sounding in medical negligence and loss of spousal
consortium, respectively. Attached to the complaint
was a certificate of reasonable inquiry, executed by the
plaintiffs’ attorney, and a written and signed medical
opinion [by a physician]. The body of the opinion [pro-
vides in relevant part]: ‘I have reviewed the relevant
records and information that were provided to me with
regard to . . . Wilcox.
‘‘ ‘I can conclude that, to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal probability, there are deviations from the applicable
standards of care pertaining to the care and treatment
of . . . Wilcox provided by [Schwartz] and that the
care and treatment provided by [him] was not provided
in a manner consistent with the standards of care that
existed among general surgeons at the time of the
alleged incident.
‘‘ ‘Specifically [Schwartz] failed to prevent injury to
. . . Wilcox’s biliary structures during laparoscopic
[gallbladder] surgery and failed to accurately document
the surgical procedure of March 12, 2006. As a result of
[Schwartz’] negligent treatment . . . Wilcox sustained
severe, painful and permanent injuries.
‘‘ ‘My opinions are based [on] my education, training
and experience as a physician, and my examination of
. . . Wilcox’s medical records.’ ’’ Id., 811–12.
‘‘[T]he defendants filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint . . . [on the ground] that the plaintiffs’ written
opinion was not detailed enough to satisfy the require-
ments of § 52-190a (a). Specifically, the defendants
argued that ‘the opining physician simply provides a
conclusory statement of negligence, and fail[ed] to pro-
vide an opinion as to how [Schwartz was] negligent in
[his] care of [Wilcox], [that is], how [Schwartz] deviated
from the standard of care.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
812. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss; see General Statutes § 52-190a (c);4 concluding
that the ‘‘detailed basis’’ requirement of § 52-190a (a)
requires a written opinion to include ‘‘some particulars
as to what the defendant did that he was not supposed
to do or failed to do that he was supposed to do.’’ In
its view, although the written opinion submitted by the
plaintiffs in the present case asserts that Schwartz ‘‘was
supposed to do something ‘to prevent injury to . . .
Wilcox’s biliary structures’ . . . [that] he did not,’’ it
failed to identify the negligent act or omission with
sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of
§ 52-190a (a).
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiffs
claimed that the trial court incorrectly had concluded
that the written opinion was insufficiently detailed to
meet the requirements of § 52-190a. See Wilcox v.
Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn. App. 810. The Appellate
Court agreed with that claim and reversed the judgment
of the trial court. Id., 810, 817. In reaching its determina-
tion, the Appellate Court relied on this court’s decision
in Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 359–60, 972 A.2d 715
(2009), in which we rejected a claim that the written
opinion required by § 52-190a (a) must state that the
defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See Wilcox v.
Schwartz, supra, 814–15. In Dias, we concluded, rather,
on the basis of our examination of the language and
legislative history of § 52-190a, that the written opinion
need only provide an opinion as to the breach of the
standard of care. See Dias v. Grady, supra, 355–60.
Because the written opinion in the present case satisfied
that requirement, the Appellate Court concluded that
it was sufficient for purposes of § 52-190a (a). See Wil-
cox v. Schwartz, supra, 815. Specifically, the Appellate
Court stated: ‘‘The [written] opinion first states the
author’s conclusion, ‘to a reasonable degree of medical
probability,’ that there were ‘deviations from the appli-
cable [standard] of care’ by Schwartz and that the care
and treatment provided to Wilcox by Schwartz ‘was not
provided in a manner consistent with the [standard] of
care that existed among general surgeons at the time
of the alleged incident.’ The opinion continues: ‘Specifi-
cally, [Schwartz] failed to prevent injury to . . . Wil-
cox’s biliary structures during laparoscopic [gall-
bladder] surgery and failed to accurately document the
surgical procedure of March 12, 2006.’ Thus, the struc-
ture of the [written opinion] reveals the author’s state-
ment of the prevailing standard of care: protecting the
biliary structures during laparoscopic gallbladder sur-
gery. It is this standard of care, the author opines, that
Schwartz breached in performing the surgery on Wil-
cox.’’ Id.
The Appellate Court concluded that ‘‘the [written]
opinion [was] sufficiently detailed to satisfy the require-
ments of § 52-190a (a). It suffices to notify the reader
that a similar health care provider is of the opinion that
the medical negligence consisted of a failure to protect
Wilcox’s bile ducts from injury during surgery. . . .
The ultimate purpose of [the] requirement [of a written
opinion] is to [discourage frivolous lawsuits by] demon-
strat[ing] the existence of the claimant’s good faith in
bringing the complaint by having a witness, qualified
under General Statutes § 52-184c, state in written form
that there appears to be evidence of a breach of the
applicable standard of care. [As] long as the good faith
opinion sufficiently addresses the allegations of negli-
gence pleaded in the complaint, as [the written] opinion
[in the present case] does, the basis of the opinion is
detailed enough to satisfy the statute and the statute’s
purpose.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 815–16. The Appellate
Court further concluded that the plaintiffs’ ‘‘complaint
allege[d] only one specification of negligence pertaining
to the actual performance of the surgery: that Schwartz
‘failed to prevent injury to [Wilcox’s] biliary structures
during the laparoscopic cholecystectomy.’ The defen-
dants have been given sufficient notice that a similar
health care provider is willing to state his opinion that
the standard of care was breached during this surgical
procedure. The defendants will have the opportunity
to gather more information during discovery of any
medical expert [that] the plaintiffs plan to use at trial.’’
Id., 817. This appeal followed.
On appeal to this court following our granting of
certification, the defendants challenge the determina-
tion of the Appellate Court that the plaintiffs’ written
opinion contains sufficient detail to pass muster under
§ 52-190a (a) on the ground that the opinion fails to
identify the particular negligent act or acts that caused
the damage to Wilcox’s biliary structures. The defen-
dants also assert that the written opinion is legally inad-
equate because it asserts only that Schwartz was
negligent in failing to prevent injury to Wilcox’s biliary
structures but does not expressly identify the standard
of care. The defendants’ contention concerning the
scope of the written opinion requirement of § 52-190a
(a) is predicated on their claim that the requirement
was intended, first, to make medical ‘‘malpractice cases
more difficult to file’’ and, second, to ‘‘ ‘narrow down’
the basis of a plaintiff’s claim’’ in the interest of expedit-
ing an ultimate resolution of the action.
The plaintiffs maintain that the Appellate Court cor-
rectly concluded that the purpose of the written opinion
requirement is to discourage frivolous medical malprac-
tice actions by placing the burden on the person bring-
ing the action to identify a qualified medical pro-
fessional who is willing to attest to the fact that there
appears to be evidence of medical negligence as alleged
in the complaint. The plaintiffs further contend that
interpreting § 52-190a (a) to require that a written opin-
ion provide an explanation of the precise manner in
which the defendant was negligent prior to any discov-
ery in the case would lead to the untenable result that
many potentially meritorious claims never would be
commenced. In accordance with their view of the mean-
ing of § 52-190a (a), the plaintiffs maintain that the
Appellate Court properly reversed the judgment of the
trial court because the assertion in the written opinion
that Schwartz negligently failed to protect Wilcox’s bili-
ary structures is all that was necessary to satisfy § 52-
190a (a). We agree with the plaintiffs.
The question of whether the statements contained in
the written opinion satisfy the ‘‘detailed basis’’ require-
ment of § 52-190a (a) is one of statutory construction.5
See, e.g., Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State,
278 Conn. 77, 82, 896 A.2d 747 (2006) (application of
particular statutory provision to undisputed facts gives
rise to issue of statutory construction). We therefore
begin our analysis with the language of the statute,
which provides in relevant part: ‘‘No [medical malprac-
tice] action . . . shall be filed . . . unless the . . .
party filing the action . . . has made a reasonable
inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine
that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there
has been negligence in the care or treatment of the
claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate
of the . . . party filing the action . . . that such rea-
sonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that
grounds exist for an action against each named defen-
dant . . . . To show the existence of such good faith,
the claimant . . . shall obtain a written and signed
opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there
appears to be evidence of medical negligence and
includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opin-
ion. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-190a (a). Because this
language offers no specific guidance with respect to
the level of detail that a written opinion must contain,
we look to extratextual sources to ascertain the mean-
ing of the ‘‘detailed basis’’ requirement of the statute,
as applied to the facts of the present case.
As we explained in Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn.
350, ‘‘[§] 52-190a originally was enacted as part of the
Tort Reform Act of 1986. See Public Acts 1986, No. 86-
338, § 12. The original version of the statute required the
plaintiff in any medical malpractice action to conduct ‘a
reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances
to determine that there are grounds for a good faith
belief that there has been negligence in the care or
treatment of the [plaintiff]’ and to file a certificate ‘that
such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief
that grounds exist for an action against each named
defendant.’ General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 52-190a
(a). The original statute did not require the plaintiff
to obtain the written opinion of a similar health care
provider that there appeared to be evidence of medical
negligence . . . but permitted the plaintiff to rely on
such an opinion to support his good faith belief. . . .
[T]he purpose of the original version of § 52-190a was
to prevent frivolous medical malpractice actions. See
Bruttomesso v. Northeastern Connecticut Sexual
Assault Crisis Services, Inc., 242 Conn. 1, 15, 698 A.2d
795 (1997) (‘[t]he purpose of the legislation is to inhibit
a plaintiff from bringing an inadequately investigated
cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming
negligence by a health care provider’).
‘‘In 2005, the legislature amended § 52-190a (a) to
include a provision requiring the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action to [‘show the existence of the claim-
ant’s good faith’ belief that grounds exist for an action
by] obtain[ing] the written opinion of a similar health
care provider that ‘there appears to be evidence of
medical negligence’ . . . . See Public Acts 2005, No.
05-275, § 2 . . . .’’ Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 357.
The 2005 legislation was part of ‘‘a comprehensive effort
to control significant and continued increases in mal-
practice insurance premiums by reforming aspects of
tort law, the insurance system and the public health
regulatory system.’’ Bennett v. New Milford Hospital,
Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 18, 12 A.3d 865 (2011).
As we also observed in Dias with regard to the legisla-
tive history of the 2005 legislation, Michael D. Neubert,
an attorney representing the Connecticut State Medical
Society at a hearing before the judiciary committee,
‘‘stated that the [written opinion requirement] was
intended to ‘ensure that there’s a reasonable basis for
filing a medical malpractice action under the circum-
stances. It would help eliminate some of the more ques-
tionable and meritless claims filed under the present
statutory scheme.’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, [Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2005 Sess.], p. 5539. [Neub-
ert] also stated that the [requirement ‘obviously’ was
not ‘going to impact the majority of cases’ and] was
targeting [only ‘the cases on the margins’] . . . ‘where
attorneys, based on their own judgment and maybe in
good faith have misread what an [expert has] told them
. . . . Very often you hear what you want to hear as
an attorney, or interpret [what has] been told to you
as you want to interpret it. . . . [I]f the [physician is]
not willing to sign on the dotted line, maybe [that is]
a good indication that this [is not] a good case to bring.
. . . If part of what [we are] trying to do here is elimi-
nate those cases [that] should not be in the system then
I think this serves to do it.’ Id., p. 5553; see also Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 19,
2005 Sess., p. 5743, written testimony of Neubert (‘the
present statutory scheme does not adequately [e]nsure
that an attorney filing a medical malpractice action has
a reasonable basis to believe that the defendants have
violated the standard of care in causing the plaintiff
injury’).’’ Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 358 n.7.
Two legislators echoed Neubert’s view that the writ-
ten opinion requirement was intended primarily to
reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice
actions by requiring a plaintiff to obtain an opinion
from a similar health care provider substantiating the
plaintiff’s good faith belief that there had been negli-
gence in the plaintiff’s care and treatment. See Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 18,
2005 Sess., p. 5545, remarks of Senator John A. Kissel
(stating that written opinion requirement would greatly
improve on then current practice of ‘‘[the plaintiff’s]
attorney just sort of signing off in good faith’’); see also
48 S. Proc., Pt. 14, 2005 Sess., p. 4433, remarks of Senator
Edward Meyer (observing that written opinion require-
ment would deal ‘‘with . . . [the] bad cases’’). Relying
in large measure on Neubert’s testimony,6 we concluded
in Dias that the legislative history ‘‘indicates that [the
written opinion requirement] was intended to address
the problem that some attorneys, either intentionally
or innocently, were misrepresenting in the certificate
of good faith the information that they had obtained
from experts.’’ Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 357–58.
A review of the pertinent judiciary committee debate
on the 2005 legislation, however, reveals no discussion
or testimony directly addressing the question of what
specific kind of information concerning the defendant’s
alleged negligence is necessary to satisfy the ‘‘detailed
basis’’ requirement. During floor debate in the House
of Representatives, however, Representative Michael
P. Lawlor described the written opinion as a ‘‘threshold
opinion that, in fact, this is medical malpractice.’’ 48
H.R. Proc., Pt. 31, 2005 Sess., p. 9502. During discussion
of the 2005 legislation on the Senate floor, Senator Kis-
sel observed that the written opinion requirement was
consistent with the legislative goal of expediting medi-
cal malpractice actions because the opinion, which is
appended to the good faith certificate, would inform
the defendant, at the commencement of the action, of
the basis of the plaintiff’s good faith belief that the
defendant had performed negligently. See 48 S. Proc.,
supra, p. 4428. Senator Kissel explained that, under the
prior version of the statute, it could take months, or
‘‘even over [one] year, until [the defendant’s] counsel
and their clients could really narrow down’’ the basis
for the complaint. Id. Senator Kissel also observed that,
by allowing the defendant’s counsel to start gathering
information about the claim ‘‘right of[f] the bat,’’ the
written opinion requirement would reduce the length
of the discovery process and better enable the defen-
dant to assess any settlement offers early in the litiga-
tion process. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2005 Sess., pp. 5545–46.
Upon consideration of the statutory language in light
of this legislative history, we agree with the Appellate
Court that a written opinion satisfies the ‘‘detailed
basis’’ requirement of § 52-190a (a) if it sets forth the
basis of the similar health care provider’s opinion that
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence by
express reference to what the defendant did or failed
to do to breach the applicable standard of care. In other
words, the written opinion must state the similar health
care provider’s opinion as to the applicable standard
of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached,
and the factual basis of the similar health care provider’s
conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of
care.7 This level of detail is sufficient because it satisfies
the requirement of § 52-190a (a) that the written opinion
shall include both the opinion of the similar health care
provider that ‘‘there appears to be evidence of medical
negligence’’ and a ‘‘detailed basis for the formation of
such opinion,’’ that is, a statement setting forth the facts
then known to the health care provider on which that
opinion of medical negligence is predicated. General
Statutes § 52-190a (a).
The foregoing interpretation of § 52-190a (a) also rep-
resents an appropriate balance between the two pri-
mary competing considerations identified by the leg-
islature, namely, the need for enough specificity to sup-
port a good faith belief of the existence of medical
negligence, on the one hand, and the fact that, at the
time the written opinion is issued, the plaintiff will not
yet have had the opportunity to engage in any formal
discovery into the alleged malpractice, on the other.
Although, in some cases, a more comprehensive expla-
nation of the defendant’s alleged negligence will be
possible, a blanket requirement mandating a more oner-
ous or stringent standard would serve to deter not only
frivolous lawsuits but some meritorious ones, as well,
a result that the legislature did not intend to achieve.8
Our conclusion finds support in Dias, in which we
explained that, because ‘‘the phrase ‘medical negli-
gence,’ as used in § 52-190a (a), means breach of the
standard of care and was not intended to encompass
all of the elements of a cause of action for negligence’’;
Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 359; the provision does
not require the additional opinion that the medical negli-
gence was the cause of the injury. See id., 359–60. In
reaching that determination, we emphasized that,
‘‘[a]lthough the language and history of § 52-190a (a)
indicate that the statute was intended to bar meritless
medical malpractice actions, [there is] no evidence that
the legislature intended to bar meritorious claims
merely because a similar health care provider is not
qualified to provide an opinion as to both the applicable
standard of care and proximate causation. In the
absence of any such evidence, we must presume that
the legislature had no such intent.’’ Id. Consistent with
the analysis and conclusion in Dias, we are persuaded
that the legislature did not intend to bar a potentially
meritorious claim merely because a similar health care
provider, although able to determine that there appears
to be evidence of a breach of the standard of care, is
unable to identify the specific negligent act or omis-
sion involved.
We also agree with the Appellate Court that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case meets this standard.
See Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn. App. 815–16.
The written opinion provides that its author had ‘‘con-
clude[d] . . . to a reasonable degree of medical proba-
bility’’ that, on the basis of his ‘‘education, training and
experience as a physician, and [an] examination of . . .
Wilcox’s medical records,’’ Schwartz had ‘‘deviat[ed]
from the applicable [standard] of care’’ and, therefore,
was ‘‘negligent’’ in his treatment of Wilcox in ‘‘fail[ing]
to prevent injury to . . . Wilcox’s biliary structures
during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery . . . .’’ In
other words, the written opinion sets forth the author’s
professional medical judgment that, consistent with the
allegations of the complaint, the applicable standard of
care required Schwartz to protect the biliary structures
during surgery and that his failure to do so constituted
a breach of that standard of care. This explanation,
although concise, constitutes a sufficiently clear and
detailed explication of what the defendant did or failed
to do in breaching the applicable standard of care.9
The defendants make several arguments in support
of their claim that the written opinion in the present
case is insufficiently detailed to satisfy § 52-190a (a).
In particular, they contend that the opinion does not
set forth the applicable standard of care. The defen-
dants also contend that the statement in the opinion that
Schwartz failed to protect Wilcox’s biliary structures
is tantamount to a res ipsa loquitur claim because it
suggests that negligence can be inferred from the injury
alone.10 The defendants further argue that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded in the present case,
and, even if it had been, it is rarely relied on in medical
malpractice actions. In addition, the defendants assert
that a written opinion that the defendant was negligent
in failing to prevent injury is inadequate under § 52-
190a (a) because the purpose of the statutory ‘‘detailed
basis’’ requirement is to notify the defendant not only
of the standard of care that was breached but also the
specific manner in which it was breached. We are not
persuaded by these arguments.
First, we disagree with the defendants that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case fails to identify the
applicable standard of care and a breach of that stan-
dard of care. As we previously stated, the opinion pro-
vides that the standard of care required Schwartz to
protect Wilcox’s biliary structures during the laparos-
copic gallbladder surgery and that his failure to do so
caused injury to those structures. Although the defen-
dants may disagree with the standard of care identified
in the written opinion and with the author’s assertion
that Schwartz had deviated from it, that disagreement
does not render the opinion insufficient under § 52-
190a (a) when the information contained therein was
sufficient to place the defendants on notice of the nature
of the alleged medical negligence.
We also agree with the plaintiffs that an opinion by
a similar health care provider that there appears to be
evidence of medical negligence properly may be based
on evidence of an injury or outcome that the medical
professional believes is highly unlikely to have occurred
in the absence of negligence. Such a conclusion may
be reasonable when, for example, an injury occurs to
an organ that is rarely, if ever, injured during a particular
procedure, and the plaintiff’s medical records do not
reveal an explanation for the injury that does not involve
negligence. In such circumstances, the plaintiff’s mal-
practice claim is predicated not on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur but, rather, on the considered opinion of
a medical professional that the injury would not have
occurred but for the defendant’s negligence.
We therefore disagree with the defendants and the
dissent that a written opinion always must identify the
precise manner in which the standard of care was
breached to satisfy the requirements of § 52-190a (a).
The opinion necessarily is obtained prior to the com-
mencement of the action, before the plaintiff will have
had the opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery
under the rules of practice governing such discovery.
When, as in the present case, a health care professional
has opined that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s breach
of the standard of care, that opinion is sufficient to
satisfy § 52-190a (a). Of course, the plaintiff may be
able to obtain more particularized information about
the alleged negligence during the course of pretrial dis-
covery. But, at least in a case like the present one, in
which a similar health care provider opines that, in
essence, the injury would not have occurred in the
absence of medical negligence, § 52-190a (a) does not
require such specificity.11 This is particularly true when,
as in the present case, the similar health care provider
reports that the defendant negligently failed to docu-
ment adequately the surgical procedure.12 In such cir-
cumstances, we do not believe that the legislature
intended to bar potentially meritorious medical mal-
practice claims simply because it is impossible for the
plaintiff to identify, prior to discovery, the particular
act or omission that caused the injury.
Indeed, in certain cases, it may be impossible to deter-
mine the precise cause of the injury even after extensive
discovery. In those cases, the plaintiff’s expert neverthe-
less may be able to opine, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that the injury would not have
occurred in the absence of medical negligence. As a
general matter, there is no reason why that opinion
evidence would not be sufficient to survive a motion
for a directed verdict. If such expert testimony is suffi-
cient to permit the case to go to the jury at the conclu-
sion of the plaintiff’s evidence, it would be unrea-
sonable—indeed, it would be bizarre—to conclude that
the same expert opinion nevertheless is insufficient to
satisfy the ‘‘detailed basis’’ requirement of § 52-190a (a)
at the very inception of the litigation.
Finally, the defendants take issue with our interpreta-
tion of the pertinent legislative history as supporting
the conclusion that the written opinion in the present
case is sufficient under § 52-190a (a). In support of
their contention that the opinion was insufficient, the
defendants maintain that the requirement of a written
opinion was intended to reduce medical malpractice
insurance premiums by making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring medical malpractice cases and to
expedite the resolution of medical malpractice actions
by notifying the defendant or defendants of the basis
for the plaintiff’s claim when the action is commenced.
We do not agree that the legislative history supports
the defendants’ claim.
With respect to their first contention, the defendants
rely on a statement by Representative Lawlor, who, in
discussing the 2005 legislation on the floor of the House
of Representatives, remarked that the written opinion
requirement would make ‘‘it much more difficult to
bring a medical malpractice action in court.’’ 48 H.R.
Proc., supra, p. 9445. Our review of Representative
Lawlor’s remarks, however, reveals that the foregoing
comment was not addressed to the ‘‘detailed basis’’
language of the legislation but, rather, to the fact that
the written opinion would have to be attached to the
complaint. See id., p. 9501, remarks of Representative
Lawlor. In Representative Lawlor’s view, requiring
plaintiffs to attach the full text of the opinion to the
complaint would make it more difficult to obtain such
an opinion because similar health care providers
‘‘would be reluctant to render an opinion that another
physician had . . . engaged in malpractice . . . [due
to] the likelihood that there would be some backlash
against [them] from other physicians when it comes
to referrals [and the like].’’ Id., p. 9502. Accordingly,
Representative Lawlor’s remarks do not support the
defendants’ interpretation of the statute.
Indeed, as we previously indicated, although the legis-
lative history makes clear that the written opinion
requirement was intended to reduce the number of friv-
olous lawsuits, there is nothing in that history to suggest
that the legislature intended to achieve this salutary
result through the ‘‘detailed basis’’ requirement of the
statute. To the contrary, as we previously noted, the
legislative history strongly suggests that the written
opinion requirement was not intended to impose any
additional burden on those plaintiffs seeking redress for
reasonably investigated, potentially meritorious claims.
The purpose of the requirement, rather, was to eliminate
those claims that are so lacking in merit that no similar
health care provider would be willing to express even
a preliminary opinion that the plaintiff’s injuries were
the result of medical negligence.
With respect to their second contention, the defen-
dants rely on Senator Kissel’s statement that the written
opinion would expedite the resolution of a medical
malpractice case by notifying the defendant, at the
inception of the case, of the exact basis for the plaintiff’s
claim. See 48 S. Proc., supra, pp. 4428–29. The defen-
dants contend that the written opinion in this case,
which merely provides that Schwartz negligently failed
to prevent injury to Wilcox’s biliary structures, ‘‘hardly
seems consistent with this legislative purpose.’’ We dis-
agree. For the reasons previously identified, we believe
that the written opinion in the present case satisfies
the requirements of § 52-190a (a) because it sets forth
a similar health care provider’s opinion that the applica-
ble standard of care required Schwartz to prevent injury
to Wilcox’s biliary structures during surgery and that
he failed to do so.
Finally, the defendants contend that the failure of
the legislature, in 2010, to pass a bill entitled, ‘‘An Act
Concerning Certificates of Merit,’’ supports their claim
that the ‘‘detailed basis’’ language of § 52-190a (a)
requires greater detail than that which is contained in
the written opinion in the present case. See House Bill
No. 5537, 2010 Sess. According to the defendants, that
bill would have amended § 52-190a (a) by replacing the
phrase ‘‘includes a detailed basis for the formation of
such opinion’’ with the phrase ‘‘which states one or
more specific breaches of the prevailing professional
standard of care.’’ Id. In the defendants’ view, because
this bill ‘‘would have watered down the ‘detail’ require-
ment’’ of the present statute, it is apparent that the
written opinion in the present case does not satisfy
§ 52-190a (a). We are not persuaded.
‘‘Although we have relied on the failure to amend a
statute as an indication of legislative intent regarding
that statute or statutes within the same legislative
scheme; see, e.g., Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545,
555, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); cf. State v. McVeigh, 224 Conn.
593, 619–21, 620 A.2d 133 (1993) (subsequent amend-
ments held not relevant to legislative intent at time of
enactment of underlying statute); we hesitate unilater-
ally to assign motives to the legislature [when] it has
failed to enact a statute other than the one whose inter-
pretation is before us.’’ State v. Miranda, 245 Conn.
209, 230–31 n.24, 715 A.2d 680 (1998), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727, 878
A.2d 1118 (2005). ‘‘[W]hen we have drawn on legislative
rejection of proposed statutory amendments as the
basis for an inference of legislative intent, ordinarily
we have viewed those failures as indicative of legislative
approval of an existing interpretation of substantive
law. . . . [Because, however] [t]here is no authorita-
tive prior judicial interpretation with respect to which
the legislature could have been expressing its approval
in this case’’; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted]) State v. McVeigh, supra, 621–22; we are
unwilling to draw such an inference.13
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case satisfies the ‘‘detailed
basis’’ requirement of § 52-190a (a). We therefore agree
with the Appellate Court that the judgment of the trial
court must be reversed.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VER-
TEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
1
We refer to Kristy Wilcox and Timothy Wilcox collectively as the
plaintiffs.
2
General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No civil action
or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from
personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987,
whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death
resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney
or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable
inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are
grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or
treatment of the claimant. The complaint, initial pleading or apportionment
complaint shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action
or apportionment complaint that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good
faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant
or for an apportionment complaint against each named apportionment defen-
dant. To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s
attorney, and any apportionment complainant or the apportionment com-
plainant’s attorney, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar
health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health
care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section,
that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a
detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. Such written opinion shall
not be subject to discovery by any party except for questioning the validity
of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant’s attorney, and any apportion-
ment complainant or apportionment complainant’s attorney, shall retain the
original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion,
with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged,
to such certificate. The similar health care provider who provides such
written opinion shall not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable
for any damages to the defendant health care provider by reason of having
provided such written opinion. In addition to such written opinion, the court
may consider other factors with regard to the existence of good faith. If
the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate
was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented
against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal
discovery, the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose
upon the person who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee. The court may also submit the matter to the appropriate
authority