Nelson v. Dettmer
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJuly 24, 2012
DocketSC18700
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Zarella; McLachlan; Eveleigh; Harper
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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VAYLE NELSON ET AL. v. KAREN
S. DETTMER ET AL.
(SC 18700)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js.*
Argued March 13—officially released July 24, 2012
Michael G. Rigg, for the appellants (defendant John
Dempsey Hospital et al.).
Steven D. Ecker, with whom were Paul A. Slager and,
on the brief, M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the appel-
lees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
McLACHLAN, J. In this appeal, we must determine
whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
and substantive authority to set aside its prior decision
granting a motion for summary judgment. The issues
on appeal arise out of two reversals of fortune, so to
speak, in favor of the named plaintiff, Vayle Nelson
(plaintiff), through her parents and next friends, Susan
Birk and Glen Nelson, in a medical malpractice action
against, inter alia, the defendants, John Dempsey Hospi-
tal and the University of Connecticut Health Center
(state). The claims commissioner (commissioner)
granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state after
vacating an earlier decision dismissing the plaintiff’s
claim, and the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the summary judgment rendered in favor of
the state after the legislature amended General Statutes
§ 4-158 to authorize the commissioner to vacate a deci-
sion under certain conditions. The state appeals from
the trial court’s decision granting the plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the summary judgment rendered in favor
of the state. The state argues: (1) that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
claim because the commissioner did not have authority
to vacate his original dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim,
thus leaving the state’s sovereign immunity intact; and
(2) that the trial court lacked substantive authority to
entertain the plaintiff’s motion to set aside because the
motion was not filed within the four month limitation
period provided in General Statutes § 52-212a.1 We con-
clude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
and substantive authority to consider the plaintiff’s
motion to set aside. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. The plaintiff was born on April
30, 2005, in Charlotte Hungerford Hospital. After her
birth, due to serious medical complications, the plaintiff
was transported to John Dempsey Hospital by the trans-
port team for John Dempsey Hospital and the University
of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff alleges that
she sustained severe and permanent brain damage due
to a delay in treatment by the state.
The plaintiff filed a claim with the commissioner pur-
suant to General Statutes § 4-160,2 seeking permission
to bring an action against the state. The commissioner
dismissed this claim on January 30, 2007, for failure to
prosecute because the plaintiff failed to respond to the
state’s discovery requests. The plaintiff alleges that her
attorney had not informed her of the discovery requests
or the dismissal of her claim. Upon discovery of the
dismissal, the plaintiff retained new counsel and filed
a motion to vacate the dismissal and reopen her claim.
The commissioner concluded that ‘‘ ‘justice and
equity’ ’’ required the granting of the plaintiff’s motion
and her request for permission to bring an action against
the state.
The plaintiff thereupon filed the present action in
the Superior Court. Thereafter, the state moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the commissioner did
not have statutory authority to vacate his prior dismissal
of the plaintiff’s claim. The state further contended that,
because the commissioner did not have authority to
undertake further proceedings with respect to the plain-
tiff’s claim, the state retained sovereign immunity, and,
therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the plaintiff’s claims. The trial court agreed
and granted the state’s motion on November 13, 2008.
The plaintiff then filed a timely motion to reargue that
decision. On February 11, 2009, the trial court granted
the motion to reargue but ultimately upheld its prior
decision in favor of the state.
Subsequently, on May 20, 2009, No. 09-44 of the 2009
Public Acts (P.A. 09-44) was enacted. Public Act 09-44
amended General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 by
adding a new subsection (e)3 that expressly authorized
the commissioner to vacate a prior dismissal in certain
circumstances. Additionally, P.A. 09-44, § 1, provided
that it applied to all ‘‘claims filed prior to, on or after’’
the date of enactment. On June 11, 2009, the plaintiff
moved to set aside the court’s previous ruling on the
state’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
new subsection (e) of § 4-158, as enacted pursuant to
the P.A. 09-44, specifically granted the commissioner
the authority to vacate a prior dismissal. The state
objected on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiff’s
motion was not timely; (2) § 4-158 (e), as amended,
violated article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecti-
cut because it constituted an exclusive public emolu-
ment or privilege for the plaintiff; and (3) even if § 4-
158 (e) did not violate the constitution of Connecticut,
it did not impact the trial court’s prior decision.
The trial court rejected these arguments and granted
the motion to set aside. The trial court first determined
that it had authority to consider the plaintiff’s motion
because it was timely filed within four months of that
court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s motion for reargument,
and, even if the motion fell outside the four month limit,
it fell within the ‘‘[u]nless otherwise provided by law’’
exception to the four month limitation contained in
§ 52-212a. Second, the trial court held that § 4-158 (e)
did not constitute an exclusive public emolument or
privilege for the plaintiff in violation of article first, § 1,
of the constitution of Connecticut because § 4-158 (e)
applied universally and not solely to the plaintiff.4
Finally, the court reviewed § 4-158 (e) and determined
that both the plain language and the extratextual evi-
dence supported the conclusion that the statute applied
to the situation at hand and provided the commissioner
with authority to vacate his earlier dismissal. Accord-
ingly, the trial court set aside its decision granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the state. This appeal
followed.5
On appeal, the state claims that the trial court improp-
erly interpreted § 4-158 (e), as amended by P.A. 09-
44, to provide the commissioner with the authority to
vacate the earlier dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim and,
thereafter, to waive the state’s sovereign immunity. The
state also renews its argument that the plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the summary judgment was untimely under
§ 52-212a. In particular, the state contends that the trial
court improperly determined that it had the authority
pursuant to § 52-212a to consider the motion to set
aside because that motion was filed within the four
month statutory period, and, even if the motion was
not filed within the four month limit, it met the ‘‘[u]nless
otherwise provided by law’’ exception under § 52-212a.
In response, the plaintiff challenges the state’s interpre-
tation of § 4-158 (e) and argues that the trial court’s
interpretation of the plain language of the statute is
reinforced by the legislative history. The plaintiff also
argues that her motion was timely filed because the
four month statutory limitation period ran from the date
on which the trial court denied the relief requested in
the plaintiff’s motion to reargue the summary judgment
decision, not the date summary judgment was rendered,
as the defendant claims. Alternatively, the plaintiff sug-
gests that the new subsection (e) of § 4-158, triggered
the application of the ‘‘[u]nless otherwise provided by
law’’ exception to § 52-212a, permitting the filing of
an untimely motion to open or set aside when strict
adherence to the four month time limit would thwart
the purpose of remedial legislation. Upon consideration
of these claims, we agree with the plaintiff.
I
We begin with the state’s contention that the trial
court improperly interpreted § 4-158 (e) to provide the
commissioner with the authority to vacate an earlier
dismissal of a claim and to conduct further proceedings,
including waiving the state’s sovereign immunity. ‘‘Sov-
ereign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter juris-
diction over a case . . . and therefore presents a
question of law over which we exercise de novo
review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daiml-
erChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d
675 (2007). ‘‘Once the question of lack of jurisdiction
of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter
in what form it is presented. . . . The court must fully
resolve it before proceeding further with the case.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers
Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).
‘‘The principle that the state cannot be sued without
its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established
under our case law. . . . It has deep roots in this state
and our legal system in general, finding its origin in
ancient common law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra, 284 Conn.
711. ‘‘[T]he doctrine protects the state from uncon-
sented to litigation, as well as unconsented to liability.’’
Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000),
overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn.
201, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). When the state has not
expressly waived sovereign immunity by statute,6 ‘‘a
plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary
damages against the state must first obtain authoriza-
tion from the [commissioner]. . . . [T]he . . . com-
missioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary
claims against the state and determine whether the
claimant has a cognizable claim. See General Statutes
§§ 4-141 through 4-165b.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 317. Chapter 53 of the
General Statutes, which governs claims against the
state, ‘‘expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by
the . . . commissioner . . . except as he may autho-
rize, an indication of the legislative determination to
preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary
claims against the state not sanctioned by the commis-
sioner or other statutory provisions.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 317–18.
Section 4-158 (a) sets forth the permissible actions
the commissioner may take in response to a claim.
Under General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 (e), as
amended by P.A. 09-44, the commissioner may later
vacate his decision to take one of the enumerated
actions ‘‘at any time prior to the submission of a claim
to the General Assembly’’ if the commissioner deems
it ‘‘just and equitable . . . .’’ The state argues that the
trial court misread § 4-158 (e) to provide that the com-
missioner retains authority over claims indefinitely,
unless the claim has been submitted to the General
Assembly. Rather, the state suggests that, properly con-
strued, § 4-158 (e) provides the commissioner with con-
tinuing authority over a dismissed claim only in cases
in which a claimant has filed a request for review within
the twenty day time period set forth in § 4-158 (b).7
According to the state’s interpretation of § 4-158 (e),
because the plaintiff did not file a request for review
in the present action and the twenty day window had
passed when the commissioner vacated his dismissal
of the plaintiff’s claim, the commissioner would not
have retained authority over the plaintiff’s claim. Thus,
under the state’s interpretation of the statute, the com-
missioner’s subsequent ‘‘waiver’’ of sovereign immunity
was invalid and, accordingly, the state retained its sov-
ereign immunity. In the absence of both express statu-
tory waiver and valid permission to sue by the
commissioner, the trial court therefore would lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to consider the present action.
Resolution of the issue concerning the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction requires us to determine
whether the commissioner had statutory authority to
act. Because this issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Consid-
ine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 836, 905 A.2d 70 (2006).
When construing a statute, ‘‘we are guided by well estab-
lished principles regarding legislative intent. See Hicks
v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 801, 1 A.3d 39 (2010) (setting
forth process of ascertaining legislative intent pursuant
to General Statutes § 1-2z).’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Taylor v. Conservation Commission, 302
Conn. 60, 68, 24 A.3d 1199 (2011).
In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis by
reviewing the text of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007)
§ 4-158 (e), as amended by P.A. 09-44, which provides
in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever the . . . [c]ommissioner
deems it just and equitable, the . . . [c]ommissioner
may, at any time prior to the submission of a claim to
the General Assembly pursuant to subsection (a) of
section 4-159, vacate the decision made pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section and undertake such fur-
ther proceedings in accordance with this chapter as the
. . . [c]ommissioner may, in his or her discretion, deem
appropriate.’’8 (Emphasis added.) This language is
unambiguous in conferring broad discretion to the com-
missioner to vacate a prior decision if the following
three requirements have been met: (1) the decision
being vacated was made pursuant to § 4-158 (a); (2)
the decision has not been submitted to the General
Assembly pursuant to General Statutes § 4-159 (a); and
(3) vacating that decision would be ‘‘just and equitable
. . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 (e), as
amended by P.A. 09-44.9 Because the state does not
challenge the commissioner’s conclusion that vacating
his prior dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim was just and
equitable, we focus our analysis on the first two
requirements.
We first review § 4-158 (a) to determine the specific
decisions the commissioner may vacate pursuant to § 4-
158 (e). General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 (a), as
amended by P.A. 09-44, expressly authorizes the com-
missioner to take the following actions: ‘‘(1) order that
a claim be denied or dismissed, (2) order immediate
payment of a just claim in an amount not exceeding
seven thousand five hundred dollars, (3) recommend
to the General Assembly payment of a just claim in an
amount exceeding seven thousand five hundred dollars,
or (4) authorize a claimant to sue the state, as provided
in section 4-160.’’ In authorizing the commissioner to
‘‘vacate the decision made pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section,’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4-158
(e), as amended by P.A. 09-44, does not provide any
indication that the statute’s application is limited to
certain types of decisions under § 4-158 (a). Therefore,
we conclude that § 4-158 (e) authorizes the commis-
sioner to vacate any of the enumerated decisions if the
other requirements of that statute have been met.
Turning to the second requirement—that the decision
has not been submitted to the General Assembly pursu-
ant to § 4-159 (a)—we look to that statute to clarify
further the scope of the commissioner’s authority to
vacate a prior decision. Section 4-159 (a)10 requires
review by the General Assembly when the commis-
sioner recommends payment of a claim in an amount
greater than $7500 and when a claimant has filed a
request for review pursuant to § 4-158 (b).11 In turn,
under § 4-158 (b), a claimant can file a request for review
only if the claimant sought more than $7500 and the
commissioner denied or dismissed the claim or ordered
immediate payment of the claim in an amount less than
$7500. Thus, the language in General Statutes (Rev. to
2007) § 4-158 (e), as amended by P.A. 09-44, ‘‘prior to
the submission of a claim to the General Assembly
pursuant to subsection (a) of section 4-159,’’ precludes
the commissioner from vacating a decision in three
situations, namely: (1) when the commissioner recom-
mends payment of a claim in an amount greater than
$7500; (2) when the commissioner denies or dismisses
a claim seeking more than $7500 and the claimant prop-
erly files a request for review; and (3) when the commis-
sioner orders payment of a claim seeking more than
$7500 in an amount less than $7500 and the claimant
properly files a request for review. Prior to submission
to the General Assembly, the commissioner may vacate
his earlier decision with respect to these three types
of claims pursuant to § 4-158 (e); however, once the
commissioner submits the claim to the General Assem-
bly, he is divested of this authority. In such a way, the
statutory scheme avoids the potential for duplicative
review and conflicting decisions by the commissioner
and the General Assembly.
On the other hand, the statutory scheme does not
contemplate review by the General Assembly of certain
other types of claims. Specifically, § 4-159 (a) does not
direct the commissioner to submit a claim to the Gen-
eral Assembly for review in the following circum-
stances: (1) when the commissioner denies or dismisses
a claim seeking less than $7500; (2) when the commis-
sioner orders immediate payment of a claim seeking
less than $7500 in an amount less than $7500; (3) when
the commissioner grants permission to sue; (4) when
the commissioner denies or dismisses a claim seeking
more than $7500 and the claimant does not file a request
for review; and (5) when the commissioner orders pay-
ment of a claim seeking more than $7500 in an amount
less than $7500 and the claimant does not file a request
for review. The condition ‘‘at any time prior to the
submission of a claim to the General Assembly pursuant
to subsection (a) of section 4-159’’; General Statutes
(Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 (e), as amended by P.A. 09-44;
therefore does not implicate these types of claims.
Accordingly, the plain language of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2007) § 4-158 (e), as amended by P.A. 09-44,
permits the commissioner to vacate these latter types
of claims ‘‘[w]henever the . . . [c]ommissioner deems
it just and equitable,’’ without any express time limita-
tion on the commissioner’s authority. (Emphasis
added.)
To summarize, we conclude that, pursuant to § 4-158
(e), the commissioner has discretion to vacate the three
types of decisions to which § 4-159 (a) applies whenever
he deems it just and equitable for the limited period
of time prior to the submission of the claim to the
General Assembly. With respect to all other decisions
that the commissioner has made pursuant to § 4-158
(a), he retains discretion to vacate those decisions at
any time in the future.12
This broad authority is consistent with the commis-
sioner’s legislative role as ‘‘the gatekeeper through
which [actions] against the state must pass.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn.
384, 401, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). For instance, under § 4-
160 (a),13 the commissioner may grant permission to
file an action against the state. This statute uses the
same broad and unequivocal language in delegating
responsibility to the commissioner that is used in § 4-
158 (e). Specifically, the commissioner may authorize
an action against the state ‘‘[w]hen the . . . [c]ommis-
sioner deems it just and equitable . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 4-160 (a). Previous decisions of this court have
recognized the commissioner’s broad latitude in exer-
cising this discretion. See, e.g., Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn.
265, 279–81, 684 A.2d 696 (1996). Similarly, General
Statutes § 4-156 also empowers the commissioner with
broad discretion, namely, to rehear a claim following
his previous outright or recommended rejection of a
claim ‘‘[u]pon the discovery of new evidence . . . .’’14
The state argues that the legislature intended to grant
the commissioner the power to vacate a decision pursu-
ant to § 4-158 (e) only in cases in which a claimant has
filed a request for review of the commissioner’s decision
under § 4-158 (b). Because General Statutes (Rev. to
2007) § 4-158 (b), as amended by P.A. 09-44, indicates
that ‘‘[t]he filing of a request for review shall automati-
cally stay the decision of the . . . [c]ommissioner,’’ the
state suggests that the ability to obtain a stay of the
commissioner’s decision when a claimant files a request
for review indicates that the commissioner’s decision is
final in the absence of such a request and corresponding
stay. The state further asserts that if this court con-
strued § 4-158 (e) to provide the commissioner with
authority to vacate a claim at any time, so long as the
claim has not been submitted to the General Assembly,
the ‘‘stay’’ provision would be rendered superfluous
because the commissioner’s decision would not be final
in either case. We disagree.
We are not persuaded that the ‘‘stay’’ provision com-
pels us to adopt the state’s interpretation of § 4-158 (e).
Although the claims to which § 4-158 (b) and 4-158 (e)
apply overlap, they are not coextensive. A stay prevents
the commissioner from implementing a decision; it does
not inherently conflict with subsection (e), which
allows the commissioner to vacate the earlier decision.
Rather, we view § 4-158 (b) and 4-158 (e) as setting
forth alternative procedures for obtaining review of the
commissioner’s decision, and we fail to see how the
availability of an automatic stay in one case but not the
other renders the ‘‘stay’’ provision a nullity.
Moreover, we are mindful that, ‘‘in the absence of
ambiguity, courts cannot read into statutes, by con-
struction, provisions which are not clearly stated
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Carothers v. Capozziello, 215 Conn. 82, 129,
574 A.2d 1268 (1990). Because the plain language of
§ 4-158 (e) does not mention the request for review
process, there is no express textual basis for limiting
the provision’s application to cases in which a request
for review has been filed. Nor does the plain language
of § 4-158 (e) permit us to impute a request for review
requirement. As already discussed, § 4-158 (e) applies
to any decision made by the commissioner pursuant to
§ 4-158 (a). As we have also indicated, a claimant can
file a request for review under § 4-158 (b) only in two
circumstances, namely, if the claimant sought more
than $7500 and the commissioner denied or dismissed
the claim or the commissioner ordered immediate pay-
ment of that claim in an amount less than $7500. Section
4-158 (b) does not authorize a claimant to seek review
by the General Assembly of any of the other decisions
made by the commissioner under § 4-158 (a) enumer-
ated previously in this opinion. Consequently, if this
court interpreted § 4-158 (e) to require the filing of a
request for review, we would deny this avenue of relief
to certain types of claimants without any evidence of
a legislative intent to so restrict the statute’s application.
Additionally, in spite of the state’s argument that it
would be absurd to interpret § 4-158 (e) to permit the
commissioner to vacate a decision on a claim that has
not been submitted to the General Assembly at any time
in the future, we observe that § 4-156, which permits the
commissioner to rehear a claim upon the discovery of
new evidence, authorizes exactly that. Like § 4-158 (e),
§ 4-156 does not contain an express time limit or a
requirement that the claimant has filed a request for
review under § 4-158 (b); nor is this court aware of any
case interpreting § 4-156 to include either implicitly.
Without any apparent reason for concluding that the
legislature intended to authorize the commissioner to
revisit a claim upon the discovery of new evidence at
any time, but that the legislature could not have
intended to allow the commissioner to revisit a claim
when justice and equity so required at any time in the
future as well, we decline to impose any restriction not
contained in the statutory text on the commissioner’s
authority to vacate a prior decision.
Finally, we also disagree with the state’s contention
that interpreting § 4-158 (e) to empower the commis-
sioner to vacate a decision at any time is bizarre and
unsupportable because the General Assembly’s author-
ity to review the merits of a claim is limited to cases
in which a claimant files a request for review within
twenty days of a decision. In fact, the state’s argument
conflicts with the legislature’s intention in creating the
office of the commissioner. ‘‘[P]rior to 1959, before the
legislature created the office of the claims commission,
the General Assembly in the first instance considered
what action, if any, was appropriate on claims made
against the state. . . . It reached a point where the
number of claims submitted to the legislature became
a major burden and this interfered with the more
important function of enacting general legislation. . . .
[The] director [of the claims commission] . . .
explained [that the commission was created] . . . to
ensure that ‘equity and justice’ [would be] done. . . .
Therefore, the commissioner is in reality the conscience
of the state, assuming in part the prior role of the legisla-
ture to ensure that justice and equity is done. It is the
commissioner who now determines what claims should
be paid, what claims should be referred to the legisla-
ture for payment, or which claimants should be author-
ized to institute an action against the state.’’ Chotkowski
v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 271–74, 690 A.2d 368 (1997)
(Berdon, J., concurring and dissenting). Merely because
§ 4-158 (e) invests the commissioner with substantial
discretion does not compel the conclusion that our
interpretation of the plain language of that provision is
absurd or unworkable. Accordingly, upon consideration
of the text of § 4-158 (e) in relation to related provisions
in the statutory scheme, we discern no basis for
engrafting any further limitation on the commissioner’s
authority to vacate a prior decision pursuant to § 4-158
(e) that the statutory language does not contain.
In the present case, the plaintiff filed a claim seeking
an amount greater than $7500 and permission to sue the
state. The commissioner initially dismissed this claim
pursuant to his authority under § 4-158 (a) for failure
to prosecute.15 Although a dismissal of a claim that
sought an amount greater than $7500 and permission
to sue the state is a decision that could be reviewed
by the General Assembly upon the claimant’s request
under § 4-158 (b), the plaintiff did not file a request
for review, and the commissioner’s decision was not
submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to § 4-159
(a). Consequently, in accordance with our interpreta-
tion of the plain and unambiguous language of § 4-158
(e), the commissioner had discretion without any
express time limitation to vacate the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claim and to undertake further proceedings,
including waiving sovereign immunity on behalf of the
state. Because the commissioner exercised that discre-
tion to waive the state’s sovereign immunity, we con-
clude that this court has subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the present action.
II
Proceeding to the primary issue on appeal, we con-
sider whether the trial court properly concluded that
the plaintiff’s motion to set aside was timely filed pursu-
ant to the requirements set forth in § 52-212a. Prelimi-
narily, we recognize that this court has jurisdiction to
hear an appeal only if the appeal is taken from a final
judgment. See General Statutes § 52-263. ‘‘Although it
is well established that an order opening a judgment
ordinarily is not a final judgment [for purposes of
appeal] . . . [t]his court . . . has recognized an
exception to this rule [when] the appeal challenges the
power of the court to act to set aside the judgment. . . .
Thus, [a]n order of the trial court opening a judgment is
. . . an appealable final judgment [when] the issue
raised is the power of the trial court to open [the judg-
ment] in light of the four month limitation period of
§ 52-212a.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Dioce-
san Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 195, 884 A.2d 981 (2005).
Consequently, this court has jurisdiction to consider
the timeliness of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the
summary judgment.
The state argues that the four month period within
which the plaintiff could have filed a motion to set aside
pursuant to § 52-212a commenced on the date that the
trial court initially rendered summary judgment. In
response, the plaintiff maintains that the trial court
properly measured the four month period from the trial
court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to reargue. The
issue of when a judgment sought to be set aside is
‘‘rendered or passed’’ under § 52-212a, triggering the
start of the four month period, presents a question of
statutory interpretation over which our review is ple-
nary. See Hicks v. State, supra, 297 Conn. 800. Upon
consideration of the plain language of § 52-212a, we
agree with the plaintiff that the motion to set aside
was timely.
Our analysis of the statute is guided by § 1-2z and
principles of statutory construction. See id., 801. Thus,
we begin with the text of § 52-212a, which provides in
relevant part: ‘‘Unless otherwise provided by law and
except in such cases in which the court has continuing
jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the
Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless
a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months
following the date on which it was rendered or passed.
. . .’’16 This statutory limitation ‘‘operates as a con-
straint, not on the trial court’s jurisdictional authority,
but on its substantive authority to adjudicate the merits
of the case before it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 176 n.11. Although the language
of § 52-212a indicates that the four month period to
open or to set aside a judgment is mandatory, it does
not address the effect of motions, such as a motion to
reargue, which, if granted, would render the underlying
judgment ineffective. Thus, although the statute does
not expressly provide that the filing of a motion that
could change the underlying judgment suspends the
four month period, neither does the statute preclude
such an interpretation.
According to the text of § 52-212a, the four month
period begins on the ‘‘date on which [the judgment
sought to be opened or set aside] was rendered or
passed.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-212a.
The statute does not define the terms ‘‘rendered’’ or
‘‘passed.’’ ‘‘If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define
a term, it is appropriate to look to the common under-
standing of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning
Commission, 243 Conn. 485, 490, 705 A.2d 195 (1998).
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999),
‘‘to pass’’ means ‘‘[t]o pronounce or render an opinion,
ruling, sentence, or judgment . . . .’’ Similarly, ‘‘rendi-
tion of judgment’’ refers to ‘‘[t]he judge’s oral or written
ruling containing the judgment entered.’’ Id. Thus, both
terms turn on the meaning of the word ‘‘judgment,’’
which is defined as the ‘‘court’s final determination of
the rights and obligations of the parties in a case . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Id. The plain language of § 52-212a
therefore contemplates finality. Consistent with this
definition, decisions by this court reviewing the applica-
tion of § 52-212a have measured the four month period
from the time that the judgment became final. See State
v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 437, 513 A.2d 620 (1986); see
also In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 237–38, 764 A.2d
739 (2001); Lynch v. Lynch, 135 Conn. App. 40, 56,
A.3d (2012); Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn.
App. 449, 458, 975 A.2d 729 (2009).
A decision granting a motion for summary judgment
would satisfy this definition of ‘‘judgment’’ as summary
judgment is a final judgment. See Practice Book § 61-
2 (judgment ‘‘rendered on an entire complaint, counter-
claim or cross complaint . . . by summary judgment
. . . shall constitute a final judgment’’). It is therefore
clear that the four month period under § 52-212a would
begin when the trial court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment. This finality, however, is called into
question upon the filing of a motion to reargue because
the purpose of filing a motion to reargue is ‘‘to demon-
strate to the court that there is some decision or some
principle of law which would have a controlling effect,
and which has been overlooked, or that there has been
a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used
to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel, 303
Conn. 614, 624, 35 A.3d 260 (2012). A decision granting
a motion for reargument thereby implicitly recognizes
that the underlying judgment may be altered or invali-
dated if the court is persuaded by the moving party’s
argument that the court overlooked facts or law in
rendering its initial judgment and, accordingly, grants
the relief requested. In other words, until the court
issues a decision on the motion to reargue, the substan-
tive rights and obligations of the parties are placed
in flux. So long as the parties’ substantive rights and
obligations remain undetermined, the finality of the
original judgment becomes, in effect, suspended. In
turn, once the court issues a decision resolving the
issues raised upon reargument, this new decision con-
stitutes the ‘‘court’s final determination of the rights
and obligations of the parties in a case.’’ Black’s Law
Dictionary, supra (defining ‘‘judgment’’). Thus, an inter-
pretation of the plain terms of § 52-212a suggests that
when a party files a motion to reargue, which would,
if granted, alter the substantive rights and duties of the
parties, the four month limitation is measured from
the court’s decision on that motion, as opposed to the
initial judgment.
In an analogous context, the rules for calculating the
statutory period to appeal recognize the instability in
the rights and obligations of the parties as set forth in
the underlying decision when a motion to reargue has
been filed.17 The rules of practice address this instability
by providing that ‘‘the filing of a motion that seeks an
alteration, rather than a clarification of the judgment
suspends the appeal period.’’ Weinstein v. Weinstein,
275 Conn. 671, 699, 882 A.2d 53 (2005). Specifically,
although the statutory time period for filing an appeal
commences with the notice of a judgment; Practice
Book § 63-1 (a);18 ‘‘[i]f a motion is filed within the appeal
period that, if granted, would render the judgment . . .
ineffective, either a new twenty day period or applicable
statutory time period for filing the appeal shall begin
on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last
such outstanding motion . . . .’’ Practice Book § 63-1
(c) (1). Furthermore, our rules of practice expressly
characterize ‘‘reargument of the judgment or decision’’
as a ‘‘[motion] that, if granted, would render a judgment
. . . ineffective . . . .’’ Practice Book § 63-1 (c); see
also Practice Book § 11-11 (motion to reargue may
extend appeal period). Thus, a new appeal period com-
mences when the trial court issues a decision on a
motion to reargue.
The state concedes that if the trial court granted a
motion to reargue and modified the underlying judg-
ment, the new judgment would supplant the original
judgment, and the four month period would be mea-
sured from the date of the new judgment. The state
argues, however, that if the decision on the motion
merely reaffirms the underlying judgment and does not
effect any change, the four month period continues to
commence from the date of the original decision. We
disagree. Instead, we believe the proper rule is the rule
that we employ to calculate the appeal period, that is,
a motion suspends the finality of a judgment if, viewed
prospectively, the motion, if granted, would redeter-
mine the rights and obligations of the parties such that
it would render the judgment ineffective. In contrast,
if the motion would not affect the rights of the parties,
and would merely clarify a portion of the decision, the
motion would not suspend the finality of the judgment.
See, e.g., Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) (new appeal
period triggered ‘‘[i]f a motion is filed within the appeal
period that, if granted, would render the judgment . . .
ineffective’’ but not if motion seeks ‘‘clarification or
articulation, as opposed to alteration, of the terms of
the judgment’’ [emphasis added]).
We followed this same approach in Weinstein v.
Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 671, and Killingly v. Con-
necticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 600 A.2d 752
(1991), wherein we were asked to determine the point
at which a decision became final in varying contexts.
In Weinstein, we held that a motion for reconsideration
suspended the finality of a judgment of dissolution until
the trial court decided such motion, even though that
court ultimately denied it. Weinstein v. Weinstein,
supra, 698. Likewise, in Killingly, we rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that a request for a rehearing suspended
the finality of the underlying administrative agency deci-
sion because the rehearing ‘‘sought to clarify a portion
of the [agency’s] decision, and would not, if granted,
have redetermined the rights of the parties.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra,
521. In both cases, the trial court’s ultimate determina-
tion on the merits of the motion was irrelevant; rather,
the pertinent inquiry focused on the potential effect on
the parties’ rights if the motion were granted.19
Principles of judicial economy are consistent with
this interpretation of the four month limitation under
§ 52-212a. As the rules of practice recognize, ‘‘reargu-
ment of the judgment or decision