Grimm v. Fox
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJanuary 10, 2012
DocketSC18814
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; McLachlan; Vertefeuille
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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ROBERT GRIMM v. JOHN WAYNE FOX ET AL.
(SC 18814)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued September 20, 2011—officially released January 10, 2012
Robert Grimm, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).
Frederick L. Murolo, with whom was Karen T. Mur-
olo, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
NORCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Robert Grimm, appeals1
from the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment
in favor of the defendants, John Wayne Fox and Curtis,
Brinckerhoff and Barrett, P.C., in this legal malpractice
action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly: (1) granted the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment, determining that the critical statements concern-
ing the defendants made by this court in its opinion in
Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 886 A.2d 391 (2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S. Ct. 2296, 164 L. Ed.
2d 815 (2006), were not sufficient ‘‘evidence of an expert
nature’’ (expert evidence) of the defendants’ malprac-
tice; and (2) heard the defendants’ motion for judgment
one day after the motion was filed, and on the same
day that trial was scheduled to begin. We disagree with
the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving plaintiff, reveals the following relevant facts
and procedural history. The defendants represented the
plaintiff serving as local counsel in an action to dissolve
his marriage. In January, 2003, the trial court rendered
judgment dissolving the plaintiff’s marriage to his for-
mer wife and issued various financial orders. Grimm
v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 380–81. The trial court
determined, among myriad other issues, that the plain-
tiff had diminished the marital estate by $2.9 million
and also ordered him to pay $100,000 of the attorney’s
fees incurred by his former wife. Id., 381. The plaintiff
raised both of these issues along with four other issues
in an appeal from the dissolution judgment to the Appel-
late Court,2 which concluded that the trial court had
improperly determined that the plaintiff had diminished
the marital estate by $2.9 million, but that this incorrect
finding was harmless and did not require reversal.
Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 52–53, 844 A.2d
855 (2004). That court also concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff
to pay his wife’s attorney’s fees. Id., 55.
This court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certifica-
tion to appeal limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s
improper findings in support of its financial award were
harmless?’’3 Grimm v. Grimm, 270 Conn. 902, 903, 853
A.2d 519 (2004). We also granted his former wife’s con-
ditional cross-petition limited to the following question:
‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial
court’s award of counsel fees?’’ Grimm v. Grimm, 270
Conn. 903, 853 A.2d 519 (2004). In that certified appeal,
we determined that the award of attorney’s fees was
not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and reversed
the judgment of the Appellate Court on that issue.
Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 399. We affirmed
the judgment of the Appellate Court with regard to the
financial orders, however, determining that the plaintiff
had abandoned his claims with respect to the $2.9 mil-
lion because: (1) he had failed to move for an articula-
tion or rectification of the trial court’s factual findings
on this point; and (2) he had failed to raise this issue
until oral argument before the Appellate Court and only
addressed that issue in the statement of facts section,
rather than the argument section of his brief. Id., 386–
87, 390–91.
Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this legal malpractice
action, relying solely on certain language from this
court’s opinion deciding his divorce appeal4 to establish
the defendants’ breach of the standard of care. The
plaintiff did not, however, disclose an expert witness,
as is generally required to sustain an action for legal
malpractice.5 The parties filed cross motions for sum-
mary judgment and responsive objections by the dead-
line specified in the court’s scheduling order. Although
the motions and objections were heard by the trial
court, neither of these motions was decided prior to
the scheduled start of the trial. The day before the trial
was scheduled to begin in this case, the defendants
filed four motions in limine, including one to preclude
the plaintiff from making any mention, argument or
claim at trial that the defendants had breached the
standard of care in their representation of the plaintiff,
as well as the motion for judgment that is the subject
of this appeal. On the day of trial, prior to the start of
jury selection, the trial court held a hearing on the
motions before it, and granted the defendants’ motion in
limine precluding the plaintiff from presenting evidence
that the defendants had breached the standard of care
in their representation of him because the plaintiff had
failed to disclose an expert witness. The trial court then
granted the defendants’ motion for judgment6 because
the plaintiff had not disclosed an expert when one was
required and, therefore, could not establish a prima
facie case for legal malpractice as to the defendants’
breach of the standard of care. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that certain statements
made by this court in its opinion on his divorce case, in
which we indicated our disapproval of the defendants’
actions in failing to provide an adequate record for
review and in inadequately briefing the plaintiff’s
claims,7 are sufficient evidence upon which the jury
could reasonably have found that the defendants
breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff argues, therefore, that an expert witness
was not required to establish his claim for legal malprac-
tice.8 The defendants contend, however, that the lan-
guage of this court’s opinion is not sufficient, on its
own, to establish that they breached the applicable stan-
dard of care.9 We address the plaintiff’s claims in turn.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improp-
erly granted the defendants’ motion for judgment
because the language from our opinion in Grimm v.
Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, was sufficient expert
evidence to support the plaintiff’s action for legal mal-
practice. We disagree.
To begin, we set forth the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘The determination of whether expert testi-
mony is needed to support a claim of legal malpractice
presents a question of law. . . . Accordingly, our
review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Moore v. Crone, 114 Conn. App. 443, 446, 970 A.2d 757
(2009). Inasmuch as the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment is, in essence, a renewed motion for summary
judgment; see footnote 6 of this opinion; we note that
‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judg-
ment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affida-
vits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that
the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant [the defendants’] motion for summary judgment
is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks
v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).
‘‘In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice
action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or
omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.’’ Mayer v.
Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92, 713 A.2d
1267 (1998). ‘‘As a general rule, for the plaintiff to prevail
in a legal malpractice case in Connecticut, he must
present expert testimony to establish the standard of
proper professional skill or care. . . . The requirement
of expert testimony in malpractice cases serves to assist
lay people, such as members of the jury . . . to under-
stand the applicable standard of care and to evaluate the
defendant’s actions in light of that standard.’’ (Citations
omitted.) Davis v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 416, 576
A.2d 489 (1990).
‘‘There is an exception to this rule, however, where
there is such an obvious and gross want of care and
skill that neglect is clear even to a lay person.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Paul v. Gordon, 58 Conn.
App. 724, 727, 754 A.2d 851 (2000). Nevertheless, ‘‘[t]he
exception to the need for expert testimony is limited
to situations in which the defendant attorney essentially
has done nothing whatsoever to represent his or her
client’s interests . . . .’’ Pagan v. Gonzalez, 113 Conn.
App. 135, 141, 965 A.2d 582 (2009). Finally, ‘‘summary
judgment [is] proper when [a] plaintiff alleging legal
malpractice fails to establish [his] claim by expert testi-
mony.’’ Moore v. Crone, supra, 114 Conn. App. 446.
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not retain
or disclose an expert witness to testify concerning the
standard of care to which the defendants’ legal repre-
sentation should be held. Instead, the plaintiff contends
that expert testimony in this case is unnecessary
because the language of our opinion in Grimm v.
Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, is sufficient expert evi-
dence regarding the standard of care and the breach
of that standard to establish that element of his claim.
Relying on Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn. App. 410, 421–22,
835 A.2d 477 (2003), aff’d, 271 Conn. 782, 860 A.2d
698 (2004), in which the Appellate Court indicated that
‘‘there may be no expert who knows more about the
practice of law before the Superior Court than a judge
of that court,’’ the plaintiff contends that, logically, no
expert knows more about the practice of law before
the appellate courts than the justices of the Supreme
Court. Therefore, he argues that the statements this
court made regarding the inadequate record and the
inadequate briefing of the divorce appeal clearly indi-
cate an obvious and gross want of care such that a
layperson could reasonably and logically conclude that
the defendants breached the standard of care. We are
not persuaded.
Initially, we note that Dubreuil is inapposite to the
disposition of the present case. In Dubreuil, the Appel-
late Court observed, and this court agreed, that when
a legal malpractice case is tried before a judge, rather
than a jury, the trial judge need not require the aid of
expert testimony to understand the requisite standard
of care or the reasonableness of the attorney’s actions
in the context of that standard. Id., 422. It is possible
to infer from this statement that no expert knows more
about appellate practice than this court, but the present
case was scheduled to go forward as a jury trial rather
than a bench trial. Had this case proceeded to trial, the
jury would have required the aid of expert testimony
to understand the applicable standard of care and the
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions in that con-
text. The jury—not this court or even the trial judge—
would have been required to assess whether the defen-
dants’ actions in the underlying divorce case breached
the standard of care such that they would be liable for
legal malpractice.10
Furthermore, the language we used in our opinion
in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, expressed
our dissatisfaction with the state of the record and the
briefing of the issues in that case. This court did not,
however, set forth the standard of care that is required
of attorneys in similar situations, nor did it address the
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions within the
context of the factual circumstances of that case. The
statements, although critical in tone and content, were
based upon nothing more than the materials we had
before us in the record of that case. We did not, nor
could we, on the basis of the record before us, opine
as to the reasonableness of the defendants’ strategic
process or their ultimate decisions throughout the litiga-
tion of that case.11 Although the specific language we
used can certainly be characterized as critical of the
materials that the defendants submitted to this court,
it did not delve into whether the activities in preparing
those materials satisfied the requisite standard of care
or whether other attorneys would have performed simi-
larly in a comparable situation.12 Ultimately, our opinion
does not indicate that we had determined that the defen-
dants had definitively breached the requisite standard
of care with regard to ensuring an adequate record for
review or with regard to adequately briefing the issue
on appeal because we did not consider whether their
failure to move for an articulation was reasonable
within the circumstances of that case and we were not
privy to the interactions with the client or the ultimate
strategic decisions regarding which issues to emphasize
on appeal. As such, a jury would still require the aid of
an expert to explain the standard of care regarding the
decision to move for an articulation and preparing a
brief, and whether by failing to move for an articulation
and de-emphasizing the financial claim in the specific
circumstances of the divorce appeal, the defendants
failed to satisfy that standard of care.13
Thus, we find persuasive Dixon v. Bromson & Reiner,
95 Conn. App. 294, 298–99, 898 A.2d 193 (2006), wherein
the Appellate Court noted that ‘‘an observation by a
trial judge . . . that evidence was not produced to sup-
port a contention does not mean that the failure to
produce that evidence was the result of professional
negligence by trial counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Similarly, in the present case, our observation
that the defendants had provided this court with an
inadequate record and inadequately briefed issues, even
though such actions amounted to technical violations
of rules of appellate practice, does not, standing alone,
indicate that those failures were necessarily the result
of professional negligence by the defendants. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the critical language from
Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, is not sufficient
expert evidence of the standard of care that the defen-
dants owed to the plaintiff, nor is it sufficient expert
evidence to inform the jury as to whether the defendants
breached their duty to the plaintiff.
Moreover, this case is also not one that falls within
the exception to the expert testimony requirement set
forth in Paul v. Gordon, supra, 58 Conn. App. 727. The
cases that have defined the extent of the exception to
the expert testimony requirement have made clear that
the exception is limited to ‘‘situations in which the . . .
attorney essentially has done nothing whatsoever to
represent his or her client’s interests . . . .’’ Pagan v.
Gonzalez, supra, 113 Conn. App. 141.14 Thus, the Appel-
late Court has upheld grants of summary judgment in
favor of attorneys when disgruntled clients have sued
for legal malpractice on the basis of an omission by
their attorneys, but have failed to retain or disclose an
expert witness to testify that such omissions breached
the standard of care the attorneys owed to their clients.
See Moore v. Crone, supra, 114 Conn. App. 447–48
(attorney failed to raise certain issues on appeal, failed
to notice portion of trial transcript was missing, and
failed to adequately brief issues on appeal); see also
Byrne v. Grasso, 118 Conn. App. 444, 450, 985 A.2d
1064 (2009) (attorney failed to appear at hearing at
which award of fees was made against client and failed
to explain right to appeal fees ordered), cert. denied,
294 Conn. 934, 987 A.2d 1028 (2010); Pagan v. Gonzalez,
supra, 138 n.4 (criminal defense attorney failed to
object, at sentencing, to representation by prosecutor
as to amount of heroin in client’s possession at time
of his arrest). Although Moore, Byrne and Pagan all
involved omissions and failures by the attorneys
therein, the Appellate Court consistently has required
a more significant failure or omission to warrant the
application of the exception to the expert testimony
requirement in legal malpractice cases.
Here, the defendants represented the plaintiff in his
divorce case throughout a lengthy trial and appeal that
took place over the course of several years. This is not
a case wherein the attorneys essentially did ‘‘nothing
whatsoever’’ in their representation of their client;
Pagan v. Gonzalez, supra, 113 Conn. App. 141; but
rather one in which the plaintiff claims that the activities
that the defendants undertook on his behalf failed to
satisfy the requisite professional standard of care.
Although the language we used in our opinion in Grimm
expressing our dissatisfaction with the record and the
briefing before us was critical, such language does not
by itself clearly indicate such an obvious and gross
want of care and skill so as to render expert testimony
unnecessary. Accordingly, in the absence of expert tes-
timony regarding the professional standard of care
owed and whether the defendants breached their duty
in the circumstances of this case, both of which are
required to establish a prima facie case of legal malprac-
tice under Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, supra,
245 Conn. 88, the defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
II
The plaintiff also contends that it was improper for
the trial court to grant the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment the day after the motion was filed. We disagree.
‘‘The summary judgment procedure is designed to
eliminate the delay and expense incident to a trial where
there is no real issue to be tried. . . . It is an attempt
to dispose of cases involving sham or frivolous issues
in a manner which is speedier and less expensive for
all concerned than a full-dress trial.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Mac’s Car City, Inc.
v. American National Bank, 205 Conn. 255, 261, 532
A.2d 1302 (1987). Furthermore, ‘‘[a] trial court has the
authority to manage cases before it as is necessary.’’
Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817 A.2d
628 (2002).
This court has determined that ‘‘it is within the trial
court’s discretion to consider a renewed motion for
summary judgment that has previously been denied
where . . . additional or new evidence has been sub-
mitted . . . .’’ Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. American
National Bank, supra, 205 Conn. 262. ‘‘We have
declared that, although a judge should not lightly depart
from a prior ruling on a motion before the same or a
different judge, the prior ruling is not binding. ‘From
the vantage point of an appellate court it would hardly
be sensible to reverse a correct ruling by a second judge
on the simplistic ground that it departed from the law
of the case established by an earlier ruling.’ ’’ Barnes
v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734, 473 A.2d 1221 (1984).
‘‘Because this determination is within the trial court’s
discretion, it may be overturned on appeal only if the
court abused that discretion.’’ Chadha v. Charlotte
Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn. App. 527, 533, 906 A.2d
14 (2006).
Here, because the previous motions for summary
judgment had not been acted upon and jury selection
was set to begin as soon as the motions in limine and
the motion for judgment before the court had been
decided, those initial motions for summary judgment
had been effectively denied by virtue of the trial court’s
inaction. In that context, the trial court then granted
the defendants’ pending motion in limine, which pre-
cluded the plaintiff from making any mention, argument
or claim at trial that the defendants had breached the
standard of care in their representation of him.
Although that ruling is not the ‘‘new evidence’’ that is
often referred to in cases addressing renewed motions
for summary judgment; see, e.g., Johnson v. Atkinson,
283 Conn. 243, 250, 926 A.2d 656 (2007) (outstanding
factual disputes present during first motion for sum-
mary judgment were resolved by parties’ stipulation of
facts prior to renewed motion), overruled in part on
other grounds by Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323,
348, 948 A.2d 955 (2008); it is nonetheless equivalent.
Prior to the start of the trial, the defendants obtained
a ruling from the trial court precluding the plaintiff from
presenting any evidence, including the language that
this court used in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn.
377, as to the standard of care that the defendants owed
to the plaintiff or their alleged breach of the duty owed
to him. Without the ability to present any evidence
showing that the defendants were negligent in their
representation of him, the plaintiff’s legal malpractice
claim could not go forward. Because the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice
without evidence of the defendants’ alleged negligence,
it was well within the trial court’s discretion to consider
the renewed motion filed the day before jury selection
began in order to avoid the delay and expense of a trial
in which the plaintiff could not present any evidence
to support his claim.
Furthermore, the Appellate Court recently has
emphasized the trial court’s ample discretion in
determining whether to address a motion for summary
judgment filed on the eve of trial. In Kervick v. Silver
Hill Hospital, 128 Conn. App. 341, 354, 18 A.3d 622,
cert. granted on other grounds, 301 Conn. 922, 22 A.3d
1279 (2011), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court’s determination that a motion for summary judg-
ment was untimely because it had not given the defen-
dants adequate notice regarding the plaintiff’s claim.
Id., 353. That is not the case here. In their initial motion
for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff had failed to disclose an expert witness to
testify as to the relevant standard of care and the reason-
ableness of the defendants’ actions under that standard
of care, and thus could not establish a prima facie case
for legal malpractice. The plaintiff had the opportunity,
and did in fact offer specific arguments to counter the
defendants’ claims in his opposition to their initial
motion for summary judgment and during the five hour
hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment.
Moreover, when the defendants renewed their motion
for judgment, they specifically referred back to their
initial motion for summary judgment and the accompa-
nying memorandum of law in support of that motion.
The trial court also held a hearing on the defendants’
renewed motion in which it gave the plaintiff another
opportunity to argue against the motion. The renewed
motion did not present any new arguments of which
the plaintiff did not have notice or an opportunity to
refute. It simply renewed the defendants’ claim that the
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of legal
malpractice without presenting an expert witness, an
issue upon which the trial court had not yet ruled.
Inasmuch as the trial court’s grant of the defendants’
motion in limine solidified the defendants’ position that
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of
legal malpractice, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in hearing and deciding the
defendants’ motion for judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and ZARELLA,
McLACHLAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
1
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
2
In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that: (1) the
irretrievable breakdown provision of General Statutes § 46b-40 (c) (1) vio-
lates the free exercise of religion clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions; (2) the trial court improperly concluded that the parties’ marriage had
irretrievably broken down and precluded expert testimony on the subject; (3)
the trial court abused its discretion in making financial orders that lacked
evidentiary support; (4) the trial court improperly denied his motion to open
the evidence prior to judgment for the purpose of offering certain evidence
regarding the valuation of stock options; and (5) the court improperly denied
his motion to dismiss or to transfer the matter to another judicial district.
See Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 43, 844 A.2d 855 (2004).
3
In addition to the question that this court certified, the plaintiff also
sought review of three additional questions, namely: (1) whether attorney’s
fee awards that are improperly rendered as part of a judgment are severable
from the overall financial award; (2) whether the Appellate Court properly
declined to address his claim of prejudice from the trial court’s denial
of his pretrial motions; and (3) whether the Appellate Court improperly
determined that the no-fault divorce statute did not violate his rights to
exercise his religious beliefs.
4
The language on which the plaintiff most heavily relies as evidence of
the defendants’ breach of the standard of care includes our statement that
‘‘two separate, but related, breakdowns of basic appellate procedure require
that the trial court’s judgment be affirmed because this intensely factual
issue is incapable of evaluation by any reviewing court’’; Grimm v. Grimm,
supra, 276 Conn. 386; our statement that the Appellate Court brief ‘‘violently
disregards Practice Book § 67-4, which is the rule governing the organization
of appellate briefs’’; id., 391 n.14; and the several instances in which we
stated that the record was inadequate for review and that the plaintiff’s
claim on appeal was abandoned due to his failure to adequately brief the
issue. See id., 379, 390, 391 n.14, 393.
5
See, e.g., Davis v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 416, 576 A.2d 489 (1990)
(‘‘[a]s a general rule, for a plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice case in
Connecticut, he must present expert testimony to establish the standard of
proper professional skill or care’’).
6
Although the defendants relied on Practice Book §§ 15-1, 16-9 and 17-1
in support of their ‘‘Motion for Judgment,’’ these sections appear inapposite.
We therefore understand the defendants’ ‘‘Motion for Judgment’’ to be, in
essence, a renewed motion for summary judgment, since a stand-alone
motion for judgment does not exist under our rules of practice.
7
For the specific language on which the plaintiff relies, see footnote 4 of
this opinion.
8
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff, for the first time, also
claimed that if the defendants had not decided to file the petition for certifica-
tion in the first place, his former wife would not have filed her conditional
cross petition, which provided this court the opportunity to reverse the
Appellate Court’s determination that the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees was an abuse of discretion. In other words, if the petition for certification
had not been filed, the Appellate Court’s decision that the trial court had
abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay the attorney’s fees
incurred by his former wife would have been the last word on the issue,
and he would not have been required to pay those fees. Because the claim
regarding the propriety of the defendants’ conduct in filing the petition for
certification in the first place and the consequences of such conduct was
raised for the first time during oral argument before this court, and, therefore,
has not been properly briefed, we decline to consider it. See, e.g., State v.
Wright, 197 Conn. 588, 595, 500 A.2d 547 (1985).
9
The defendants also argue, alternatively, that, even if the court’s language
in the opinion were sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of care,
such language, alone, is not sufficient to establish another required element
of the cause of action, namely, that such breach actually caused the plaintiff
harm. The plaintiff, however, argues that expert testimony similarly would
have been unnecessary to prove the causation of damages because the
Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court’s miscalculation of the
amount to which the plaintiff had dissipated the marital assets was harmless
was obviously, clearly, and egregiously incorrect such that a jury would not
need expert testimony to understand the error. Given that we conclude that
the trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants because
the plaintiff was precluded from presenting any evidence regarding the
defendants’ alleged breach of the standard of care, and thus, could not
establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice, we need not reach the
alternative causation issue.
10
The concurrence correctly notes that the jury would be required to
accept our observation that the defendants had violated basic rules of appel-
late procedure as a definitive statement on that issue in evaluating the
defendants’ performance on behalf of the plaintiff. See footnote 10 of the
concurring opinion. As explained hereinafter, however, this does not obviate
the need for expert testimony to elucidate whether such violations were,
in fact, a breach of the requisite standard of care in the specific circumstances
of the plaintiff’s divorce appeal. See footnote 13 of this opinion.
11
The concurrence states that it ‘‘ha[s] difficulty with [this] assertion . . .
because the plaintiff does not claim that the defendants were negligent in
their handling of the . . . case generally . . . [but rather] in connection
with a particular claim on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Footnote 12 of the dissenting opinion. The reasonableness of the defendants’
conduct with regard to the one claim before this court cannot be assessed
in a vacuum. Rather, whether the defendants breached the requisite standard
of care with regard to this one claim must be determined given the entire
context of the plaintiff’s divorce appeal.
12
The lack of certainty as to the standard of care is demonstrated by the
fact that, at present, the advisory committee on appellate rules has before
it a proposed amendment to Practice Book § 61-10, which currently places
the burden for providing an adequate record for review wholly on the
appellant. See Practice Book § 61-10 (‘‘[i]t is the responsibility of the appel-
lant to provide an adequate record for review’’). The amendment proposes
‘‘that the existing articulation system should be overhauled because it often
results in an unfair and inequitable finding that a party has forfeited a right
to obtain appellate review for failure to seek an articulation from the trial
court, there is a lack of certainty as to when articulation is needed, and the
current system encourages trial judges to withhold the grounds for their
decisions unless an articulation is requested.’’ Advisory Committee on Appel-
late Rules, Meeting Minutes, p. 2 (May 11, 2011), available at http://www.jud.-
ct.gov/Committees/ap- rules/aprules min 051111.pdf (last visited
December 23, 2011). Indeed, there are multitudinous cases, in virtually all
areas of the law, in which both the Appellate Court and this court have
determined that the claims would not receive appellate review because the
appellant, by failing to move for an articulation, had not presented the court
with an adequate record to support the factual underpinnings of the claims.
See Connecticut Bar Association’s Appellate Advocacy Committee, The
Articulation Process in Connecticut Appellate Practice: A Proposal for
Change, pp. 6, 21–27 (January 2011) (identifying 152 appellate cases from
2007 to 2010 in which appellate review was forfeited for failure to seek
articulation).’’ The proposed amendment to § 61-10 states that the failure
to seek articulation shall not be grounds for the court to decline to review
any issue or claim on appeal.’’ Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Meeting Minutes, supra, p. 2.
Providing this court with an adequate record for review is a basic rule
of appellate procedure in that this court is incapable of meaningful review
of a claim without an adequate record. That providing an adequate record
for review is a basic rule, however, does not necessarily mean that what is
required to provide an adequate record in a specific case is entirely clear
at the start of the appeal. The statement by the concurrence that ‘‘we made
it clear that (1) the plaintiff was required to file a motion for articulation
or rectification, (2) the requirement to do so was a basic one, (3) without
a motion for articulation or rectification, the plaintiff’s claim was unreview-
able, and (4) if the plaintiff had filed the motion, [the plaintiff] would have
obtained appellate review of his claim,’’ is nothing more than twenty-twenty
hindsight. Given that the efficacy of the current articulation system is cur-
rently under review and given the frequency with which the appellate courts
refuse to engage in review of claims when the appellant has failed to comply
with Practice Book § 61-10, our mention of the defendants’ failure to do so
in this case is hardly consequential to the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim.
Furthermore, our statement that the defendants failed to adequately brief
the financial order issue does not account for the off-the-record interactions
between the defendants and the plaintiff or the extent to which the plaintiff
or his cocounsel directed the content of the brief on appeal. For example,
the plaintiff’s main goal in bringing the appeal from his divorce decree was
to remain married to his wife. It is possible that the appeal regarding the
trial court’s financial orders was sought merely as a consolation if he could
not remain married to his wife. Had that been the motivation—and tellingly,
we must surmise as to what the specific goals were on appeal because the
record did not include such information—the question becomes whether
the emphasis on the claims that would result in the reversal of the divorce
decree altogether, with the resulting de-emphasis on the financial arguments,
was a professionally sound strategic decision. Simply stating that the one
claim certified for appeal before this court, out of the five claims presented on
appeal to the Appellate Court, was inadequately briefed does not necessarily
indicate a breach of the requisite standard of care. Such a statement does
not address whether it was reasonable for the defendants to emphasize
certain issues and necessarily de-emphasize other issues, or whether another
attorney would have presented the issues differently in similar circum-
stances. Finally, similar to the treatment of the failure to provide an adequate
record for review, both this court and the Appellate Court frequently refuse
to address the merits of claims because they have been inadequately briefed.
See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold
v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263, 279, 25 A.3d 632 (2011); Bohonnon Law Firm,
LLC v. Baxter, 131 Conn. App. 371, 383, 27 A.3d 384 (2011). As such, our
mention of the inadequate briefing of one of the five claims in the plaintiff’s
divorce appeal is not necessarily noteworthy without additional context.
13
In stating that ‘‘our determination that the defendants had violated
certain basic rules of appellate procedure and that we would have enter-
tained the plaintiff’s claim but for those violations, may be adequate, without
more, to support the conclusion that the defendants’ representation of the
plaintiff with respect to that claim was not acceptable under any fair standard
of reasonableness,’’ the concurrence essentially states that a violation of
the rules of practice is negligence per se. We decline to go that far. As
explained previously, without a review of or an explanation as to why
counsel acted as they did, and particularly without a statement regarding
whether violating rules of practice was reasonable in a specific circumstance,
the observation that the defendants had violated even basic rules of practice
is not, alone, sufficient to establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice.
14
The concurrence takes issue with our reference to Pagan because there
could be a circumstance in which ‘‘an attorney who has represented a client
competently over a period of time might thereafter engage in professional
conduct that so clearly falls below the standard of care that a juror readily
would recognize the inadequacy of the attorney’s performance.’’ In support
of its disagreement with the exception to the requirement for expert testi-
mony in legal malpractice cases articulated in Pagan, the concurrence cites
to a medical malpractice case in which the court indicated that the exception
to the requirement for expert testimony was applicable only in situations
similar to when a surgeon leaves a foreign object inside a patient following
an otherwise successful surgery. See footnote 14 of the concurring opinion;
see Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 568, 864 A.2d 1
(2005). Leaving a foreign object inside a surgical patient, however, could
only be attributed to a lack of the requisite care by the surgeon. In that case,
there is no possibility that the surgeon exercised some level of professionally
sound judgment in deciding to leave a foreign object inside a patient, which
makes such a case inapposite to legal malpractice cases involving a question
as to whether an attorney’s violation of a rule of procedure was attributable
to a legitimate professional decision. There very well may be instances in
which an attorney, after a period of competent representation, engages in
conduct that clearly falls below the requisite standard of care, and in such
a circumstance the jury may not require the aid of expert testimony to
understand the applicable standard. Nevertheless, this is not such a case.
As discussed previou