Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor KOSEL EQUITY, LLC v. MARK MACGREGOR ET AL. (SC 21184) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff landlord appealed to this court, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of public interest was involved, from the trial court’s decision to grant the motion of the Middle- town Fair Rent Commission to intervene in the plaintiff’s summary process action against the defendant tenant, M, which was based on, inter alia, M’s alleged nonpayment of rent. Before moving to intervene in the summary process action, the commission had issued two decisions in response to cer- tain fair rent commission complaints that M had filed against the plaintiff. In those decisions, the commission found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had retaliated against M by serving him with a notice to quit within six months of the filing of his initial fair rent commission complaint, in violation of statute (§ 47a-20), and ordered the plaintiff to cease and desist from pursu- ing eviction proceedings and to accept a certain amount as monthly rent during the pendency of the initial complaint. The plaintiff filed separate administrative appeals in the Superior Court from the commission’s two decisions, and those appeals remained pending at the time of the present appeal. In its motion to intervene, the commission had explained that its purpose in intervening was to enforce its cease and desist order, to defend its capacity to adjudicate complaints and issue orders, and to protect the public policy undergirding fair rent commissions more broadly. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court had improperly granted the com- mission’s motion to intervene. Held: A review of the relationship between the fair rent commission statutes (§§ 7-148b through 7-148f) and the relevant landlord-tenant and summary pro- cess statutes (§§ 47a-20, 47a-20a and 47a-33) made it clear that, although fair rent and summary process proceedings involve separate adjudications before different decision makers, there is a substantive connection between the subject matters of those proceedings, and the issues and remedies subject to adjudication in those different forums can converge when the proceedings involve the same underlying factual circumstances. Moreover, a review of federal and state case law, as well as the relevant federal rules of civil procedure, led this court to conclude, with respect to the issue of permissive intervention by a governmental entity, that the rules governing permissive intervention should be liberally construed when a governmental agency seeks to intervene in a case that may impact the proper construction and application of statutes that delineate the agency’s powers, proper opera- tion, or enforcement authority. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the commission lacked stand- ing to intervene in the plaintiff’s summary process action.  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor It was unnecessary for this court to address the issue of whether the usual standing requirements apply in the context of permissive intervention because, regardless of the precise standing analysis to be applied, if any, it was clear that the commission had met the prerequisites for permissive intervention as a governmental entity, as the claims subject to adjudication in the summary process action, which involved the same landlord, tenant, and premises as those involved in the pending administrative appeals from the commission’s decisions, were of sufficient legal interest to the commission to confer any necessary standing for purposes of permissive intervention. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the commission’s motion to intervene under the circumstances of the present case. The trial court fully considered all of the factors relevant to a determination of whether intervention should be allowed, including the timeliness of the commission’s intervention, the commission’s interest in the controversy, whether the commission’s interests were adequately represented by the parties to the summary process action, the delay in the proceedings and the prejudice to the parties that the commission’s intervention might cause, and the value of the commission’s intervention in resolving the controversy. With respect to the commission’s interest in intervening in the summary process action, the trial court recognized that the summary process action and the administrative proceedings involved overlapping issues, including what constituted fair rent and whether there was nonpayment of rent or retaliation, and also recognized that the commission had an interest in pro- tecting its jurisdiction and its authority to issue and enforce orders setting proper rental amounts and enjoining retaliatory conduct. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the commission had a substantial institutional interest in litigating in support of its preferred construction of the fair rent commission statutory scheme and that the commission was not intervening as an advocate for M but, rather, to promote its own institutional interests. Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that the commission could not intervene in the absence of express statutory authority or that the trial court improperly based its decision to grant the commission’s motion on considerations of judicial economy. Argued March 2—officially released June 30, 2026 Procedural History Summary process action, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Housing Session at Middletown, where the court, Menjivar, J., granted the motion to intervene filed by the Middletown Fair Rent Commission; thereafter, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor that a matter of substantial public interest was involved, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Ian G. Gottlieb, with whom were David E. Rosenberg and Paul J. Small, for the appellant (plaintiff). Jane Kelleher, for the appellee (named defendant). Philip G. Kent, for the appellee (intervenor Middletown Fair Rent Commission). Jeffrey Gentes and Anika Singh Lemar, and Galen Fastie, Grady Martin, Uma Menon and Dylan Shapiro, law student interns, filed a brief for the New Haven Legal Assistance Association et al. as amici curiae. Jeffrey R. Babbin and Caitlyn Doerr filed a brief for the National Apartment Association et al. as amici curiae. Opinion ECKER, J. This is the companion case to TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, 354 Conn. 745, ___ A.3d ___ (2026), which we decided on June 9, 2026. Both cases are public interest appeals concerning the discretion of a trial judge to utilize certain well established procedural devices to facilitate the sensible and efficient adjudication of dis- puted issues in a summary process action that are also the subject of a pending administrative appeal of a fair rent commission decision involving the same landlord, tenant and premises. In TOV Realty, LLC, we held that the trial court properly stayed the summary process action pending adjudication of the ongoing administra- tive appeal. See id., 747–48, 765. The present appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court in the summary process action properly granted permissive intervention to a fair rent commission that had ordered the landlord to cease and desist from pursuing evic- tion proceedings and to accept a specified rental amount while the tenant’s previously filed fair rent complaint remained pending. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the fair rent commis- sion’s motion to intervene to advocate its institutional  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor interests, in particular, its statutory authority to act in the public interest by adjudicating fair rent complaints and enforcing its resulting orders. The record reflects the following facts. The named defendant, Mark MacGregor,1 entered into an agreement to lease an apartment located in Middletown from the plaintiff, Kosel Equity, LLC, from May 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025. The lease set a monthly rent of $1500, but the plaintiff agreed in a “concession addendum” to accept a monthly rent of $1175 for the term of the lease. On April 21, 2025, the defendant filed a fair rent complaint against the plaintiff’s property manager, Up Realty, LLC, with the Middletown Fair Rent Commis- sion (MFRC), claiming that the plaintiff had informed him that, beginning on May 1, 2025, his monthly rent was increasing from $1175 to $1500. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the defendant’s rent had increased each of the past two years of his tenancy, while, over that same period, the housing conditions and services had deteriorated. The MFRC sent the plaintiff a letter on April 23, 2025, attaching the complaint, set- ting an answer date, and advising the plaintiff that it was “prohibited from retaliating against the tenant(s) in any manner due to the filing of the complaint.” In par- ticular, the notice stated that “no landlord may engage in any action prohibited by . . . General Statutes § 47a- 20 . . . within six months after the filing of a complaint by the tenant(s) with the [MFRC],” and referenced the antiretaliation provision in § 14-81 (formerly § 14-78) of the Middletown Ordinances.2 After filing his fair rent complaint, the defendant mailed two checks totaling $1175 to Up Realty, LLC, as rent for the month of May, 2025. The checks were 1 Jane Doe and John Doe were also named as defendants in the underly- ing summary process action, but the plaintiff subsequently withdrew its action as to those individuals. See footnote 4 of this opinion. For convenience, we refer to MacGregor as the defendant. 2 One retaliatory action enumerated in § 47a-20 is “maintain[ing] an action or proceeding against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit . . . .” Section 14-81 (A) of the Middletown Ordinances provides  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor returned to the defendant with a message stating that personal checks could not be accepted “[d]ue to [the defendant’s] legal status . . . .”3 On May 14, 2025, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit pos- session of the apartment by June 23, 2025. The notice to quit alleged nonpayment of rent as one reason for the eviction4 and stated that any payment tendered after service of the notice would not be accepted as rent. After receiving the notice to quit, the defendant filed a second complaint with the MFRC, alleging that the plaintiff had retaliated against him because of the complaint he had filed on April 21, 2025. The MFRC held a hearing on the defendant’s retaliation claim on May 28, 2025, and issued a notice of decision on June 18, 2025, finding that the plaintiff’s issuance of the notice to quit was prohibited retaliatory conduct. Pursuant to General Statutes § 7-148d (b) and § 14-81 (C) of the Middletown Ordinances, the MFRC ordered the plaintiff “to cease and desist from retaliatory conduct and to withdraw or remediate the notice to quit that was served.” Pursuant to General Statutes § 7-148d (a) and § 14-80 (B) of the Middletown Ordinances,5 the MFRC also ordered the plaintiff “to accept $1175 as rent . . . from the [defendant] during the pendency of [his fair rent] complaint.” On July 14, 2025, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court an administrative appeal from the MFRC’s decision in relevant part: “Retaliatory actions by a landlord include but are not limited to . . . (1) . . . any action prohibited by . . . [§] 47a-20 . . . .” 3 In June, 2025, the defendant again mailed two checks totaling $1175 to Up Realty, LLC, but these checks were returned to the defendant with a similar message. 4 In addition to the defendant, the notice to quit named Jane Doe and John Doe as tenants or occupants, and alleged as additional grounds for eviction that these three individuals never had the right or privilege to occupy the premises, or that any such right had terminated. See General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) (2) and (3). 5 Section 14-80 (B) of the Middletown Ordinances provides in relevant part: “If the [MFRC] determines after a hearing that the rental charge or proposed increase in the rental charge for any housing accommoda- tion is so excessive . . . as to be harsh and unconscionable, it may order  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor and order in accordance with General Statutes § 7-148e. In its administrative appeal, the plaintiff claimed that (1) a contractually agreed on rent is not a rent increase within the MFRC’s jurisdiction, (2) under General Stat- utes § 47a-20a, a summary process action alleging non- payment of rent is not retaliatory, and (3) the MFRC had no authority to order the plaintiff to withdraw its notice to quit. That administrative appeal remains pending. In the meantime, the plaintiff initiated this summary process action against the defendant on July 7, 2025, alleging, among other grounds, nonpayment of rent. The defendant responded by filing a third complaint against the plaintiff with the MFRC, again alleging retaliation. The MFRC held a hearing on this third com- plaint on July 9, 2025, and issued its notice of decision on July 23, 2025. In its decision, the MFRC “disagreed with [the plaintiff’s] argument that . . . [its] summary process action could not be deemed to be retaliatory . . . because it was purportedly brought for nonpayment of rent.” The MFRC ordered the plaintiff “to cease and desist from pursuing the notice to quit and to withdraw the pending summary process action . . . .” Finding that the plaintiff had violated the MFRC order of June 18, 2025, the MFRC fined the plaintiff $100 for the period from June 19 through 23, 2025, and $100 for each sub- sequent day until the notice to quit and summary process action are withdrawn. The plaintiff thereafter filed an administrative appeal from the MFRC’s decision and order regarding the defendant’s third complaint, rais- ing the same issues as in its first administrative appeal. This second administrative appeal also remains pending. In a motion captioned “[The MFRC’s] Motion To Inter- vene and Motion To Dismiss, or, in the Alternative to Dismissal, Motion To Stay,” filed on July 25, 2025, the MFRC sought to intervene in the summary process action pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-102 and 52-107, and Practice Book § 9-18. The MFRC explained that it wished that the rent be limited to such an amount as it determines to be fair and equitable . . . .”  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor to intervene “for the purposes of enforcing its [cease and desist] order . . . and to defend its capacity to adjudicate complaints (including claims of retaliation), issue orders, and carry out the provisions of” Connecticut’s fair rent statutes and Middletown’s fair rent ordinances, as well as “to protect the public policy undergirding fair rent com- missions more broadly.” The MFRC also asked the trial court to dismiss the summary process action, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, or, in the alternative, to stay the action pend- ing the outcome of the ongoing administrative appeal. On July 28, 2025, the defendant filed his answer and special defenses in the summary process action, in which he argued, among other things, that the plaintiff had retaliated against him. The trial court heard argument on, and then granted, the MFRC’s motion to intervene in the summary process action on November 10, 2025. During the hearing, the trial court recognized that an order of possession in the summary process action would not itself directly affect the MFRC but opined that the MFRC had alleged “an interest in protecting [its] lawful orders, protect- ing [its] authority, [and] protecting [its] jurisdiction,” particularly in light of the issues common to the sum- mary process action and the two pending administra- tive appeals, such as the MFRC’s finding of retaliation and the plaintiff’s allegation of nonpayment of rent. In addition, the court discussed with counsel a variety of other considerations, including the potential overlap between arguments likely to be made by the defendant and the MFRC, if permitted to intervene, the MFRC’s ability to provide additional information to the court, the timing of the MFRC’s motion to intervene, and whether the defendant had made continued use and occupancy payments to the plaintiff. The court granted permis- sive intervention, reasoning that “there will be legal issues [in the administrative appeals and the summary process action] that will overlap, that [intervention is]  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor not going to cause undue delay, [and] that there’s not undue prejudice to either party . . . .” On November 24, 2025, the plaintiff filed an appli- cation for certification to file an interlocutory public interest appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a. Chief Justice Mullins granted the plaintiff’s applica- tion on December 1, 2025. On December 5, 2025, this court directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) “[w]hether the trial court improperly granted the [MFRC’s] motion for permissive intervention in the summary process action,” and (2) “[w]hether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying summary process action when the [MFRC] argues that (a) its cease and desist order renders the plaintiff’s notice to quit ‘invalid,’ and (b) the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies . . . .”6 Additional facts and background relevant to this appeal will be provided as necessary. I RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK Resolution of this appeal requires us to determine the proper interaction between two different but related statutory schemes governing the landlord-tenant rela- tionship, namely, the summary process and the fair rent commission statutes. Those statutes are discussed at length in part I of this court’s decision in the compan- ion case, TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, supra, 354 Conn. 752–61, and that discussion will not be repeated except as necessary to highlight those provisions most pertinent to the present appeal. 6 Upon consideration, we have concluded that we lack jurisdiction to reach the second question, which concerns questions raised in the as yet unadjudicated motion to dismiss. As we explained in TOV Realty, LLC, with respect to the issues yet to be adjudicated by the trial court in that case, this court is without jurisdiction in an interlocutory public interest appeal to decide such issues because “the plaintiff . . . is not yet ‘aggrieved by an order or decision of the Superior Court’ for purposes of our review under § 52-265a (a).” TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, supra, 354 Conn. 766.  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor It is well established that the summary process stat- utes create “a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy . . . [by] enabl[ing] land- lords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 466, 974 A.2d 626 (2009). See generally General Statutes §§ 47a-23 through 47a-42a. That said, a landlord is not free to use summary process to retake possession of property under any and all circumstances. Of particular relevance to the present case are three antiretaliation provisions contained in the summary process statutes. Section 47a-20 provides in relevant part: “A landlord shall not maintain an action or proceed- ing against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit . . . within six months after: (1) [t]he tenant has in good faith . . . fil[ed] a complaint with a fair rent com- mission . . . .” This provision “ ‘establishes retaliation as a presumption, if a summary process action is initiated within six months of a complaint, [that] the landlord must successfully rebut.’ ” Holdmeyer v. Thomas, 167 Conn. App. 544, 548, 144 A.3d 1052 (2016), quoting Visco v. Cody, 16 Conn. App. 444, 450 n.7, 547 A.2d 935 (1988). The presumption of retaliation established by § 47a-20 is not absolute. In addition to the requirement in § 47a-20 that the fair rent complaint be filed in good faith, § 47a- 20a enumerates four grounds—including nonpayment of rent—as the exclusive means by which a landlord may rebut that presumption.7 See General Statutes § 47a-20a (a); see also Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 147, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). In more than two dozen decisions dat- ing back to 1979, numerous judges of the Superior Court 7 Section 47a-20a (a) (1) permits a “landlord [to] maintain an action to recover possession of [a] dwelling unit” on the ground that the “tenant is using the dwelling unit for an illegal purpose or for a purpose which is in violation of the rental agreement or for nonpayment of rent . . . .”  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor have stated that, to rebut the presumption of retaliation, a landlord must produce “substantial countervailing evidence” of at least one of the four grounds enumerated in § 47a-20a. Alteri v. Layton, 35 Conn. Supp. 261, 264, 408 A.2d 18 (1979). Finally, General Statutes § 47a-33 enumerates cir- cumstances under which a tenant may raise retaliation as a special defense to a summary process action, even when the operation of § 47a-20a defeats the presump- tion that would otherwise apply under § 47a-20. These circumstances include when “the plaintiff brought [the summary process] action solely because the defendant . . . fil[ed] a complaint with a fair rent commission . . . .”8 General Statutes § 47a-33. Thus, if a tenant cannot ben- efit from a presumption of retaliation under § 47a-20 because, for example, the eviction is for nonpayment of rent, then the tenant may still raise retaliation as a special defense pursuant to § 47a-33. In that situation, the tenant carries the burden of demonstrating that the landlord’s sole motivation for bringing the summary process action was the tenant’s exercise of one or more of the rights specified in the statutory provision. See Alteri v. Layton, supra, 35 Conn. Supp. 264–65; see also TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, supra, 354 Conn. 755. Turning to the statutory provisions governing the pow- ers and proceedings of the fair rent commissions, we note that the principal components of the relevant legislation and certain key portions of the legislative history are set forth in part I B of our decision in TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, supra, 354 Conn. 755–61. General Statutes (Supp. 2026) § 7-148b (b)9 provides in relevant part that 8 General Statutes § 47a-33 also provides in relevant part that “[t]he obligation on the part of the defendant to pay rent or the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises which are the subject of any such action shall not be abrogated or diminished by any provision of this section.” 9 The recent amendments to § 7-148b; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., November, 2025, No. 25-1, § 35; Public Acts 2025, No. 25-121, § 1; have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. For purposes of clarity and convenience, hereinafter, all references to § 7-148b are to the current version of the statute.  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor “[a]ny municipality may, and each municipality with a population of fifteen thousand or more . . . shall, through its legislative body, adopt an ordinance” either creating a fair rent commission or joining an existing commission. Importantly, § 7-148b (b) also expressly links the duties of the fair rent commissions to the antiretaliation pro- visions of § 47a-20 by stating that a “commission shall make studies and investigations, conduct hearings and receive complaints relative to rental charges on housing accommodations . . . in order to control and eliminate excessive rental charges on such accommodations, and to carry out the provisions of sections 7-148b to 7-148f, inclusive, section 47a-20 and subsection (b) of section 47a-23c.” (Emphasis added.) The statutory scheme goes on to provide that, “[i]f a commission determines, after a hearing, that the rental charge or proposed increase in the rental charge for any housing accommodation is so excessive . . . as to be harsh and unconscionable, it may order that the rent be limited to such an amount as it determines to be fair and equitable.”10 General Statutes § 7-148d (a); see also Lawrence v. Fair Rent Commission, 10 General Statutes § 7-148c provides a multifactor inquiry to carry out this particular function: “In determining whether a rental charge or a proposed increase in a rental charge is so excessive, with due regard to all the circumstances, as to be harsh and unconscionable, a fair rent commission shall consider such of the following circumstances as are applicable to the type of accommodation: (1) The rents charged for the same number of rooms in other housing accommodations in the same and in other areas of the municipality; (2) the sanitary conditions existing in the housing accommodations in question; (3) the number of bath- tubs or showers, flush water closets, kitchen sinks and lavatory basins available to the occupants thereof; (4) services, furniture, furnishings and equipment supplied therein; (5) the size and number of bedrooms contained therein; (6) repairs necessary to make such accommodations reasonably livable for the occupants accommodated therein; (7) the amount of taxes and overhead expenses, including debt service, thereof; (8) whether the accommodations are in compliance with the ordinances of the municipality and the general statutes relating to health and safety; (9) the income of the petitioner and the availability of accommodations; (10) the availability of utilities; (11) damages done to the premises by the tenant, caused by other than ordinary wear and tear; (12) the amount and frequency of increases in rental charges; (13) whether, and the extent to which, the income from an increase in rental charges has been or will be reinvested in improvements to the accommodations.”  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor Docket No. CV-H-8501-1613, 1989 WL 516454, *4 (Conn. Super. April 12, 1989) (“[t]he statutory and municipal authority vested in the [fair rent commissions] concern- ing the adjustment and suspension of rental payments is both broad and discretionary”). In addition to authorizing fair rent commissions to exercise their powers to carry out the antiretaliation provisions of § 47a-20, the legislature explicitly granted specific enforcement powers to fair rent commissions. “If the commission determines, after a hearing, that a landlord has retaliated in any manner against a tenant because the tenant has complained to the commission, the commission may order the landlord to cease and desist from such conduct.” General Statutes § 7-148d (b). Moreover, “[a]ny person who violates any order of rent reduction or rent suspension . . . or violates any . . . provision of . . . section 47a-20, or who refuses to obey any subpoena, order or decision of a commission pursuant thereto, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense. If such offense continues for more than five days, it shall constitute a new offense for each day it continues to exist thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 7-148f. Although fair rent and summary process proceedings involve separate adjudications before different decision makers, the foregoing review of the statutory schemes demonstrates that the legislature expressly recognized a substantive connection between the subject matters of those proceedings in numerous provisions of the statutes, including §§ 47a-20 and 47a-33 (both of which reference complaints to a fair rent commission as grounds for retaliation), § 7-148b (b) (empowering a fair rent com- mission to exercise its powers “to carry out the provisions of . . . section 47a-20”), and § 7-148f (authorizing a fair rent commission to impose fines on any person who has been found to violate § 47a-20). And, as our decision in TOV Realty, LLC, recognizes, the issues and remedies subject to adjudication in these different forums can converge to a substantial extent when the proceedings involve the same underlying factual circumstances. See  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, supra, 354 Conn. 761–62, 764. The relevant legislative history reinforces this con- clusion. See id., 759–61. II PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION A The primary issue in the present appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the MFRC’s motion to intervene under §§ 52-102 and 52-107, and Practice Book § 9-18. “A party challenging a ruling on permissive intervention bear[s] the heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of . . . discretion . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 226, 884 A.2d 981 (2005). “[A]buse of discretion exists when a court could have chosen different alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or irrelevant factors.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Id., 224–25; see also Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 461–62, 904 A.2d 137 (2006) (“ ‘[r]eversal of a [federal] district court’s denial of permissive intervention is a very rare bird indeed, so seldom seen as to be considered unique’ ”), quoting AT & T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005). Indeed, this court has indicated that a trial court’s discretion in this context is sufficiently broad that, if the trial court applies the correct legal standard to the circumstances of the case in a rational manner, a decision either granting or denying permissive intervention will be upheld on appeal. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 461–63; Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 198–99, 445 A.2d 579 (1982). “Because our rules of practice provide no specific artic- ulation of the factors to be considered in determining whether intervention should be allowed, we have turned to rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. . . . In reliance on that rule, [o]ur cases estab-  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor lish that, in determining whether to grant a request for permissive intervention, a court should consider sev- eral factors: [1] the timeliness of the intervention, [2] the proposed intervenor’s interest in the controversy, [3] the adequacy of representation of such interests by other parties, [4] the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause, and [5] the necessity for or value of the interven- tion in resolving the controversy.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 225–26;11 see also Horton v. Meskill, supra, 187 Conn. 197. These five factors provide the well established framework used by trial courts to determine whether to grant permissive intervention. See, e.g., In re Santiago G., 325 Conn. 221, 226–27 and n.6, 157 A.3d 60 (2017); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 279 Conn. 461. 11 The five Rosado factors governing permissive intervention in Con- necticut combine the four factors that must be considered under rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether a party may intervene as of right in federal court, plus the final factor that must be considered to grant permissive intervention under rule 24 (b) (3). See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 225 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2000) (to qualify for intervention as of right under rule 24 (a) (2), “the applicant must: (1) file a timely motion; (2) show an interest in the litigation; (3) show that its interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) show that its interest is not adequately protected by the parties to the action”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (3) (“[i]n exercising its discretion [to grant permissive intervention under rule 24 (b)], the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights”). Although the text of rule 24 (a) (intervention as of right) is not identical to that of rule 24 (b) (permissive interven- tion), courts as a practical matter apply the four factors set forth in rule 24 (a) (2), together with the undue delay or prejudice factor in rule 24 (b) (3), to decide whether to allow permissive intervention. See, e.g., In re Bank of New York Derivative Litigation, 320 F.3d 291, 300 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003). A court may, of course, exercise its discretion to allow permissive intervention even when intervention is not available as of right. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chestman, 861 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Harris, Docket No. 16-cv-1434 (JCH), 2016 WL 9967919, *8–9 (D. Conn. November 8, 2016).  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor Before addressing the five Rosado factors, we observe preliminarily that the present case involves interven- tion by a governmental organization. There are particu- lar considerations, mostly developed by federal courts operating under the purview of rule 24 (b) of the Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure, that provide additional guidance in this context. Indeed, rule 24 (b) contains explicit guidance applicable to intervention sought by governmental actors: “On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, require- ment, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (2). This provi- sion was promulgated in 1946 “to avoid exclusionary constructions [of rule 24 (b) when] . . . public officials seek permission to intervene, and the amendment in effect expands the concept of claim or defense12 insofar as intervention by a governmental officer or agency is concerned.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 704–705 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also International Paper Co. v. Inhabitants of Jay, Maine, 887 F.2d 338, 346 (1st Cir. 1989). Commentators have observed that “the whole thrust of [rule 24 (b) (2)] is in the direction of allowing intervention liberally to governmental agencies and officers seeking to speak for the public interest . . . .” 7C C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (2007) § 1912, p. 472. In addition to the particularized considerations for governmental intervenors contained 12 The phrase “claim or defense” refers to the language of rule 24 (b) (1) (B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a court may grant permissive intervention to any person who “has a claim or defense that shares with the [case in which intervention is sought] a common question of law or fact.” Because the proposed governmental intervenor may not itself have an interest in the matter based on a “claim or defense” it asserts, rule 24 (b) (2) was amended to “[allow] interven- tion even in situations [in which] the existence of any nominate claim or defense is difficult to find.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children’s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor in rule 24 (b) (2), the other factors relevant to deciding a motion for permissive intervention under rule 24 (b), including the five Rosado factors, also remain applicable to motions to intervene by governmental entities. See Appleton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 430 Fed. Appx. 135, 137–38 (3d Cir. 2011); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1986).13 Rule 24 (b) “plainly dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuni- ary interest in the subject of the litigation.” Securities 13 We note that the vast majority of intervention cases involve gov- ernmental actors seeking to intervene in what might be called their regulatory role. See, e.g., Nuesse v. Camp, supra, 385 F.2d 698–99, 704 (District Court should have granted permissive intervention to Wisconsin state banking commissioner, whose office is responsible for enforcing state laws relating to banking, in declaratory judgment action implicating state banking law brought by Wisconsin bank against United States comptroller of currency). Alternatively, the government may move to intervene for the purpose of obtaining targeted relief, such as a stay or modification of a protective order, to protect or promote its interests as a party in a parallel or related proceeding or investigation. See, e.g., Twenty First Century Corp. v. LaBianca, 801 F. Supp. 1007, 1008–11 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (permitting government to intervene in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act case for limited purpose of moving to stay discovery until completion of pending criminal case against defendant); see also Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (government may “seek permissive intervention in [a] private action pursuant to [r]ule 24 (b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] . . . for the purpose of obtaining vacation or modification of [a] p