Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc.

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ******************************************************  INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES v. SUMMIT ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL. (SC 18910) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Espinosa, Js. Argued March 18—officially released August 27, 2013 Proloy K. Das, with whom was Bernard F. Gaffney, for the appellant (defendant Joseph D. Lancia). Pasquale Young, for the appellee (plaintiff).  Opinion McDONALD, J. In 2009, our legislature created a mechanism whereby a judgment creditor can ‘‘revive’’ an unsatisfied judgment for money damages at any time before the period for enforcement expires; Public Acts 2009, No. 09-215, § 1 (c) (P.A. 09-215); see General Stat- utes § 52-598 (c);1 the purpose of which was to aid in the execution of such judgments in foreign jurisdic- tions. The present case requires us to consider the nature of proceedings under § 52-598 (c) regarding questions of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with respect to a judgment rendered before the effective date of § 52-598 (c). Upon our grant of certification, the defendant Joseph D. Lancia2 appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s 2010 judgment reviving a 1994 judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Investment Associates, pursuant to § 52-598 (c). Investment Associ- ates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 132 Conn. App. 192, 31 A.3d 820 (2011) The defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that: (1) his challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff was neither a legal entity nor an entity in existence was barred as an improper collateral attack on the original judgment; and (2) § 52-598 (c) applies retroactively and provides a proper basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of adjudicating the motion to revive. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. The following facts are undisputed. In 1991, the plain- tiff commenced an action to recover on a promissory note executed by Summit Associates, Inc. (Summit), and guaranteed by Ned B. Wilson and the defendant. The complaint identified the plaintiff as having been at all relevant times a joint venture, equally owned by R. S. S. McKosky and Alton W. Seavey, Jr., and having its usual place of business in North Branford. The com- plaint further identified the plaintiff as the holder and owner of the note and as the assignee of a related security agreement. In 1992, while the action was pend- ing, the defendant moved from Connecticut to South Carolina. The defendant continued to be represented by counsel at proceedings on the action, at which he asserted various defenses to the merits but no jurisdic- tional challenges. In 1994, the trial court, Hon. Frank S. Meadow, judge trial referee, rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $272,530.03 plus costs. Under Connecticut law, the plaintiff had twenty years from the date judgment entered to obtain an exe- cution on the judgment. See General Statutes § 52-598 (a). Under South Carolina law, the plaintiff had ten years from that date to obtain an execution in that state’s courts. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-600 (2005); Abba Equipment, Inc. v. Thomason, 335 S.C. 477, 481, 517 S.E.2d 235 (App. 1999). The plaintiff did not seek an execution of the Connecticut judgment in South Carolina before that state’s limitations period expired.3 In 2007, the plaintiff commenced a separate action in Connecticut solely against the defendant to enforce the judgment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court, A. Robinson, J., granted. Investment Associ- ates v. Lancia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 5, 2008) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 437). The court recognized that Connecti- cut would have a valid interest in enforcing the judg- ment. Id., 440. Nonetheless, it concluded that the defendant’s sole contact with Connecticut since leaving the state in 1992—the 1994 judgment—was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of either the long arm stat- ute; General Statutes § 52-59b; or due process to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.4 Investment Associates v. Lancia, supra, 439–40. In June, 2009, the legislature enacted P.A. 09-215, codified as § 52-598, and made effective October 1, 2009. Pursuant to the newly enacted subsection (c) of § 52- 598, the plaintiff filed a motion on October 6, 2009, to revive the 1994 judgment, alleging that the judgment remained unsatisfied and that the period for executing the judgment had not yet expired. In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the motion, claiming that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in light of: (1) his South Carolina residency and lack of contact with Connecticut since 1992; (2) the trial court’s ruling dismissing the plaintiff’s 2007 action for lack of personal jurisdiction as res judicata; (3) the absence of any basis in § 52-598 (c) or postjudgment procedure statutes con- ferring personal jurisdiction; and (4) his lack of mini- mum contacts with the state to render the exercise of such jurisdiction consonant with due process. The court issued a decision in 2010 concurrently denying the motion to dismiss and granting the motion to revive. The defendant thereafter moved to reargue the motion to revive, claiming that he had not been given an oppor- tunity to assert substantive challenges to the merits of the motion because he could not have advanced such claims without conceding personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied that request, and the defendant appealed from the revived judgment to the Appellate Court. In that appeal, the defendant renewed claims pre- viously made to the trial court, and, for the first time, challenged the plaintiff’s standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff, as a joint ven- ture, was neither a legal entity nor in existence at the time it commenced the action. Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., supra, 132 Conn. App. 195–96. Following oral argument, the Appellate Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the defendant should be precluded from challenging the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 197. After considering supple- mental briefs on that question, the Appellate Court con- cluded that the defendant was precluded from raising these claims. Id., 197, 201–202. The court reasoned that a motion to revive is not the beginning of a new action, in which the defendant undoubtedly would be able to challenge the court’s jurisdiction even for the first time on appeal, but, rather, a continuation of the original action. Id., 199–200. Accordingly, the court concluded that the timeliness of the defendant’s challenge must be viewed in light of the original judgment. Id., 200. Considering the fact that the defendant had failed to avail himself of the opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the original proceedings, the Appellate Court concluded that the interest in finality of judg- ments outweighed the concerns that the defendant had raised regarding the validity of the judgment. Id., 201– 202. The court further concluded that, because the prac- tical effect of the defendant’s challenge to the motion to revive was an attack on the 1994 judgment, the defen- dant could not challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over either the original judgment or the motion to revive. Id. In addition, the Appellate Court rejected the defen- dant’s challenge to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him and his claim that the trial court’s decision on the motion to revive had been made without affording him an opportunity to challenge that motion on the merits. Id., 202–208. With respect to the former, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the defendant when granting the motion to revive because: § 52-598 (c) is a procedural statute that may be applied retroactively; a motion filed pursuant to that subsection is not a new action that would require the trial court to obtain personal jurisdic- tion over the defendant independent of the jurisdiction present at judgment; and the legislature had conferred continuing jurisdiction on the court over parties to post- judgment procedures, which included § 52-598 (c). Id., 203–205. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the revived judgment. Id., 208. Thereafter, this court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s 2009 motion to revive?’’; (2) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that . . . § 52-598 (c) is procedural in nature, and, therefore, may be applied retroactively?’’; and (3) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court had per- sonal jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of adjudicating the plaintiff’s 2009 motion to revive?’’5 Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 303 Conn. 921, 922, 34 A.3d 396 (2012). Each of these issues raises questions of law over which this court exercises plenary review. Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 7, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (standing); Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 195, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007) (retroactivity of statute and statutory construction); New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012) (personal jurisdiction). Upon such review, we answer the certified questions in the affirmative. I We begin with a brief explanation of the nature and effect of § 52-598 (c), which is central to our resolution of the issues in this appeal. Under the law existing at the time the original judgment was rendered in the present case and as it currently exists, a party obtaining a judgment for money damages in Connecticut has two means to enforce that judgment; it may seek an execu- tion of the judgment or it may initiate an independent action. See General Statutes § 52-598 (a); see also 30 Am. Jur. 2d 84, Executions and Enforcement of Judg- ments § 47 (2005) (distinguishing between execution and action on judgment). With limited exceptions not applicable to the present case, under § 52-598 (a), a party has twenty years to execute the judgment and twenty-five years to enforce it through a separate action. Public Act 09-215 added subsection (c) to § 52-598, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘With respect to a judg- ment for money damages rendered in any court of this state . . . a motion to revive such judgment may be filed with the Superior Court prior to the expiration of any applicable period of time to enforce such judgment as set forth in this section. The court may grant the motion to revive the judgment if the court finds that the applicable time period to enforce the judgment under this section has not expired. No order to revive a judgment may extend the time period to enforce a judgment beyond the applicable time period set forth in this section.’’ On its face and viewed in isolation, § 52-598 (c) appears to have no practical effect. Although an order granting a motion under this provision ostensibly ‘‘revive[s]’’ the judgment, the judgment must be pres- ently enforceable in order to be revived and revival has no effect on the time limit to enforce the judgment.6 Thus, for example, in the present case, under the origi- nal 1994 judgment, the plaintiff had until 2014 to execute the judgment and until 2019 to initiate an independent action to enforce the judgment. Under the 2010 revived judgment, the plaintiff is subject to those same limits. The intended effect of the revived judgment becomes evident upon examination of P.A. 09-215 and its legisla- tive history. Public Act 09-215 enacted House Bill No. 6248, 2009 Sess., entitled ‘‘An Act concerning the Time Limit for Enforcing a State Court Judgment in a Foreign Jurisdiction.’’ The explanation of the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives makes clear that the bill’s purpose was to ensure that satisfaction of a valid Connecticut judgment was not avoided simply because the judgment debtor (or the debtor’s assets) resided in a foreign jurisdiction having a shorter period for enforcement. See 52 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 2009 Sess., pp. 6387–88, remarks of Representative Gerald M. Fox III;7 see also Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 20, 2009 Sess., pp. 6582–83, remarks of Representative Vincent J. Candelora; Conn. Joint Stand- ing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 21, 2009 Sess., pp. 6722–23, written testimony of Representative Can- delora (citing example of judgment rendered in Con- necticut eleven years prior that could not be enforced under South Carolina’s ten year period for enforcing judgment as problem intended to be remedied by bill). Thus, the manifest purpose of revival under § 52-598 (c) is to create a new judgment for the purpose of meeting a foreign jurisdiction’s time limits for enforcement. As one court explained: ‘‘The object of the proceeding is not to obtain a new judgment for a debt, but to enable the judgment creditor to enforce by execution the judg- ment he has already obtained. . . . The order to revive does no more than reinvest the plaintiff with the right to have execution of his original judgment. His cause of action against the defendant is the original judgment, not the order to revive. The order merely confers upon the plaintiff the statutory right to issue executions on the judgment after it had become dormant for that pur- pose. The common-law right to sue on the judgment is not enlarged or made to accrue anew by force of the order. . . . It is plain that a new lease of life is not given to that cause of action by merely affording to the plaintiff the opportunity of resorting to the cumulative and independent remedy for the enforcement of the judgment by means of executions upon it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Second National Bank v. Allgood, 234 Ala. 654, 656, 176 So. 363 (1937). Accordingly, a proceeding to revive a judgment generally is viewed as a continuation of the original action, not a new action. See, e.g., Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 381 Ill. 486, 489, 45 N.E.2d 651 (1942); Bahan v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 191 So. 2d 668, 670 (La. App. 1966); State ex rel. Silverman v. Kirkwood, 361 Mo. 1194, 1200, 239 S.W.2d 332 (1951); Columbus Check Cashers, Inc. v. Cary, 196 Ohio App. 3d 132, 139, 962 N.E.2d 812 (2011); Berly v. Sias, 152 Tex. 176, 181, 255 S.W.2d 505 (1953); Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 415, 46 S.E.2d 570 (1948). A survey of other jurisdictions reveals that the circumstances in which a revival proceeding has been deemed a new action are those in which the revival provides a means by which the original judgment may be substantively altered, such as by the addition or deletion of parties or the assertion of new defenses other than satisfaction of the judgment, or in which a new period of limitations attaches to the revived judgment.8 See, e.g., Johnson Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Clemmons, 233 Kan. 405, 408, 661 P.2d 1242, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 345, 78 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1983); Union National Bank v. Lamb, 360 Mo. 81, 88–89, 227 S.W.2d 60 (1950); Allen v. Wilson County Investors, LLC, Docket No. M2002- 00540-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21849545, *5 (Tenn. App. August 8, 2003). Accordingly, because proceedings under § 52-598 (c) result in no substantive change to the original judgment, a point we discuss in further detail in part III A of this opinion, a motion to revive under § 52-598 (c) is effectively a continuation of the original proceeding rather than a new action.9 With this background and premise in mind, we turn to the defen- dant’s claims. II We begin with the question of whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court had sub- ject matter jurisdiction over the motion to revive. More precisely, the question is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the defendant was precluded from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction over the motion because the challenges raised were in fact or effect collateral attacks on the original judgment. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly failed to recognize that, under our case law, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void ab initio, not merely voidable, and that such a defect can be raised as a defense at any time, even by way of a collateral attack and especially when that judgment is being used as a source of a right. The defendant contends that his attack on the motion to revive raised such issues in that he claims that the plaintiff lacked standing to com- mence the action because: (1) joint ventures are not legal entities and therefore lack the capacity to bring actions in their own names; and (2) the plaintiff failed to establish that it was an existing joint venture at the time that it initiated the action. The defendant further asserts that, even if it was proper to preclude his chal- lenges to the trial court’s jurisdiction in connection with the 1994 judgment, he should have been permitted to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion to revive because ‘‘there is no reason to believe that [the plaintiff] still existed in 2009,’’ when it filed the motion. In response, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court properly declined to consider the defendant’s claims, that lack of capacity to bring an action is not a jurisdictional defect in any event, and, even if it is, that joint ventures are legal entities that can bring an action. For purposes of clarity, we characterize the defen- dant’s claims in three parts: (1) whether joint ventures are legal entities capable of bringing an action—a claim that pertains equally to the original and revived judg- ments; (2) whether the plaintiff was in existence at the time the original action was commenced; and (3) assuming the plaintiff was then in existence, whether it continued in existence as a joint venture when the motion to revive was filed. With respect to the first two claims, the defendant acknowledges that these defenses to the motion to revive are ‘‘collateral challenge[s] to [the] judgment . . . .’’ For the reasons set forth subse- quently in this opinion, we agree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the defendant is not entitled to review of those claims on the merits. Insofar, however, as the third claim neither directly, nor in effect, attacks the original judgment, we conclude that the defendant is not precluded from raising such a challenge, but that his claim fails on the merits. We begin with the two claims that undoubtedly are collateral attacks on the original judgment. In preclud- ing the defendant’s claims, the Appellate Court relied on principles first articulated by this court in Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 422 A.2d 271 (1979), and reiterated in several later cases. In Vogel, the plaintiff had chal- lenged a finding of contempt arising out of his noncom- pliance with the trial court’s order in a judgment rendered approximately twenty years earlier, claiming that, under this court’s case law construing the applica- ble statute, the trial court properly could not have issued such an order under the facts of the case. Id., 361–64. In rejecting that challenge, this court con- cluded: ‘‘The plaintiff’s collateral attack upon the valid- ity of the 1959 judgment is framed as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court which, as we have consistently recognized, can be raised at any time . . . and the lack thereof cannot be waived. . . . As we have only recently observed, however, [t]he modern law of civil procedure suggests that even litigation about subject matter jurisdiction should take into account the importance of the principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when the parties have had a full opportunity originally to contest the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal. . . . Under this rationale, at least where the lack of jurisdiction is not entirely obvious, the critical considerations are whether the complaining party had the opportunity to litigate the question of jurisdiction in the original action, and, if he did have such an oppor- tunity, whether there are strong policy reasons for giv- ing him a second opportunity to do so.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 362–63, citing, inter alia, F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (2d Ed. 1977) § 13.16, pp. 695–97; Restatement (Sec- ond), Judgments § 15 (Tentative Draft No. 5 1978). While we continue to agree with the vitality of this rule,10 two factors give us pause as to whether this rule should strictly apply in the context of proceedings to revive an earlier judgment. Numerous jurisdictions pro- vide for revival of judgments and recognize principles limiting collateral attacks on judgments, yet none of them have broadly extended the Restatement (Second) rule to revival proceedings. Rather, these jurisdictions, without exception, appear to permit jurisdictional attacks on the original judgment to be raised in proceed- ings to revive the judgment, at least to the extent that the judgment can be demonstrated to be void on its face. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d 715, Judgments § 415 (2006) (‘‘It is clear that errors or irregularities in obtaining the judgment, which do not render it void, may not be set up as a defense. Ordinarily, however, it is proper to urge, in defense of a proceeding for the revival of a judgment, that the judgment is void for want of jurisdic- tion of either the parties or of the subject matter.’’ [Footnotes omitted.]); 50 C.J.S., Judgments § 861 (2009) (noting that, in revival proceeding, ‘‘defenses may be successfully advanced, including . . . incapacity of [the] plaintiff to maintain the proceeding’’ [footnotes omitted]); see, e.g., Tingwall v. King Hill Irrigation District, 66 Idaho 76, 82, 155 P.2d 605 (1945) (in revival proceeding in which debtor sought to attack original judgment, ‘‘[a] judgment, although obtained by extrinsic fraud, cannot be collaterally attacked unless such inval- idity appears on the face of the judgment’’); Romero v. Sunseri, 359 So. 2d 305, 307 (La. App.) (‘‘in a suit for revival of judgment, no defense short of absolute nullity of the original judgment can be raised’’), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 579 (La. 1978); Arthur v. Garcia, 78 N.M. 381, 383, 431 P.2d 759 (1967) (concluding that collateral attack in revival proceeding on original judgment not permitted unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears in record); Rindfleisch v. AFT, Inc., Docket No. 84551, 2005 WL 110443, *2 (Ohio App. January 20, 2005) (claim preclusion inapplicable to challenge to court’s subject matter jurisdiction over motion to revive judgment if jurisdiction had not previously been determined). In addition, as we previously explained, the sole pur- pose of § 52-598 (c) is to advance the enforcement of Connecticut judgments in foreign jurisdictions. Foreign jurisdictions constitutionally are bound to give full faith and credit to Connecticut judgments, but only insofar as such judgments are valid. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 118 S. Ct. 657, 139 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1998) (‘‘Regarding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one [s]tate, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.’’); see also Durham v. Dept. of Human Ser- vices/Child Support Enforcement Unit, 322 Ark. 789, 793, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995) (applying this principle in revival proceeding); Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 255, 260–61 (1873) (same); Yorkshire West Capital, Inc. v. Rodman, 149 P.3d 1088, 1092 (Okla. App. 2006) (same); Carter v. Carter, 232 Va. 166, 169, 349 S.E.2d 95 (1986) (same). Accordingly, when a judgment creditor seeks to enforce a Connecticut judgment in a foreign jurisdic- tion, that jurisdiction will consider jurisdictional chal- lenges to the validity of the judgment. See Law Firm of Paul L. Erickson, P.A. v. Boykin, 383 S.C. 497, 504– 505, 681 S.E.2d 575 (2009). Although the foreign jurisdic- tion will apply Connecticut law in making that determination; see Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 453, 48 S. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed. 365 (1928); Law Firm of Paul L. Erickson, P.A. v. Boykin, supra, 500 n.2; there is reason to question whether that jurisdiction will treat the judgment as presumptively valid if it is invalid on its face under our laws pertaining to jurisdiction but shielded from such an attack under our law regarding jurisprudential considerations. In any event, that for- eign jurisdiction also would be limited to deciding the matter on the record as it exists. Limiting collateral attacks to those that can be estab- lished by the record has support in our case law. In In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383, 406–407, 773 A.2d 347 (2001), this court noted: ‘‘The reason for the rule against collateral attack is well stated in these words: The law aims to invest judicial transactions with the utmost permanency consistent with justice. . . . Public policy requires that a term be put to litigation and that judg- ments, as solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown. . . . [T]he law has established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court’s decision. . . . If he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults upon it.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Accord Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, P.C. v. Cadle Co., 278 Conn. 92, 99 n.7, 897 A.2d 58 (2006) (‘‘[a]lthough we generally require that collateral attacks be supported by facts apparent from the record, we have eschewed the appli- cation of that rule when a nonresident defendant collat- erally challenges the personal jurisdiction of the court rendering judgment’’); Vogel v. Vogel, supra, 178 Conn. 362 (exception to bar on collateral attack when lack of jurisdiction is ‘‘entirely obvious’’); see also R.C. Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008) (motion to dismiss attacks jurisdiction of court and ‘‘tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We need not, however, conclusively resolve this ques- tion in the present case. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the defendant is entitled to review of his claims if he can demonstrate that prevailing on those claims would render the original judgment void on its face, his claims do not meet this standard. As the follow- ing discussion illustrates, the defendant cannot estab- lish that he is entitled to a judgment of dismissal on the record as it exists. We begin with the defendant’s first claim, that joint ventures are not legal entities. We agree that this claim implicates a substantial question of subject matter juris- diction. See 59 Am. Jur. 2d 460, Parties § 22 (2012) (‘‘[A] proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. As a general matter, there are three classes of legal entities with the inherent power to sue and be sued: [1] natural persons; [2] an artificial person; and [3] such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue. Only a party that actually or legally exists may bring a lawsuit. There must be some ascertainable persons, natural or artificial, to whom judgments may be awarded, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted except in the name of such person.’’ [Foot- notes omitted.]). Nonetheless, even if the defendant were correct that joint ventures lack such capacity, a question of first impression in this state, the plaintiff would be entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate that it also is a partnership, an entity that, as the defendant recognizes, is capable of bringing an action in its own name11 and universally recognized as sharing substan- tial similarities with a joint venture. See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 673–74, 748 A.2d 834 (2000). Well established authority recognizes that the two types of entities are not mutually exclusive.12 There is nothing in the record in the present case that would be inconsistent with such a finding. Indeed, the plaintiff claimed at oral argument before this court that it is a partnership and merely had referred to itself as a joint venture in the complaint as a matter of convenience, an assertion for which there is some support in the record.13 Therefore, the defendant’s claim, even if suc- cessful, would not require a judgment of dismissal, but instead a remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Sey- mour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 489–92, 803 A.2d 318 (2002); Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 181–82, 740 A.2d 813 (1999). Accordingly, this claim could not conclusively demonstrate that the judgment is void ab initio on its face. Turning to the defendant’s second claim, that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it was in existence at the time that it filed the complaint, this assertion is squarely contradicted by the record. The defendant relies solely on the plaintiff’s use of the past tense in the following allegation in the 1991 complaint: ‘‘At all times herein, the plaintiff . . . was a joint venture equally owned by R. S. S. McKosky and Alton W. Seavey, Jr., having its usual place of business in the town of North Branford . . . .’’ Not only does the defendant adopt an unduly cramped construction of this allegation in contravention to the rule that we read pleadings liberally in support of jurisdiction; see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996); Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn. App. 600, 605–606, 970 A.2d 787 (2009); he also overlooks allegations in the complaint and other evidence in the record that indicate that the plaintiff was in existence during the original proceedings.14 Accordingly, with respect to the aforementioned claims, neither would require a judgment of dismissal because the judgment is not void on its face in light of the record. Therefore, even if we were inclined to permit collateral attacks in the context of motions to revive, the defendant would not be entitled to do so in the present case. A different lens is required, however, with respect to the defendant’s third claim that, even if we were to presume that the plaintiff was in existence when it commenced the action in 1991 and when it obtained judgment in its favor in 1994, there is no basis to believe that it still was in existence in 2009 when it filed the motion to revive. This claim cannot be characterized as a collateral attack on the original judgment, either directly or in effect. Even if the defendant were to prevail on this claim, the original judgment would retain its validity, leaving the defendant subject to liability on the full amount of the debt. Therefore, the principles enunciated in Vogel have no application to this claim. The defendant, however, cannot prevail on this claim. The defendant is correct that the plaintiff did not allege any facts in its motion to revive relating to its status as a joint venture. Nonetheless, the defendant has pro- vided no authority to support the proposition that, after having pleaded sufficient facts to establish itself as an existing joint venture in the initial pleading, the plaintiff was required to replead facts in its motion to revive to demonstrate that it retained the status previously established. As we continue to underscore, a proceed- ing to revive a judgment is a continuation of the original action. Moreover, the defendant made no offer of proof of any evidence that would call into question the plain- tiff’s existence when it filed the motion to revive. Although we recognize that joint ventures are formed for a limited purpose rather than as an ongoing enter- prise; see Dolan v. Dolan, 107 Conn. 342, 349, 140 A. 745 (1928) (‘‘a partnership is formed for the purpose of carrying on a general business of one sort or another, and a joint adventure is more commonly limited to a single transaction or course of transactions’’); the gen- eral rule is that a joint venture continues until its pur- pose is fulfilled or rendered impracticable unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. See Lauth Indiana Resort & Casino, LLC v. Lost River Development, LLC, 889 N.E.2d 915, 919–20 (Ind. App. 2008) (‘‘The parties further agree that this case presents an issue of first impression in Indiana regarding precisely when a joint venture terminates in those cases where the joint ven- ture agreement itself contains no specific termination date. Although research has revealed no Indiana case which has addressed this issue, there does seem to be a consensus among our sister states and in federal jurisdictions with regard to this issue. Specifically, the generally accepted law of joint ventures is that ‘[a] joint venture without a termination date remains in force until its purpose is accomplished or that purpose becomes impracticable.’ Scandinavian Airlines [Sys- tem] Denmark-Norway-Sweden v. McDonald’s Corp., 129 F.3d 971, 973 [7th Cir. 1997]; see also 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 15 [2004] [stating that . . . general rule is that . . . joint venture remains in place unless its primary purpose or contingency has become imprac- ticable or impossible to accomplish].’’). In the proceed- ings culminating in the 1994 judgment, the defendant never challenged the plaintiff’s ownership of the debt or its right, as a joint venture, to collect on the debt. Because we have no basis to question that the prosecu- tion of the original action to recover the debt was within the scope of the joint venture’s purpose, we see no reason why the collection of the judgment would not also presumptively fall within that scope, in the absence of evidence that the joint venturers had agreed other- wise. Cf. General Statutes § 33-884 (a) (‘‘[a] dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: [1] [c]ollecting its assets . . . and [5] doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs’’); General Statutes § 34-373 (a) (‘‘[A] partnership continues after dissolution only for the purpose of wind- ing up its business. The partnership is terminated when the winding up of its business is completed.’’); 60 Am. Jur. 2d 111, Partnership § 198 (1972) (‘‘Both under the Uniform Act and at common law it is recognized that after dissolution, the partnership continues only for the purpose of winding up the partnership affairs. . . . Included in the winding up or liquidation of partner- ship affairs are the performance of existing contracts, the collection of debts or claims due the firm, and the payment of firm debts.’’ [Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.]). Surely a colorable basis to conclude other- wise is not manifested on the record before us.15 There- fore, we conclude, albeit for slightly different reasons than the Appellate Court, that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion to revive. III We next turn to the certified questions relating to the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the revival proceeding. The defendant challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusion that § 52-598 (c) provided a basis for such jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that the statute cannot be applied retroactively to revive the 1994 judgment; and second, that the statute does not fall within the postjudgment procedures over which the trial court is statutorily authorized to retain continuing personal jurisdiction of parties thereto. We disagree with both claims. A The defendant has marshaled numerous arguments in support of his claim that § 52-598 (c) cannot be applied retroactively.16 Broadly characterized, the defendant contends that the legislature has manifested such an intention by virtue of the October, 2009 effective date of the statute and legislatively imposed rules of con- struction. He further contends that § 52-598 (c) is sub- stantive, not procedural, because it creates a right, namely, ‘‘a right for a judgment creditor to obtain a new judgment date in order to create a right of recovery for Connecticut judgments in foreign [jurisdictions].’’ We disagree with the defendant’s characterization of this provision and find none of his other arguments ultimately persuasive. In considering the question of whether a statute may be applied retroactively, we are governed by certain well settled principles, under which our ultimate focus is ‘‘the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 620, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). Because all public acts not specifying an effective date automati- cally are assigned to ‘‘take effect on the first day of October following the session of the General Assembly at which they are passed’’; General Statutes § 2-32; we never have ascribed particular significance to such dates in ascertaining the legislature’s intent. Rather, ‘‘[o]ur point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corpora- tion, shall be construed to have retrospective effect. . . . [W]e have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative in