State v. Hall
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledJanuary 24, 2012
DocketSC18621
JudgeRogers; Norcott; Palmer; Zarella; Eveleigh; Harper and
Vertefeuille
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OSIBISA HALL
(SC 18621)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Harper and
Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued October 26, 2011—officially released January 24, 2012
Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy,
state’s attorney, and Anthony J. Spinella, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).
Erin M. Field, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
VERTEFEUILLE, J. The issue in the present case is
whether, in conducting a plea canvass of the defendant,
Osibisa Hall, the trial court substantially complied with
General Statutes § 54-1j,1 which seeks to ensure that
defendants understand the potential immigration con-
sequences of their guilty pleas. The state appeals, fol-
lowing our grant of certification,2 from the judgment
of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to vacate and withdraw his
guilty pleas to one count of possession of marijuana
with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-
277 (b) and two counts of violation of a protective order
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223. On appeal,
the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the defendant’s motion because it failed to
address the defendant personally and to determine that
he fully understood the potential immigration conse-
quences of his plea pursuant to § 54-1j. We agree with
the state, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Appellate Court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court.
‘‘On May 22, 2007, the defendant pleaded guilty, pursu-
ant to the Alford doctrine,3 to one count of possession
of marijuana with intent to sell and two counts of viola-
tion of a protective order. During the plea hearing, the
court questioned the defendant as to his understanding
of the rights he was waiving, the meaning of his Alford
plea and the agreed upon sentence. The court then
addressed defense counsel and the following collo-
quy ensued:
‘‘ ‘The Court: Any immigration issues here, [defense
counsel]?
‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, there are, Your Honor.
‘‘ ‘The Court: Have you talked to [the defendant]?
‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, I have.
‘‘ ‘The Court: All right. And he understands the possi-
ble consequences of his pleas?
‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes.’
‘‘The court then accepted the defendant’s pleas and
found that they were made voluntarily. The court also
made a finding that the defendant ‘has been advised by
his counsel of the immigration consequences of his
acts.’ The discussion then turned to the start date of
the defendant’s sentence, and the court asked again
about immigration as follows:
‘‘ ‘The Court: Is there an immigration sticker on him?
‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: There is no immigration sticker
as [far as] I know of. But I know that—
‘‘ ‘[The Prosecutor]: He’s going to be deported. I
looked into it when we did the . . . [and] we talked
and then when we did the [violation of probation] hear-
ing that’s what they told us.
‘‘ ‘The Court: All right.’
‘‘After further discussion, the court sentenced the
defendant to forty months incarceration.
‘‘On January 13, 2009, the defendant filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgments
of conviction, claiming that the court did not fulfill
its obligation pursuant to § 54-1j (a) to address him
personally and determine that he understood the immi-
gration consequences of his pleas. On January 27, 2009,
the [trial] court denied the defendant’s motion, stating,
‘[i]n reading the transcript of the sentence, the issue of
immigration was directly addressed to counsel for the
defendant in which he indicates he discussed the immi-
gration issues with his client and that the client under-
stood the immigration consequence of his plea[s]. Along
in the canvass . . . the state brought up the fact that
the defendant is going to be deported.’ ’’ State v. Hall,
120 Conn. App. 489, 490–92, 992 A.2d 343 (2010).
Following the trial court’s denial of his motion, the
defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgments to
the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court abused
its discretion when it concluded that § 54-1j (a) had
been satisfied. The Appellate Court agreed with the
defendant, concluding that the trial court had failed to
comply substantially with the statute when it neglected
to personally address the defendant regarding the
potential immigration consequences of his pleas. Id.,
494–95. The Appellate Court therefore reversed the
judgments of the trial court and its decision denying
the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; id.,
497; the state’s certified appeal to this court followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The state claims on appeal that the Appellate Court
improperly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defen-
dant’s motion to vacate and withdraw his guilty pleas.
The state argues that, pursuant to our rule in State v.
Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 778 A.2d 134 (2001), substantial
compliance with § 54-1j (a) was sufficient and contends
that the trial court in the present case substantially
complied with the statute. Specifically, the state con-
tends that, although the Appellate Court cited the
proper standard for substantial compliance with § 54-
1j (a), it in effect required literal compliance with that
statute. The defendant responds that the requirements
of § 54-1j (a) were not fulfilled in the present case in
any way. We agree with the state, and conclude that
the trial court substantially complied with the basic
tenets of § 54-1j (a).
Before addressing the merits of the state’s claim, we
set forth our standard of review. ‘‘[A guilty] plea, once
accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission
of the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Stocking, 131 Conn. App. 81, 86, 26 A.3d 117 (2011).
Section 54-1j (c)4 permits the defendant, not later than
three years after the acceptance of his guilty plea, to
move to withdraw his plea if he can show that the court
failed to comply with the requirements of § 54-1j (a).
‘‘The burden is always on the defendant to show a
plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.
. . . Whether such proof is made is a question for the
court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission
to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been
abused.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., 110 Conn. App. 543, 549,
955 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 950, 960 A.2d
1037 (2008).
We first addressed the issue of substantial compli-
ance with § 54-1j in State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn.
653. In that case, the trial court failed to mention specifi-
cally all three of the immigration and naturalization
consequences set forth in § 54-1j (a) during the defen-
dant’s plea canvass. We concluded that ‘‘it was not
necessary for the trial court to read the statute verbatim
. . . [and, instead] only substantial compliance with
the statute [was] required to validate a defendant’s
guilty plea.’’ Id., 662. In reaching that conclusion, we
took note of the rule under which ‘‘substantial compli-
ance is required when warning the defendant of the
direct consequences of a guilty plea pursuant to Prac-
tice Book § 39-195 in order to ensure that the plea is
voluntary pursuant to Practice Book § 39-20.’’6 (Empha-
sis added.) Id. Therefore, we reasoned that it would be
illogical to ‘‘require stricter compliance with regard to
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Id., 663.
Notwithstanding our conclusion in Malcolm, the
defendant in the present case claims that an amendment
to § 54-1j (a) subsequent to our decision in Malcolm
requires us to revisit the substantial compliance stan-
dard. Prior to the 2003 amendment; see Public Act 2003,
No. 03-81, § 1 (a); the statute provided that ‘‘[t]he court
shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless
the court advises him of the following: ‘If you are not
a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised
that conviction of the offense for which you have been
charged may have the consequences of deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial
of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United
States.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to
2003) § 54-1j (a). As a result of the amendment, rather
than requiring the court to advise the defendant of the
potential immigration consequences of his plea, the
statute requires the court to ‘‘[address] the defendant
personally and [determine] that the defendant fully
understands [those potential consequences] . . . .’’
General Statutes § 54-1j (a). That change, the defendant
contends, requires the court in all circumstances ‘‘to
direct its immigration inquiry to the defendant himself,
not his attorney . . . .’’ Although we do not disagree
that § 54-1j, as amended, places an additional burden
on the court to ascertain the defendant’s understanding
of the potential consequences of his plea, we do not
agree that substantial compliance can be established
only if the court addresses the defendant personally.
We find that our reasoning in Malcolm still applies
today despite the 2003 statutory amendment, because
the purpose of the statute remains the same—to warn
a defendant of possible immigration consequences from
a guilty plea.7 ‘‘[Section] 54-1j, rather than demanding
that trial courts instruct defendants on the intricacies
of immigration law, seeks only to put defendants on
notice that their resident status could be implicated by
the plea.’’ State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn. 663–64.
Thus, ‘‘[a]lthough it would have been better practice
for the trial court to have read the statute verbatim,
strict compliance was not necessary to put the defen-
dant on notice that a conviction could have implications
beyond the state criminal justice system.’’ Id., 664.
Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that
§ 54-1j was amended in such a way that it now employs
the same exact wording as the Practice Book section
upon which we relied heavily in Malcolm. Practice Book
§ 39-198 provides that the judicial authority, prior to
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must ‘‘first
[address] the defendant personally and [determine] that
he or she fully understands [the nature and conse-
quences of the plea] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) It is well
established that substantial compliance with Practice
Book § 39-19 is sufficient; State v. Malcolm, supra, 257
Conn. 662; and we see no reason to depart from that
reasoning in light of the fact that § 54-1j (a) now has
identical terminology. We thus conclude again that, in
amending the statute, ‘‘[t]he legislature [still] did not
intend to create a loophole for defendants to use as
grounds for vacating guilty pleas, years after they have
been entered, once evidence is destroyed or witnesses
become unavailable.’’ Id., 665.
In the present case, the record reveals that the defen-
dant was adequately warned that his immigration status
could be implicated by his guilty pleas. In response to
the court’s inquiry, defense counsel stated on the record
that he had informed his client about potential immigra-
tion issues and that the defendant understood the possi-
ble consequences of his pleas. The trial court properly
relied upon these representations by defense counsel.
‘‘Absent some indication to the contrary, a court is
entitled to rely on counsel’s representations on behalf
of his or her client.’’ State v. Stewart, 64 Conn. App.
340, 349–50, 780 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 909,
782 A.2d 1250 (2001).
We find these representations by defense counsel
particularly pertinent because the statute, on its face,
turns on communication between the defendant and
his attorney about immigration consequences. Pursuant
to § 54-1j (a), if the court finds that the defendant has
not discussed the possible immigration consequences
with his attorney, the appropriate remedy is for the
court to ‘‘permit the defendant to do so prior to
accepting the defendant’s plea.’’ Clearly, then, based on
the text of the statute, the legislature was primarily
concerned with ensuring that defendants engage in a
conversation with their counsel, not the court, regard-
ing the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.
We further note that there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the defendant, upon hearing these repre-
sentations by his attorney, objected to them, demon-
strated surprise, or in any way gave the court reason
to doubt their accuracy. See State v. Henry, 117 Conn.
App. 478, 484, 979 A.2d 572, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 910,
982 A.2d 1083 (2009) (denial of defendant’s motion to
correct illegal sentence when defendant and counsel
‘‘did not indicate that [sentence] contradicted their
understanding of the terms’’); State v. Cazzetta, 97
Conn. App. 56, 60–61, 903 A.2d 659 (2006) (defendant
cannot claim surprise regarding sentence when he had
opportunity to indicate sentence was inconsistent but
failed to do so). In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, then, we conclude that the defendant had been
informed by his attorney of the potential immigration
consequences he faced.
Next, we find additional support for our conclusion
in facts occurring prior to the date of the defendant’s
plea canvass. Specifically, at a violation of probation
hearing approximately six months prior to the date
on which the defendant entered his guilty pleas, the
defendant’s testimony demonstrated that he under-
stood that he was at risk for deportation.9 Furthermore,
immediately after the defendant’s pleas were accepted
by the trial court, the prosecutor clearly stated on the
record that the defendant was ‘‘going to be deported.’’10
Again, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the defendant or his counsel expressed surprise, ques-
tioned the prosecutor’s statement, objected to it, or
otherwise expressed any reservation.
‘‘It is often said that common sense does not take
flight at the courtroom door.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177, 194,
965 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728
(2009). A commonsense analysis of the record in the
present case reveals that the defendant had notice of
the potential immigration consequences that he faced
as a result of his guilty pleas, and the purpose of § 54-
1j therefore was effectuated. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial
court’s judgments on the basis of its failure to substan-
tially comply with § 54-1j.
We underscore that our conclusion that the trial court
substantially complied with § 54-1j in the present case
is not intended to suggest that we expect anything less
than full and literal compliance with the statute. The
statutory requirements of § 54-1j and similar statutes
serve an important function in safeguarding fundamen-
tal rights, and we expect that trial courts will follow the
better practice of complying closely with all applicable
requirements concerning plea canvasses.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
General Statutes § 54-1j provides: ‘‘(a) The court shall not accept a plea
of guilty or nolo contendre from any defendant in any criminal proceeding
unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines
that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen
of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has
been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from
the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial
of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant
has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant’s attor-
ney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the
defendant’s plea.
‘‘(b) The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose
the defendant’s legal status in the United States to the court.
‘‘(c) If the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine
that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defen-
dant’s plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section, and the defendant
not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea shows that the
defendant’s plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated conse-
quences, the court, on the defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment,
and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
and enter a plea of not guilty.’’
2
We granted the state’s petition for certification, limited to the following
issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea based on the trial court’s
failure to properly address the defendant regarding the possible consequence
of deportation?’’ State v. Hall, 297 Conn. 910, 910–11, 995 A.2d 638 (2010).
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35, 91 S. Ct. 160, 21 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970).
4
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
5
Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority
shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally
and determining that he or she fully understands:
‘‘(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
‘‘(2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any;
‘‘(3) The fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit
the sentence to be suspended;
‘‘(4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge . . . and
‘‘(5) The fact that he or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist
in that plea if it has already been made . . . .’’
6
Practice Book § 39-20 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority
shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining,
by addressing the defendant personally in open court, that the plea is volun-
tary and is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a
plea agreement. . . .’’
7
It bears mention that an alternative characterization of Public Act 03-
81, § 1, is that it memorializes the decisions of the Appellate Court in State
v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805, 813–14, 772 A.2d 690 (2001), and State v. Irala,
68 Conn. App. 499, 518–21, 792 A.2d 109, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797
A.2d 519, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 887, 123 S. Ct. 132, 154 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2002),
that trial courts have no duty to advise defendants on the intricacies of
immigration law. Rather, as Public Act 03-81, § 1, clarifies, § 54-1j merely
requires trial courts to put defendants on notice that there could be immigra-
tion consequences of their pleas.
8
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
9
The defendant testified at his violation of probation hearing as follows:
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And are you deportable?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.’’
10
The discussion at the defendant’s plea canvass occurred as follows:
‘‘The Court: Is there an immigration sticker on him?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: There is no immigration sticker as [far as] I know
of. But I know that—
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: He’s going to be deported. I looked into it when we
did the . . . [and] we talked and then when we did the [violation of proba-
tion] hearing that’s what they told us.
‘‘The Court: All right.’’