Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL. (SC 18622) (SC 18623) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORAMTION COMMISSION ET AL. (SC 18624) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js.* Argued April 16—officially released September 27, 2012** Grant Martinez, pro hac vice, and Sirine Shebaya, law student intern, with whom were Michael J. Wish- nie, Hope Metcalf and, on the brief, Pouneh Aravand, Bonnie Doyle, Alex Iftimie, Stephen Poellot, Sasha Post and Saurabh Sanghvi, law student interns, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 18622, the appellee and cross appellant in Docket No. SC 18623, and the appel- lee in Docket No. SC 18624 (defendant Rashad El Badrawi). Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney gen- eral, Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, Nora R. Dannehy, deputy attorney general, and Henri Alexandre, former assistant attorney general, for the appellant and cross appellee in Docket No. SC 18623 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 18622 and SC 18624 (plaintiff commissioner of correction). H. Thomas Byron III, pro hac vice, with whom were John B. Hughes, chief of the civil division of the United States Attorney’s Office, District of Connecticut, and Lisa E. Perkins, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, Thomas M. Bondy, pro hac vice, Tony West, pro hac vice, and David B. Fein, United States attorney, District of Con- necticut, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 18624 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 18622 and SC 18623 (plaintiff United States of America). Lisa Fein Siegel, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 18622, SC 18623 and SC 18624 (defendant freedom of information com- mission). William S. Fish, Jr., and Michael J. Pendell filed a brief for the Tribune Company et al. as amici curiae. Opinion PALMER, J. These appeals arise from the ruling of the named defendant, the freedom of information com- mission (commission), that the defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Informa- tion Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff, the commis- sioner of correction (commissioner), obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized database, which is maintained by the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The commissioner and the intervenor, the United States of America (United States), appealed from the commission’s ruling to the trial court, claiming that the commission improp- erly had ordered disclosure of the document because, for among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and, therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with General Stat- utes § 1-210 (a).1 The trial court rendered judgments dismissing the appeals in part and sustaining them in part, and ordered that a redacted version of the docu- ment be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States then filed these appeals.2 We conclude that the document falls within an exemption to the act set forth in § 1-210 (a) and, therefore, reverse the judgments of the trial court. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. El Badrawi was arrested by agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),3 a federal agency, on October 29, 2004, for alleged violations of civil immigration law. Pursuant to an inter- governmental service agreement between the depart- ment of correction (department) and the United States Department of Homeland Security, El Badrawi was incarcerated at the Hartford correctional center (cor- rectional center) from the date of his arrest through December 22, 2004. He voluntarily left the country immediately upon his release from detention. While El Badrawi was detained at the correctional center, the department submitted an inquiry seeking information about him from the NCIC database.4 The inquiry generated a record indicating whether El Bad- rawi was listed in an NCIC file known as the ‘‘violent gang and terrorist organization file’’ (violent gang and terrorist file), and the department printed the record and maintained the printout in its files.5 After El Badrawi was released from detention, he requested from the department and the correctional center copies of all public records pertaining to his incarceration.6 The department’s freedom of informa- tion administrator provided some of the requested doc- uments7 but declined to provide the printout that the department had obtained from the NCIC database. El Badrawi then appealed to the commission, alleging that the department’s refusal to provide him with a copy of the NCIC printout violated the act. The United States submitted to the commission a statement of interest and appeared at the hearing on El Badrawi’s appeal. The commissioner and the United States contended that, contrary to El Badrawi’s claim, the printout was exempt from the act under § 1-210 (a) because its disclo- sure was barred by 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2007)8 and 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b) (2006).9 In addition, the commissioner con- tended that the printout was exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (3) (D)10 because it would reveal an investigatory technique not otherwise known to the public. The commission concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 did not bar disclosure of the printout because the regu- lation applies only to current detainees. It further con- cluded that the printout was not exempt under § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) because there was no evidence that the printout had been ‘‘compiled’’ in connection with the detection or investigation of a crime. Rather, the com- mission expressly found that ‘‘the NCIC printout was compiled as a consequence of [El Badrawi’s] alleged civil violation of immigration laws.’’ The commission did not address the claim that disclosure was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b). The commissioner appealed from the commission’s ruling to the trial court. The United States filed in the trial court a statement of interest in which it requested permission to participate in the administrative appeal, and it submitted a brief in support of the commissioner’s position.11 The trial court concluded that, because the commission had not viewed the NCIC printout, there was no basis for its conclusion that the document related solely to a civil violation. The court also con- cluded that the commission had given no consideration to the commissioner’s and the United States’ claims that the printout would reveal an investigatory technique not otherwise known to the public for purposes of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D). Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the commission and directed it to review the NCIC printout in camera and, if necessary, to allow additional argument and to amend its findings.12 On remand, the United States filed with the commis- sion a motion to intervene in the matter as a party, which the commission granted. After reviewing the NCIC printout in camera and holding a second hearing, the commission issued a second decision in which it again concluded that the document must be disclosed to El Badrawi under the act. The commission deter- mined that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 must be narrowly construed as an exemption to the act and that, so construed, it applied only to information regarding current detainees and, therefore, did not bar disclosure of the printout under the circumstances of this case. The commission also determined that, although the FBI and the state had entered into an agreement barring the state from disclosing NCIC records, and although 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b) permitted the FBI to cancel that agreement if the state breaches it, the state could not contract away its obligations under the act, and the threat of cancellation did not preclude the state from disclosing information obtained from the NCIC database. Finally, the commis- sion again concluded that the printout did not contain an investigatory technique unknown to the general pub- lic for purposes of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D). The United States appealed from the commission’s ruling to the trial court and filed a motion to consolidate its appeal with the commissioner’s pending appeal, over which the trial court had retained jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to consolidate. The trial court ultimately concluded that the commission properly had found that, because exemptions to the act must be construed narrowly, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 must be construed to apply only to information concerning current detain- ees. The court also agreed with the commission’s analy- sis of 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b). The court disagreed, however, with the commission’s determination that the NCIC printout had not been compiled in connection with the investigation of a crime, concluding that the document was the result of a criminal law enforcement effort to identify members of violent gangs and terrorists. Nevertheless, the court concluded that disclosure of the document indicating whether El Badrawi was listed in the violent gang and terrorist file, in and of itself, would not reveal an investigatory technique not known to the general public, which § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) requires to exempt a document from disclosure under the act. Accordingly, the court ordered the United States to redact the NCIC printout to delete information that could lead to the disclosure of any such techniques and to submit the redacted document to the court for in camera review. After the United States submitted a redacted printout, the court issued a supplemental deci- sion in which it ordered that the redacted document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The court rendered judgments dismissing the administrative appeals in part and sus- taining them in part.13 Thereafter, the commissioner and the United States filed separate appeals from the trial court’s judgments.14 In the commissioner’s appeal, El Badrawi filed a cross appeal. Thereafter, the appeals and cross appeal were consolidated with El Badrawi’s pending appeal from the trial court’s initial remand order. See footnote 12 of this opinion. On appeal, the commissioner and the United States renew their claims that disclosure of the NCIC printout is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b), § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), and 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. El Badrawi disputes these claims and contends in his cross appeal that the trial court improperly allowed the United States unilat- erally to determine the scope of the redactions to the printout. In addition, El Badrawi claims that the trial court improperly remanded the matter to the commis- sion so that the printout could be submitted for in camera review (1) when a remand was not authorized by General Statutes § 4-183 (h) or (j), (2) the United States had failed to submit the printout as evidence in the initial proceeding before the commission, and (3) no party had requested a remand. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that disclosure of the NCIC printout was not barred by 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and that it therefore was not exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (a). Accordingly, we need not address the com- missioner’s and the United States’ claims that disclosure was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b) and § 1-210 (b) (3) (D). In addition, we do not address El Badrawi’s claims in his appeal and cross appeal that the trial court improperly remanded the matter to the commission and ordered the redaction of the printout because these claims are moot in light of our conclusion that the printout is exempt from disclosure under the act. Because it is dispositive, we first address the claims of the commissioner and the United States that, con- trary to the trial court’s determination, disclosure of the NCIC printout is barred by 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and, therefore, that the document is exempt from the act under § 1-210 (a).15 We begin our analysis by considering whether the decision of the commission is entitled to judicial deference. ‘‘Ordinarily, this court affords defer- ence to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 716, 6 A.3d 763 (2010). El Badrawi contends that, because the issue before us involves the application of an exemption to the act to the facts of this case, we must defer to the commission’s reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions. See, e.g., Rocque v. Freedom of Information Commission, 255 Conn. 651, 659–60, 774 A.2d 957 (2001). The commissioner responds that, because the proper interpretation of the regulation is a pure question of law for this court to decide, this court should not defer to the commission’s interpreta- tion. See, e.g., Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division, Office of the Comptroller v. Freedom of Infor- mation Commission, 256 Conn. 764, 771–72, 775 A.2d 981 (2001) (‘‘the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts, where the administrative decision is not entitled to special defer- ence’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Finally, the United States contends that this court should defer not to the commission’s interpretation but to the promulgat- ing agency’s interpretation.16 See, e.g., Thomas Jeffer- son University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 129 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1994) (‘‘we must defer to the [promulgating agency’s] interpretation unless an alter- native reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We agree with the United States that the interpreta- tion of the promulgating agency, not the commission, is entitled to deference by this court. It is not the scope of § 1-210 (a) that is at issue in these appeals but the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. The commission has no special expertise in federal immigration law, in federal criminal law enforcement policies and procedures, or in questions of national security, which matters are the subject of the regulation. Moreover, the intent of our state legislators when setting policy and enacting laws regarding access to public records in this state has no bearing on the intent of the federal agency that promulgated the regulation.17 If the promulgating agency intended the federal regulation to apply to infor- mation about former detainees, then such information clearly falls within the ‘‘otherwise provided by any fed- eral law’’ exemption in § 1-210 (a). We conclude, therefore, that, to the extent that there is any ambiguity in 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, we should defer to the promulgating agency’s interpretation of that regula- tion, as long as that interpretation is not unreasonable. ‘‘[The court’s] task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. . . . In other words, we must defer to the [agency’s] interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regula- tion’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promul- gation.’’18 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, supra, 512 U.S. 512. With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. The regulation provides: ‘‘No person, including any state or local government entity or any privately operated detention facility, that houses, main- tains, provides services to, or otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the [Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service, the predecessor to ICE and certain other branches of the United States Department of Homeland Security] (whether by contract or otherwise), and no other person who by virtue of any official or contractual relationship with such person obtains information relat- ing to any detainee, shall disclose or otherwise permit to be made public the name of, or other information relating to, such detainee. Such information shall be under the control of the [Immigration and Naturaliza- tion] Service and shall be subject to public disclosure only pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws, regulations and executive orders. Insofar as any documents or other records contain such information, such documents shall not be public records. This sec- tion applies to all persons and information identified or described in it, regardless of when such persons obtained such information, and applies to all requests for public disclosure of such information, including requests that are the subject of proceedings pending as of April 17, 2002.’’ 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2007). The commission and the trial court concluded that, because the first sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 uses the present tense when it refers to any ‘‘person19 . . . that houses, maintains, provides services to, or otherwise holds any detainee’’; (emphasis added) id.; the regula- tion applies only to a person who currently engages in one of the described activities, and when a person who is subject to the regulation no longer ‘‘houses, main- tains, provides services to, or otherwise holds’’ the detainee; id.; the regulation no longer applies. The United States contends that, to the contrary, the use of the present tense ‘‘merely describes a triggering event, not a temporal limitation with a beginning and an end.’’ In other words, the United States argues that, once a person has engaged in one of the described activities with respect to a detainee, the regulation then applies to all information about the detainee in the person’s possession, and nothing in the regulation indicates that the obligations that the regulation imposes at that point can be terminated by the subsequent occurrence of any event. Because we believe that both of these interpretations are plausible, we conclude that the language of the first sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is ambiguous. We further conclude that the United States’ interpretation is not only reasonable, it is the more reasonable one. First, contrary to El Badrawi’s claims, the remaining language in the regulation is either consistent with or supports the United States’ interpretation. The third sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides that, ‘‘[i]nsofar as any docu- ments or other records contain such information, such documents shall not be public records.’’ El Badrawi claims that ‘‘information,’’ as that term is used therein, clearly is limited to information about current detain- ees. That interpretation, however, merely assumes the correctness of El Badrawi’s interpretation of the first sentence of the regulation. Although we recognize that, like the first sentence of the regulation, the third sen- tence is ambiguous, its language neither independently supports El Badrawi’s interpretation of the phrase ‘‘information relating to any detainee’’ in the first sen- tence nor undermines the United States’ position that that phrase includes information about detainees who are no longer being held by the state, local or private entity. The last sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides that ‘‘[t]his section applies to all persons and information identified or described in it, regardless of when such persons obtained such information, and applies to all requests for public disclosure of such information, including requests that are the subject of proceedings pending as of April 17, 2002.’’ According to the United States, this language makes the regulation applicable to information about a detainee who no longer is being detained and to persons who have obtained information about a detainee after the detainee is released. El Bad- rawi claims that the sentence is a retroactivity provision and merely provides that the regulation applies to infor- mation about current detainees who were taken into detention before the effective date of the regulation. Because the first sentence of the regulation clearly and unambiguously applies at least to all persons that cur- rently hold detainees, however, regardless of when the person received a request for information about the detainee, El Badrawi’s interpretation of the last sen- tence would render it superfluous. Put another way, because the application of the regulation to information about a current detainee simply would not be retroac- tive, even if the request for information had been sub- mitted before the regulation was enacted, there would be no need for such a retroactivity provision if the first sentence had been intended to apply only to information about current detainees. Under the United States’ inter- pretation, however, the last sentence would not be superfluous because it would clarify the ambiguity in the first sentence as to whether it applies to information about former detainees. ‘‘Because statutory interpreta- tions that render language superfluous are disfavored’’; Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2012); we conclude that the United States’ interpretation of the last sentence is the more reason- able one. The United States’ interpretation also is consistent with the purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, as set forth in the notices in the Federal Register explaining the regula- tion. See generally Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508, 19,508–11 (April 22, 2002) (explaining interim rule); see also Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Nat- uralization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 4364, 4366 (January 29, 2003) (explaining that interim rule was adopted as final rule without amendment). The regulation was intended to ensure that the disclosure of information about detainees would be subject to a uniform federal policy,20 to protect the privacy of detainees,21 and, most significantly, to prevent adverse impacts on ongoing investigations and investigative methods.22 All of these purposes would be undermined by allowing state and local entities to disclose information about a detainee after the detainee has been released from custody, subject only to their own policies and procedures. Specifically, allowing such disclosures would be highly adverse to the privacy interests of a detainee who does not wish to be identi- fied as a possible terrorist or who, after his release from detention, is cooperating with an ongoing government investigation. In addition, disclosure of such informa- tion could interfere with the investigation itself, both by discouraging the detainee from continuing to cooperate with the government and by disclosing potentially valu- able information about investigative activities that already have occurred. See Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, supra, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,510 (‘‘[d]isclosure of a detainee’s identity or informa- tion related to the detainee could deter these individuals from cooperating with the [United States] Department of Justice now or after they are released from custody for fear of retaliation by terrorist organizations against [the detainee] or [his] family members and associates’’ [emphasis added]); id., 19,509 (‘‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed . . . may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context’’); see also El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 258 F.R.D. 198, 205 (D. Conn. 2009) (disclo- sure of fact that detainee is listed in violent gang and terrorist file gives rise to ‘‘a danger that an individual could deduce that a confidential informant has infil- trated a particular terrorist cell,’’ and ‘‘[t]his knowledge could result in, at worst, the death of the informant, or, at best, the compromise of an ongoing terrorist investigation’’); El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland Secu- rity, 596 F. Sup. 2d 389, 396 (D. Conn. 2009) (‘‘significant harm . . . would result if members of terrorist organi- zations were able to confirm whether [individuals] are listed in [the violent gang and terrorist file]’’). These concerns have no less force merely because the detainee is no longer in detention. We note, moreover, that both El Badrawi and the commission conceded at oral argument before this court that, under their interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, the regulation would not apply to information about a detainee held by a state or local entity after the detainee is transferred from the custody of that entity to federal custody. It could hardly be clearer, however, that the regulation was intended, at the very least, to address the problems caused by disclosure of information about a person who is currently detained. If the regulation, as it clearly must, precludes state and local entities from disclosing information about detainees who have been transferred from state or local custody to federal custody, even though the state or local entity itself no longer ‘‘houses, maintains, provides services to, or otherwise holds’’ the detainee; 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2007); we can perceive no reason why the regulation should permit the disclosure of such information when the detainee has been released from custody altogether. Nothing in the language of the regulation differentiates between information about detainees who have been transferred to the custody of another governmental entity and information about detainees who have been released.23 We conclude, therefore, that the commission incor- rectly determined that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not bar the disclosure of the NCIC printout. Accordingly, we conclude that the printout falls within the ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law’’ exemption set forth in § 1-210 (a). El Badrawi and the commission make a number of arguments in support of their claim to the contrary. First, El Badrawi contends that the regulation’s struc- ture and placement in the Code of Federal Regulations support the view that it was intended to apply only to current detainees. Specifically, El Badrawi notes that the title of both of the notices in the Federal Register explaining the interim and final rules was ‘‘Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities,’’ and con- tends that the phrase ‘‘in Non-Federal Facilities’’ dem- onstrates that the regulation applies only to information about current detainees. In addition, El Badrawi con- tends that the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a press release the day after the interim rule now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 took effect, in which it stated that the regulation would ‘‘cover all . . . detainees being housed temporarily at the facilities on behalf of [the Immigration and Naturalization Service].’’ Immigration and Naturalization Service, News Release: INS Issues Rule Governing Release of Detainee Informa- tion (April 18, 2002). This argument, however, is essen- tially a rehash of the argument regarding the use of the present tense in the first sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, which we already have rejected. El Badrawi further contends that the regulation’s placement in part 236 of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which is entitled ‘‘Apprehension and Detention of Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens; Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed,’’24 rather than in part 103 of title 8, which is entitled ‘‘Powers and Duties; Availability of Records,’’ indicates that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 deals primarily with the treatment of detained aliens, not with public access to records. In the context of the interpretative issue presented, this argument is unper- suasive. Although the title of a statute or regulation and its placement within a group of statutes or regulations may provide some evidence of its meaning; see Burke v. Fleet National Bank, 252 Conn. 1, 13, 742 A.2d 293 (1999); such considerations cannot trump an interpreta- tion that is based on an analysis of the statutory or regulatory language and purpose. El Badrawi and the commission next contend that the historical context of the promulgation of 8 C.F.R § 236.6 demonstrates that it was intended to apply only to information about current detainees. They note that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 was promulgated as an interim rule five days after a New Jersey trial court ordered certain detention facilities in New Jersey to disclose informa- tion about alien detainees.25 See American Civil Liber- ties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hudson, 352 N.J. Super. 44, 56, 799 A.2d 629 (App. Div.) (trial court ordered disclosure of records pertaining to detainees on April 12, 2002), cert. denied, 174 N.J. 190, 803 A.2d 1162 (2002). The plaintiffs in Hudson had sought infor- mation about ‘‘persons [then] confined in the Hudson County [j]ail and in the Passaic County [j]ail . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Their primary complaint apparently was that ‘‘secret detention is anathema to the civilized nations of the international community.’’26 Id., 63. El Badrawi and the commission contend that the fact that the regulation was promul- gated in response to the New Jersey court order indi- cates that the only problems that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 was intended to address were those attendant to the disclo- sure of information about current detainees. As we have explained, however, such a narrow reading of the regu- lation would undermine the regulatory purposes that the promulgating agency expressly identified in the notices in the Federal Register. The fact that the plain- tiffs’ request for information in Hudson may have trig- gered the need for the regulation does not compel the conclusion that the promulgating agency narrowly tai- lored the regulation to address only the problems resulting from that specific request, without giving any thought to other problems that the disclosure of infor- mation about detainees, both those currently detained and those released from detention, might produce. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998) (‘‘statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils’’). El Badrawi further claims that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had no authority to promulgate 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. In support of this claim, he relies on Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 126 S. Ct. 904, 163 L. Ed. 2d 748 (2006), in which the United States Supreme Court considered whether the United States Attorney General (attorney general) had the authority under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2000 and Sup. V 2005), to issue an interpretive rule, having the force of law, that assisting suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations.27 Gonzales v. Oregon, supra, 249. The court noted that, under the Controlled Substances Act, the attorney general was authorized only to ‘‘ ‘promulgate rules and regulations and to charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of . . . con- trolled substances . . . .’ ’’28 Id., 259, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (Sup. V 2005). The court concluded that the inter- pretive rule went beyond the attorney general’s powers of registration and control of controlled substances; see Gonzales v. Oregon, supra, 259–63; and that he lacked the medical expertise to determine whether assisted suicide was a ‘‘legitimate medical purpose’’ under the Controlled Substances Act. (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 267. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Controlled Substances Act ‘‘does not give the [a]ttorney [g]eneral authority to issue the [i]nterpretive [r]ule as a statement with the force of law.’’ Id., 268. Gonzales does not control the present case. The authorizing statute in effect when the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 pro- vided that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of [the] chapter [governing immigration and nationality] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . .’’ 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a) (1) (Sup. II 2002). In addition, the attorney general was authorized to ‘‘estab- lish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of [the] chapter [governing immi- gration and nationality].’’29 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a) (3) (2000). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) (2000), ‘‘[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. . . . [T]he Attor- ney General . . . (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien . . . .’’ Finally, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (c) (2000) provided in relevant part that the commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ‘‘shall be charged with any and all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the [Immigration and Natural- ization] Service and of [the] chapter [governing immi- gration and nationality] which are conferred upon the Attorney General . . . .’’ We agree with the court in American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hudson, supra, 352 N.J. Super. 44, that ‘‘we would breach faith with overarching principles of our federalism if we were to see this case as an occasion for viewing the grant of authority to the [c]ommissioner [of the Immigration and Naturalization Service] as anything but very broad. Although 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 might be primarily concerned with securing con- fidential information, it still relates to immigration and naturalization in several ways. We accept as not pat- ently unrealistic the government’s assertion that the regulation bears [on] the privacy interests of those detainees who may not want to have their names made public and that it tends to affect the safety of the detain- ees and their families as well as others involved in the detention scheme. The further assertion that the regulation affects ongoing investigations into violations of the immigration laws is also not so far-fetched as to invite disbelief.’’ Id., 78. In addition, ‘‘there can be no question that the government of the United States has a compelling interest in securing the safety of the nation’s citizens against terrorist attack.’’ Id. ‘‘Thus . . . [8 C.F.R. § 236.6] falls within the authority delegated to the [c]ommissioner [of the Immigration and Naturalization Service] by Congress through the [a]ttorney [g]en- eral.’’ Id. We see nothing in Gonzales that would undermine this analysis. Unlike the narrow delegation of authority to the attorney general in that case, which was limited to the registration and control of controlled substances; see Gonzales v. Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. 259; 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a) (1) (Sup. II 2002) broadly charged the attor- ney general ‘‘with the administration and enforcement of [the] chapter [governing immigration and nationality] and all other laws relating to the immigration and natu- ralization of aliens,’’ and 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (c) (2000) allowed the attorney general to delegate to the commis- sioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ‘‘any and all responsibilities and authority . . . which are conferred upon the Attorney General . . . .’’ More- over, unlike the interpretive rule at issue in Gonzales, which affected an activity that historically has been subject to state regulation; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, supra, 270 (practice of medicine generally is within power of states to regulate); 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 primarily affects matters involving immigration and national security, which are matters that are exclusively within the purview of the federal government. American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hudson, supra, 352 N.J. Super. 76. Although we recognize that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 may have an incidental effect on the operation of state laws and policies governing the disclosure of documents in the possession of state and local govern- ment officials, that effect is limited to cases in which the operation of state law would undermine laws and policies that are clearly federal in scope and within the authority of the promulgating agency to implement. We also reject El Badrawi’s claim that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not apply to the NCIC printout in the present case because the regulation does not clearly express an intent to preempt state law.30 As the United States notes, however, preemption is not an issue in this case because the act is the only state law under which El Badrawi has sought disclosure of the NCIC printout, and § 1-210 (a) expressly exempts from the act any information that is protected from disclosure under federal law.31 Because our legislature clearly has expressed in the act its willingness to defer to federal laws barring disclosure of otherwise disclosable infor- mation, at least when disclosure of the information is not expressly mandated by an independent provision of state law, there is no conflict between 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and the act. Finally, El Badrawi claims that the United States’ interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 would lead to bizarre and unduly harsh results. For example, he contends that, if an individual had been in state prison for years pursuant to a sentence imposed under state criminal law, and then served only one day as a detainee as a result of a violation of federal immigration law, the department would have no control over that individual’s records. In addition, El Badrawi contends that a detainee released from a state detention facility would be unable to obtain his own medical records from that facility. Although we acknowledge that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 places obstacles in the path of a person seeking informa- tion about immigration detainees from the persons described in the