D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Date FiledAugust 13, 2013
DocketSC18935
JudgeNorcott; Palmer; Zarella; Eveleigh; McDonald; Espinosa
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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EMILIO D’ASCANIO ET AL. v. TOYOTA
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION ET AL.
(SC 18935)
Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Espinosa, Js.
Argued April 24—officially released August 13, 2013
Paul D. Williams, with whom were Erick M. Sandler
and, on the brief, James E. Hennessey and Patrick W.
Schmidt, pro hac vice, for the appellants (defendant
BT Prime Mover, Inc., et al.).
Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
EVELEIGH, J. In this products liability case, the
defendants Toyota Material Handling USA, Inc., BT
Prime Mover, Inc., and Summit Handling Systems, Inc.,1
appeal2 from the judgment of the Appellate Court
reversing the judgment of the trial court directing a
verdict in their favor. On appeal, the defendants claim
that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion in striking the testimony
presented by the plaintiffs’ expert witness, precluding
that expert witness from offering further testimony and
denying the plaintiffs’ motions for a mistrial and a con-
tinuance. In response, the plaintiffs, Emilio D’Ascanio
and Maria D’Ascanio,3 contend that the Appellate Court
correctly determined that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion because the trial court’s rulings, considered in
their entirety, constituted an improper sanction of dis-
missal because they left the plaintiffs without an expert
witness in a case in which one was required and, thus,
led to a directed verdict in favor of the defendants.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court had
other reasonable remedies available to it rather than
excluding their expert’s testimony and that, even if it
did exclude his testimony, it should have granted a
mistrial or a continuance so that they could have dis-
closed another expert witness. Thus, the plaintiffs claim
that, because the sanction of dismissal should be
employed only as a last resort, the trial court improperly
resorted to imposing that sanction in the present case.
We agree with the plaintiffs and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the Appellate Court.4
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following facts and procedural history. ‘‘On June 14,
2005, the plaintiffs filed this action for damages incurred
as a result of serious personal injuries sustained by
Emilio D’Ascanio when he was operating an allegedly
defective stand-up forklift designed, manufactured and
distributed by the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that
defects in the forklift’s steering system and its elec-
tronic control display proximately caused Emilio D’As-
canio’s injuries. The court bifurcated the trial of the
case, commencing with the presentation of evidence
on the issue of liability.
‘‘The plaintiffs began their case by presenting the
testimony of Daryl Ebersole, an engineer whom they
had disclosed as their expert witness on the issue of
whether the forklift in question was defective. After
Ebersole had testified for the majority of the first day
of trial, the plaintiffs sought to introduce into evidence
a videotape that depicted a Toyota forklift with an elec-
tronic directional display system. The defendants
objected to the admission of the videotape, and, in
response, the court excused the jury to hear the argu-
ments of counsel. The defendants objected first on the
basis that they were unaware of any videotape involving
the exact model of forklift at issue in this case. In
response, the plaintiffs’ counsel asked Ebersole: ‘[H]ave
you reviewed any video by any defendant in this action
which portrays a directional control indicator as a
[safety]-related device?’ In an attempt to resolve the
confusion of the court and the defendants’ counsel as
to what the videotape actually portrayed, the plaintiffs’
counsel stated: ‘[M]y point being is it’s the same person
that puts the name on the truck—they’re claiming that
this directional control indicator on—same manufactur-
ers is a safety-related device, and it does the same thing.
It may look different but it does the same job.’ In an
attempt to further lay a foundation for the exhibit, the
plaintiffs’ counsel asked Ebersole: ‘Have you seen a
video by any defendant—by Toyota Material Handling
[USA, Inc.] that shows a directional control indicator
on one of its vehicles and they’ve portrayed it as a
safety device?’ Ebersole indicated that he had seen such
a videotape and that he had obtained it from ‘a Toyota
[website].’ He indicated that, although the directional
control indicator and steering wheel might look differ-
ent from those on the forklift at issue in the present
case, they served the same safety purpose. The defen-
dants’ counsel then undertook his voir dire examination
of Ebersole. He began by asking Ebersole: ‘[W]hat
model Toyota is shown in the video?’ Ebersole indicated
that he believed it was a ‘six series’ but that he was
not certain exactly which model it was. The plaintiffs’
counsel then asked Ebersole about the number of indi-
cator lights on the model in the videotape, and a discus-
sion ensued between counsel and the court as to the
contrast between the number of indicator lights on that
model and the model at issue in the case before the
jury. The defendants’ counsel voiced various further
objections as to foundation, and, in response, the plain-
tiffs’ counsel offered the defendants’ counsel the oppor-
tunity to view the videotape. The defendants’ counsel
did not avail himself of that offer, and the court over-
ruled the objection and admitted the videotape into
evidence.
‘‘The videotape was first played for the jury and the
court without commentary by Ebersole. The defen-
dants’ counsel did not raise any further objection to
the videotape at that time. The videotape was then
played a second time with Ebersole explaining what it
depicted. The defendants’ counsel objected only to any
‘editorial comment’ by Ebersole. The court sustained
the objection, and the remainder of the videotape was
played for the jury again with Ebersole intermittently
pausing the tape and explaining what it depicted. After
the videotape had been played for the jury for the sec-
ond time, the plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that it be
played one more time, a third time, straight through,
without any narration or commentary. At that point,
the defendants’ counsel asked to approach the court.
The court dismissed the jury for the weekend, and the
defendants’ counsel objected to the admission of the
videotape. The thrust of the defendants’ objection was
that the forklift portrayed in the videotape was not the
same model that was involved in this case, and the
two forklifts did not have the same displays. The court
agreed that it, too, thought that the videotape was going
to depict the same control system and indicated that
it assumed that the jury shared that understanding. The
court indicated that, when the jury reconvened, it would
strike the exhibit and instruct the jury that it should
be disregarded on the ground that it ‘is not a video
which involves the model truck which is involved in
this accident . . . .’ Although the defendants’ counsel
accepted the court’s ruling, further colloquy followed
regarding the origin of the videotape, specifically
regarding the date that the truck depicted in the video-
tape was manufactured. The plaintiffs’ counsel indi-
cated that he would attempt to obtain that information,
and court adjourned for the weekend.
‘‘By the time court reconvened on the following Tues-
day, May 25, 2010, the defendants had filed a motion for
a mistrial on the ground that Ebersole and the plaintiffs’
counsel intentionally misled the jury and the court in
their efforts to admit the videotape into evidence. The
court questioned both the plaintiffs’ counsel and Eber-
sole as to when they knew that the forklift in the video-
tape did not depict the model forklift that was the
subject of the present litigation. The court also inquired
as to the time of the making of the videotape. Following
lengthy argument, the court ruled that both the video-
tape and Ebersole were ‘out of the case,’ striking the
testimony that he had already given and precluding him
from testifying further.
‘‘Subsequently, on May 28, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for a continuance to allow them to disclose
another liability expert. On that same date, the plaintiffs
also filed a motion for a mistrial on the ground that
they could no longer proceed with their cause of action
without a liability expert. On June 1, 2010, the court
issued a memorandum of decision denying the plain-
tiffs’ motions. In explaining its decision to strike the
testimony, and to preclude further testimony of Eber-
sole, the court found that ‘Ebersole’s behavior was moti-
vated by a desire to hide critical facts about the evidence
in question and was therefore deceptive’ and that such
evidence ‘certainly would have been prejudicial to the
defendants.’ The court concluded that a mistrial would
not have been an appropriate remedy because it would
‘excuse . . . Ebersole from the consequences of his
behavior. If this trial had to be put on all over again
. . . Ebersole could conceivably be replaced, and the
plaintiffs would get the equivalent of a judicial ‘‘do-
over.’’’ The court concluded that a curative instruction
would ‘not do enough to undo the harm done here.’
Finally, the court concluded that: ‘When a witness
whom the court has qualified as an expert demon-
strates, as . . . Ebersole has, that his testimony cannot
be relied on to be honest and complete, the testimony
should not be permitted.’ The court found that the ‘avail-
able alternative relief was simply not severe enough,
under the circumstances, to address this witness’
behavior.’ The court summarily denied the plaintiffs’
motion for a continuance of the trial to allow them to
disclose another liability expert.
‘‘The plaintiffs continued with their case without a
liability expert. At the end of the plaintiffs’ case, the
defendants moved for a directed verdict on the basis
that the plaintiffs had not presented expert testimony
that the forklift at issue was defective. The court agreed
and granted the defendants’ motion for a directed ver-
dict.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.) D’As-
canio v. Toyota Industries Corp., 133 Conn. App. 420,
422–27, 35 A.3d 388 (2012).
The plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Appellate
Court, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion
in striking Ebersole’s testimony, preventing him from
offering any further testimony and failing to grant a
mistrial or a continuance to allow them to procure
another liability expert. Id., 421–22. The Appellate Court
agreed with the plaintiffs, reversed the judgment of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings according to law. Id., 430–31. This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis with an overview of the applica-
ble standard of review and relevant legal principles. It
is well established that ‘‘ ‘a court may, either under its
inherent power to impose sanctions in order to compel
observance of its rules and orders, or under the provi-
sions of [Practice Book] § 13-14, impose sanctions
. . . .’ Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Stan-
dard, 257 Conn. 1, 14, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001). The decision
‘to enter sanctions . . . and, if so, what sanction or
sanctions to impose, is a matter within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. . . . In reviewing a claim that
this discretion has been abused the unquestioned rule
is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court
and every reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of its correctness. . . . [T]he ultimate issue is
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’
. . . Associated Investment Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Williams Associates IV, [230 Conn. 148, 163–64, 645
A.2d 505 (1994)].’’ (Footnote omitted.) Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 277 Conn. 496, 522–23, 893 A.2d 371
(2006).
‘‘At the same time, however, we also have stated:
‘[D]iscretion imports something more than leeway in
decision-making. . . . It means a legal discretion, to
be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law
and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat
the ends of substantial justice. . . . State v. Martin,
201 Conn. 74, 88, 513 A.2d 116 (1986).’ . . . Gateway
Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 239, 654 A.2d 342 (1995).
In addition, the court’s discretion should be exercised
mindful of the ‘policy preference to bring about a trial
on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to
secure for the litigant his day in court. Snow v. Calise,
174 Conn. 567, 574, 392 A.2d 440 (1978). The design of
the rules of practice is both to facilitate business and
to advance justice; they will be interpreted liberally in
any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adher-
ence to them will work surprise or injustice. . . . Rules
are a means to justice, and not an end in themselves
. . . . In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 363, 572 A.2d 328,
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S. Ct. 247, 112 L. Ed. 2d
205 (1990). Our practice does not favor the termination
of proceedings without a determination of the merits
of the controversy where that can be brought about with
due regard to necessary rules of procedure. Johnson v.
Zoning Board of Appeals, 166 Conn. 102, 111, 347 A.2d
53 (1974).’ . . . Coppola v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657,
665–66, 707 A.2d 281 (1998). Therefore, although dis-
missal of an action is not ‘an abuse of discretion where a
party shows a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted
disregard for the court’s authority’; Fox v. First Bank,
198 Conn. 34, 39, 501 A.2d 747 (1985); see also Pavlinko
v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, [192 Conn. 138, 145, 470
A.2d 246 (1984)] (dismissal proper where party’s disobe-
dience intentional, sufficient need for information
sought is shown, and disobedient party not inclined
to change position); the court ‘should be reluctant to
employ the sanction of dismissal except as a last resort.’
Fox v. First Bank, supra, 39. ‘[T]he sanction of dismissal
should be imposed only as a last resort, and where
it would be the only reasonable remedy available to
vindicate the legitimate interests of’ the other party and
the court. Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn.
60, 75, 756 A.2d 845 (2000).’’ Millbrook Owners Assn.,
Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, supra, 257 Conn. 16–17.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate
Court improperly determined that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding Ebersole’s testimony. Specifi-
cally, the defendants claim that, in arriving at its deci-
sion, the Appellate Court was inappropriately
concerned with adhering to the well recognized policy
preference in favor of reaching a trial on the merits and
securing a litigant his day in court because the trial
court’s rulings at issue did not end the trial. The defen-
dants further claim that the Appellate Court misapplied
the standard of review because it did not afford ‘‘ ‘every
reasonable presumption’ ’’ in favor of the trial court’s
decision to exclude Ebersole’s testimony or its decision
to decline the plaintiffs’ requests for a mistrial and a
continuance. Thus, the defendants claim that, when the
standard of review is applied correctly, the trial court’s
actions must be upheld because its rulings demon-
strated a careful review of the available evidence and
constituted a genuine effort to fashion an appropriate
remedy to Ebersole’s conduct.
In response, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate
Court properly determined that the trial court abused
its discretion in issuing rulings that prevented them
from presenting expert testimony regarding the defen-
dants’ liability and, thus, ensuring an adverse judgment
against them. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that,
although the trial continued after the trial court issued
its rulings, those rulings led to a directed verdict in
favor of the defendants and, therefore, amounted to a
sanction of dismissal. The plaintiffs further contend
that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the
trial court abused its discretion because a trial court
may dismiss a case without reaching the merits only
in situations where lesser sanctions would be inade-
quate and that, in the present case, the trial court had
other suitable sanctions available to it. We agree with
the plaintiffs.
We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that the totality
of the trial court’s rulings amounted to a sanction of
dismissal. At trial, the plaintiffs claimed that Emilio
D’Ascanio was injured while operating a defectively
designed forklift that was manufactured by the defen-
dants. In order to prevail on a strict product liability
claim, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia,5 that the product
was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the consumer or user and that the defect caused
the injury for which compensation is sought. Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 214, 694
A.2d 1319 (1997). Depending on the type of product at
issue—namely, its complexity—expert testimony
regarding whether the product was defective and causa-
tion may be required in order to make out a prima facie
product liability case. Under the ordinary consumer
expectation test, a plaintiff may prove that the product
is unreasonably dangerous without presenting expert
testimony, but only ‘‘when the everyday experience of
the particular product’s users permits the inference that
the product did not meet minimum safety expecta-
tions.’’ Id., 222. Conversely, ‘‘there may be instances
involving complex product designs in which an ordinary
consumer may not be able to form expectations of
safety.’’ Id., 219. In those situations, the modified con-
sumer expectation test applies, and the trier of fact
must view a consumer’s expectations of the product
‘‘in light of various factors that balance the utility of
the product’s design with the magnitude of its risks.’’
Id., 220. Expert testimony is generally required in cases
in which the modified consumer expectation test
applies because, due to the complexity of the product
design, the issues involved go ‘‘beyond the field of the
ordinary knowledge and experience of the trier of fact.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273
Conn. 138, 149, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); see also Franchey
v. Hannes, 155 Conn. 663, 666, 237 A.2d 364 (1967).
Thus, without expert testimony in such cases, a plaintiff
cannot provide sufficient evidence for the case to be
submitted to the trier of fact. ‘‘[I]t is the function of the
trial court to determine whether an instruction based on
the ordinary consumer expectation test or the modified
consumer expectation test, or both, is appropriate in
light of the evidence presented.’’ Potter v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., supra, 223.
In the present case, there appears to have been an
implicit understanding between the parties and the
court, prior to and during trial, that expert testimony
regarding the defendants’ liability was necessary in
order for the plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case.6
In denying the plaintiffs’ motions for a mistrial and a
continuance, which had the effect of preventing the
plaintiffs from offering expert testimony regarding the
defendants’ liability, the trial court stated that ‘‘[t]he
court is well aware of the impact which this ruling will
probably have on the pending trial . . . .’’ The
‘‘impact,’’ of course, was that the plaintiffs would be
left without a liability expert and, therefore, they would
be unable to prevail on their claim. The plaintiffs also
recognized the severity of the trial court’s ruling, evi-
denced by the fact that they sought a mistrial or a
continuance so that they could procure another liability
expert in order to provide sufficient evidence to make
out a prima facie case. Specifically, the plaintiffs stated
that, without expert testimony concerning the defen-
dants’ liability, there was a ‘‘fatal gap’’ in their evidence,
and that the lack of expert testimony would ‘‘guarantee
an adverse judgment’’ against them.
Thus, although the trial court allowed the plaintiffs
to continue with their proof after the rulings at issue
were made, the subsequent evidence put forth by the
plaintiffs was futile because they lacked expert testi-
mony regarding the defendants’ liability in a case in
which such testimony was necessary. Indeed, the lack
of expert testimony concerning the defendants’ liability
formed the basis of the trial court’s decision to grant the
defendants’ request for a directed verdict. In directing a
verdict in favor of the defendants, the trial court stated:
‘‘This is a situation where the only way the plaintiff[s]
can prove the existence of a defect which is unreason-
ably dangerous is through expert testimony, and clearly
there wasn’t any. . . . There is simply not enough evi-
dence before this jury to allow it to deliberate on the
issues of liability, because they could only resolve the
issues of fact by resorting to speculation and conjec-
ture.’’ Accordingly, although the trial continued for sev-
eral days after the rulings at issue were made, we
conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined
that the actions by the trial court were tantamount to
a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case.
Having concluded that the totality of the trial court’s
rulings amounted to a sanction of dismissal, we now
must determine whether the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in ruling as it did. As we have stated, although
the sanction of dismissal should only be imposed as a
last resort, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
in dismissing a case without reaching the merits ‘‘where
a party shows a deliberate, contumacious or unwar-
ranted disregard for the court’s authority.’’ Fox v. First
Bank, supra, 198 Conn. 39. For example, in Fox v. First
Bank, supra, 38–39, the trial court dismissed the plain-
tiff’s case for failure to comply with the orders of the
court. In that case, the plaintiff obtained a loan from
the defendant for the purchase of an automobile. Id., 35.
After the plaintiff defaulted on the loan, the defendant
repossessed the car and the plaintiff filed an action for
wrongful repossession. Id., 35–36. Under the terms of
an order by the trial court, the defendant returned the
car to the plaintiff upon condition that the plaintiff
would make monthly payments to the defendant in the
amount established by the underlying contract. Id., 36.
Thereafter, the plaintiff was found in contempt on three
separate occasions, over a period of several months,
for failing to make the monthly payments as required
by the court’s order. Id., 37–38. At the conclusion of
the third contempt proceeding, the trial court ordered
that the plaintiff pay to the defendant the arrearage
that had resulted due to her repeated failure to make
payments, by a specified date, or, failing that, the action
would be dismissed. Id., 38–39. When the plaintiff failed
to pay the arrearage by the date specified, the trial court
dismissed the action. Id., 39. The plaintiff appealed from
the order of dismissal and claimed that the trial court
improperly invoked the ‘‘strongest possible sanction.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action.
Id. In so concluding, this court noted that ‘‘[t]he record
is devoid of any reason why the plaintiff failed to make
continuing payments as required. During this period the
court expended a great deal of time entertaining the
defendant’s [contempt] motions and trying to accom-
modate the plaintiff. . . . The record does not reveal
any explanation by the plaintiff for her noncompliance.’’
Id., 40. Thus, this court concluded that the plaintiff’s
actions demonstrated a ‘‘sufficient disregard for the
court’s order and deliberate disregard of the authority
of the court to warrant the trial court’s imposition of
[the sanction of dismissal].’’ Id. Additionally, this court
noted that the plaintiff’s noncompliance occurred ‘‘for
almost two years’’ and, therefore, her action ‘‘justified
the court’s conclusion that such conduct would have
persisted.’’ Id. Accordingly, this court concluded that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dis-
missing the action. Id.; see also Pavlinko v. Yale-New
Haven Hospital, supra, 192 Conn. 144–45 (dismissal
of action proper where plaintiff improperly refused to
answer certain questions at deposition and where plain-
tiff represented to court that he would not comply with
order requiring him to answer those questions).
Conversely, this court has concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in dismissing a party’s case
in situations where the sanctioned party’s conduct did
not evince a contumacious or unwarranted disregard
for the court’s authority. For instance, in Usowski v.
Jacobson, 267 Conn. 73, 75–76, 836 A.2d 1167 (2003),
the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants,
alleging that the defendants had breached an oral part-
nership agreement. Thereafter, the defendants moved
for a judgment of dismissal for the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with certain orders of the court. Id., 83. The
trial court granted the motion, stating that it found a
‘‘ ‘continuing violation’ ’’ by the plaintiff of the court’s
discovery orders. Id. Specifically, the trial court based
its ruling on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with three different orders: the first being an
order to produce certain documents; the second being
an order of sanctions; and the third being an order
modifying the order of sanctions. Id. The plaintiff
appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the Appel-
late Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. Id. An appeal to this court followed. Id., 84.
On appeal, this court concluded that the Appellate
Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s judgment of
dismissal. Id., 91. In reversing the judgment of dismissal,
this court stated that ‘‘[i]n each instance where the
plaintiff . . . failed to comply with the trial court’s
order, other factors of a mitigating nature also were
present.’’ Id., 93. As to the plaintiff’s failure to comply
fully with the document production order, this court
noted that the trial court found that the plaintiff had
made ‘‘ ‘diligent efforts’ ’’ to locate and provide the doc-
uments requested, and that the violation of the order
was due to the fact that the plaintiff was simply ‘‘ ‘not
good at keeping records.’ ’’ Id., 94. Furthermore, this
court found it even more significant that the trial court
stated that it was ‘‘ ‘satisfied [that the plaintiff had]
made a good faith effort’ to produce the documents in
question.’’ Id. Likewise, this court determined that the
plaintiff was justified in failing to comply with the trial
court’s order of sanctions because a party may appropri-
ately fail to comply with an interlocutory order in order
to obtain a final judgment so that the order can be
immediately appealed. Id., 95. In light of these facts,
this court concluded that the plaintiff’s conduct ‘‘did
not evince a ‘contumacious or unwarranted disregard
for the court’s authority’ ’’ and that the plaintiff’s failure
to comply with the trial court’s orders ‘‘did not consti-
tute a pattern of abuse so egregious as to warrant dis-
missal, the remedy of last resort.’’ Id., 95–96; see also
Hirsch v. Squillante, 17 Conn. App. 354, 357–58, 552
A.2d 1222 (1989) (trial court improperly directed verdict
and declined plaintiff’s request for mistrial where plain-
tiff’s expert witness refused to continue to testify, at
no fault of plaintiff, because direct examination had
taken longer than anticipated).
Turning to the present case, we find it significant that
the only finding of fraud or intentional misrepresenta-
tion made by the trial court pertained to Ebersole. Thus,
as in Usowski, the trial court did not find that either the
plaintiffs or their counsel were complicit in Ebersole’s
allegedly deceitful conduct or, in other words, acted
in any way other than in good faith. See Usowski v.
Jacobson, supra, 267 Conn. 94. Indeed, in its memoran-
dum of decision on the plaintiffs’ motions for a mistrial
and a continuance, the trial court made clear that it
was primarily concerned with disciplining Ebersole for
his conduct and that its rulings were not issued as a
result of actions attributable to the plaintiffs or their
counsel. Specifically, the trial court stated: ‘‘Under the
circumstances of this case, a mistrial would excuse
[Ebersole] from the consequences of his behavior. If
this trial had to be put on all over again, [Ebersole]
could conceivably be replaced, and the plaintiffs would
get the equivalent of a judicial ‘do-over.’ ’’ (Emphasis
added.) The trial court went on to state: ‘‘Qualification
by the court as an expert witness is not available to
‘experts’ as a matter of right, it is a privilege. . . . When
a witness whom the court has qualified as an expert
demonstrates, as [Ebersole] has, that his testimony can-
not be relied on to be honest and complete, the testi-
mony should not be permitted.’’ These statements
unequivocally indicate that the trial court’s rulings were
driven solely by its finding that Ebersole’s testimony
was dishonest and deceitful, and that those rulings were
not, in any way, a product of misconduct on the part
of the plaintiffs or their counsel. Despite the fact that
the trial court attributed all of the allegedly deceitful
behavior to Ebersole, the totality of its rulings had the
primary effect of severely harming the plaintiffs by lead-
ing inexorably to a directed verdict in favor of the
defendants.
The defendants claim, however, that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in preventing the plaintiffs
from producing another liability expert because the
plaintiffs selected Ebersole as their liability expert and,
therefore, the plaintiffs were sponsors of Ebersole’s
testimony. Thus, the defendants contend that it is not
unfair for the plaintiffs to suffer the consequences of
Ebersole’s conduct since they were the ones who
retained, paid and proffered him. We disagree. The
defendants do not allege, nor did the trial court find,
that, in selecting Ebersole as their liability expert, the
plaintiffs were aware that Ebersole would testify dis-
honestly at trial. In fact, it is not even alleged that the
plaintiffs possessed knowledge of some fact that could
have alerted them that Ebersole was likely to offer
misleading testimony at trial, such as knowledge that
Ebersole had a reputation for giving such testimony.
Thus, in the absence of a finding by the trial court to
the contrary, it is fair to assume that the plaintiffs chose
Ebersole in good faith, and did not make the selection
with the intention to deceive the defendants or the
court.7 The mere fact that the plaintiffs chose Ebersole
as their liability expert does not justify imposing a sanc-
tion of dismissal against them for conduct that is attrib-
utable solely to Ebersole. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Squillante,
supra, 17 Conn. App. 357–58 (court rejected notion that
plaintiff should suffer fatal consequences of directed
verdict where his expert witness unexpectedly refused
to continue to testify).
In addition to the fact that there was no finding that
the plaintiffs intentionally engaged in any allegedly
wrongful conduct, it is equally noteworthy that the
objectionable conduct at issue was an isolated event
and was not one in a series of actions in disregard of
the court’s authority. The allegedly deceitful testimony
occurred on only one day, and made up merely a small
portion of Ebersole’s testimony as a whole.8 Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs were never given a chance to rectify
the situation. Rather, when faced with the first and
only instance of a witness offering allegedly deceitful
testimony, the trial court issued rulings that effectively
ended the case instead of first attempting to issue lesser
sanctions. This stands in stark contrast to the actions
of the trial court in Fox, where the trial court held the
plaintiff in contempt on three separate occasions, and
gave the plaintiff four opportunities to comply with the
court’s order over a period of nearly two years, prior
to dismissing the action. Fox v. First Bank, supra, 198
Conn. 40. In that case, this court stated that the duration
of the plaintiff’s course of conduct ‘‘justified the [trial]
court’s conclusion that such conduct would have per-
sisted.’’ Id. Given the fact that the allegedly deceitful
conduct at issue in the present case was an isolated,
rather than a common, occurrence, we cannot draw
the same conclusion.
We recognize that it is a reality of litigation that the
fortunes of a party can turn conclusively on the experts
that they sponsor. This is not a situation, however,
where a party has selected a witness to serve as an
expert, but who is ultimately deemed unqualified by
the court; see, e.g., Young v. Rutkin, 79 Conn. App. 355,
359–61, 830 A.2d 340, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 920, 835
A.2d 60 (2003); or where a party’s expert simply delivers
unpersuasive testimony that is not credited by the jury.
Nor is this a situation where a judgment of dismissal
is issued against a party because disclosure of an expert
witness occurred after a court imposed deadline. See,
e.g., Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc.,
286 Conn. 789, 813–15, 945 A.2d 955 (2008) (affirming
trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert and resultant
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant). In
those situations, the onus properly falls on the party
who proffers that witness because that party could have
chosen a witness whose credentials and experience
would ensure that the court would qualify him as an
expert, selected an experienced expert witness who is
more likely to present persuasive and credible testi-
mony or made a timely disclosure. The present case
differs from the aforementioned situations in that the
plaintiffs merely chose Ebersole as their expert and,
therefore, were not at fault, in any way, for his allegedly
deceitful conduct. Additionally, as we have previously
stated, the plaintiffs were never given any chance to
rectify the situation, despite the fact that the plaintiffs
did not show a continuous pattern of intentional mis-
conduct.9 Thus, on the basis of all of the foregoing
factors, the trial court’s ruling, which prevented the
plaintiffs from presenting expert testimony regarding
the defendants’ liability, resulted in surprise and injus-
tice to the plaintiffs. See Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc.
v. Hamilton Standard, supra, 257 Conn. 16 (‘‘[t]he
design of the rules of practice is both to facilitate busi-
ness and to advance justice; they will be interpreted
liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a
strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice’’
[internal quotation marks omitted]).
We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs’ conduct
does not evince a ‘‘contumacious or unwarranted disre-
gard for the court’s authority’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Usowski v. Jacobson, supra, 267 Conn.
95; that would justify dismissal of the case. Dismissal
was not the only option available to vindicate the legiti-
mate interests of the defendants and the court. Rather,
the trial court had an abundance of options at its dis-
posal that would have sufficed. For example, the court
could have struck Ebersole’s testimony and precluded
him from testifying further, but could have granted the
plaintiffs’ request for a mistrial or a continuance10 to
allow the plaintiffs to procure another liability expert.11
The court also could have, as it was first inclined,
stricken the videotape and Ebersole’s accompanying
testimony and instructed the jury to disregard both.12
Additionally, the court could have fined Ebersole in
conjunction with any of the aforementioned sanctions.
Any of these sanctions would have accomplished the
primary goal of the court—punishing Ebersole—with-
out ensuring an adverse judgment against the plaintiffs.
Thus, because the plaintiffs’ conduct did not constitute
a pattern of abuse so egregious as to warrant dismissal,
we conclude that the Appellate Court properly deter-
mined that the trial court’s rulings, considered in their
entirety, constituted an abuse of discretion.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion NORCOTT, PALMER and ESPINOSA,
Js., concurred.
1
On January 24, 2006, the action was withdrawn as to the named defen-
dant, Toyota Industries Corporation, and the defendants Toyota Equipment
Manufacturing, Inc., and Toyota Industries North America, Inc. We therefore
refer to Toyota Material Handling USA, Inc., BT Prime Mover, Inc., and
Summit Handling Systems, Inc., collectively as the defendants. See D’As-
canio v. Toyota Industries Corp., 133 Conn. App. 420, 422 n.2, 35 A.3d
388 (2012).
2
We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal limited
to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the
trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony and refusal to grant a mistrial
constituted an abuse of discretion?’’ D’Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp.,
304 Conn. 907, 39 A.3d 1118 (2012).
3
We note that Wiremold Company, the employer of Emilio D’Ascanio,
filed an intervening complaint in this action but is not a party to this appeal.
Consequently, we refer to Emilio D’Ascanio and Maria D’Ascanio as the
plaintiffs in this opinion. See D’Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp., 133
Conn. App. 420, 421 n.1, 35 A.3d 388 (2012).
4
Because we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, we need not
reach the plaintiffs’ alternative grounds for affirmance.
5
In order to recover under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff
must prove that: ‘‘(1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling
the product; (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury for
which compensation was sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the
sale; and (5) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without
substantial change in condition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Potter
v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 214, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997);
see also 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 402 A (1965).