In the Matter of Mary E. Bachand

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ******************************************************  IN THE MATTER OF MARY E. BACHAND (SC 18827) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js.* Argued February 3—officially released August 14, 2012 Peter J. Casey, for the appellant (plaintiff). Glenn E. Knierim, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).  Opinion NORCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Lisa Charette, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the deci- sion of the Probate Court for the district of West Hart- ford (Probate Court) requiring her to provide an accounting of her actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother, Mary E. Bachand (Mary). On appeal,1 the plain- tiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) the Probate Court had subject matter jurisdic- tion pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-175 (b)2 to call the plaintiff to account for her actions as attorney-in- fact for Mary; (2) the defendant, Cheryl Miller-Gray, had standing under § 45a-175 (b) to make an application to the Probate Court for an accounting of the plaintiff’s actions in her role as attorney-in-fact; and (3) the Pro- bate Court properly ordered the plaintiff to submit an accounting of her activities as attorney-in-fact for Mary in the absence of a showing of cause for the accounting. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On September 28, 2005, Mary, then a resident of Longmeadow, Massachusetts, executed a durable power of attorney, naming her husband, Rene H. Bachand (Rene), as attorney-in-fact. The durable power of attorney also named the plaintiff as the succes- sor attorney-in-fact, and the defendant, her sister, as the second successor attorney-in-fact. Thereafter, on July 18, 2007, Rene died, and, pursuant to the terms of the durable power of attorney, the plaintiff became Mary’s attorney-in-fact, a position in which she served from that point forward. Mary suffered from progressive Alzheimer’s disease and, in April, 2008, because she had become incapable of managing her personal and financial affairs, was moved to a long-term care facility in West Hartford, where she ate, slept and received daily medical care through December, 30, 2009. Thereafter, on September 29, 2008, the defendant petitioned the Probate Court, pursuant to § 45a-175 (b), for the appointment of an auditor to examine the accounts of the plaintiff per- taining to her actions as attorney-in-fact for Mary. After a hearing, the Probate Court determined that an auditor should not be appointed, but ordered the plaintiff to file an accounting of her activities as attorney-in-fact for the period of July 18, 2007, through November 30, 2008. The plaintiff appealed from the Probate Court’s deci- sion to the trial court. After a bifurcated trial, the trial court, Prescott, J., concluded that the Probate Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s actions as attorney-in-fact for Mary pursuant to § 45a-175 (b) because Mary resided in West Hartford, and the defen- dant had standing to proceed under § 45a-175 (b) as the only remaining successor attorney-in-fact. The trial court, Robaina, J., subsequently concluded that § 45a- 175 (b) does not require any showing of cause, and, accordingly, that the Probate Court properly ordered the plaintiff to account for her actions as attorney-in- fact despite the fact that the defendant did not present any evidence to establish cause for the accounting. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I On appeal, the plaintiff first challenges the Probate Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action, arguing that the Probate Court’s jurisdiction to order an accounting is limited to the specific circumstances prescribed in § 45a-175 (b), and neither Mary nor the defendant appropriately fall within the scope of that statute. ‘‘Whether an issue implicates subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ Heussner v. Hayes, 289 Conn. 795, 802, 961 A.2d 365 (2008). ‘‘It is well established that courts of probate are statutory tribunals that have no common- law jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, they can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by statute. . . . They have jurisdiction only when the facts exist on which the legislature has conditioned the exercise of their power. . . . [A] court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation. . . . Ordinarily, therefore, whether a Pro- bate Court has jurisdiction to enter a given order depends upon the interpretation of a statute.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 580–81, 756 A.2d 214 (2000). ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . We recognize that terms in a statute are to be assigned their ordinary meaning, unless context dictates other- wise . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commis- sioner of Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 213–14, A.3d (2012).  The authority of the Probate Court to call attorneys- in-fact to account for their actions under powers of attorney is set forth in General Statutes § 45a-98 (a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to . . . (6) to the extent provided for in section 45a-175, call . . . attorneys-in-fact acting under powers of attorney created in accordance with section 45a-562, to account concerning the estates entrusted to their charge . . . .’’ Thus, the jurisdiction of a Probate Court to order an attorney-in-fact to provide an accounting is subject to two limitations, namely: (1) the power of attorney under which the attorney-in-fact acts must have been created in accordance with General Statutes § 45a-562; and (2) the circumstances under which the Probate Court orders the accounting must satisfy § 45a-175. It is this second limitation that is at issue in this appeal. A On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that § 45a-175 (b), in establishing jurisdiction for the Probate Court in the district where a grantor of a power of attorney ‘‘resides,’’ requires that the grantor intend to reside in that district. She contends that the Probate Court, there- fore, lacked jurisdiction because, by the time Mary moved from Longmeadow, Massachusetts to the long- term care facility in West Hartford, she was incapable of forming any intent to reside there. Furthermore, she contends that Mary’s presence at the long-term care facility in West Hartford resembles a prolonged hospital stay rather than a change of residence. She therefore claims that Mary did not ‘‘reside’’ in West Hartford, and, consequently, § 45a-175 (b) did not provide the Probate Court with subject matter jurisdiction to order an accounting from the plaintiff. In response, the defendant argues that Mary’s inabil- ity to form any intent to reside in West Hartford is irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court there because the legislature used the word ‘‘resides’’ in § 45a- 175 (b), rather than basing jurisdiction on the ‘‘domi- cile’’ of a grantor of a power of attorney. She therefore posits that § 45a-175 (b) does not require anything more than the grantor actually living in a district to confer jurisdiction on its Probate Court. We agree with the defendant and conclude that, when read in context, the term ‘‘resides,’’ as employed in § 45a-175 (b), unambigu- ously means the place where a person actually lives regardless of her intention to remain there, or even an understanding of that location as the place at which she resides. The contours of what is required to establish where a grantor resides under § 45a-175 (b) is a question of first impression for Connecticut’s appellate courts. Because the term resides is not defined by the relevant statutory scheme, ‘‘it is appropriate to look to the com- mon understanding expressed in the law and in diction- aries.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beloff v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 45, 59, 523 A.2d 477 (1987). ‘‘It is assumed that all legislation is interpreted in light of the common law at the time of its enactment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 153, 680 A.2d 1231 (1996). ‘‘[R]esidence’’ is defined as: ‘‘1. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time . . . . 2. The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile . . . . Residence usu[ally] just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile usu[ally] requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time but only one domi- cile.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Moreover, a ‘‘resident’’ is ‘‘[a] person who lives in a particular place.’’ Id. With these concepts in mind, Connecticut courts have explored what constitutes residency in other probate related contexts, and have established that a person resides in a place where she is physically located for more than a temporary or transient period of time, and where the usual conditions of household life obtain. For example, in the context of establishing residency for the purpose of legally changing one’s name, this court has stated that ‘‘[a] resident of a place is one who is an actual stated dweller in that place, as distinguished from a transient dweller there . . . .’’ Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 311, 114 A.2d 203 (1955). In the context of determining residency for the appointment of a conser- vator, ‘‘[r]esidence as distinguished from domicil[e], means a temporary residence; but, when the word is used as a limitation of jurisdiction, it must also be distin- guished from a place in which one is transiently found. In that restricted sense, residence is the place where one has temporarily fixed his abode with an intention to depart, which is definite as to purpose but indefinite as to time.’’ Schutte v. Douglass, 90 Conn. 529, 538, 97 A. 906 (1916) (Beach, J., concurring); see also R. Folsom & G. Wilhelm, Probate Jurisdiction and Proce- dure in Connecticut (2d Ed. 2011) § 2:17, p. 2-46 (‘‘In general, [residence] means the place where one actually dwells. It connotes a place of living more permanent than a mere place of visit, but not necessarily so perma- nent as a domicile. Domicile and residence may be, and usually are, concurrent, but they are not necessarily so.’’); R. Folsom & G. Wilhelm, supra, p. 2-48 (‘‘[a] person resides in the place where the usual conditions of house- hold life obtain’’). Furthermore, this court has specifically distinguished domicile from residence on the basis of intent. The case law unanimously defines domicile as residency combined with an intent to remain permanently. See, e.g., Adame v. Adame, 154 Conn. 389, 391, 225 A.2d 188 (1966) (‘‘[t]he requisites of domicil[e] are actual residence coupled with the intention of permanently remaining’’); Marshall v. Marshall, 130 Conn. 655, 657, 36 A.2d 743 (1944) (domicile established by ‘‘personal presence in this [s]tate and the absence of intent to remove elsewhere’’); Washington v. Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 272, 193 A. 751 (1937) (‘‘intent is the controlling factor in determining the question of domicil[e]’’). It is also well established that residence and domicile are two distinct concepts; see, e.g., Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 578, 953 A.2d 868 (2008) (‘‘[r]esidence does not necessarily import domicil[e]’’); Marshall v. Marshall, supra, 656 (‘‘domicil[e] and resi- dence are not interchangeable terms’’); and it is clear that, although domicile requires specific intent to remain, no such intent is incorporated into the concept of residence. Finally, although this court has stated that intent may be relevant to the determination of residency in the context of determining whether an injured party was a resident of an insured’s household, and thus cov- ered under the insured’s policy, we also specifically have stated that such intent is not dispositive evidence of a person’s residence. See Middlesex Mutual Assur- ance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 686, 590 A.2d 957 (1991). The nature of the grantor of a power of attorney’s living conditions are, however, determinative of resi- dence. Here, the facts relevant to establishing Mary’s residence, namely, that she was physically located in West Hartford where she enjoyed the usual conditions of daily life for more than a transitory period of time, were undisputed. See Don v. Don, supra, 142 Conn. 311; R. Folsom & G. Wilhelm, supra, § 2:17, p. 2-48. We conclude that, because § 45a-175 (b) establishes jurisdiction for the Probate Court in the jurisdiction where the grantor of a power of attorney resides— as distinguished from the grantor’s domicile—Mary’s incapacity to form any specific intent to change her domicile from Longmeadow, Massachusetts to West Hartford is irrelevant to the determination that she resided in West Hartford when the other conditions of residence are undisputed. Had the legislature intended to provide the Probate Court with jurisdiction over the affairs of incapacitated grantors of powers of attorney only in a district in which such grantors intended to make their homes— a proposition that seems highly unlikely given the fact that § 45a-175 (b) provides a mechanism through which the Probate Court may supervise the accounts of those who are not only incapable of managing their own affairs, but also of forming such intent—it could have done so simply by establishing jurisdiction exclusively in the district in which the grantors are domiciled. Indeed, the legislature has made domicile relevant to Probate Court jurisdiction in other statutes providing the Probate Court with the power, for example, to pro- bate a decedent’s will; General Statutes § 45a-283 (a); grant letters of administration of an intestate estate; General Statutes § 45a-303 (a) (1); determine any issue regarding the custody, control or disposition of a deceased person’s body; General Statutes § 45a-318 (e); appoint a trustee over the property of a person who has disappeared; General Statutes § 45a-478 (a); appoint conservators pursuant to applications for voluntary rep- resentation; General Statutes § 45a-646; appoint conser- vators pursuant to applications for involuntary representation; General Statutes § 45a-648 (a); appoint guardians; see General Statutes § 45a-670; and deter- mine ability to give informed consent to sterilization. General Statutes § 45a-692. It is clear from a review of these other statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Probate Court that the legislature understood that the terms resides and domicile have two different mean- ings, and that the legislature’s use of the term resides in § 45a-175 (b), rather than domicile, therefore, sup- ports a determination that no specific intent is required to confer jurisdiction on the Probate Court. See, e.g., Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 431, 927 A.2d 843 (2007) (‘‘[t]ypically, the omission of a word otherwise used in the statutes suggests that the legislature intended a different meaning for the alternate term’’). The plaintiff argues, however, that, because Mary was moved to West Hartford for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment for her Alzheimer’s condition, her physical presence there was akin to temporary hospital- ization, which trial courts have found insufficient to establish residence. See, e.g., Trambarulo v. Whitaker, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 28, 2007); Robinson v. Probate Appeal, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 22, 2005). We disagree. It is undisputed that the facility at which Mary was placed provides long-term care for patients with an incurable condition who require care for the remainder of their lives, rather than acute, transi- tory care, which patients may seek for temporary, cur- able conditions, with the intention of returning to their homes once cured. Therefore, Mary was not moved to the West Hartford long-term care facility for a tempo- rary or transitory purpose but, rather, to receive ongo- ing care in a residential setting for an indefinite period of time. In that regard, the facility in West Hartford was the place where Mary actually lived, which was definite as to purpose, but indefinite as to time.3 See Schutte v. Douglass, supra, 90 Conn. 538 (Beach, J., concurring). Accordingly, we conclude that Mary resided in West Hartford at the time of the defendant’s petition and, therefore, the Probate Court there had jurisdiction to order the accounting from the plaintiff pursuant to § 45a-175 (b).4 B The plaintiff next claims that the defendant, who was named as the second successor attorney-in-fact in Mary’s durable power of attorney, did not have standing to petition the Probate Court pursuant to § 45a-175 (b), because she is merely a contingent successor attorney- in-fact unless and until she actually takes over the role of successor attorney-in-fact.5 She further argues that the fact that other individuals, namely the grantor of the power of attorney herself and her legal representative, have standing pursuant to § 45a-175 (b) to request an accounting from the plaintiff supports a determination that the defendant does not have standing as Mary’s third, and last, choice as attorney-in-fact. The defendant responds by noting that § 45a-175 (b), in allowing ‘‘the successor of the . . . attorney-in-fact’’ to make an application to the Probate Court, does not use the word ‘‘contingent,’’ and specifically does not preclude contingent successor attorneys-in-fact from making applications.6 The defendant also argues that, because Rene, the attorney-in-fact named in Mary’s durable power of attorney, has died, the plaintiff has become Mary’s attorney-in-fact, and the defendant is now the sole successor attorney-in-fact under Mary’s durable power of attorney. Finally, the defendant con- tends that the issue of whether other individuals have standing to seek an accounting pursuant to § 45a-175 (b) is irrelevant to the determination of whether the defendant, as a successor attorney-in-fact, has standing. We conclude that, because the defendant has become the only successor to Mary’s current attorney-in-fact, she falls squarely within the ambit of § 45a-175 (b), and, therefore had standing to make an application for an accounting in Probate Court. To begin, ‘‘[t]he question of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . [A] court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by persons who do not have standing . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Soracco v. Williams Scottsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 90, 971 A.2d 1 (2009). ‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983). ‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.’’ Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 579, 668 A.2d 688 (1995). Standing to apply to the Probate Court for an account- ing from an attorney-in-fact is statutorily established by § 45a-175 (b), which specifically provides that, in addition to several other individuals with standing, ‘‘the successor of the . . . attorney-in-fact’’ may make such an application.7 In reviewing the language of § 45a-175 (b) and the language of Mary’s durable power of attor- ney, it is clear that the defendant was the successor to Mary’s acting attorney-in-fact at the time the defendant made her application to the Probate Court and, there- fore, had statutory standing pursuant to § 45a-175 (b). Mary’s durable power of attorney named her hus- band, Rene, as attorney-in-fact, and then provided: ‘‘If my said attorney in fact dies, resigns or becomes either mentally or physically incapable of performing the pow- ers herein granted, I constitute and appoint as successor my daughter, [the plaintiff] of East Windsor . . . or if she is unable or unwilling to serve by reason of death, resignation or becomes either mentally or physically incapable of performing the powers herein granted, I constitute and appoint as her successor my daughter, [the defendant].’’ At the time the durable power of attor- ney was executed, Rene was Mary’s attorney-in-fact, the plaintiff was the successor attorney-in-fact, and the defendant was the second successor attorney-in-fact. If the defendant had made her application to the Probate Court while Rene was still alive, the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant did not have standing pur- suant to § 45a-175 (b) because she was merely a second, contingent successor attorney-in-fact might have pre- sented a more complicated question. At the time of the defendant’s application, however, Rene had died, the plaintiff, by operation of law, had succeeded into the position of attorney-in-fact for Mary, and the defendant had become the only remaining successor to the acting attorney-in-fact. ‘‘Succession’’ is defined as ‘‘[t]he act or right of legally or officially taking over a predecessor’s office, rank, or duties.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. When Rene died, the plaintiff legally and officially took over the duties of attorney-in-fact for Mary. At the same time, the defendant legally and officially took over the responsibilities of successor to the attorney-in-fact, namely, that she would step into the role of attorney- in-fact for Mary should the plaintiff be unwilling or unable to do so. The plaintiff nevertheless argues that the defendant could not become the successor attorney-in-fact within the meaning § 45a-175 (b) unless and until the defendant actually took up the duties and responsibilities of serv- ing as Mary’s attorney-in-fact. We disagree. First, the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant lacks standing because she is merely a ‘‘contingent’’ successor attor- ney-in-fact seems disingenuous given the December 30, 2009 stipulation that the parties submitted to the trial court, which stated that the plaintiff ‘‘served as an attor- ney in fact for Mary . . . from July 18, 2007 through December 30, 2009,’’ and that the defendant ‘‘is named as successor attorney-in-fact under the [d]urable [p]ower of [a]ttorney . . . to serve as attorney-in-fact in the event that [the plaintiff] is unwilling or unable to serve . . . .’’ Importantly, the stipulation did not refer to the plaintiff as the successor attorney-in-fact who performed the duties of the attorney-in-fact. Nor did it refer to the defendant as a second or contingent successor attorney-in-fact. Rather, it reflected the status of the parties as of the time of the death of the attorney- in-fact named in Mary’s durable power of attorney; the plaintiff as attorney-in-fact and the defendant as succes- sor attorney-in-fact. Furthermore, § 45a-175 (b) specifically and unambig- uously provides standing for successors to attorneys- in-fact. Restricting standing to make applications to the Probate Court only to those individuals who have actually assumed the role of acting attorneys-in-fact would render the provision allowing successors to make such applications wholly superfluous. ‘‘Interpre- ting a statute to render some of its language superfluous violates cardinal principles of statutory interpretation . . . [because] [i]t is a basic tenet of statutory construc- tion that the legislature [does] not intend to enact mean- ingless provisions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Promotional Events, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008). Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s construction of § 45a-175 (b), which would not confer standing to make applications to the Probate Court upon an individual named as the succes- sor to an attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney until after she has assumed the role of acting attorney- in-fact. Moreover, the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant is not an individual with standing pursuant to § 45a- 175 (b) because the defendant was named merely as a second, contingent successor attorney-in-fact in Mary’s durable power of attorney ignores the fact that, upon the death of Rene, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were required to take any affirmative action to succeed into their current positions. The plaintiff became Mary’s attorney-in-fact, and the defendant became the succes- sor to the attorney-in-fact, upon the death of Rene, by operation of law, which ‘‘is a generic term or phrase commonly used to express the manner in which rights (and/or liabilities) attach to a person by the mere appli- cation to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of that person. . . . Running through all of the definitions and cases on the subject is a common thread that operation of law means the practical effect of what the law is intended to be on the subject.’’ (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 201, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). Successor attorneys-in-fact are named so that, in the event that the named attorney-in-fact is unable or unwilling to continue in that role, the successor may ‘‘legally or officially [take] over a predecessor’s office, rank, or duties.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. That the defendant was named as the second successor does not indicate that Mary hoped to prevent her from being involved with the management of Mary’s affairs, such that concluding that the defendant had standing to make the application to the court would be contrary to Mary’s intent as expressed in her durable power of attorney. To the contrary, Mary was not required to name any successors in her durable power of attorney. By includ- ing the defendant as a successor attorney-in-fact— albeit a successor who would become acting attorney- in-fact only if both her father and her sister were unable or unwilling to continue in that role—Mary clearly con- templated the defendant as an individual who could, at some point, be involved in the management of her affairs. Therefore, when Rene died, pursuant to Mary’s durable power of attorney, and by operation of law, the plaintiff succeeded into the role of attorney-in-fact, and the defendant succeeded into the role of successor to the attorney-in-fact, a position that placed her squarely within the terms of § 45a-175 (b) as an individual with standing to make an application to the Probate Court for an accounting.8 Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant is ‘‘the successor to the . . . attorney-in- fact’’ with standing to make an application to the Pro- bate Court for an accounting pursuant to § 45a-175 (b). II The plaintiff additionally claims that the trial court improperly determined that § 45a-175 (b) does not require a showing of cause as a condition precedent to requiring an attorney-in-fact to account for her actions. Specifically, she claims that, because an action for an accounting may be brought in both the Superior Court or the Probate Court, it is inconceivable that the legisla- ture would have required a showing of cause for an action brought in the Superior Court, but not for an action brought in the Probate Court. Accordingly, she argues that, because the defendant did not present any evidence to establish cause for the accounting, the Pro- bate Court improperly ordered the plaintiff to provide an accounting of her actions as attorney-in-fact for Mary. In response, the defendant argues that, although the right to seek an accounting in the Superior Court may overlap with the right to seek an accounting in the Probate Court, the two procedures are distinct. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the Probate Court’s jurisdiction is governed by the statutory provi- sions, and in reviewing § 45a-175 as a whole, it is clear that no cause is required when a successor attorney- in-fact seeks an accounting from the acting attorney- in-fact. We agree with the defendant that § 45a-175 (b) does not require a showing of cause before the Probate Court may order an attorney-in-fact to account for her actions under a power of attorney. As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of § 45a-175 (b) and its relationship to other statutes. See, e.g., In re Michaela Lee R., supra, 253 Conn. 583. Section 45a-175 lodges in the Probate Court jurisdiction over the accounts of all fiduciaries, and provides that, among other accounts, ‘‘[c]ourts of probate . . . to the extent provided in this section, shall have jurisdiction of accounts of the actions of trustees of inter vivos trusts and attorneys-in-fact acting under powers of attorney.’’ General Statutes § 45a-175 (a). Section 45a-175 (b) goes on to provide: ‘‘A trustee or settlor of an inter vivos trust or an attorney-in-fact or the successor of the trustee, settlor or attorney-in- fact or the grantor of such power of attorney or his legal representative may make application to the court of probate . . . for submission to the jurisdiction of the court of an account for allowance of the trustee’s or attorney’s actions under such trust or power.’’ Sec- tion 45a-175 (c) then provides that ‘‘[a]ny beneficiary of an inter vivos trust may petition a court of probate having jurisdiction under this section for an accounting by the trustee or trustees. The court may, after hearing with notice to all interested parties, grant the petition and require an accounting for such periods of time as it determines are reasonable and necessary on finding that: (A) The beneficiary has an interest in the trust sufficient to entitle him to an accounting, (B) cause has been shown that an accounting is necessary, and (C) the petition is not for the purpose of harassment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Like the trial court, we observe that the ‘‘difference between subsection (b) and subsection (c) [of § 45a- 175] is as striking as it is obvious,’’ that ‘‘[i]t is difficult to conceive of a circumstance where two subsections of the same statute can be compared so readily . . . [and that it is] equally difficult to read the requirements of each of the subsections to be the same.’’ First, the persons entitled to relief under each of these subsec- tions have markedly different interests in obtaining accountings. Under subsection (b) of § 45a-175, individ- uals with power or authority over the trust or the power of attorney or their successors have the right to request the Probate Court to order an accounting. These individ- uals, as fiduciaries, have a very strong interest in ensur- ing the proper management of the settlor’s or the grantor’s affairs. Under subsection (c) of § 45a-175, only beneficiaries of inter vivos trusts, whose interest is merely gratuitous, may request such relief. See 2 Restatement (Third), Trusts § 63 (1) (2003) (‘‘[t]he set- tlor of an inter vivos trust has power to revoke or modify the trust to the extent the terms of the trust . . . so provide’’). More importantly, subsection (c) of § 45a-175 sets forth specific limitations on the extent to which the Probate Court may order an accounting, and, strikingly, requires specific findings, including a finding of cause, before the Probate Court may order a trustee to provide an accounting upon the request of a beneficiary. In comparison, from even the most cursory glance, it is clear that the legislature did not include the same limita- tions and requirements in subsection (b) of § 45a-175 concerning attorneys-in-fact. Indeed, the legislature did not include any limitations on the Probate Court’s authority to order an accounting from a trustee or an attorney-in-fact upon the application of an individual in a fiduciary position regarding those affairs. Nor did the legislature require the Probate Court to make any findings at all, let alone a finding of cause, before it could order an attorney-in-fact to provide an account- ing. Had the legislature intended to limit the circum- stances under which the Probate Court could order an attorney-in-fact to provide an accounting under subsec- tion (b) of § 45a-175, the limitations and requirements set forth in subsection (c) of that statute clearly indicate that it could have done so. ‘‘[W]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ralph M., 211 Conn. 289, 306, 559 A.2d 179 (1989). Accordingly, from the plain language of § 45a-175 (b), and its relationship to the other related statutory provisions, as applied to the circumstances of this case, it is clear that no cause must be shown before the Probate Court may call an attorney-in-fact to account for her actions under a power of attorney. The plaintiff, nevertheless, argues that, because an action for an accounting may be brought in either the Probate Court or the Superior Court,9 the Probate Court is similarly limited by the common-law requirement that cause be shown before the Superior Court may order an accounting unless the legislature explicitly abrogates the common-law requirements. See Donahue v. Barnes, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 64, 65–66, 265 A.2d 87 (App. Div.) (‘‘To support an action of accounting [in the Superior Court], one of several conditions must exist. There must be a fiduciary relationship, or the existence of mutual and/ or complicated accounts, or a need of discovery, or some other special ground of equitable jurisdiction such as fraud.’’), cert. denied, 158 Conn. 656, 259 A.2d 139 (1969). We disagree. Simply because the Probate Court and the Superior Court have concurrent jurisdiction over accountings by attorneys-in-fact acting under pow- ers of attorney, however, does not require that actions in both courts be subject to the same limitations. This is because ‘‘courts of probate are statutory tribunals that have no common-law jurisdiction. . . . [T]hey can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by statute. . . . [A] court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michaela Lee R., supra, 253 Conn. 580–81. In the present case, the Probate Court is con- strained to act only in the manner particularly pre- scribed by § 45a-175 (b), which specifically does not require that the Probate Court first make a finding of cause before ordering an attorney-in-fact to account for her actions under a power of attorney. We therefore conclude that the defendant was not required to show cause before the Probate Court could order the plaintiff to account for her actions as Mary’s attorney-in-fact.10 The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. * The listing of the justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. 1 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. 2 General Statutes § 45a-175 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]n attorney- in-fact or the successor of the . . . attorney-in-fact . . . may make applica- tion to the court of probate for the district where . . . the attorney-in-fact has any place of business or to the court of probate for the district where . . . the attorney-in-fact or the grantor of the power [of attorney] resides . . . for submission to the jurisdiction of the court of an account for allow- ance of the . . . attorney’s actions under such . . . power.’’ 3 We acknowledge that generally, ‘‘[a] person does not acquire a residence at a place of confinement, unless freely acquiesced.’’ R. Folsom & G. Wilhelm, supra, § 2:17, p. 2-47; see also Grant v. Dalliber, 11 Conn. 232, 237–38 (1836) (‘‘The state’s prison was not the place of [the defendant’s residence]; it was the place of his punishment; and while there, he was absent from home. . . . [His] residence . . . is not changed or abandoned, by a constrained removal, as by imprisonment.’’). Furthermore, judges of the Superior Court have determined that temporary hospitalization for immediate treatment is insufficient to establish residency for the purpose of appointing a conserva- tor under General Statutes § 45a-648 (a). For example, in Trambarulo v. Whitaker, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, the trial court determined that a Delaware resident who had traveled to Connecticut to obtain medical treatment expected to last thirty to si