Moore v. Commissioner of Correction

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction DARNELL MOORE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (SC 21080) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.* Syllabus The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the state had violated his constitutional rights during his underlying criminal trial by, inter alia, failing to disclose an informal cooperation agreement between the state and a witness, G, who provided critical testimony for the state in the petitioner’s criminal case. G had been separately charged with a series of crimes in connection with the murder with which the petitioner had been charged, including carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit and hindering prosecution in the second degree, and those charges remained pending at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial. Prior to G’s testimony, the petitioner’s defense counsel sought to discover whether there had been any cooperation agreement or understand- ing of leniency between the state and G, to which the prosecutor responded that G had not been given any assurances. During cross-examination at the petitioner’s criminal trial, G answered “[n]o” when asked if anyone had led him to believe that testifying against the petitioner might benefit him in his own criminal case. G also testified that he was “hoping” that his cooperation and testimony would help him at his own sentencing. Shortly after the petitioner was convicted and sentenced, G entered a plea as to the crime of hindering prosecution in the third degree and was sentenced, in accordance with his plea agreement, to a total effective sentence of five years of incarceration, fully suspended, and three years of probation. At the petitioner’s habeas trial, the habeas court heard testimony from G, G’s defense counsel, and the three prosecutors who were involved in the petitioner’s criminal trial, all of whom testified that there was no cooperation agreement between G and the state prior to or during the petitioner’s criminal trial. The habeas court concluded that there was no cooperation agreement between G and the state and rendered judgment denying the petitioner’s habeas petition. The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, contending, inter alia, that, contrary to the conclusion of the habeas court, the state had entered into an informal cooperation agreement with G and then failed to correct G’s testimony denying the existence of that agreement, in violation of Napue v. Illinois (360 U.S. 264). Held: * This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Mullins and Justices D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dan- nehy and Bright. Thereafter, Justice McDonald was added to the panel and has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction This court concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether G, G’s defense counsel, and the prosecutors involved with the petitioner’s criminal trial, all of whom testified at the petitioner’s habeas trial, proceeded under a misapprehension as to what constitutes a cooperation agreement for purposes of Napue, and, accordingly, this court remanded the case to the habeas court for further factual findings but retained jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of ultimately deciding the appeal. The fact that a prosecutor has afforded favorable treatment to a cooperating witness in that witness’ criminal case, standing alone, does not establish the existence of an underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony. Accordingly, this court rejected the petitioner’s claim that this court should infer that there was an informal cooperation agreement between G and the state merely because the record contained evidence of “conspicuous” leni- ency in connection with G’s criminal case and there was no other reasonable conclusion to draw from the record. This court clarified that, to properly protect the due process rights of crimi- nal defendants, prosecutors have a duty to correct false or substantially misleading testimony regarding both formal and informal agreements with cooperating witnesses, including those that are implied, unwritten, or tacit. Moreover, in considering whether there is evidence of a cooperation agree- ment or understanding of leniency between a cooperating witness and the state, courts should consider whether the prosecutor, by his words or actions, created an expectation in the witness that the state would provide leniency and whether the witness acted on the basis of that expectation, and courts should also examine the consideration that the state provided to the coop- erating witness. In remanding the case to the habeas court for further factual findings, this court relied in part on Brown v. Commissioner of Correction (230 Conn. App. 384), which was decided after the habeas trial in the present case and in which the Appellate Court concluded that the state in that case should have informed the petitioner, B, of an undisclosed cooperation agreement or understanding of leniency between a cooperating witness and the office of the state’s attorney for the same judicial district involved in the prosecution of the petitioner in the present case. Specifically, in Brown, the state’s attorney testified at B’s habeas trial that, in virtually all cases, his office would not make any promises to a cooperat- ing witness regarding a future plea offer but that the office had a practice of informing cooperating witnesses that, if they testify, and if the prosecutor deems their testimony to be truthful, the prosecutor would bring the wit- ness’ cooperation to the attention of the judge presiding over his criminal case, with the expectation that doing so would likely benefit the witness in his own criminal case. Thus, in light of this testimony in Brown regarding the practice of pros- ecutors in this particular state’s attorney’s office, around the time that  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction the petitioner in the present case was prosecuted, of communicating to cooperating witnesses what they can expect in exchange for their testimony, and given that G, G’s defense counsel, and the prosecutors involved in the petitioner’s criminal case did not have the benefit of knowing about the holding in Brown when they testified at the petitioner’s habeas trial, this court concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether they all testified at the petitioner’s habeas trial under a misapprehension as to what constitutes a cooperation agreement for purposes of Napue. This court directed the habeas court on remand to determine whether the past practice of the prosecutors in the particular state’s attorney’s office responsible for prosecuting both the petitioner in the present case and B was employed in the present case and whether, because of that practice, the testimony of G, G’s defense counsel and the prosecutors at the petitioner’s habeas trial may have been affected by a misunderstanding as to what con- stitutes an agreement or understanding between a cooperating witness and the state for purposes of Napue. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued April 8—officially released August 18, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, M. Murphy, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, Elgo, Moll and Clark, Js., which affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certi- fication, appealed to this court. Further proceedings. Denis J. O’Malley III, assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner). Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci, state’s attorney, Angela Macchiarulo, supervisory assistant state’s attor- ney, and David Smith, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion McDONALD, J. It is implicit in any concept of ordered liberty that a state “may not knowingly use false evi- dence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction conviction . . . .” Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959). In this certified appeal, we consider whether that bedrock principle of constitutional law is violated when a cooperating witness denies under oath both the existence of any agreement with the state and that he expects any consideration from the state in his separate criminal case in exchange for his testimony, despite the fact that the state has com- mitted, either expressly or by implication, to bringing the witness’ cooperation to the attention of the judge presiding over the witness’ criminal case. The petitioner, Darnell Moore, appeals from the judgment of the Appel- late Court, which affirmed the habeas court’s judgment denying his third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. App. 487, 489, 519, 321 A.3d 470 (2024). He claims that the state entered into an informal cooperation agreement with Samuel Gomez, who provided critical testimony for the state in the petitioner’s criminal case, and then failed to correct Gomez’ testimony denying the existence of the agreement. He contends that, because the record included evidence of conspicuous leniency for Gomez in connection with Gomez’ criminal case, and because there is no other reasonable conclusion to draw from the record, this court should infer that there was an informal cooperation agreement between Gomez and the state. Although we reject the petitioner’s analysis, in light of testimony regarding the practice of prosecutors in the office of the state’s attorney for the judicial dis- trict of New London, around the time that the petitioner was prosecuted there, of communicating to cooperating witnesses what they can expect in exchange for their tes- timony; see Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 384, 406, 412–13, 330 A.3d 134 (describing consideration prosecutors in New London state’s attor- ney’s office regularly provided to cooperating witnesses), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 921, 333 A.3d 103 (2025); we conclude that the record before us is insufficient for this court to determine whether Gomez and the attorneys who testified at the petitioner’s habeas trial did so under  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction a misapprehension as to what constitutes a coopera- tion agreement for the purposes of Napue. Because that uncertainty concerns the factual foundation on which this appeal must be decided, we exercise our authority under Practice Book § 60-21 and remand the case to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700, 730–32, 756 A.2d 799 (2000). We retain jurisdiction over this case for the purpose of deciding the appeal following the habeas court’s factual determinations on remand. The relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the Appellate Court’s opinion; see Moore v. Commis- sioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. App. 489–97; which we summarize along with other pertinent undis- puted facts in the record. In August 2010, the state charged the petitioner with murder in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-54a (a). The case was brought in the judicial district of New London and tried to a jury in December 2012. During the petitioner’s criminal trial, Gomez testified for the state that he had, among other things, provided the petitioner with the murder weapon and driven the petitioner to and from the scene of the crime. Prior to Gomez’ testimony, the petitioner’s defense counsel informed the trial court that Gomez had been separately charged with a series of crimes related to his conduct in this case and that Gomez’ charges remained open and pending in the New London judicial district. The petitioner’s defense counsel also informed the trial court that he had asked the prosecutor whether there was any cooperation agreement or understanding of leniency between Gomez and the state, to which the prosecutor responded that Gomez’ defense counsel had not been given any assurances. During cross-examination, the petitioner’s defense counsel asked Gomez if he had committed the offenses with which he was charged—carrying a pistol or revolver 1 Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant part that this court may “on its own motion . . . (8) remand any pending matter to the trial court for the resolution of factual issues where necessary . . . .”  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29-35 (a), a felony that carries a maximum sentence of five years of incarceration and a mandatory minimum of one year; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29-37 (b); and hindering prosecution in the sec- ond degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-166, a class C felony that carries a maximum sentence of ten years of incarceration.2 See General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-35a (7), as amended by Public Acts 2010, No. 10-36, § 18 (P.A. 10-36). Rather than invoking his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself while his own criminal case remained pending, and in which he had entered a plea of not guilty, Gomez readily answered in the affirmative. Although he admitted under oath to committing these serious felonies, Gomez answered “[n]o” when asked if anyone had led him to believe that testifying at the petitioner’s criminal case might benefit him in his own case. He also testified that he did not know why the charges against him had not been resolved and that he was still going to court for his pending criminal case. When asked if he intended to cut a deal with the state after his testimony in the petitioner’s case, Gomez answered that he was “hoping for the best.” Gomez also confirmed that he was hoping that his testimony would help him at sentencing. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fifty-three years of incarceration. Less than ten days after the court sentenced the petitioner in this case, Gomez pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,3 to one count of hindering prosecution in the third degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-167, which is a class D felony that carries a sentence of up to 2 The state originally attempted to charge Gomez with accessory to murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and General Statutes § 53a-8, but a Superior Court judge denied the warrant application. 3 “Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Com- missioner of Correction, 342 Conn. 771, 776 n.8, 272 A.3d 189 (2022).  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction five years of incarceration. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-35a (8), as amended by P.A. 10-36, § 18. The trial court sentenced Gomez in accordance with a plea agreement that he entered into with the state—five years of incarceration, fully suspended, with three years of probation—and the state nolled the remaining charges. The petitioner commenced this habeas action in 2015 and filed the operative third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in April 2021. In the third count of the operative petition, which is the only one relevant to this appeal, the petitioner alleged that the state had failed to disclose consideration given to Gomez in exchange for his testimony and that the prosecutor had knowingly solicited Gomez’ false testimony concerning that consid- eration and allowed that testimony to stand uncorrected. After a one day trial in March 2022, the habeas court, M. Murphy, J., in August 2022, issued a memorandum of decision and denied the petition. As to count three, the court found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that there was any cooperation agreement or leniency understanding between Gomez and the state prior to or during the petitioner’s criminal trial. The habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed from the habeas court’s judgment. The Appellate Court affirmed. See Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. App. 519. This certified appeal followed. I On appeal, the petitioner contends that the prosecutor violated his constitutional due process rights by improp- erly eliciting testimony from Gomez that substantially misled the jury regarding his motivation to testify and by failing to correct that testimony. The petitioner argues that this court’s conception of an agreement for purposes of the prosecutor’s duty to correct misleading testimony under Napue has evolved considerably and that, pursu- ant to our decision in Gomez v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 336 Conn. 168, 176–78, 243 A.3d 1163 (2020), we  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction should infer the existence of a cooperation agreement or leniency understanding between Gomez and the state because Gomez received “conspicuous leniency” in his own criminal case and the facts in the present case allow for no other reasonable conclusion. We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “that the fact that a prosecutor afforded favorable treat- ment to a government witness” in that witness’ criminal case, “standing alone, does not establish the existence of an underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony”; Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003); and reject the petitioner’s proposition as overly broad. However, we also reject the interpretation of Napue and its progeny advocated by the respondent, the Com- missioner of Correction. The respondent argues that the evidence at the habeas trial established that there was no cooperation agreement or leniency understanding between Gomez and the state and, therefore, that Gomez’ testimony did not need to be corrected. The respondent claims that, if statements regarding an agreement or understanding between a cooperating witness and the state “didn’t come from a state actor’s mouth, [they are] not anything that the state is responsible for disclosing or correcting because there is nothing to disclose . . . [or] correct.” We conclude that this standard is too narrow to protect the due process rights of criminal defendants. In light of conflicting interpretations of what con- stitutes a cooperation agreement or understanding of leniency, we take this opportunity to clarify the proper standard that courts in Connecticut should apply in considering whether there was “evidence of any under- standing or agreement” between a cooperating witness and the state. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). We have recognized that “the state’s knowing presenta- tion of false testimony regarding the benefits that have been afforded to a cooperating witness may implicate two related but distinct rights protected by the due process  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction clause of the fourteenth amendment.” Gomez v. Commis- sioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 182. “First, under Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)] and its progeny, the state may not suppress material, exculpatory evidence, including evidence that tends to undermine the credibility of the state’s witnesses. Second, under Napue and its progeny, the state may not knowingly rely on the presentation of false or substantially misleading evidence to the jury, including evidence regarding the benefits that have been afforded to cooperating witnesses, to obtain a crimi- nal conviction.” Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 182. “[U]nlike Brady, [t]he harm associated with a Napue violation is not limited to a specific defendant, but instead undermines the credibility of the criminal justice system as a whole . . . .” (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 183. In this case, the petitioner solely makes a Napue claim. “[D]ue process is [also] . . . offended if the state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 175. “Even if the denial of a leniency agree- ment is not outright false, but only substantially mischar- acterizes the nature of the agreement, we have indicated that the state is obliged to correct the misconception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marquez v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 575, 593, 198 A.3d 562 (2019). Most critically, we have clarified that “[a] new trial is required if the false [or substantially misleading] testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected” the jury’s verdict of guilty. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 313 Conn. 325, 349, 96 A.3d 1238 (2014); see also, e.g., Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 186. At the outset, courts consider whether there is “an undisclosed agreement or understanding between the cooperating witness and the state.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomez v. Commis- sioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 180. Although  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction Brady was concerned primarily with the disclosure to a defendant, the crux of a Napue violation—and the focus of our recent decisions—is the lack of disclosure to the jury. See, e.g., id., 181–82. Napue’s requirements are not limited to testimony regarding formal agreements. To effectively address the credibility and impeachment concerns at issue with cooperating witnesses, the pros- ecution must correct misleading testimony denying the existence of an agreement or understanding, even if the evidence merely suggests that there was an informal understanding of leniency between a state’s witness and the state. See, e.g., State v. Floyd, supra, 253 Conn. 740–42; Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 743, 758–59, 187 A.3d 1163 (2018); see also, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 233 (6th Cir.) (conclud- ing that “a less formal, unwritten or tacit agreement” between cooperating witness and prosecution is possible impeachment material), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 822, 129 S. Ct. 114, 172 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2008); United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1986) (in addition to evidence of explicit agreement between cooperating witness and government, “facts which imply an agree- ment would also bear on [the witness’] credibility”); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 41, 702 A.2d 699 (1997) (“an agreement or understanding between the witness and the [s]tate need not be formal or detailed to come within the prosecutor’s duty to disclose”); People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 442, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1979) (despite absence of “express promise” of leniency, prosecutor should have disclosed “strong inference . . . of an expectation of leniency”). As we noted in Marquez, “informal, off-the-record leni- ency understandings with cooperating witnesses”; Mar- quez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 330 Conn. 603; carry with them “risks that threaten the efficient and fair administration of justice.” Id., 605. Although “experienced counsel . . . can comfortably advise the wit- ness of the possible credit that might follow”; id., 604; jurors, who “are not well versed in the nuanced vagaries of such leniency agreements”; id., 605; are “[l]eft out  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction of [the] equation . . . .” Id., 604. We are troubled by this because “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.” Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 269. The issue of leaving the jury out of the equation is exemplified by testimony quoted by the Appellate Court in its decision in Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 230 Conn. App. 384. In Brown, State’s Attorney Paul J. Narducci, who supervises the New London state’s attorney’s office, the same office that prosecuted the petitioner and Gomez, testified during the habeas trial of the petitioner in Brown regarding his office’s handling of agreements with cooperating witnesses. See id., 390, 405–406. According to his testimony, in virtually all cases, the prosecutors in that office, at the time, “[did] not make any specific promises concerning any offers that [were] being made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 406. Instead, the prosecutors told the witnesses that, “in the past, people who [came] in to testify truthfully and accurately, that information is considered by the prosecuting authorities in determining a recommenda- tion. And if they do testify truthfully and completely and accurately, that information will be made available to the sentencing judge, but [the prosecutors] do not make any promises, any specific promises, as it relates to any offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. He added that the prosecutors also told witnesses that “it’s expected that you can testify that you’re hoping for some consideration in exchange for your complete, accurate and truthful testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This information was presumably conveyed to the cooperating witness in Brown sometime between when the petitioner in that case was arrested in November 2013 and when he was convicted in October 2014. See id., 386, 388. Nevertheless, Narducci did not view these  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction representations made to cooperating witnesses as consti- tuting exculpatory material that needed to be disclosed under Brady. See id., 405–409, 413. The habeas court in Brown agreed, concluding that “the petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of an undisclosed agree- ment through which [the cooperating witness] would receive consideration from the state in exchange for her testimony at the petitioner’s [criminal] trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 395–36. The Appellate Court disagreed with Narducci and the habeas court, concluding that “Narducci’s statements suggested an informal understanding to provide con- sideration to [the cooperating witness] in exchange for her testimony at the petitioner’s [criminal] trial.” Id., 414. It further concluded that “the statements strongly suggest[ed] that the past practice that Narducci described would apply to [the cooperating witness] if she testified favorably at the petitioner’s [criminal] trial. Thus, the statements reasonably [gave] rise to an understanding that, in exchange for her cooperation, Narducci would provide [the cooperating witness] with a favorable plea deal in connection with her pending charges and bring her cooperation to the attention of the court at the time of her sentencing.” Id., 413. The Appellate Court further concluded that it was of “no consequence to [its] evaluation of Narducci’s state- ments that he did not describe with greater particularity the consideration that he had suggested . . . or . . . that he testified as to his belief that he had not extended an ‘offer’ to [the cooperating witness].” Id. This is because “a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose evidence that the state induced a cooperating witness to testify . . . is not triggered by a prosecutor’s use of talismanic words or phrases, or what might be deemed formalized commit- ments from the state.” Id., 414. Through the practice that Narducci described, all parties involved would know, without affirmatively acknowledging the existence of what is implicitly under- stood, that, if a cooperating witness testified, and if the  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction testimony was deemed truthful by the prosecutor, the prosecutor would bring the witness’ cooperation to the attention of the judge presiding over the witness’ crimi- nal case, with the expectation that doing so would more likely than not benefit the witness in his own criminal case. Our concerns with that practice are twofold. First, the practice motivates a cooperating witness to testify for the state but withholds the basis for that motivation from the jury. Thus, the jury is deprived of the opportunity to properly and fully assess how the witness’ credibility is affected by that motivation. As we have observed, “[o]nly through complete and candid disclosure of a witness’ interest can the jury accurately gauge the credibility of the testimony proffered.” State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 190, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010). Second, the practice further impacts the usefulness of testimony that is already considered questionable. For more than 150 years, this court has recognized “that [accomplice] testimony is of a suspicious character . . . and calls for scrutiny on the part of the jury . . . .” State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 473 (1861); see also, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence”), cert. denied sub nom. Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026, 108 S. Ct. 749, 98 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1988); cf. Innocence Project, Explore the Numbers: Innocence Project’s Impact (2026), available at https:// innocenceproject.org/exonerations-data/ (last visited August 12, 2026) (noting that “involved informants” are one of “the most common causes of wrongful conviction”). This is because “[t]he conditions of character and interest most inconsistent with a credible witness, very frequently, but not always, attend an accomplice when he testifies . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, supra, 295 Conn. 191. When there exists only a “wink and nod” understanding between a cooperating witness and the state, the witness is even more motivated to lie or embellish while testifying to meet with the prosecutor’s approval and to receive the  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction expected leniency. See, e.g., E. Mazur, Note, “Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice,” 51 Duke L.J. 1333, 1336 (2002) (“[r]esearch shows that witnesses are more likely to lie, more likely to cooperate, and more likely to fabricate when agents of the state make implicit rather than explicit promises of leniency”); see also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) (opinion announcing judgment) (“[t]he fact that the [inducement] was not guaranteed through a promise or binding contract, but was expressly contingent on the [g]overnment’s satisfac- tion with the end result, served only to strengthen any incentive to testify falsely in order to secure a convic- tion”); Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506, 516 (Del. 2001) (acknowledging that implicit promises by state “might enhance the propensity of a witness . . . to embellish his testimony in order to increase the likelihood of favorable treatment” in his pending criminal case). If the leniency understanding based on an informal agreement between the cooperating witness and the state is not then put before the jury, the jury may have no reason to consider whether the witness is testifying truthfully or shading his testimony in favor of the state to curry favor with the prosecutor. This concern becomes even greater when the cooperating witness wrongly denies the existence of the implicit agreement and the prosecutor fails to correct the misleading testimony. In that situation, the jury not only does not learn about the implicit agreement but has been expressly told that no such agreement exists. With those issues in mind, we reaffirm that, to properly protect the due process rights of criminal defendants, prosecutors have a duty to correct false or substantially misleading testimony regarding both formal and infor- mal agreements with cooperating witnesses, including those that are implied, unwritten, or tacit. This is in line with our prior decisions acknowledging the importance of not withholding from the jury critical information that would help it assess just how motivated a cooperating witness might be to testify favorably for the state. See,  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction e.g., Marquez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 330 Conn. 604–605. For greater clarity regarding informal agreements, contract law principles serve as a helpful analytic frame- work. We have held that “a plea agreement is akin to a contract” and that the “well established principles of contract law can provide guidance in the interpretation of a plea agreement . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Kallberg, 326 Conn. 1, 15, 160 A.3d 1034 (2017). The same is true for cooperation agreements. See, e.g., State v. Rivers, 283 Conn. 713, 717–18 and n.6, 724–25, 931 A.2d 185 (2007) (analyzing plea and cooperation agreement under contract law prin- ciples). “[T]he primary goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the parties . . . . In ascertaining that intent, we employ an objective standard and look to what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the . . . agreement on the basis of their words and con- duct, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement and the purposes they sought to accomplish.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks.) State v. Kallberg, supra, 15. Specifically, we look to contract law principles govern- ing implied in fact contracts. An implied in fact contract is a contract that “is inferred from the conduct of the parties though not expressed in words.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 804, 826 A.2d 1066 (2003). Such a contract would arise when “the conduct and acts of the parties show an agreement.” Brighenti v. New Britain Shirt Corp., 167 Conn. 403, 406, 356 A.2d 181 (1974). “It is not fatal to a finding of an implied contract that there were no express manifestations of mutual assent if the parties, by their conduct, recognized the existence of contractual obligations.” Rahmati v. Mehri, 188 Conn. 583, 587, 452 A.2d 638 (1982). Importantly, the question “is not whether the defendant in fact expected to pay for the services but whether they were rendered under such circumstances that the defendant either knew, or, as a  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction reasonable man, should have known, that the plaintiff expected compensation.” Butler v. Solomon, 127 Conn. 613, 616, 18 A.2d 685 (1941). In other words, as it relates to cooperation agreements, the question is whether the prosecutor, by his words or actions, created an expec- tation in the witness that the state would provide the witness with consideration for his testimony. We find instructive decisions in other jurisdictions in which the courts considered the conduct of the prosecu- tor and the cooperating witness in determining whether there was an undisclosed cooperation agreement or leni- ency understanding between the witness and the prosecu- tion.4 In United States v. Shaffer, supra, 789 F.2d 682, a coconspirator testified against another coconspirator, implicating him in a narcotics operation. See id., 684–85. The cooperating witness had acquired assets, including a house, by using profits from the operation about which he testified. Id., 689. Although the government knew about these assets, it did not initiate forfeiture proceedings. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that an undisclosed tacit agreement had been created, evidenced in part by the prosecution’s decision not to seek forfeiture of the witness’ ill-gotten assets in return for his testimony. See id. The govern- ment’s conduct provided the witness with an expectation that, if he cooperated, the government would allow him to avoid forfeiture. See id., 689–90. The Ninth Circuit 4 We acknowledge that, in arriving at their conclusions, these courts analyzed the facts under Brady as opposed to the Napue line of cases. The issue for Brady purposes is simply whether the information could be used by the defense to challenge the witness’ credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, supra, 789 F.2d 690. As we explained in Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 187–89, the state can violate its Napue obligation to correct false or misleading testimony even if it complied with its Brady disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, given that “Napue and Brady are cousin[s] representing . . . [the] principle that prosecutors must expose material weaknesses in their cases”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 182; for our purposes, it is useful to examine decisions under either precedent that analyze whether there was an agreement or understanding between a cooperating witness and the prosecution.  Moore v. Commissioner of Correction affirmed the District Court’s order granting a new trial. Id., 691. In Ware v. State, supra, 348 Md. 19, the cooperating witness was serving a life sentence for an unrelated mur- der. Id., 31–32. The witness filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration of his life sentence on the ground that he had come forward voluntarily to provide information in the criminal case against the defendant. See id., 32. During the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the prosecutor in the defendant’s case testified and con- firmed that the witness would be testifying for the state. Id., 33. The court presiding over the witness’ moti