Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction CARLTON BRYAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (SC 21193) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had plotted with H, the petitioner’s close friend, to kill the victim, who was pregnant with the petitioner’s child. The petitioner allegedly sought to terminate the victim’s pregnancy after he failed to convince her to have an abortion. H ultimately fired the fatal gunshot through the rear window of a car that the victim had been driving. A few weeks after the victim’s murder, H met with M, a mutual friend, and H confessed that he had murdered the victim at the petitioner’s behest. During the investigation of a robbery that H and M had committed together after the victim’s murder, the police gathered information implicating H and the petitioner in the murder. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, M testified for the prosecution, stating, inter alia, that H had confessed to committing the murder at the petitioner’s behest and that H had used the same gun during both the victim’s murder and the robbery that H and M had committed together. During his testimony, M denied that he had a deal or agreement with the state or that anything was promised to him relating to pending criminal charges against him in consideration for his testimony against the petitioner. M, however, stated during recross-examination that he had “considerations, but those are the details that will happen,” without specifying what those details were. The prosecution also called M’s defense attorney, C, to testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial, and C testified that there was no agreement between M and the state but that there “would be some consideration given” to M if he testified truthfully at the petitioner’s criminal trial. In the habeas court, the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the prosecutor had violated Napue v. Illinois (360 U.S. 264) when she knowingly presented M’s and C’s false or substantially misleading testimony regarding whether M had a deal or agreement with the state to exchange his testimony against the petitioner for consideration in M’s own criminal case. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed. Held: The prosecutor violated Napue by eliciting false or substantially misleading testimony from M and C concerning M’s agreement with the state, failing to correct the false impressions created by their testimony, and adopting or relying on that testimony during closing argument, and, because those Napue violations were material, this court reversed the habeas court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the habeas petition, to vacate the petitioner’s conviction, and to order a new criminal trial.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction The habeas court’s findings that M did not testify falsely insofar as there merely was some ambiguity in his testimony due to the “different terms” that he and the prosecutor used to describe the arrangement M had with the state, and that this ambiguity was later clarified were clearly erroneous in view of M’s blanket denial of the existence of an agreement, which was never corrected by the prosecutor. Moreover, on redirect examination, the prosecutor reinforced the idea that M had no incentive to wrongly implicate the petitioner by having M confirm that he had no expectation that anything would be given to him as a result of his testimony against the petitioner and that he was testifying because it was “the right thing to do,” and the habeas court’s reliance on M’s statement on recross-examination that he had “considerations, but those are the details that will happen,” to support that court’s conclusion that the jury was made aware of M’s arrangement with the state was misplaced. Furthermore, C’s testimony that there was no agreement but that there would be some consideration if M testified truthfully at the petitioner’s criminal trial did not elucidate the nature of the actual agreement that existed in this case, and C’s testimony that there was no consideration for M other than merely “the hope, perhaps, the expectation” that the sentencing court in M’s criminal case would consider M’s cooperation did not put the jury in the petitioner’s criminal case on notice that there had always been an agreement between M and the state, and, therefore, contrary to the habeas court’s conclusion, C’s testimony was substantially misleading. In addition, the habeas court’s finding that the prosecutor sufficiently clari- fied the nature of the state’s agreement with M was clearly erroneous in light of how the prosecutor viewed the totality of the testimony and described it to the jury during her closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor argued to the jury that M had no interest in the outcome of the petitioner’s case, despite being fully aware that M’s outstand- ing criminal charges would not be resolved until after the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial and his sentence were known, and the prosecutor failed to inform the jury during closing argument that there was, at a mini- mum, an agreement to bring M’s cooperation with the state to the attention of the sentencing court in M’s criminal case but that there was no agreement as to a specific sentence. The Napue violations were material, as there was a reasonable likelihood that M’s and C’s false or substantially misleading testimony concerning the lack of an agreement between M and the state could have affected the jury’s verdict. M’s testimony directly implicated the petitioner in the victim’s murder and was the only evidence linking the murder weapon to the crimes charged, the Napue violations enhanced M’s credibility, and, after accounting for the Napue violations, this court was not persuaded that the remainder of the state’s case against the petitioner was strong enough to render the Napue violations harmless.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction (Two justices concurring in the judgment and one justice dissenting in part in one separate opinion) Argued April 15—officially released September 1, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, geographical area number nineteen, and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed. Reversed; judgment directed. Kayla R. Stephen, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner). Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Christopher Alexy, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion McDONALD, J. The petitioner, Carlton Bryan, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus chal- lenging his conviction of murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-8, and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and General Statutes § 53a-48 (a). See State v. Bryan, 193 Conn. App. 285, 287–88, 293–94, 219 A.3d 477, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 906, 220 A.3d 37 (2019). He claims that the state violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), when the prosecutor, Senior Assistant State’s Attorney Donna Mambrino, knowingly presented the false or substantially mislead- ing testimony of two state witnesses, Kingsley Minto and Richard Cohen, Minto’s defense counsel, during the petitioner’s criminal trial regarding whether Minto made a “deal” with the state to exchange his testimony for consideration in his own criminal case. Additionally, the petitioner claims that Mambrino’s endorsement of this false or substantially misleading testimony in her closing  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction argument contributed to the Napue violations. Because we agree that the state violated Napue, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.1 I The Appellate Court’s decision in the petitioner’s direct appeal, as supplemented by the decision of the habeas court, sets forth the relevant facts that reasonably could have been found by the jury, and the procedural history, which we summarize. See State v. Bryan, supra, 193 Conn. App. 288–94. The victim, Shamari Jenkins, was pregnant with the petitioner’s child. Having failed to convince the victim to have an abortion, the petitioner plotted with a close friend, Matthew Allen Hall-Davis, to kill the victim in order to terminate the pregnancy. In order to carry out the plan, the petitioner asked a for- mer coworker, Reginald Lewis, to repair a Ruger Super Blackhawk .44 Magnum revolver (.44 Ruger). Lewis was unable to fix the .44 Ruger, but Hall-Davis told Lewis that he would fix it. Sometime later, the petitioner and Hall-Davis repaired the .44 Ruger. Prior to the shooting, the petitioner, the victim, and Hall-Davis attended a cookout at the home of the vic- tim’s father in East Hartford. The petitioner and Hall- Davis left the cookout together and met with Hall-Davis’ cousin, Everett Walker, near Walker’s apartment build- ing, which was located on Magnolia Street in Hartford. The petitioner told Walker that the victim refused to have an abortion and that he wanted to kill her in the vicinity of Walker’s apartment building. He also asked Walker to act as a lookout and to tell any police offi- cers dispatched to the crime scene that he had observed an unknown individual running away from the scene. 1 For this reason, we have no occasion to reach the petitioner’s claims brought under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Notwithstanding that we need to go no further than our Napue analysis, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the concurring and dissenting opinion’s thoughtful and thorough treat- ment of the Brady claims. We see no flaws in its analysis, and, had we not disposed of this case under Napue, we would have been inclined to embrace its approach.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction Walker did not respond to the request and returned to his apartment. Later, the victim drove the petitioner in her car to Mag- nolia Street, where the petitioner purportedly intended to meet with his cousin. Hall-Davis approached the car and, using the .44 Ruger, fired a single gunshot through the rear window of the car, fatally striking the victim. The petitioner then called 911 to report that the victim had been shot, but he did not identify the shooter. Subsequently, the petitioner met with Detective Regi- nald Early at the Hartford Police Department and sub- mitted a signed, sworn statement regarding the victim’s murder. In that statement, the petitioner asserted that the shooter was Kevan Simmons. Following an investi- gation, Detective Early ruled out Simmons as a suspect. A few weeks after the murder, Hall-Davis met with Minto, a mutual friend of both Hall-Davis and the peti- tioner. Hall-Davis confessed to Minto that he had killed the victim at the petitioner’s behest because she would not terminate her pregnancy. Hall-Davis then asked Minto for money so that he could flee the area, but Minto had no money to give to Hall-Davis. Thereafter, Hall-Davis and Minto robbed a jewelry store in Manchester. During the robbery, which was recorded on surveillance video, Hall-Davis brandished the .44 Ruger. As Hall-Davis and Minto were driving away from the jewelry store, Hall-Davis tossed a shell casing out of the car window, which Hall-Davis told Minto was from the bullet that he had fired at the victim. Later that day, they drove to a park in Vernon, where Hall-Davis hid the .44 Ruger. After viewing the video footage of the Manchester robbery on the Internet, the petitioner became upset that Hall-Davis had lied to him about having disposed of the .44 Ruger. He called Detective Early to report that Hall-Davis and Minto had committed the Manchester robbery. Largely on the basis of that information, the Manchester Police Department secured arrest warrants  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction for Hall-Davis and Minto. While in police custody, Minto admitted to his involvement in the Manchester robbery and assisted the police in locating the .44 Ruger. On the basis of information that he obtained during the course of his investigation from, among others, Hall- Davis, Minto, and Lewis, Detective Early secured arrest warrants for the petitioner and Hall-Davis in relation to the victim’s murder. After his arrest, the petitioner agreed to be interviewed by Detective Early and another detective. He submitted a signed, sworn statement, alleging that, while he was sitting with the victim in her car on Magnolia Street, Hall-Davis entered the car and sat in the backseat, behind the victim. Detective Early questioned the petitioner as to how Hall-Davis could have entered the car, which had only two doors, without the petitioner first exiting the car. Detective Early also noted that the bullet that struck the victim had been shot through the rear window of the car and would have hit Hall-Davis had he been seated in the backseat. The petitioner ended the interview at that juncture. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, Mambrino called Minto as a prosecution witness. Through his testimony, which was based in large part on Hall-Davis’ hearsay statements, the prosecution established the petitioner’s motive for the victim’s murder and the petitioner’s con- spiracy with Hall-Davis to commit the murder. Similarly, it was through Minto’s testimony that the prosecution introduced Hall-Davis’ confession to killing the victim at the petitioner’s behest. Minto also testified that Hall- Davis had used the same gun in both the Hartford murder and in the Manchester robbery, that the petitioner and Hall-Davis had fixed a mechanical issue affecting this gun before the murder, that he saw Hall-Davis dispose of a shell casing from the bullet that had been fired at the victim, and that the video footage of the Manchester robbery had upset the petitioner because he saw that Hall-Davis had not discarded the gun.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction Given the importance of Minto’s testimony, both Mam- brino and the petitioner’s defense counsel questioned Minto about his potential motives for testifying. On direct examination, the following exchange occurred between Mambrino and Minto: “Q. Have you been promised any deals in exchange for your testimony? “A. No. “Q. Have you been told that, if you testify in this case . . . at the time that you enter a plea in your case . . . the [prosecutor] would merely tell the judge that you cooper- ated and testified in a criminal case? “A. No. “Q. Let me rephrase the question. Were you told that, if you testified in this case . . . [when] you [plead] in front of the judge [presiding over your criminal case] . . . the [prosecutor], either me or another member of my office, would tell the judge that you cooperated . . . in [this] case? “A. No deal was made. “Q. No specific deal was made, but was that told to you? “A. Yes.” On cross-examination, the following exchange took place between defense counsel and Minto: “Q. . . . You testified on direct that ‘there’s been no deals made.’ [Those are] the words you used, right? “A. No deals. “Q. So . . . you’re telling this jury, and you’re testify- ing here, that you have no expectation of anything being given to you for your testimony? “A. Nothing hasn’t been given to me. Nothing had been promised to me. “Q. Okay. So, you’re doing it to be like a good citizen. Is that it?  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction “A. Not in those words. “Q. Okay. Isn’t it true that you anticipate that . . . at some point in the future, when your robbery case is resolved . . . your lawyer will endeavor to make some claim on your behalf that you testified today? Isn’t that true? “A. No. “Q. It’s not. So, you’ve instructed your lawyer not to make any claims to that effect? “A. No.” On redirect examination, the following exchange ensued between Mambrino and Minto: “Q. . . . [Defense] counsel asked you about testifying in this case, and you said that you had no expectation that anything would be given to you as a result of your testimony, right? “A. Yes. “Q. Was any specific plea agreement ever made out between you and the state for your testimony here? “A. No. There was no agreement. “Q. And [defense] counsel said, ‘oh, you’re just doing it to be a good citizen,’ right? “A. Yes. “Q. Why are you doing it? Why are you testifying in this case? “A. Because it’s the right thing to do.” The following exchange occurred on recross-exami- nation: “Q. . . . [N]ow you’re talking because it’s the right thing to do, right? “A. Yes.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction *** “Q. . . . Again, I’m going to ask you, so we’re clear, because [Mambrino] said to you, ‘there’s no deals,’ she said to you on redirect. “A. No deals.” Finally, Minto’s testimony ended with this exchange: “Q. . . . [Y]ou’re telling this jury that you had no con- siderations for your testimony, right? “A. Yes, I have considerations, but those are the details that will happen.” Immediately following Minto’s testimony, Mambrino called Minto’s defense counsel, Cohen, to testify. On direct examination, the following exchange took place: “Q. . . . [D]id we work out any sort of written plea agree- ment between . . . Minto and the state . . . ? “A. No. “Q. Did we work out any other sort of agreement between the state . . . and . . . Minto? “A. No. There was no agreement, verbal or written, regarding this case . . . . “Q. Okay. . . . Did you approach the [prosecution] and ask if [it] wanted to use . . . Minto as a witness in this particular case? “A. Yes. We had discussed that at sometime in the past. “Q. Okay. And, after we discussed that, did the [pros- ecution] tell you what [it] would do if . . . Minto came in and testified truthfully in this case? “A. That there would be some consideration given to . . . Minto if he did testify truthfully in this case. But, beyond that, there was no agreement for any specific sentence [or] any reduction of the sentence. “Q. So, when you say ‘consideration,’ what specifically do you mean by that?  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction “A. Well, I would hope that, when he’s standing before the judge, and he’s being sentenced, or we would work out some plea agreement that would take into consideration the fact that he did come here, he did testify truthfully, and that . . . he might get a break from the judge, in other words, get a lower sentence than he would have other- wise. That would be the hope, perhaps, the expectation, but that’s all it is. “Q. But there hasn’t been anything specific worked out? “A. No. There never is in these situations. “Q. That’s just the expectation, and that’s what the [prosecution] said [it] would indicate to the court [pre- siding over Minto’s criminal case] also at the time that he [pleaded] guilty? “A. Yes. That’s correct. “Q. Other than that, any other promises made to him? “A. No.” After the petitioner’s defense counsel referenced Cohen’s testimony during closing argument, Mambrino argued in rebuttal: “None of [the prosecution witnesses has] an interest in the outcome of this case. There was no deal. There is no deal between the state and . . . Minto. You heard an officer of the court, his lawyer . . . Cohen, get up there and tell you there is no deal between the state and . . . Minto. The only one who has an interest in this case is [the petitioner], and he continually makes up stories to divert attention away from him[self] and [to] get everybody else involved in it.” After requesting and listening to the playback of Minto’s testimony, the jury found the petitioner guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. See State v. Bryan, supra, 193 Conn. App. 287–88, 293–94. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of eighty years of incarceration. Id., 294. At Minto’s subsequent sentencing for the Manchester robbery, Mambrino informed the sentencing court that  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction “the only ‘agreement,’ so to speak, if you want to call it [that], was that, at the time that . . . Minto, in fact, [pleaded] guilty after . . . the [criminal] trials [of the petitioner and Hall-Davis] were over, if he cooperated in those trials, and he testified truthfully in those trial[s], that I would, in fact, let the court know that. I would not be recommending any particular sentence in any way; I never did recommend any sentence in any way.” Mambrino also told the sentencing court that Minto “testified probably better than any witness I’ve ever seen testify, except for an expert witness.” Minto’s sentenc- ing court confirmed that the prosecution never made a recommendation for a particular sentence. The petitioner later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which included Napue claims for Mambrino’s failure to correct Minto’s and Cohen’s false or substan- tially misleading testimony. At the habeas trial, which was held in 2023, Mambrino testified that, during the petitioner’s criminal case, she disclosed to the petition- er’s defense counsel that she would eventually inform the sentencing court presiding over Minto’s criminal case about Minto’s cooperation with the state and his testimony against the petitioner. Mambrino also testified that, in similar situations, when a cooperating witness had his or her own criminal charges pending, Mambrino would “offer” this incentive as “consideration,” and Minto in fact “received the consideration . . . .” Nonetheless, Mambrino denied that this arrangement was a “deal,” such that she had an obligation under Napue to correct Minto’s testimony denying the existence of any deal. She conceded that there was a “promise” and that there had “always been an agreement” between the state and Minto, but she explained that a “specific deal” would have entailed “something written up, specifically what [Minto] would have testified to, what the exact promise was, what the outcome would be.” Mambrino testified that, in her agreement with Minto, “[t]here wasn’t anything specific with respect to a plea and an amount of [prison] time [Minto] would get,” so she did not  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction consider it a “deal . . . .” Minto’s testimony that nothing had been “given” or “promised” to him, in Mambrino’s view, “wasn’t false testimony.” Similarly, Mambrino tes- tified, Minto’s statement that he was testifying against the petitioner because it was “the right thing to do” contained “nothing to correct.” Mambrino maintained that she did not correct Minto’s testimony because “[i]t all was fleshed out in the direct examination.” Mambrino also defended her rebuttal closing argu- ment—in which she twice told the jury that there was no deal—by testifying: “There was no deal. There was an agreement. . . . There was no deal, as words [were] used.” Additionally, when the habeas court questioned her about the difference between a “deal,” a “promise,” and an “agreement,” Mambrino responded by instead discussing her conception of a “plea agreement.” When pressed to define the three specific words in the court’s question, Mambrino answered that she used the word “deal” at the petitioner’s criminal trial only “in a rebut- tal type of way” and the word “promise” in “a rebuttal type of a verbiage.” The habeas court denied the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding in part that there was no Napue violation. Although the court determined that there was an agreement between the state and Minto, it nevertheless found that Minto’s testimony “about the scope of the agreement” was “truthful” and that “the jury was plainly made aware that Minto was told that something would be done in exchange for his testimony” against the petitioner. The habeas court further deter- mined that, even if Minto’s testimony about the nature of the agreement was false or substantially misleading, Mambrino corrected that testimony through the testi- mony of Cohen, who accurately explained the scope of Minto’s agreement with the state. The petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction He then filed a motion to transfer his appeal to this court, which we granted. II The petitioner claims that Mambrino violated Napue by failing to correct the false or substantially mislead- ing testimony of Minto and Cohen concerning Minto’s agreement with the state. Specifically, he argues that Mambrino failed to correct Minto’s testimony that there were “[n]o deals” and Cohen’s testimony that there was “no agreement” between Minto and the state. The respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, argues that the testimony of Minto and Cohen was truthful and that, even if Minto’s testimony was false or substantially misleading, Mambrino corrected Minto’s testimony by questioning Cohen. “[D]ue process is . . . offended if the state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. . . . If a government witness falsely denies having struck a bargain with the state, or substantially mischaracterizes the nature of the inducement, the state is obliged to correct the misconception. . . . Regardless of the lack of intent to lie on the part of the witness, Giglio [v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972)] and Napue require the prosecutor to apprise the court when he or she knows that the witness is giving testimony that is substantially misleading.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomez v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168, 175, 243 A.3d 1163 (2020). “To establish a Napue/Giglio violation, then, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state’s witnesses provided material, false or substantially misleading testimony that the prosecutor failed to correct.” Id., 176. When determining whether a witness’ statement was false or substantially misleading, we consider the statement in the context of his entire testimony. See, e.g., Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 1, 16–22, 190 A.3d 851 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Greene v. Semple, 586 U.S. 1167, 139 S. Ct. 1219, 203 L. Ed. 2d 238 (2019).  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction “Whether a prosecutor knowingly presented false or misleading testimony [in violation of a defendant’s due process rights] presents a mixed question of law and fact, with the habeas court’s factual findings subject to review for clear error and the legal conclusions that the court drew from those facts subject to de novo review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomez v. Commis- sioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 175; see also, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 793 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[w]e review for clear error the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s factual findings on the first two elements [of Napue],” namely, whether government witness committed perjury and whether prosecution knew that witness’ testimony was false), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1088, 136 S. Ct. 860, 193 L. Ed. 2d 758 (2016). Specifically, the habeas court’s assessments of whether the testimony of a state witness was false or substantially misleading and, if so, whether a prosecutor knowingly failed to correct it are factual determinations subject to clear error review, whereas the court’s ultimate materiality assessment—whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the witness’ false or substantially misleading testimony could have affected the jury’s verdict of guilty—is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. See, e.g., Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 176–78 and n.5; Gaskin v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 183 Conn. App. 496, 532 n.23, 193 A.3d 625 (2018); see also, e.g., United States v. Garcia, supra, 1207; United States v. Freeman, 650 F.3d 673, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2011); Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 239, 241 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1115, 126 S. Ct. 1080, 163 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2006). We note that the record of the petitioner’s criminal trial was admitted as a full exhibit in the habeas court. We first review the habeas court’s findings regarding the testimony of Minto and Cohen at the petitioner’s criminal trial. Initially, during direct examination, Mam- brino attempted to draw the truth out of Minto regard- ing his agreement with the state. Mambrino followed up twice on Minto’s denials of any “deals” by instead asking  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction Minto whether a prosecutor had “told” him that he or she would inform Minto’s sentencing court of his cooperation with the state. Minto again responded that “[n]o deal was made.” Mambrino then asked Minto, “[n]o specific deal was made, but was that told to you?” Minto answered “[y]es” in response, thereby acknowledging that he had been told that his cooperation would be made known to the court presiding over his criminal trial at the time of his own sentencing, but offering nothing more. This answer was substantially misleading, and Mam- brino left it uncorrected. Minto’s acknowledgment about being told that his cooperation with the state would be made known to the court presiding over his criminal trial at the time of his own sentencing—his least misleading answer on this topic—was not an acknowledgment by Minto of the existence of an agreement between him and the state. Minto “substantially mischaracterize[d] the nature of the inducement”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 175; by testifying that the benefit he received was not part of a “deal” or agreement, i.e., that the benefit was not an inducement at all. This testimony remained uncorrected even though Mambrino was “obliged to correct the misconception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 175. The fact that Mambrino attempted to draw truthful testimony out of Minto, though laudable, is of no legal moment.2 Cf., e.g., United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 490–92 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Napue violation even when prosecutor conceded during rebuttal argument that witness’ testimony was false). The habeas court’s finding that “the jury was plainly made aware that Minto was told that something would be done in exchange for 2 Mambrino had other options available to her when Minto failed to acknowledge that he had a cooperation agreement with the state. For example, she could have asked the trial court to instruct the jury that the parties stipulate to the existence of such an agreement. See, e.g., United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[m]any prosecutors, when this occurs, interrupt their own questioning, and work out in a bench conference with the judge and defense counsel how to inform the jury immediately that the testimony is false”).  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction his testimony” is unsupported by the record and is clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added.) On cross-examination, Minto testified that there were “[n]o deals” and that “[n]othing had been promised to [him]”—false statements unto themselves. He further testified that Cohen was not going to tell Minto’s sen- tencing court about his cooperation with the state and ambiguously answered whether he instructed Cohen not to inform Minto’s sentencing court. Even if a hairsplit- ting distinction may be drawn here—based on whether Cohen, rather than Mambrino, was the specific person who would speak during Minto’s sentencing with the court presiding over his criminal case—Minto’s testi- mony was “in part false and otherwise so misleading as to amount to falsity”; United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1997); because it cast doubt on the existence of any agreement in the presence of the jury. On redirect examination, Mambrino pivoted from trying to elicit correct testimony from Minto to instead shoring up his credibility. She asked him: “Was any specific plea agreement ever made out between you and the state for your testimony here?” (Emphasis added.) Minto not only denied the existence of a “specific plea agreement,” but he also testified that “[t]here was no agreement” whatsoever. Mambrino thus attempted to shore up Minto’s credibility by eliciting testimony about a different kind of agreement entirely, so that Minto could deny the existence of that agreement in front of the jury, and Minto doubled down by disavowing any and all agreements. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 270–71. On recross-examination, Minto again falsely testified that there were “[n]o deals” between him and the state. Then, when defense counsel asked Minto whether he was “telling this jury that [he] had no considerations for [his] testimony,” Minto answered, “[y]es, I have consider- ations, but those are the details that will happen.” This answer was Minto’s final testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial. There is no surrounding context for what  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction those “details” are, or what Minto meant by “consider- ations . . . .” Even if not false, this answer is substantially misleading because it immediately followed another denial of any “deals” and tends to ratify this previous falsehood. Furthermore, in Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 168, we cited Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002), for its proposi- tion that a “tepid admission” by a witness during cross- examination was insufficient to cure the impact of false testimony on the jury, especially when the prosecutor sought to shore up the witness’ credibility. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 189, citing Jenkins v. Artuz, supra, 293–96. On the basis of the totality of his testimony, the habeas court determined that Minto did not testify falsely, insofar as there was merely “some ambiguity in Minto’s testimony” due to the “different terms” that he and Mam- brino used, and that this ambiguity was later clarified. This finding is clearly erroneous due to Minto’s blanket denial of the existence of an agreement, which was never corrected. To the contrary, during redirect examina- tion, Mambrino reinforced the idea that Minto had no incentive to wrongly implicate the petitioner by having Minto confirm that he “had no expectation that anything would be given to [him] as a result of [his] testimony” and by eliciting from him both that he had “no agreement” with the state and that he was testifying because “it’s the right thing to do.” Given this testimony on redirect examination, any reliance by the habeas court on Minto’s final statement on recross-examination to support its conclusion that “the jury was plainly made aware” of the agreement was misplaced.3 The habeas court also relied on Cohen’s testimony as clarifying the nature of the agreement that Minto had 3 The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 330 Conn. 1. In Greene, this court determined that a cooperating witness’ testimony that he had “no deal” with the state and “was expecting nothing in return for his testimony” was not substantially misleading; (internal quotation marks omitted)  Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction with the state. For his part, Cohen testified that “[t]here was no agreement, verbal or written, regarding this case . . . .” For the reasons discussed previously, this unequivocal answer was, at a minimum, substantially misleading. Cohen admitted that “there would be some consideration given to . . . Minto if he did testify truth- fully” in the petitioner’s criminal case but insisted that “there was no agreement for any specific sentence [or] any reduction of the sentence.” As with Minto’s response to Mambrino’s question regarding “any specific plea agree- ment,” Cohen’s answer does not elucidate the nature of the actual agreement that existed in this case. For this reason, it is substantially misleading. Cohen further id., 13; despite the facts that the witness had entered a guilty plea prior to his testimony and that the transcript of the plea reflected that his cooperation with the state would be taken into consideration when he was sentenced. See id., 5–6, 9 and n.5, 12. This court agreed with the respondent that the witness’ “testimony [made] it clear that, when he testified that he had no ‘deal,’ he was not broadly denying that he had received any benefit in exchange for his testimony.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 14. After reviewing the questions asked of the witness on direct examination and cross-examination; see id., 16–20; we concluded: “It is evident that [the witness] was responding to questions regarding the length of the sentence he expected to receive, not whether he expected any benefit whatsoever. His response that he could ‘do the time’ fur- ther shows that [the witness] understood the question to be directed at the sentence he expected to receive. Because there was no agreement with respect to his specific sentence, [the witness’] testimony was not substantially misleading.” Id., 20–21. Central to our analysis was the fact that the witness’ “testimony made clear that he had received some benefit [from the state], namely, that he had pleaded to nonhomicide charges, which carry a significantly reduced sentence”; id., 22; thereby capping his exposure for his involvement in a shooting in which six people were shot, including one person who died as a