Turner v. Commissioner of Correction

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction TYQUAN TURNER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (SC 21222) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, H, had provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge certain cell site location information (CSLI) evidence admitted at the petitioner’s criminal trial. The petitioner’s conviction stemmed from an incident in the city of Hartford during which the victim was robbed of his jewelry and shot. At the criminal trial, the state presented, among other evidence, the testimony of two eyewitnesses and W, a member of the Hartford Police Department. W testified about cell site technology generally and about specific cell phone data, including CSLI, that the police had obtained from the petitioner’s cell phone carrier. W explained that he had entered the CSLI into a computer program that produced a time-lapse video purporting to depict the movement of the petitioner’s cell phone on the day of the shooting, and the video was admit- ted into evidence without objection. The video depicted the petitioner’s cell phone, represented by a human silhouette superimposed on a map of Hartford, moving in straight lines between relevant locations, including the crime scene and a pawn shop where the victim’s jewelry had been sold shortly after the murder. W conceded on direct examination that the video and the underlying data could establish only that the cell phone was in an area associated with a particular cell site but that the data could not be used to establish that a person was in a particular location or that the cell phone was at any specific address. The state ultimately relied heavily on the CSLI evidence during closing and rebuttal arguments. At the petitioner’s habeas trial, H testified that his trial strategy was to downplay the significance of the CSLI evidence and to focus on weaknesses in the eyewitness identifications. H also testified that he had opted not to challenge W during cross-examination but instead intended to use W’s testimony to the petitioner’s advantage during closing argument. The habeas court granted in part the habeas petition and ordered a new criminal trial, concluding that H had ultimately performed deficiently and that the petitioner had been prejudiced by H’s deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the respondent, the Commissioner of Cor- rection, appealed from the habeas court’s judgment. Held: The habeas court correctly determined that H had performed deficiently and that the petitioner had been prejudiced thereby, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court’s decision was based soley on H’s failure to investigate the CSLI evidence and to cross- examine W, and the record established that the petitioner distinctly raised the claim that H had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the admissibility of the time-lapse video.  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction In construing the habeas court’s decision, this court concluded that the habeas court had determined that reasonably competent counsel would have challenged the admissibility of the time-lapse video, that, because the video misrepresented the capabilities of CSLI, it would have been excluded from evidence if H had challenged its admission, and that H had performed deficiently specifically by failing to challenge or respond to the video. Although the respondent claimed that the habeas court’s finding that H had failed to investigate the CSLI evidence was not supported by the evidence, the habeas court’s determination that H had performed deficiently did not depend on the extent of H’s investigation into the CSLI evidence, as it was H’s failure to challenge or respond to that evidence in any way that served as the basis for the habeas court’s finding of deficient performance. Moreover, although H’s stated strategy of focusing on undermining the eye- witness identifications and to downplay the significance of the CSLI evidence rather than directly challenging W’s testimony on cross-examination was not objectively unreasonable, H had failed to execute any such strategy at the petitioner’s criminal trial, thereby allowing the state’s strongest evidence to appear virtually unassailable. Accordingly, H’s failure to present any meaningful defense to the CSLI evidence, and, more specifically, the time-lapse video, was outside of the range of professionally competent assistance, and thus fell below the objec- tive standard of reasonableness. This court concluded, upon its independent review of the record, that the habeas court had properly assessed the impact of H’s deficient performance on the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial. The state’s case against the petitioner was not overwhelming and relied primarily on the CSLI evidence, including the time-lapse video, to connect the petitioner to the victim’s murder, the prosecutor acknowledged that the CSLI evidence was the state’s strongest evidence and relied extensively on the video in his closing and rebuttal arguments, and the identifications made by the two eyewitnesses were weak and had been effectively undermined by H. Accordingly, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the peti- tioner’s criminal trial would have been different if H had attempted to undermine the CSLI evidence, including the time-lapse video. Contrary to the respondent’s arguments, the petitioner’s failure to call W to testify and to present new CSLI evidence at his habeas trial did not preclude a finding of prejudice under the circumstances of this case. Argued April 15—officially released August 11, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment granting in  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction part the petition, from which the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed. Affirmed. Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state’s attor- ney, and Gail P. Hardy, former state’s attorney, for the appellant (respondent). Vishal K. Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellee (petitioner). Robert J. Meredith and Desmond M. Ryan filed a brief for the Innocence Project, Inc., et al. as amici curiae. Opinion BRIGHT, J. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court granting in part the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Tyquan Turner.1 The habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s crimi- nal trial counsel, Attorney Walter D. Hussey, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the state’s historical cell site location information (CSLI) evidence and that the petitioner was prejudiced as a result. On appeal, the respondent claims that the petitioner failed to establish both that Hussey had performed deficiently and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court. The following background regarding the petitioner’s underlying criminal conviction is relevant to the respon- dent’s appeal. See State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 224 A.3d 129 (2020); State v. Turner, 181 Conn. App. 535, 187 A.3d 454 (2018), aff’d, 334 Conn. 660, 224 A.3d 129 (2020). Shortly before 4 p.m. on July 13, 2013, the victim, Miguel Rodriguez, was fatally shot by two 1 Upon the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, the respondent appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction assailants while he was standing outside of 10-12 Flat- bush Avenue in Hartford. State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 539. Although two eyewitnesses, Charlene Lara and Jose DeJesus, gave statements to the police, the victim’s family and friends refused to cooperate beyond reporting that his gold chain and medallion were missing. Id. Shortly after the shooting, Lorenzo Christian sold those items to a pawn shop located at 1154 Albany Ave- nue in Hartford, and he received a check in the amount of $1134. Id., 540, 548. Christian was unable to cash the check, so the petitioner called Alexandra Colon, the mother of his child, who agreed to cash it for Christian. Id. The petitioner and Christian picked up Colon from her house and drove to a bank on Park Street in Hartford, where Colon deposited the check in her account. Id., 548. After the check had cleared, Colon gave the proceeds to the petitioner. Id. The day after the homicide, the police received a phone call from an unidentified person who implicated the petitioner in the shooting and provided the police with a photograph of the petitioner that had been circulated in the victim’s neighborhood. See id., 540. A few weeks later, when officers attempted to apprehend him in Hart- ford, the petitioner avoided capture but dropped his cell phone in the process, which was then seized by the police. Id., 540–41. Colon later identified the phone as the petitioner’s and gave the police the petitioner’s cell phone number, which allowed the police to obtain call detail records, including CSLI, and account subscription information from the petitioner’s cell phone carrier, formerly Sprint Corporation (Sprint). Id., 541. Those records revealed that the cell phone number had been changed on July 14, 2013, the day after the homicide. Id. Sergeant Andrew Weaver of the Hartford Police Department analyzed the call detail records and entered the CSLI into a computer program, Oculus GeoTime, which produced a time-lapse video purporting to depict the movement of the petitioner’s cell phone—represented by a purple, human silhouette—on a map of the city of  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction Hartford during the time of the homicide (GeoTime video). See id., 541–42; see also id., 542–43 n.6. “Weaver also took screenshots of the video at different times between approximately 3:24 and 5:08 p.m. on the day of the crime.” Id., 542–43. The petitioner was arrested and charged with murder, felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. Id., 543. At trial, the state called several witnesses, including DeJesus, Lara, Colon, and members of the Hartford Police Department who were involved in the investiga- tion. See id. The state introduced the cell phone records through Ray Clark, a records custodian at Sprint, and the trial court admitted those documents into evidence without objection. State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 664; see also State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 543–44. “On cross-examination, Clark testified that the call detail records allow a person to determine where a call was generated and where it ended in relationship to a particular cell site. Clark clarified, however, that ‘you can’t pinpoint and say [the phone] has to have been exactly here. This record simply says it had to have been in the vicinity of this particular cell site at the time the phone call began and, likewise, at the time the phone call ends.’ Clark explained that a cell phone is within the vicinity of a particular cell site when it is within the range of that cell site, the range being approximately two miles in larger cities like Hartford. “Weaver was called to testify next. The state did not disclose Weaver as an expert witness, although the trial court instructed the jury that he provided expert tes- timony.” State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 664–65. Weaver testified that each cell site typically has three antennae, each of which provides coverage for a different 120 degree sector of the cell site’s circular coverage area, and he estimated that the average coverage area in Hart- ford would extend approximately one and one-half miles from the cell site. Id., 665–66. He noted that, although cell sites are designed to limit overlapping coverage areas  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction to reduce interference and dropped calls, some overlap remains to allow for “ ‘seamless transmission’ ” from one cell site to the next. Id., 666. Weaver explained that a cell phone generally connects to the cell site with the strongest signal, which is often—but not always—the closest one. Id. For example, a more distant cell site may emit the stronger signal if there are obstructions between the closest cell site and the phone. Id. Weaver testified that Sprint’s call detail records iden- tify the sector of the cell site through which a call is routed and the coordinates of the cell site. Id., 665. He explained that he inputted that information into Oculus GeoTime, which created the GeoTime video depicting “a map that visually represents the calls over time.”2 Id., 665–66. Consistent with Clark’s testimony, “Weaver clarified that the cell phone data and subsequent map show only that ‘the phone itself was in a certain area’ but do not establish that a certain person was in a certain area or provide a specific address at which the phone was located.” Id., 666. Despite those well established limitations, the GeoTime video showed a human figure imposed on an underlying map of Hartford and moving in straight lines from the center of one orange, pie shaped coverage area to the next. The GeoTime video and the corresponding screenshots were admitted into evidence without objection. See id., 673. “Weaver explained that ‘[w]hat we do, once we have the [cell sites] associated on the map, the program, we add in the data that [come] from the cell phone company about the calls that were made. So, we know at . . . 3:24 in the afternoon, that . . . the cell phone [at issue] made a call, and it was routed through that pie shaped area. What we do is, the next call is routed through another [sector], or it can be the same [sector], in which case, you wouldn’t show movement [on the map]. . . . [T]he movement is actually just [showing] where the cell phone 2 Weaver testified that the GeoTime program “will move you over time based on when your calls start and end. It will move you over time across the map to the next tower.”  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction goes over time. So, we move it from the center of one coverage area to the center of the next coverage area. I can’t tell you which streets were driven down. The—the only thing we can be 100 percent sure of is, the phone calls were made and that at some point the cell phone traveled between—from one coverage area to the next coverage area.’ “The [GeoTime video] showed that, at 3:25 p.m. on the day of the shooting, the cell phone that the [petitioner] dropped was in a particular cell coverage area, in which was 1154 Albany Avenue, the address for the pawn shop where the victim’s gold chain and medallion were sold. At 3:53 p.m., near the time of the murder, the cell phone was located within another coverage area, near 18 Flat- bush Avenue, the location of the crime scene. Although the crime scene was located just outside of the [depicted] coverage area of the [cell site] that routed the 3:53 p.m. call, as explained, Weaver testified that a cell phone may [connect to a more distant cell site with a] better signal. Then, at approximately 4:17 p.m., the maps showed the cell phone again within the cell coverage area that included the location of the pawn shop.” Id., 666–67. During summation, the prosecutor focused exten- sively on the CSLI evidence, arguing that “the stron- gest piece of evidence is the phone” and referring to the GeoTime video as “a virtual map as to what happened.” The prosecutor narrated the GeoTime video for the jury, suggesting that the movement of the depicted human figure tracked the petitioner’s movements as he visited all of the incriminating locations on the day of the crime, including Christian’s residence, the crime scene, the pawn shop, Colon’s residence, and his own residence.3 3 The prosecutor stated that the GeoTime video showed that “the per- son holding this phone leaves” the petitioner’s residence at 3:06 p.m., travels toward Albany Avenue, and, by 3:25 p.m., “he’s moving from that area” where Christian lived. “The [petitioner] and his phone are on top of the shooting scene,” then the petitioner’s “phone stays” near the pawn shop before “the [petitioner], with his phone, moves about the city of Hartford.” The prosecutor described the petitioner’s stopping near Colon’s residence so that she could cash Christian’s check and argued  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction The prosecutor concluded his summation by stating that the petitioner himself recognized “the extreme value of the phone records” because he changed his phone number the day after the crime. Hussey countered that the state had relied on the CSLI evidence because the eyewitness identifications had been weak. The majority of Hussey’s closing argument focused on the flaws in the testimony of Lara and DeJesus, and the deficiencies in the investigation by the Hartford Police Department. As to the cell phone, Hussey pri- marily argued that the state had failed to prove that the phone belonged to the petitioner and suggested that the phone likely belonged to Christian: “They talk about the movement of the phone, but they don’t tell you who has the phone. . . . Who could have had that phone? . . . Christian? Yeah.”4 Hussey briefly touched on the CSLI evidence, arguing: “Weaver said . . . I can’t tell you which way they were driving. I can’t tell you who had the phone. I can’t even tell you really where it was. I can tell you where they weren’t. Well, it looks like they’re back and forth. And if—if it really was his phone and he had the phone, he doesn’t go anywhere.” Hussey offered no other direct commentary on the CSLI evidence and concluded by arguing that “all this other [evidence is a] smoke screen [and] doesn’t have any significance, because [the petitioner] has to be identified beyond a reasonable doubt as [the person] pulling that trigger and robbing that chain. It hasn’t been done.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated his narration of the GeoTime video and argued that there was no ques- tion that the petitioner was guilty of felony murder, despite any reasonable doubt as to whether he was the shooter. The prosecutor concluded by focusing on the that “the person holding this phone at the end of the evening on July 13 ultimately will come to stay” at the petitioner’s residence. 4 Hussey argued that “[Christian is] the guy who, within an hour or two of the crime, is what? Pawning that chain, right? He lives right by [the pawn shop]. . . . Who’s to say [Christian] didn’t call [the petitioner] and say, I got a chain. I got a check that I just pawned. Can your girl cash a check for me?”  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction CSLI evidence and Colon’s testimony, noting that the “phone and its records loop around . . . every point of interest related to the crime,” and that the petitioner asked Colon to cash a check for Christian shortly after the victim was killed. The jury found the petitioner guilty of felony murder, first degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, but not guilty of murder. State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 667–68. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to seventy years of incarceration, and the petitioner appealed from the judgment of conviction. Id., 668. While the petitioner’s appeal was pending in the Appellate Court,5 we issued our decision in State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 129–33, 156 A.3d 506 (2017), in which we held that expert testimony regarding CSLI evidence is the type of scientific evidence that warrants a Porter hearing6 to determine whether it is based on reliable scientific methodology. Before the Appellate Court, the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the trial court’s qualification of Weaver as an expert witness and its admission of CSLI coverage maps violated his due process right to a fair trial because that scientific evidence “does not satisfy the reliability safeguards [then] required by [Edwards].”7 (Internal 5 The petitioner appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3), and we transferred his direct appeal to the Appellate Court pursuant to § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. See State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 544 n.10. 6 In State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), “we followed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and held that testimony based on scientific evidence should be subjected to a flexible test to determine the reliability of methods used to reach a particular conclusion. . . . A Porter analysis involves a two part inquiry that assesses the reliability and relevance of the wit- ness’ methods.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 669. 7 The petitioner also claimed that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, pros- ecutorial impropriety deprived him of his right to a fair trial, and the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding robbery in the first  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 549. Because Hussey neither objected to Weaver’s testimony nor requested a Porter hearing to challenge the state’s CSLI evidence, the petitioner sought review of his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), and the plain error doctrine. State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 549. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction; id., 571; conclud- ing that the petitioner’s unpreserved evidentiary claim was unreviewable under Golding; id., 551; and that the petitioner could not prevail under the plain error doctrine because “[Hussey] made a strategic decision not to object to the [CSLI] evidence or Weaver’s qualification . . . .”8 Id., 552. We granted certification to appeal;9 State v. Turner, 330 Conn. 909, 193 A.3d 48 (2018); and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 687. The petitioner filed the underlying habeas petition while his direct appeal was pending, and he filed the operative amended petition in October 2023, shortly before the second day of the habeas trial. In the operative petition, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that Hussey performed deficiently by failing (1) to request a Porter hearing or “to otherwise challenge the introduction of expert testimony regarding call detail mapping analysis and [the] admission of cell phone coverage maps,” (2) degree. State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 538. The Appellate Court rejected those claims. Id., 538–39. 8 The Appellate Court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to review the petitioner’s unpreserved claim. State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App. 555 n.17. 9 We granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the petitioner was not entitled to review, under State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 233], of his unpreserved claim that the trial court [had] improperly admitted cell tower coverage maps?” And (2) “[d]id the Appellate Court properly determine that the petitioner was not entitled to plain error review of his unpreserved claim that the trial court [had] improperly admitted cell tower coverage maps?” State v. Turner, 330 Conn. 909, 193 A.3d 48 (2018).  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction to “prepare and . . . present the petitioner’s defense by . . . investigating legal, scientific, and factual issues related to call detail mapping analysis, cell phone cov- erage maps, and [CSLI] evidence generally,” and (3) to “cross-examine, impeach, or otherwise challenge the testimony of” Clark and Weaver.10 At the habeas trial, copies of materials from the peti- tioner’s criminal trial and subsequent appeals were admitted into evidence, including the trial transcripts, court file, CSLI exhibits, and appellate briefs and appen- dices. The petitioner called several witnesses, including Hussey, Joseph John Kennedy, who testified as an expert in digital communications and cellular analysis, and Attorney Aaron J. Romano, who testified as a criminal defense expert. Hussey testified that he focused his efforts on the state’s two eyewitnesses who had identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. Hussey did not recall doing any specific research regarding Weaver’s testimony or the CSLI evidence in the petitioner’s case, but he did research the topic for a different case in which he was involved in Bridgeport. Hussey testified: “[T]he reason why I know [about CSLI] is because I had to read things, and my issue is [that] I’m not sure if this case [preceded] or [if] it was [at] the same time as that case in Bridgeport. . . . But it seems to me [that] it was [at] about the same time.” He was aware that Weaver likely would testify about the CSLI at trial but did not become aware of the visual aids until “late in the game, closer to the point of trial.” Hussey, however, had no recollection of investigating the 10 The petitioner also claimed that (1) the state had violated his due process right to a fair trial by failing to disclose exculpatory materials in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), (2) his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of unreliable and misleading call detail mapping analysis and by the state’s failure to correct false or substantially mis- leading testimony, and (3) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In his posttrial brief, the petitioner abandoned his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and the habeas court rejected the petitioner’s due process claims. The petitioner has not cross appealed to challenge the habeas court’s judgment on those counts.  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction substance of Weaver’s expected testimony, and he recog- nized “certain flaws” in Weaver’s testimony. He noted that Weaver’s testimony suggested that the petitioner was in a specific location, which “you really can’t do” with the call detail records. When asked why he decided not to cross-examine Weaver, Hussey responded that “I didn’t want to [go] toe-to-toe with him because he had the advantage. So, I figured I would just use what he said to my advantage in my closing.” Regarding the GeoTime video in particular, Hussey testified that he saw no basis for challenging the video’s depiction of the cell sites and coverage areas because that information is “real and demonstrative,” but he recognized that he could have objected to the depiction of a human figure moving around the map because it was “more prejudicial than probative.” Hussey explained that he was not “completely concerned with” the video because Weaver “had to acknowledge that you’re at least” one and one-half miles away from the cell site, which made the video appear to be “a reach” by the state to compensate for the lack of any direct evidence. Hussey admitted, however, that he “was wrong in [his] assess- ment of the damage that was done, but [he] thought it could be explained away as more or less a reach. And, if you’re two miles away, you’re two miles away.” Hussey assumed that “the distance obviously [would have been] the focal point” of his summation because “Weaver said that he couldn’t say who had the phone in their hands, [and] he couldn’t say what street they were on. He really couldn’t say anything . . . with any degree of certainty . . . .” On cross-examination, Hussey testified that, gener- ally, he would forgo cross-examination if he thought that (1) the witness did not “hurt our case,” or (2) cross- examination would “make us look worse” because Hussey “didn’t have a lot to work with . . . .” When asked about his strategy of forgoing cross-examination and using Weaver’s testimony to his advantage in closing, Hussey explained that he viewed “the cell phone [as] an attempt  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction to backdoor a conviction, and [he] didn’t think it was going to work. . . . [T]o [Hussey], it looked . . . more des- perate than what it turned out to be, which, obviously, was damning.” Romano testified that reasonably competent counsel would have (1) requested a Porter hearing to challenge call detail mapping in general, (2) filed a motion in limine to exclude the GeoTime video on the ground that its depiction of a human figure moving in linear paths to and from specific places on the map was likely “to mislead the jury,” (3) cross‑examined the state’s expert to challenge the accuracy of the GeoTime video, and (4) presented testimony from a defense expert. Romano opined that, at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial, reasonably competent counsel with a basic understanding of CSLI and its limits “would be able to know that [the GeoTime] video . . . is misleading” because “it purports to demon- strate that there’s movement” when the underlying data do not establish “that, indeed, there is movement.” He further opined that, absent an objection to the admis- sibility of the GeoTime video, reasonably competent counsel would have challenged the accuracy of the video through cross-examination. Romano also testified that he was unable to envision any circumstances in which reasonably competent counsel would allow CSLI evidence to be admitted at trial without challenging it. Kennedy, who had reviewed the materials of the peti- tioner’s criminal trial, testified regarding the limitations of CSLI, including that CSLI cannot pinpoint an exact location and that switching cell sites does not necessarily indicate movement. Kennedy testified that, on the basis of the call detail records in the petitioner’s case, only the coverage areas for the cell sites through which calls were routed could be determined, and attempting to specify the phone’s location within a particular coverage area “would just be speculation, just a random guess.” In his posttrial brief, the petitioner argued that Hussey performed deficiently by “failing to adequately pre- pare and present the petitioner’s defense to the state’s  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction [CSLI] evidence” and that Hussey failed to “raise avail- able challenges to the admissibility and scope of such evidence.” The respondent countered that the petitioner had failed to prove his ineffective assistance claims based on Hussey’s “[failure] to raise novel claims pertaining to the admission of [CSLI] evidence” or to demonstrate prejudice attributable to that deficient performance because “whether the trial court would have granted a motion for a Porter hearing in the pre-Edwards envi- ronment in which the petitioner’s [criminal] case was tried is entirely speculative.” In his reply, the petitioner argued that the respondent had failed to “address the petitioner’s claim that Hussey was ineffective because he did not request the removal of the depiction of a person moving around the city from the [GeoTime video] that accompanied Weaver’s testimony. Hussey [offered no] strategic basis for his failure, and the prejudicial nature of the completely misleading visual representation speaks for itself.” The habeas court subsequently issued its memorandum of decision and granted in part the petition.11 The court applied the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate both that (1) counsel performed deficiently (performance prong), and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner (prejudice prong). The court concluded that Hussey performed deficiently by failing “to challenge the admissibility of [CSLI] testimony, including [the GeoTime video] purporting to show the [petitioner’s] path of travel, from . . . Weaver and that this failure prejudiced [the petitioner].” The court found that the GeoTime video “actively misrepresented” the CSLI evi- dence by showing a human silhouette moving in straight lines between precise locations within each cell site’s coverage area, even though that evidence could not be used to determine the phone’s precise location or move- ments. The court observed that the CSLI evidence could 11 See footnote 10 of this opinion.  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction have been presented in several “alternat[ive] and equally correct” ways,12 but “the state chose to represent the cell phone [as] a silhouette of a person traveling along a path that coincided with key locations in this case.” As to Strickland’s first prong, the court reasoned that “Hussey’s strategy of attacking [the eyewitness] identifications was a reasonable trial strategy. However, [despite] having experience with Weaver and CSLI evi- dence . . . Hussey neither investigated the CSLI data, requested a Porter hearing, appreciated the impact the GeoTime [video] likely would have on the jury, [nor] in any way challenged Weaver’s testimony and [related] evidence. There is no evidence that [he] even did a rudi- mentary investigation into the CSLI [evidence] and Weaver’s likely testimony. This complete lack of inves- tigation prior to trial . . . is evidence of deficient perfor- mance by trial counsel that allowed the state to present uncontested evidence that connected [the petitioner] to the charged offenses. Weaver’s testimony and the Geo- Time [video were] central to the state’s case and [were] not cumulative. That evidence was . . . the proverbial circumstantial glue that held together the fabric woven by the state’s evidence. . . . Hussey neither investigated the CSLI evidence nor conducted any cross-examination of Weaver. . . . [T]his is deficient performance below that of . . . reasonably competent trial counsel.” (Emphasis in original.) As to the prejudice prong, the habeas court deter- mined that the petitioner failed to prove that he had been prejudiced by Hussey’s failure to request a Porter hearing because he had not shown that the CSLI evidence would have been excluded altogether. The court, how- ever, concluded that the petitioner demonstrated that he had been prejudiced by Hussey’s failure to challenge the admissibility of the misleading GeoTime video and 12 The habeas court reasoned that “[r]epresenting the cell phone could just as validly have been done by showing a single, unmoving dot for the entire duration, or a silhouette moving in a haphazard, random pattern at the edge of one or all of the [coverage areas], or even a silhouette slowly turning in circles of ever increasing radii around a central point.”  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction Weaver’s related testimony.13 The court reasoned that the eyewitness testimony presented at the petitioner’s criminal trial was weak, whereas the GeoTime video was “uncontested, uncontradicted, and highly suggestive,” and “Weaver’s expert opinion would have been viewed as highly convincing.” The court emphasized that the prosecutor relied extensively on the GeoTime video in summation and rebuttal, thereby magnifying the impact the misleading evidence had on the jury. The court there- fore granted in part the petition, vacated the petitioner’s conviction, and ordered a new criminal trial. This appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The applicable standard of review is well settled. In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, although the habeas court’s factual “findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous . . . [t]he application of [the pertinent legal standard to] the habeas court’s factual findings . . . presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 344 Conn. 365, 373, 279 A.3d 147 (2022). I Before considering the respondent’s claims on appeal, we must resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the basis for the habeas court’s judgment. The respondent claims that “the granting of the writ was solely based on Hussey’s failure (1) to investigate the CSLI evidence, and (2) to cross-examine Weaver,” whereas the peti- tioner contends that the habeas court concluded that Hussey “failed to adequately prepare and [to] present a defense to the state’s [CSLI] evidence” on the basis of Hussey’s “complete failure to respond to the highly misleading GeoTime” video. The parties also disagree as to whether the habeas court found that the GeoTime video would have been excluded if Hussey had objected 13 The habeas court framed the prejudice inquiry as whether “the jury’s verdict [was] substantially influenced by Weaver’s uncontested testimony and use of the GeoTime rendition of [the petitioner’s] move- ments . . . .”  Turner v. Commissioner of Correction to its admissibility on the grounds that it was misleading and unduly prejudicial. In his reply brief, the respondent argues that any claim that Hussey performed deficiently in failing to object to the GeoTime video as misleading or prejudicial is unpre- served because the petitioner did not distinctly raise that claim before the habeas court, and the habeas court never made such a finding. The respondent suggests that the mislea