Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services LESLIE B. DANIELS, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF JACK ANDERSON) v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE SERVICES (SC 21150) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff, the executor of the estate of the decedent, A, appealed from the trial court’s judgment upholding a tax assessment imposed by the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services, against A’s estate. At the time of his death, A maintained homes in Connecticut, Arizona and Florida, and divided his time between them. The audit division of the Department of Revenue Services had determined that A was a resident of and domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his death and, therefore, that his estate was subject to taxation pursuant to statute (§ 12-391 (d) (1) (C)). The commissioner, through the department’s appellate division, subsequently upheld the audit division’s domicile determination. The executor then appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that A had died as a Florida domiciliary and that A’s estate should not have been subject to taxation in Connecticut. The trial court conducted a de novo trial during which it heard evidence concerning A’s personal, social and proprietary connections with Connecticut and Florida, and ultimately determined that the executor had failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that A was not a Connecticut domiciliary at the time of his death. Accordingly, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that the executor had not demonstrated that the assessment was erroneous or unreasonable. On appeal, the executor claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly sustained the estate tax assessment insofar as it incorrectly concluded that A was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his death. Held: This court rejected the commissioner’s argument that it was improper for this court to consider, sua sponte, whether the trial court had applied the appropriate standard of proof for purposes of that court’s determination of whether A had been domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his death. A taxpayer’s burden of proof in an appeal from an estate tax assessment is an exceptional circumstance in which important considerations of justice outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules governing the preserva- tion of claims and adversarial principles. Moreover, this court has never previously had occasion to opine on the proper standard of proof required to establish domicile for estate tax purposes, and the appropriate burden of proof a taxpayer must satisfy in an appeal from a decision of the government’s taxing authority necessarily implicates both the public’s interest in and the taxpayer’s entitlement to fair and accurate taxation. The trial court improperly applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, in making  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services its domicile determination, and, accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was reversed to the extent that that court sustained the commissioner’s tax assessment, and the case was remanded so that the trial court could apply the correct standard. Under § 12-391 (h) (1), a decedent is presumed to have died as a resident of Connecticut for estate tax purposes, and the burden is expressly placed on the decedent’s estate to establish exemption from taxation by reason of the decedent’s alleged nonresidency, but that statute does not specify what standard of proof applies. In Connecticut, when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard generally governs factual determinations required by that statute, and, although this court previously has held that the clear and convincing standard applies in the context of sales and use tax appeals, that higher degree of proof is generally reserved for civil cases involving allegations of quasi-criminal wrongdoing or when particularly important individual rights are involved. In the present case, there was no compelling justification for courts to depart from the usual preponderance of the evidence standard when adjudicating estate tax appeals challenging the commissioner’s domicile determination, and, therefore, this court held that, under § 12-391 (h) (1), the executor of a decedent’s estate bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent was not domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his or her death. This court further clarified that, although the statutes (§§ 12-395 and 12-554) permitting appeals from the commissioner’s domicile determinations do not expressly provide for a trial de novo, such appeals are to be tried by the reviewing court de novo, without the deference that generally occurs in other administrative appeals. Moreover, in determining a decedent’s domicile, the reviewing court is not limited to the evidence or legal theories presented at the agency level but, rather, may adopt whatever testimony it believes to be credible, and, although a court should consider the guidance provided in the case law and the factors set forth in the department’s regulations (§ 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (8)) for determining domicile, a court may afford those factors the weight it considers appropriate in light of the evidence presented on appeal. The executor could not prevail on the claim that the estate was denied pro- cedural due process insofar as the auditors who initially determined that A was not domiciled in Connecticut were not properly trained and used an undisclosed weighting system in making that determination. In the absence of evidence that an improper error or procedure was repeated in or tainted a subsequent de novo determination of a decedent's domicile, such administrative errors do not create procedural due process violations. In the present case, the trial court correctly determined that any procedural due process violation by the audit division was cured when the executor was  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services afforded a second review by the department’s appellate division and a de novo trial in the Superior Court. Argued January 28—officially released June 16, 2026 Procedural History Appeal from the defendant’s assessment of tax against the estate of the plaintiff’s decedent, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Tax Session, and tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment sustaining the defendant’s assessment, from which the plaintiff appealed. Reversed in part; new trial. Julie A. Lavoie, with whom were Jeffrey M. Sklarz and, on the brief, Daniel J. Krisch, for the appellant (plaintiff). Joshua P. Britt, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen- eral, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion D’AURIA, J. In this appeal, we consider the burden of proof and the scope of appellate review applicable to an appeal from a determination of domicile by the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services (com- missioner), for the purposes of estate taxation. The plaintiff, Leslie B. Daniels (executor), executor of the estate of Jack Anderson (estate), appeals from the trial court’s judgment sustaining the commissioner’s estate tax assessment. The executor claims that the trial court improperly (1) sustained the assessment by erroneously finding that the decedent, Jack Anderson, was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his death, and (2) rejected the executor’s procedural due process claim. Following oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the scope of the Superior Court’s review in an appeal from the commis- sioner’s domicile determination for the purposes of estate taxation and the appropriate standard of proof, if any, a decedent’s estate must satisfy to prevail in that appeal. We hold that the estate bears the burden of proving, by  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent was not domiciled in Connecticut at the time of his death and that the Superior Court hears an appeal from the domi- cile determination for the purposes of estate taxation de novo. We agree with the trial court that the executor was not deprived of due process. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment sustaining the commissioner’s deficiency assessment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings to apply the appropriate stan- dard of review. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. Connecticut law imposes a tax on the transfer of the estate of each person who, at the time of death, was a resident of this state and whose estate exceeds a certain value. See General Statutes § 12-391 (d) (1) (C).1 Under state law, a decedent whose estate is subject to the tax is presumed to have died while the decedent was a resident of Connecticut. See General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (1). The Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies define a “resident” as an “[individual] domiciled in Connecticut . . . .” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (a) (1). “Domicile” is defined, in turn, as “the place which an individual intends to be his or her permanent home and to which such individual intends to return whenever absent.” Id., § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (1). Under the regu- lations, “[a]n individual can only have one domicile. If an individual has two or more homes, the domicile is the one which the individual regards and uses as his or her permanent home. In determining an individual’s intentions in this matter, the length of time customarily spent at each location is important but not necessarily conclusive.” Id., § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (4). The decedent died in 2015, leaving behind a sizeable fortune. After the decedent’s death, the executor of the estate filed a Connecticut domicile declaration form with the commissioner, which is required for the estate of 1 Although § 12-391 has been amended since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2024, No. 24-149, § 20; Public Acts 2022, No. 22-117, § 17; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services any decedent who lived part-time in Connecticut but is claimed to be a nonresident for estate tax purposes at the time of death. The form contains questions intended to assist the commissioner in determining whether the dece- dent was domiciled in Connecticut and, thus, whether the estate is subject to taxation in this state. See Department of Revenue Services Form C-3 UGE (revised May, 2011), titled “State of Connecticut Domicile Declaration.” The executor’s domicile declaration form triggered an audit by the audit division of the Department of Rev- enue Services (department). The audit division applied the twenty-eight factors listed in the department’s income tax regulations. See Regs., Conn. State Agen- cies § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (8). The audit division assigned various weights2 to each factor and determined that the decedent was a Connecticut resident at the time of his death for estate tax purposes. The executor filed a written protest to the audit division’s determination with the department’s appellate division pursuant to General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (3). The appellate division issued a final determination sustaining the audit divi- sion’s assessment that the estate owed $13,198,554.60 in estate taxes. The executor then appealed from the commissioner’s determination to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-395 (a) (1) and 12-554,3 claiming that the decedent had died as a Florida domiciliary, rendering his estate not subject to taxation in Connecticut. The executor also claimed that the commissioner’s audit division had deprived the executor of procedural due process because the auditors were not properly trained in applying the twenty-eight factor domicile test in § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (8) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies and used an undisclosed “weighting” system when considering the relative importance of those factors 2 See part III of this opinion. 3 Although § 12-554 has been amended since the events at issue; see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-186, § 22; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services as applied to the decedent. The trial court conducted a four day de novo trial, during which it heard testimony from ten witnesses and admitted into evidence more than 200 exhibits. On the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, the court made the following factual findings. At the time of his death, the decedent was married with three adult chil- dren, two of whom lived in Texas and one in Pennsylva- nia. The decedent’s funeral was held in Florida, and he is buried in Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia. His obituary was published in the Vero Beach News in Florida, the Greenwich Time, and The New York Times. The decedent was a successful businessman who lived significant portions of his life in several states.4 At the time of his death, the decedent maintained homes in Arizona, Connecticut, and Florida.5 From 2006 until his death in 2015, the decedent divided his time among his three residences, typically staying approximately five and one-half months in Connecticut (from approximately May through mid-October), three and one half months in Florida (from approximately November through mid-February), and three months in Arizona (from mid-February through early May). The decedent maintained full homes, furnishings, and possessions at each residence. 4 From 1957 to 1970, the decedent lived in Greenwich with his family. In about 1970, he moved with his family to Tennessee where he pursued business interests. In about 1980, he moved to Texas. The trial court found that he remained domiciled in Texas until 2006. 5 In 1984, the decedent purchased a 4000 square foot condominium in Greenwich. In 2010, he purchased a second condominium in the same complex of approximately 3000 square feet in size and, in 2014, pur- chased a third unit, approximately 2000 square feet, also in the same complex. The decedent used the condominium purchased in 1984 as a personal residence for himself and his wife; the other two condominiums were used for guests, personal assistants, and health aides. In 1989, the decedent purchased a home in Arizona comparable in size and accommodations to that of his Connecticut and Florida homes. In 1991, the decedent acquired land and built an approximately 9700 square foot beachfront home in Vero Beach, Florida. The estate has never argued that the decedent was domiciled in Arizona.  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services In 2006, at Daniels’ suggestion, the decedent filed a domicile declaration in Florida. He also held a Florida driver’s license, was registered to vote in Florida, and maintained a local bank account in Florida, although his bills were sent to his business office in Texas for payment. At the time of his death, the decedent owned four cars registered in Connecticut and three cars registered in Florida. The decedent maintained personal friendships and social connections in both Florida and Connecticut, which the trial court found to have been substantial and “roughly equal . . . .” The decedent also participated in “concierge” medicine, which meant that he had access to physicians who communicated with one another and coordinated his care regardless of his location. On the basis of these facts, the trial court concluded that the decedent’s personal, social and property connec- tions with Connecticut and Florida were generally equal. The court noted that the decedent’s driver’s license, voter registration, bank account, and personal declara- tion favored a finding that he was a Florida domiciliary. However, the court found these factors, comparatively, to be less persuasive indicators of the decedent’s intention to remain in Florida permanently because, in the court’s view, they involved one-time administrative tasks that held little practical significance in the decedent’s daily life, particularly if undertaken—albeit legally—to pre- vent his estate from paying millions of dollars in taxes with minimal effort.6 The court determined that the 6 Section 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d) (2) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “A domicile once established continues until the individual moves to a new location with the bona fide intention of making his or her fixed and permanent home there. No change of domicile results from a removal to a new location if the intention is to remain there only for a limited time; this is the case even though the individual may have sold or disposed of his or her former home. The burden is upon an individual asserting a change of domicile to show that the necessary intention existed. In determining an individual’s intention [to change domicile], declarations shall be given due weight, but they shall not be conclusive if they are contradicted by conduct. The fact that an individual registers and votes in one place is important but not necessarily conclusive, especially if the facts indicate that he or she did this merely to escape taxation in some other place.”  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services decedent’s choice to spend more time in Connecticut than in any other state, together with his substantial social and property connections with Connecticut, sufficiently counterbalanced the decedent’s administrative elections and substantial social and property connections with Florida, where he spent significantly less time. The trial court observed that, given the decedent’s financial resources and lifestyle, the decedent had main- tained residences in and other connections with multiple states that, under normal circumstances, would qualify as a primary residence and domicile. The court concluded that the executor had failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the decedent was not a Connecticut domiciliary at the time of his death and, therefore, that the executor did not sustain his burden of proving that the commissioner’s estate tax assessment was erroneous or unreasonable. The court concluded that, “at best, the evidence demonstrating that [the decedent] was a domiciliary of Florida at the time of his death [was] equivocal and well below the quantum of evidence neces- sary to convince [the] court that it was highly probable that [the decedent] was a Florida domiciliary at the time of his death and not a Connecticut domiciliary.” The court also rejected the executor’s procedural due process claim, finding that the executor was not deprived of due process “because [the] court trie[d] [the] case de novo and has made its own, independent determinations of the facts, without regard to whatever determinations may have been made by the commissioner.” The executor appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the executor’s motion to transfer the appeal to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 65-2. On appeal, the executor challenges both the trial court's decision to uphold the commissioner’s domicile deter- mination and its rejection of the executor’s procedural due process claim. I In adjudicating whether the executor had carried his statutory burden of proof in this estate tax proceeding,  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services both parties and the trial court assumed that the execu- tor had to present clear and convincing evidence of his claimed “exemption by reason of the decedent’s alleged nonresidency.” General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (1). Under- standably, but not in our view ineluctably, this assump- tion stemmed from Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 264 Conn. 286, 823 A.2d 1184 (2003), a sales and use tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 12-422, in which this court held that, to succeed on appeal, “[t]he plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence that the [sales and use tax] assessment is incorrect or that the method of audit or amount of tax assessed was erroneous or unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 302. In the present case, we raised at oral argument the question of whether the “clear and convincing” standard is also the appropriate burden of proof for a taxpayer in an estate tax appeal pursuant to §§ 12-395 and 12-554. After oral argument, we ordered the parties to file sup- plemental briefs addressing (1) whether the clear and convincing standard from our case law, articulated in Leonard, applies in the context of an executor’s challenge to the commissioner’s determination of domicile in an estate tax proceeding, and (2) the appropriate scope of review in a de novo appeal to the Superior Court from that determination. The commissioner asserts that this court’s consider- ation of these issues sua sponte is not justified under Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 160–64, 84 A.3d 840 (2014), or, in the alternative, that our discussion should be limited to “ ‘signaling to future litigants’ ” that they should raise the issues in a future case but without apply- ing a different standard to the executor in the present case. Without conceding that the question of the appli- cable burden of proof and the scope of appellate review, when unpreserved, are the sorts of issues that we must justify raising and addressing ourselves under Blumberg  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services Associates Worldwide, Inc.,7 we respectfully disagree with the commissioner that it is inappropriate for us to consider these issues under the present circumstances. See Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 161–64. The commissioner concedes that the “threshold” or “minimal” requirements for our review of an unpre- served claim are met here because the record is adequate for us to review and decide the issue of the appropriate burden of proof, the parties have had an opportunity to be heard on the issue, and there is no prejudice to the commissioner as the objecting party. See id., 157, 162. Nonetheless, the commissioner contends that we should not consider the issue in the present case because none of the other necessary factors applies, namely, that (1) no party objects, (2) the party who would benefit from the unpreserved issue cannot prevail, or (3) the case involves “exceptional circumstances . . . .” Id., 161. Understanding that the commissioner has objected to and that the executor would potentially benefit from our consideration of this issue, we conclude that this 7 When a case is properly before this court, we are not limited to the particular legal theories the parties advance; rather, we retain inde- pendent authority to identify and apply the proper construction of the governing law. See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 733, 265 A.3d 870 (2021); Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 311 Conn. 148. Indeed, we may consider and adopt legal arguments that differ from those the parties have raised if they are “subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020); see also State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 124, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) (“although we generally do not consider claims or issues that the parties themselves have not raised . . . in cases too numerous to mention, we have considered arguments or factors pertaining to those claims or issues that were not expressly identified by the parties” (citation omitted; emphasis in original)). It is not at all obvious that the applicable standard of proof in an appeal from the commissioner’s domicile determination is properly characterized as a separate claim rather than an argument or factor “subsumed within or intertwined with” the issue that the executor brought before this court; (internal quotation marks omitted) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 644 n.2; namely, whether the trial court correctly determined that the decedent was a Connecticut domiciliary at the time of his death.  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services case presents an “exceptional circumstance” allowing the sua sponte review of an unpreserved claim. Having “provide[d] an opportunity for all parties to be heard on the issue,” this case is one in which “important consid- erations of justice outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules governing the preservation of claims and adversarial principles . . . .” Id., 162. Specifically, the evidentiary standard that taxpayers must meet in disputes with the state is an issue of suffi- cient gravity to warrant sua sponte review in the interest of fairness, particularly in a circumstance such as this one, when we have never previously had occasion to opine on the proper standard of proof required in establish- ing a domicile for estate tax purposes. The appropriate burden of proof a taxpayer must bear when appealing from a decision of the government’s taxing authority necessarily implicates both the public’s interest and the taxpayer’s entitlement to fair and accurate taxation—a foundational public policy on which government rests. See Robertson v. Stonington, 253 Conn. 255, 260–61, 750 A.2d 460 (2000); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons, 260 Ga. 824, 825, 401 S.E.2d 4 (1991) (“[t]he people’s entitlement to fair and impartial tax assessments lies at the heart of our system, and, indeed, was a basic principle upon which this country was founded”). This is an interest that the commissioner himself has a duty to advance. See, e.g., State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 73 Conn. 255, 261, 47 A. 299 (1900) (“it is the interest of every government that the burden of taxation should be dis- tributed fairly and equally, and that it is the duty of the department in which the taxing power may be vested to honestly use its best judgment to secure such [a] result”), aff’d, 185 U.S. 364, 22 S. Ct. 673, 46 L. Ed. 949 (1902). For this reason, we cannot agree with the commissioner that the issues of the appropriately applicable standards are not of a public character but instead implicate only evidentiary standards applicable to individuals in “pri- vate tax disputes.” Although governmental entities are treated like any other party for most litigation purposes, the “government also has a duty to advance the public’s  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services interest in achieving justice, an ultimate obligation that outweighs its narrower interest in prevailing in a [law- suit].” Frey v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). We therefore have little difficulty concluding that a taxpayer’s burden of proof in an appeal from the commissioner’s deficiency assessment is an exceptional circumstance in which “important con- siderations of justice outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules governing the preservation of claims and adversarial principles . . . .” Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 311 Conn. 162. II In Connecticut, “a tax is imposed upon the transfer of the estate of each person who at the time of death was a resident of this state.” General Statutes § 12-391 (d) (1) (C). General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (1) defines a “[r]esident of this state” as “any natural person (A) who is domiciled in this state . . . .” “[E]ach decedent shall be presumed to have died a resident of this state [and] [t]he burden of proof in an estate tax proceeding shall be upon any decedent’s estate claiming exemption by reason of the decedent’s alleged nonresidency.” General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (1). The commissioner has promulgated detailed regulations to assist in determining a taxpayer’s domicile. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-701 (a) (1)-1 (d). Section 12-554, made applicable to estate tax appeals by § 12-395 (a) (1), authorizes an appeal to the Superior Court from the commissioner’s domicile determination. The estate tax statutes do not address the required stan- dard of proof an estate must sustain to demonstrate on appeal to the Superior Court that the commissioner’s domicile determination was erroneous. The executor argues that, in light of this statutory silence, the pre- ponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof applicable to the intent-based domicile inquiry. The commissioner argues, to the contrary, that the clear and convincing evidence standard should apply  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services because our courts have applied this heightened standard in a variety of types of tax appeals, and the standard for challenging the commissioner’s various determinations in court should be consistent, irrespective of the type of tax or the finding involved. We agree with the executor. In Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 264 Conn. 286, this court first held in an appeal from a sales and use tax deficiency assessment pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 12-422 that “[t]he plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence that the assessment is incorrect or that the method of audit or amount of tax assessed was erroneous or unrea- sonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 302, quoting 68 Am. Jur. 2d 193, Sales and Use Taxes § 246 (2000).8 In the nearly quarter century since our decision in Leonard, we have consistently applied the clear and convincing standard in sales and use tax appeals. See, e.g., Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 300 Conn. 566, 577, 22 A.3d 518 (2011); Sikorsky Air- craft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 297 Conn. 540, 568, 1 A.3d 1033 (2010). Neither this court nor the Appellate Court, however, has ever applied the clear and convincing standard of proof we articulated in Leonard beyond the sales and use tax context. In particu- lar, we have never been presented with a case in which we would have to extend the clear and convincing standard to a de novo estate tax appeal, let alone a case involving the commissioner’s domicile determination. The commissioner correctly notes that, since Leon- ard, the Superior Court has also applied the clear and convincing standard of proof in income tax appeals; see, e.g., Gavigan v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2006 WL 337201, *1 8 The current edition of the American Jurisprudence legal encyclo- pedia now cites this court’s decision in Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 300 Conn. 566, 22 A.3d 518 (2011), which, in turn, cites Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 264 Conn. 286. See 67B Am. Jur. 2d Sales and Use Taxes § 216 (2026) (“[b]urden of proof as to additional or deficiency assessment of sales or use taxes; evidence”).  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (Conn. Super. January 27, 2006), aff’d, 99 Conn. App. 903, 916 A.2d 127 (2007); including income tax appeals challenging the commissioner’s determination of the taxpayer’s domicile. See, e.g., Sobel v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 7, 2017) (64 Conn. L. Rptr. 235, 241–42), appeal dis- missed, 333 Conn. 712, 218 A.3d 581 (2019); Amen v. Law, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Tax Session, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (April 14, 2005) (39 Conn. L. Rptr. 243, 245–48). In Rizzuto v. Law, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Tax Session, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 28, 2007) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 895), the Superior Court rec- ognized that our tax statutes do not require a particular standard of proof, which would usually mean that the ordinary civil standard of proof of a fair preponderance of the evidence would apply, but applied the clear and convincing standard of proof because the legislature had not altered the standard of proof after our decision in Leonard. See id., 895–96. Taking a cue from Rizzuto, the commissioner argues that we should infer from the General Assembly’s inac- tion in the years since Leonard that the legislature approves of the clear and convincing standard in all tax appeals. Under the circumstances, however, we are not persuaded that Leonard compels an inference of legisla- tive acquiescence that extends to the standard of proof involved in an appeal from the commissioner’s domicile determination for estate tax purposes.9 Our courts have 9 Although, as noted, numerous Superior Court judges have applied our holding in Leonard to income tax appeals, including to challenges of the commissioner’s domicile determinations in such appeals; see, e.g., Rizzuto v. Law, supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 895–96; Amen v. Law, supra, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 245–48; the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, which rests on a presumption of legislative awareness, typically does not apply to unofficially reported trial court decisions. See, e.g., Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 686, 5 A.3d 932 (2010). But cf. State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (reviewing court relied on doctrine of legislative acquiescence in considering offi- cially published Superior Court decision as part of analysis, noting that  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services not invariably applied a heightened standard of proof to all appeals of tax assessments. Connecticut courts, for example, have frequently applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in taxpayer appeals of property tax assessments. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 756, 699 A.2d 81 (1997); Sharr v. Stonington, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX, 2011 WL 1409420, *3 (Conn. Super. March 24, 2011); New Haven v. East Haven, 47 Conn. Supp. 594, 609, 822 A.2d 376 (2001), aff’d, 263 Conn. 108, 818 A.2d 741 (2003). But see Cornelius v. Arnold, Docket No. CV-13- 5015763-S, 2015 WL 670809, *3 (Conn. Super. January 30, 2015) (citing Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 264 Conn. 302, in applying clear and convincing standard of proof), aff’d, 168 Conn. App. 703, 147 A.3d 729 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 908, 152 A.3d 1245 (2017). Moreover, in endorsing the clear and convincing standard for sales and use tax appeals in Leonard, this court did not provide any rationale that convinces us that the same standard should apply to a domicile determination. We relied only on a section of a legal encyclopedia specific to sales and use taxes as authority for the elevated standard of proof. See footnote 8 of this opinion and accompanying text. It is therefore not clear to us from Leonard that it is appropriate to apply this heightened standard to determinations of domicile, even though it is made in the context of an estate tax appeal. In particular, we do not consider it prudent to presume that the legislature has approved the application of the clear and convincing standard from Leonard to an appeal from a domicile determination made by the commissioner for estate tax purposes when, unlike with the sales and use tax, there is not even so much as a legal encyclopedia that we are aware of suggesting that taxpayers typically must establish their domicile by clear and convincing evidence in estate tax appeals. Courts in other jurisdictions are divided on the appli- cable standard of proof for both tax appeals generally decision’s nonbinding status “[did] not detract from its status . . . as the only published authority” when legislature amended statute at issue).  Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and determinations of domicile particularly, and offer little guidance on the issue. Many state legislatures require taxpayers seeking relief from a tax assessment to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the taxing authority’s determination is erroneous. See, e.g., Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 654 P.2d 337, 340 (Colo. App. 1982) (“[u]nder [Colo. Rev. Stat.] § 13-25-127 (1) . . . a taxpayer who protests a property tax assessment bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment is incorrect”); Shoshone County v. S&W OPS, LLC, 170 Idaho 487, 491, 512 P.3d 1110 (2022) (under Idaho Code § 63-3812 (c), “[a] preponder- ance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization, 291 Neb. 730, 749, 868 N.W.2d 334 (2015) (taxpayer can rebut by preponderance of evidence presumption that assessor’s valuation is correct); DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727, 732 (R.I. 2001) (“Section 8-8-28 [of the General Laws of Rhode Island] clearly directs that the quantum of evi- dence sufficient to sustain the burden of proof in factual issues in tax cases is a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, petitioners needed only to demonstrate a change of domicile . . . by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.”).10 Other jurisdictions impose a higher standard of proof;11 see, e.g., Walsh 10 See also, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 51.5 (e), 110 (b) and 5170 (Deering 2016); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 194.301 (2) (a) (West 2025); Iowa Code Ann. § 429.2 (2) (b) (West 2023); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 151-D 10 (F) (Supp. 2026); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541:13 (2007); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 221 (E) (West 2025); Or. Rev. Stat. § 305.427 (2023); Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604 (LexisNexis 2011). 11 In In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation’s Woodlands Retire- ment Community, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virigina determined that a taxpayer ch