In re Avianzah R.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  In re Avianzah R. IN RE AVIANZAH R. ET AL.* (AC 49396) Suarez, Seeley and Palmer, Js. Syllabus The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgments terminat- ing her parental rights as to two of her minor children, who previously had been adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The mother claimed that the court improperly determined that she had failed to achieve a suf- ficient degree of personal rehabilitation, as required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), as would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in the children’s lives within a reasonable period of time. Held: The record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s deter- mination that the petitioner had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent mother failed to rehabilitate, as the court’s findings regarding her lack of consistent engagement in individual counseling, her inability to meet her children’s specialized needs and her failure to engage with their therapists, which would have provided her with insight into the children’s behavior and mental health, were amply supported by evidence in the record, and, even if the court’s findings concerning her housing and employment status were clearly erroneous, those findings were harmless in light of the cumulative evidence in the record that supported the court’s determination that she had failed to rehabilitate. This court rejected the respondent mother’s claim that she should have been reunited with her children once it was determined that she had not been responsible for the death of another of her minor children, as the trial court was bound by its prior findings in the neglect proceeding, and, as the mother did not file an appeal challenging the adjudication of neglect, she could not collaterally attack it in the termination of parental rights proceeding. The respondent mother’s participation in required therapeutic and other services did not demonstrate, as she claimed, that she had rehabilitated, as substantial or even complete compliance with the court-ordered specific steps aimed at reuniting her with her children did not necessitate a conclu- sion that she had rehabilitated. Argued May 21—officially released July 15, 2026** * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. ** July 15, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin- ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.  In re Avianzah R. Procedural History Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami- lies to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the court, Torres, J.; judgments terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed. Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother). Matthew J. Parenti, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Opinion SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Jessica R., appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her minor children, Avianzah R. (Avianzah) and Amyaliese R. (Amyaliese).1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court incorrectly determined that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).2 We affirm the judgments of the trial court. The following facts, which were found by the trial court by clear and convincing evidence or are otherwise undis- puted in the record, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The respondent is married to Antonio R., and they have three children together: Amyaliese, who 1 The court also terminated the parental rights of Antonio R., the respondent father of the children. He has not appealed from the termina- tion of his parental rights. Accordingly, all references in this opinion to the respondent are to Jessica R. only. 2 The attorney for the minor children filed a statement adopting the brief of the petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).  In re Avianzah R. was born in 2015; Avianzah, who was born in 2019; and Amateo, who was born in 2021.3 The Department of Children and Families (department) became involved with Amyaliese and Avianzah in October 2022, after Amateo had been taken to Yale-New Haven Hospital with severe injuries that were determined to have been caused by inflicted trauma. On October 7, 2022, the petitioner filed ex parte motions for orders of temporary custody as to Amyaliese and Avianzah, and neglect petitions alleging neglect and physical abuse because, at that time, it could not be determined who had caused Amateo’s injuries. The court granted the motions for orders of temporary custody. Amateo died as a result of his injuries three days later, on October 10, 2022.4 On December 8, 2022, the respondent pleaded nolo contendere with regard to the neglect petitions, but only as to the neglect allegations that Amyaliese and Avianzah were “being denied proper care and atten- tion, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally . . . .” After a thorough canvass, the court, Torres, J., accepted the pleas, adjudicated Amyaliese and Avianzah neglected and committed them to the care and custody of the petitioner. The court also canvassed the respondent as to the court-ordered specific steps she was required to undertake in order to regain custody of her children and ordered that they be made final.5 On June 4, 2024, the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption with 3 The respondent has three other children from previous relationships who do not reside with her and are not subjects of this appeal. 4 Prior to being taken to the hospital, Amateo had been found unrespon- sive while in the care of a babysitter, who subsequently was arrested in connection with Amateo’s death. It is not disputed that the respondent and Antonio R. have not been charged in connection with Amateo’s death. 5 The Judicial Branch form detailing the specific steps that the court ordered directed the respondent to take part in counseling and to make progress toward the identified treatment goals on the form. Below that directive, three boxes, labeled parenting, individual, and family were checked. In that same section, the specific steps form also contained a box titled “Goals (specify),” which was not checked; however, immediately next to that box, the specific steps form indicated, “see attached goals.”  In re Avianzah R. a concurrent plan of reunification as to both children. On August 26, 2024, the petitioner filed petitions for the termination of the respondent’s parental rights as to both children. As to each child, the petitioner alleged, as the ground for termination, that the children had been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for, and that the respondent had “failed to achieve [such] degree of personal rehabilitation [as] would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age[s] and needs of the [children], [she] could assume a responsible position in [their lives] . . . .” The petitioner further alleged that the department had made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify her with the children but that reasonable efforts to reunify were not required because the court had previously approved a permanency plan other than reunification. At trial on the petitions over several nonconsecutive days beginning on March 27, 2025, during which the respondent was represented by counsel, multiple wit- nesses testified and voluminous exhibits were admitted into evidence. On October 3, 2025, following the trial, the court, Torres, J., issued a memorandum of deci- sion terminating the respondent’s parental rights as to Amyaliese and Avianzah. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children had previously been adjudicated neglected and that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate sufficiently to satisfy the require- ments of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The court also found The file in the present case contains a copy of the respondent’s specific steps form with an attachment that lists specified treatment goals. The respondent, however, as discussed in part II of this opinion, claims that she did not receive any such attachment with her specific steps. The specific steps form further ordered the respondent, inter alia, to “[t]ake care of the child(ren)’s physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including keeping the child(ren)’s appointments with his/her/their medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational pro- viders,” to “[c]ooperate with the child(ren)’s therapy, including but not limited to Birth to Three,” and to “[c]ooperate with the service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services, substance abuse assessment/treatment, and/ or intimate partner violence/domestic violence services.”  In re Avianzah R. by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children, and that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification services. In its memorandum of decision, the court made the following findings with respect to Amyaliese. “When Amyaliese . . . was an infant, she suffered an intracranial hemorrhage of unknown etiology. She had abnormal eye movement and vomiting when she was admitted to the hospital. While hospitalized, she suffered seizures. When she was released, she [was] required to follow up with neurology. She is diagnosed with cortical visual impairment due to a stroke of the occipital lobe. She has weak eye muscles and uses glasses to help keep her eyes focused. Amyaliese . . . meets the criteria for a . . . diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder with a severity rating of 2 [under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders]. “Amyaliese . . . works with a therapist at Family and Children’s Aid and started with the agency on June 26, 2024. She is currently in third grade and has an individu- alized education plan . . . . By the time of trial, Amyaliese . . . had made great improvements in her interactions with peers at school and was more verbal. Her progress was noted to be remarkable. . . . “Amyaliese . . . is diagnosed with autism, post-trau- matic stress disorder and [attention deficit hyperactivity disorder]. Amyaliese . . . is working on expressing her emotions and working through her trauma. The modal- ity of treatment is play therapy. They use art as a form of expression. It is [a] modality that is often used with children of Amyaliese’s age. The goals of therapy were to assist her in expressing her emotion[s] and processing events that [she has] been through. This therapy permits children who may not have complete verbal capacity . . . to express their emotions and process events in nonverbal ways . . . [and] [i]n [Amyaliese’s] case, to allow her to process her trauma and help her develop coping mecha- nisms to better address her emotions. . . .  In re Avianzah R. “When Amyaliese . . . first worked with . . . [therapist Nancy] Solberg, she appeared insulated [and] would talk to herself quite a bit. Amyaliese . . . would use different voices, almost as if she were playing different characters. She would repeat phrases that were not relevant to the situation that was currently happening, often talking to herself using her own name and different voices. The clinician noted that Amyaliese . . . appeared to be dem- onstrating a history of trauma. “On October 31, 2024 . . . Solberg wrote a letter to the department raising concerns about statements and actions by Amyaliese . . . during her sessions. . . . Solberg noted that, during therapy, Amyaliese . . . would act out scenarios where she was using a different voice and would use swear words. She would often use a deep male voice and say things such as, ‘[d]on’t ever tell me what to do, I could break your hand,’ and, shut the ‘F up.’ She would also use the mother toy to say, ‘[g]uess what, Avi, guess what, Amaya, I will never forgive you,’ ‘[w]hat’s wrong with you?’ and, ‘[s]top it, Amaya.’ . . . “Solberg was able to observe [Amyaliese’s] behavior while the parents were having visits and during a period of time when they ceased. She noted [that] during the period of ceased visits,6 Amyaliese . . . would appear calmer for sessions, she would not run into other rooms, [and] she would be less aggressive in the therapeutic space. . . . Solberg saw an increase in engagement with Amyaliese . . . during that time. She would make eye contact and, at times, respond to direct questions. She 6 We note that, after Amyaliese and Avianzah were committed to the care and custody of the petitioner, the respondent initially participated in weekly supervised visits with the children. In February 2024, the chil- dren’s attorney filed a motion for modification of the visitation orders. In July 2024, the parties reached an agreement to temporarily pause visitation, and the department referred the respondent to Therapeutic Family Time for supervised visitation services. On November 14, 2024, the petitioner filed an emergency motion to cease visitation as to both children, and the court held a contested hearing on the issue of visita- tion on November 26, 2024, and on several dates thereafter. On March 21, 2025, the court ordered that supervised visits with Amyaliese be suspended but that supervised visits with Avianzah could continue.  In re Avianzah R. saw a decrease in negative self-talk. . . . Her drawings evolved into pictures of fictional characters instead of real-life individuals. Her play between figurines became less aggressive. . . . This indicated to the clinician that Amyaliese . . . did not need the therapeutic space to pro- cess her trauma that had been her focus. . . . “Once visits resumed, Solberg began to see the reverse happening. Amyaliese . . . began to escalate her nega- tive behaviors. . . . The clinician made a direct correla- tion between the increase in negative reactions and the resumption of visits with [Amyaliese’s] parents. She assessed that the visits between Amyaliese . . . and her biological family were retraumatizing her, leading to decreased emotional stability. “[Amyaliese’s] schoolteacher noticed a regression in [her] behavior once visits were reinstated. She noted in August of 2024 that Amyaliese . . . was happy, ready to learn and was able to make friends. During the month of August, visits were paused due [to] the escalating behavior of the children. Once visits were reinstituted, her teacher noted [that] Amyaliese . . . would bang her head, swear and at times scream profanities. She lost valuable education time during this period. Her behav- ior subsided in December of 2024. This calmer behavior coincided with the visits between the parents and children in November of 2024 being suspended. “Similar behavior was observed by forensic psycholo- gist [Jessica] Biren Caverly. During an [interaction] between Amyaliese . . . and [Antonio R.], she walked around with her fingers in her ears, scripting the entire time. During the interaction, [Antonio R.] was noted to have raised his voice and become loud. Amyaliese . . . was talking and talking the entire time. The psycholo- gist noted that Amyaliese . . . was attempting to soothe herself, and it became more concerning that the source of trauma was from exposure to [Antonio R.].” (Footnote added.)  In re Avianzah R. The court made the following relevant findings with respect to Avianzah. “[Avianzah] worked with Child First due to some aggressive behaviors displayed while in the foster home. While working with Child First, she would engage in several play scenarios. Avianzah . . . would act out herself or her sister getting in trouble with daddy. She had a doll she called her brother that she would hang . . . upside down. She would play with the toy ambulance frequently and would make a noise that may have been her brother’s name. Avianzah . . . would bring up her brother almost every session, but, near the end of their work, the brother doll turned into the foster sister and the brother play diminished. Avianzah . . . would engage in doctor play and would scold the therapist, and say things like, ‘no talking, sit down, be quiet.’ During her sessions, she would put a Band-Aid on a bear, [which] would be representative of her brother. She would report that her brother had hurt his head. She worked with the service for seven months and was successfully discharged. She is currently placed with . . . Amyaliese . . . .” The court also made the following findings regarding the respondent. “[The respondent] has a history with the department as a child due to sexual abuse, having been placed in the department’s care two to three times. [The respondent] had a distressing time while in foster care. . . . [The respondent] was referred to [Midwestern Connecticut Council of Alcoholism, Inc.] for a substance abuse evaluation several times by the department. [The respondent] eventually attended an intake at Wellmore, and the agency did not recommend any treatment for substance abuse. They recommended [that the respon- dent] continue with her individual counseling at Stokes Counseling. She participated in visits via the [Quality Parenting] Center. [The respondent] completed the Circle of Security Program and the [Developing Options for Victim Education (DOVE)] program through Safe Haven. [The respondent] had intermittently attended therapy but was unsuccessfully discharged in November of 2024 due to too many no-call, no-shows to her appointments. The department offered parenting education through  In re Avianzah R. [Parenting Support Services] and [Therapeutic Family Time]. [The respondent] was offered weekly visitation until November of 2024, when the court suspended visits between the children and both parents. Although pro- vided with the contact information for the children’s providers, [the respondent] failed to maintain com- munication with them to obtain updates regarding the children.” In light of the foregoing findings, the court concluded, in the adjudicatory phase of the termination of parental rights proceeding, that the petitioner had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts of the department. The court stated that, follow- ing the respondent’s psychological evaluation, “it was clear that she needed to work with an individual therapist to process her historical trauma in order to be a resource for her children. However, she was unable to maintain the consistency in therapy necessary to achieve those goals. Further, she did not appear to have the capacity to understand the children’s needs. Evidence of her visits demonstrated someone detached from her children and unable to work and interact with them in a meaningful way. She was inconsistent with services, with visits, and even had irregularities in her housing and employment. This does not begin to assess whether she has the ability to digest the information needed to successfully reunify, as she is disengaged from treatment.” The court further found that a permanency plan other than reunification was approved by the court in June 2024 for termination of parental rights and adoption. The court also found that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a responsible position in her children’s lives. The court noted that the basis for the removal of Amyaliese and Avianzah “emanated from the injury and subsequent death of their younger sibling. An order of  In re Avianzah R. temporary custody was taken and, at a later date, the children were adjudicated neglected by the court, where they were found to have been denied proper care and attention either morally, physically, or educationally. Neither parent admitted to causing harm to [Amateo], nor were the surviving children adjudicated by the court on any charges of abuse. What stands before the court is an allegation that [the respondent] failed to rehabilitate. Specific steps were issued. A subsequent court-ordered evaluation was conducted, and . . . recommendations [were made] to [the respondent] to achieve reunification. The issue of whether [the respondent] committed an act that led to [Amateo’s] death is not before the court. The issue, consistent with the statute, is whether the parents are able to take a responsible position in the children’s lives, considering their age[s] and needs.” (Emphasis added.) As to the respondent, the court stated that, “initially, [she] made strides toward completing her specific steps. Referrals were made for therapy in February of 2023. [The respondent] began services in April of 2023 with [therapist Tracy LaChapelle]. Her therapeutic goals were to process the loss of [Amateo] and work through the grief of having her other children removed. She was engaged from April of 2023 through November of 2023, and then [was] not engaged again until February of 2024 and [was] unsuccessfully discharged in November of 2024. [The respondent] claimed [that] there was an insurance issue; however, it was resolved in December of 2023. The social worker did send monthly texts to follow up on services and met with both parents after visits to remind them of the progress that needed to be made. Information was provided to the parents regarding the children’s provid- ers and educators. Neither parent engaged with them in any meaningful way. “[The respondent] was referred to the Safe Haven DOVE program and successfully completed it. She was discharged from therapy in November of 2024 for several no-call, no-shows, despite expectation letters outlining  In re Avianzah R. the need for individual counseling. She is not currently engaged in therapy. Neither parent developed a relation- ship with the children’s providers or educators. This was an important step for them to better understand their children’s needs and development. Family therapy could not begin until each parent made meaningful progress while in individual therapy to assure that each parent was stable. “At the time of the filing of the petition[s], [the respon- dent] was engaged in therapy, but not consistently. Her housing was an issue. [The respondent] was behind in her rent and whether she could maintain her housing was uncertain. Stable housing would have been a necessary component to move toward rehabilitation. At the time, [the respondent] did not have consistent employment. The ability to financially meet [her needs] and her chil- dren’s needs would have been critical prior to consider- ing reunification. She had missed one [planning and placement team meeting] for Amyaliese . . . a meeting to understand and assist with her educational needs. She missed a second meeting, arriving five minutes before the meeting ended. Amyaliese . . . carries a diagnosis of autism. She requires a specialized educational plan to meet her needs. Understanding and being able to navigate [Amyaliese’s] specialized needs would have been critical for reunification. When [the respondent] failed to regu- larly attend meetings, she was unable to demonstrate her ability to take on a parenting role for Amyaliese . . . . “[The respondent] had not engaged with the children’s therapists, something the department encouraged both parents to do. This was a critical piece to work through the negative behaviors they had exhibited during visits. This communication would have provided insight to the parents on the behavior of the children and their current state of mental health. [The respondent’s] failure to engage and develop a relationship with the therapists did not create a belief that she was ready to take on a parent- ing role. During visits, [the respondent] had appeared fifteen to twenty minutes late for some visits and had  In re Avianzah R. missed several other visits. In February of 2024, the psy- chologist raised concerns about the interaction between parents and children, noting the need for therapy. This was going to be a critical piece toward reunification. Unfortunately, [the respondent] was unable to achieve the movement necessary to meet the [children’s] needs. Based on the concerns raised by the visiting supervisors, the visits with the children needed to be paused until a skilled supervisor could attend the visits to minimize the negative impact parental visits were having on the children. At the time of the filing of the [petitions], [the respondent] had failed to rehabilitate, considering the age[s] and needs of the children.” In the dispositional phase of the termination of paren- tal rights proceeding, the court made findings as to each of the criteria set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and determined that terminating the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.7 Accordingly, the court rendered judgments terminating the respondent’s paren- tal rights and appointing the petitioner as the statutory parent for each child.8 This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I On appeal, the respondent’s sole claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s determina- tion that she had failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation required to avoid a termination of her parental rights. In making this claim, the respondent also challenges some of the court’s subordinate factual findings as clearly erroneous. The petitioner contends, to the contrary, that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the court’s determination that the respondent failed to rehabilitate. The petitioner also argues that the court’s subordinate factual findings were 7 We note that the respondent does not challenge the court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. 8 The court also denied the respondent’s motion for posttermination visitation with the children.  In re Avianzah R. not clearly erroneous and, even assuming that some of the court’s findings were clearly erroneous, any error was harmless. On the basis of our review of the evidentiary record and the court’s findings, we conclude that the cumulative evidence was sufficient to justify the court’s conclusion that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate. We begin by setting forth the established principles of law and the applicable standard of review that govern the resolution of this claim. “Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: The Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in [General Statutes §§] 45a-716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this sec- tion if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of [General Statutes §] 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reuni- fication efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to [§] 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected, abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of the [petitioner] for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to [General Statutes §] 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . . “Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional  In re Avianzah R. phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [peti- tioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j) carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judgment of the legisla- ture, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of parental rights in the absence of consent. . . . Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. . . . “The trial court is required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further . . . such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when [she] will be able to assume a responsible position in [her] child’s life. Nor does it require [her] to prove that [she] will be able to assume full responsibility for [her] child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evi- dence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encour- age a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her] child’s life. . . . Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)] refers to the restoration of a parent to [her] former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the [children] at issue. . . . “[The] completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps], however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . . Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articu-  In re Avianzah R. lated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a depart- ment claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. . . . Whereas, during the adjudicatory phase of a termination proceeding, the court is gener- ally limited to considering events that precede the date of the filing of the petition or the latest amendment to the petition, also known as the adjudicatory date, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudicatory] date . . . when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reason- able time. . . . “A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court’s factual findings and from its weigh- ing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . We will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erro- neous. . . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by any evidence in the record or when there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Cameron H., 219 Conn. App. 149, 159–67, 294 A.3d 50, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 903, 296 A.3d 171 (2023). Thus, “[i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this court disagrees with it. . . . An important corollary to these principles is that the mere existence in the record of evidence that would support a different conclusion,  In re Avianzah R. without more, is not sufficient to undermine the finding of the trial court. Our focus in conducting a review for evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether there exists support for a different finding—the proper inquiry is whether there is enough evidence in the record to support the finding that the trial court made.” (Cita- tion omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Yolanda V., 195 Conn. App. 334, 345, 224 A.3d 182 (2020). II After considering the record in a manner most favor- able to sustaining the judgments, we conclude that the evidence reasonably supports the court’s determination that the respondent failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), considering the ages and needs of the children. First, although “[a] finding of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered”; (internal quotation marks omitted) In re Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 149, 290 A.3d 901 (2023); the court appropriately relied on the respondent’s lack of consistent engagement in individual counseling in find- ing that she failed to rehabilitate. In so concluding, the court recognized that, initially, the respondent “made strides toward completing her specific steps.” Ultimately, however, the respondent did not maintain consistent engagement in individual therapy, which was one of her court-ordered specific steps. She was referred for individual therapy in February 2023 and began therapy with LaChapelle, a therapist, in April 2023, during which time the respondent was engaged until November 2023. The respondent was then not engaged in therapy until February 20249 and was unsuccessfully discharged from 9 The record reveals that this gap in treatment from November 2023 until January 2024 was due in part to the therapist’s taking a leave of absence. The record, however, also contains evidence that, during this time period, the respondent missed an appointment with another therapist in the same office as LaChapelle in December 2023 and a medication management appointment. The respondent also asserted that she had an insurance issue during this time period; however, the  In re Avianzah R. therapy in November 2024. The court found, and the record reflects,10 that the respondent was discharged from individual therapy for having several no-call, no-shows, and that, as of the time of trial, she was not engaged in therapy. The court found that family ther- apy could not be commenced until the respondent made meaningful progress in individual therapy. This finding is supported by the testimony of Monique McNally, a department social worker, who testified that, “in order to participate in family therapy, everyone needed to be engaged and making progress in their own individual therapies before the family therapy could start.” Accord- ingly, the court’s findings concerning the respondent’s inconsistent engagement with individual therapy are supported by evidence in the record. We disagree with the respondent that the department did not adequately inform her about the specific goals she was supposed to complete in therapy.11 As noted previ- court found that the insurance issue was resolved in December 2023. This finding is consistent with the testimony of Monique McNally, a department social worker. Furthermore, the record contains a written record of phone corre- spondence from McNally to the respondent dated February 2, 2024, in which McNally gave her a list of services the department wanted her to engage in, noted the respondent’s inconsistent engagement in therapy and missed appointments, and “strongly recommended” that she reen- gage in individual therapy. McNally sent a letter to the respondent in January 2025, stating that the respondent needed to reengage in men- tal health treatment to continue “working through [her] traumas and current situation.” Nonetheless, it is not disputed that the respondent did not reengage in therapy after she was unsuccessfully discharged. The court reasonably could have relied on this evidence in concluding that the respondent was “engaged in therapy, but not consistently.” 10 A Fe