In re Nathaniel W.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  In re Nathaniel W. IN RE NATHANIEL W. ET AL.* (AC 49751) Moll, Seeley and Eveleigh, Js. Syllabus The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgments terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor children. Although the court, prior to trial, had denied the father’s motion to participate virtually in the trial, the court indicated to counsel that it had reconsidered its position after the morning of the first day of trial in light of changed circumstances and would allow the father to participate in the remainder of the trial virtually, but the father declined to do so. He claimed, inter alia, that the court violated his procedural due process rights pursuant to the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution in denying his motion to participate virtually at trial and commencing the trial in his absence. Held: The respondent father’s procedural due process rights were not violated as a result of the trial court’s denial of his motion to participate virtually and his absence from the morning of the first day of trial, as, after carefully balancing the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319), this court concluded that, although the father had a constitutionally protected interest in his parental rights and his virtual participation at trial, includ- ing during the morning portion of the first day of trial, would not have detrimentally affected the state’s interest in the trial, the very low risk of an erroneous deprivation of the father’s interest in his parental rights stem- ming from his absence during a portion of the trial significantly outweighed the other two factors. The trial court did not commit plain error in permitting the foster parent of two of the minor children to provide a statement during trial, as, even assuming, without deciding, that the court committed an error that was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal, the respondent father failed to demonstrate that the consequences of the presumed error were so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust. Argued September 17—officially released November 12, 2026** * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b- 142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. ** November 12, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.  In re Nathaniel W. Procedural History Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami- lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Juvenile Mat- ters, where the court, Aaron, J., denied the respondent father’s motion to participate virtually in the trial; there- after, the respondent mother consented to the termina- tion of her parental rights; subsequently, the cases were tried to the court, Aaron, J.; judgments terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed. Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father). Alma Rose Nunley, assistant solicitor general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Opinion MOLL, J. The respondent father, Michael W., appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor children Nathaniel W. (Nathaniel), Shawn W. (Shawn), Darren W. (Darren), Marissa W. (Marissa), and Izabella W. (Izabella) (collectively, five children).1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) violated his procedural due process rights pursuant to the four- teenth amendment to the United States constitution2 in denying his motion to participate virtually at trial and commencing the trial in his absence and (2) committed plain error in permitting Marissa and Izabella’s foster 1 The respondent mother, Carrissa W., consented to the termination of her parental rights as to the five children, and she is not participat- ing in this appeal. Accordingly, all references to the respondent are to Michael W. only. 2 The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.  In re Nathaniel W. parent to provide a statement during trial. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court. The following facts, as found by the trial court and which are not in dispute, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The respondent and the five children’s mother, Carrissa W., were mar- ried in March 2010 and lived together until sometime around 2018, when the respondent was incarcerated after having assaulted his brother. The respondent remained incarcerated until May 2020. In May 2022, the respon- dent was living in New York. On May 28, 2022, Car- rissa W. was visiting Connecticut temporarily with (1) her boyfriend,3 (2) the five children, and (3) Carter W. (Carter), who was the child of Carrissa W. and another individual, Kenneth W. On May 28, 2022, the Clinton Police Department con- tacted the Department of Children and Families (depart- ment) after receiving a report that Carter had sustained unexplained injuries. Carter was transported to Yale New Haven Hospital for treatment. On May 29, 2022, Marissa and Izabella were treated at Yale New Haven Hospital for injuries caused by Carrissa W.’s boyfriend. That same day, the petitioner invoked ninety-six hour holds on the five children.4 On June 1, 2022, the petitioner obtained ex parte orders of temporary custody of the five children. On June 2, 2022, the petitioner filed neglect petitions as to the five children. On December 7, 2022, the trial court, Bhatt, J., following a contested hearing, sustained the ex parte orders of temporary custody as to the respondent. On July 27, 2023, the court, Hon. Juliett L. Crawford, judge trial referee, adjudicated the five children neglected and committed them to the care and custody of the petitioner. On March 11, 2025, the petitioner filed petitions to ter- minate the respondent’s parental rights as to Nathaniel, 3 Although they were separated, the respondent and Carrissa W. remained married. 4 The petitioner also invoked a ninety-six hour hold on Carter. Unless otherwise deemed necessary, we do not discuss the proceedings that ensued regarding Carter.  In re Nathaniel W. Shawn, and Darren. On March 24, 2025, with the per- mission of the court, Esperance-Smith, J., the petitioner filed amended petitions to terminate the respondent’s parental rights as to Marissa and Izabella.5 On April 4, 2025, the court consolidated, for purposes of trial, the termination petitions regarding the five children. On September 26, 2025, the respondent filed a motion to participate virtually at trial (motion to participate virtually), which the court, Aaron, J., denied on October 1, 2025; however, the court stated that, if requested, it would consider conducting an evidentiary hearing vis- à-vis the motion and revisiting its ruling. On October 2, 2025, the respondent filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. On October 14, 2025, following an evidentiary hearing, the court declined to reconsider its denial of the motion to participate virtually. The termination petitions were tried to the court on October 24 and 29, 2025. The respondent was repre- sented by counsel at trial; however, the respondent did not attend the trial. The court admitted several exhibits into the record and heard testimony from five witnesses. Additionally, the court heard unsworn statements from the foster parents of some of the five children. Thereaf- ter, the parties presented closing arguments. On January 22, 2026, the court rendered judgments terminating the respondent’s parental rights and appointing the petitioner as the statutory parent of the five children. The court determined that the record contained clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that (1) the five children had been adjudicated neglected on July 27, 2023, (2) (a) the department made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify him with the five children and (b) the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, (3) the respondent failed to rehabilitate sufficiently pursuant to 5 In June 2022, the petitioner filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Carrissa W. as to Marissa and Izabella.  In re Nathaniel W. General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i),6 and (4) termina- tion of the respondent’s parental rights was in the five children’s best interests. This appeal followed.7 Addi- tional procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The respondent first claims that the trial court violated his federal procedural due process rights in denying the motion to participate virtually and commencing the trial in his absence. We disagree. The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. In the motion to partici- pate virtually, the respondent claimed that traveling to Connecticut to attend the trial in person would be a “hard- ship for him.” Specifically, the respondent represented that (1) he resided in New York, (2) he had custody of his fourteen year old son, Stephon, to whom Carrissa W. is not biologically related, who has special needs and was prohibited from leaving New York as a condition of probation, (3) there was no one else available to care for Stephon if he had to travel to Connecticut for the trial, (4) he attended school during the week, and (5) he had appeared virtually at prior proceedings. On October 1, 2025, the court held a hearing to address certain pretrial motions, including the motion to partici- pate virtually. The respondent’s trial counsel attended the hearing, but the respondent did not. The petitioner’s trial counsel conveyed that the petitioner would defer to the court on the issue of whether the respondent appeared for trial in person or virtually. The respondent’s trial counsel represented that, in light of the respondent’s role as Stephon’s caretaker, it would be a “hardship” for 6 In its memorandum of decision, the court also determined that the petitioner had demonstrated that the respondent failed to rehabilitate sufficiently pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E); however, none of the termination petitions vis-à-vis the five children sought to terminate his parental rights on that ground. This discrepancy is not germane to the issues on appeal, and, therefore, we need not address it further. 7 Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, counsel for the five children filed a statement adopting the petitioner’s appellate brief.  In re Nathaniel W. him to travel to Connecticut for the trial. The respon- dent’s trial counsel further stated: “[F]rom a practical standpoint, I think if you don’t allow [the respondent] to participate virtually I don’t think he’ll be able to par- ticipate. So, I think that it might be best if the court could fashion some conditions for his participation if there’s a concern about him delaying the proceedings . . . and we would try to comply with those.” In response to questions posed by the court, the respondent’s trial counsel further stated that (1) Stephon attended school and (2) the respondent was unemployed but attended school full-time during the week. The court orally denied the motion to participate vir- tually, stating that “[t]here are six children here.8 It is a complicated case. There are multiple witnesses, multiple exhibits, there’s going to be a need for counsel and clients, it’s going to be a difficult, complex, and cumbersome trial for all concerned. There are multiple witnesses and the court is going to have the trial in person. I’m going to order the department to do whatever is possible to assist the parties in making arrangements to be here. But the trial is going to be in person, and the parties are going to be required to be here.”9 (Footnote added.) The respondent’s trial counsel objected to the court’s ruling, stating that the respondent’s request was “a reasonable one under the circumstances.” The court responded by stating that it was not going to accept counsel’s represen- tation that no arrangements could be made to enable the respondent to appear in person at trial, but, if requested, the court would consider conducting an evidentiary hearing to hear testimony by the respondent as to his purported inability to be physically present. The court further iterated that “inconvenience” was not a basis to excuse the respondent’s attendance in person at trial. 8 At the time of the October 1, 2025 hearing, termination petitions were pending as to (1) the five children, seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and Carrissa W., and (2) Carter, seeking to terminate the parental rights of Carrissa W. and Kenneth W. All of the termination petitions were consolidated for purposes of trial. 9 The court also denied a motion to participate virtually at trial filed by Carrissa W.  In re Nathaniel W. On October 2, 2025, the respondent filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The respondent cited In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642, 284 A.3d 562 (2022), for the proposition that a parent has no constitutional right to an in person termination of parental rights trial, such that “[i]t follows that there is no legal necessity that a parent appear in person at a trial.” On October 14, 2025, the court held a hearing to address additional pretrial motions. During the hear- ing, the court heard testimony from the respondent, who appeared and testified virtually, regarding his alleged need to participate virtually at trial. The respondent testified that (1) he lived in New York, (2) he was taking online classes as a full-time student, (3) he was the sole caregiver of Stephon, who was turning fifteen years old the following month, attended the ninth grade, and lived with him, (4) Stephon was receiving several services, including mental health counseling, group counseling, and speech counseling, (5) Stephon was on probation, the conditions of which included being supervised at all times, attending school, reporting to probation weekly, and being prohibited from leaving New York without permission, (6) he was the only person authorized to supervise Stephon, such that he would be required to bring Stephon with him to Connecticut for the trial, and (7) Stephon has special needs and would struggle if required to accompany him to Connecticut for the trial, which would necessitate a three and one-half hour drive. The respondent further testified that he was aware that, in requesting to participate virtually, he was waiving any right to be physically present alongside his trial counsel for the presentation of evidence. Following the respondent’s testimony, his trial counsel requested that the court reconsider its denial of the motion to partici- pate virtually, arguing that allowing the respondent’s virtual participation was a “reasonable accommodation” and that the respondent had been “questioned about basically waiving his rights to confront witnesses, so, you know, that’s clear. It’s his motion; he’s obviously agreeing to it.”  In re Nathaniel W. The trial court orally declined to reconsider its denial of the motion to participate virtually, reasoning: “The trial court has a responsibility to avoid unnecessary interruptions, to maintain the orderly procedure of the proceedings and the [trial] court, and to prevent any interference with the administration of justice. And the [trial] court has reviewed . . . In re Annessa J. . . . which really dealt with a challenge to a [trial] court hearing cases during the [COVID-19] pandemic virtually. And while [our Supreme] Court [in In re Annessa J.] found that there wasn’t a constitutional right for litigants to be able to appear in person and that the issue wasn’t preserved, the [trial] court is mindful that there are six children involved. There are two fathers, and so, four parties. There are multiple witnesses, including—and multiple pleadings and motions. And it is important to the court that this matter get[s] heard efficiently, expeditiously. “And I realize that all parents have a challenge and it’s a struggle to be able to take time out or to be present in court, but it’s my understanding—I don’t know when the last time [the respondent] has been present in the court, but the [trial] court finds that—and also Practice Book § 35a-2210 where [the] presence of [a] person may be by means of an interactive audiovisual device. “There are a lot of considerations, including making available time for [the respondent] to speak to . . . his 10 Practice Book § 35a-22 provides: “(a) The appearance of a person for any proceeding set forth in subsection (b) of this section may, in the discretion of the judicial authority on motion of a party or on its own motion, be made by means of an interactive audiovisual device. Such audiovisual device must operate so that such person and their attorney, if any, and the judicial authority if the proceeding is in court, can see and communicate with each other simultaneously. In addition, a procedure by which such person and their attorney can confer in private must be provided. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to establish a right for any person to be heard or to appear by means of an interactive audiovisual device or to require the Judicial Branch to pay for such person’s appearance by means of an interactive audiovisual device. “ (b) A person may appear by means of an interactive audiovisual device in juvenile matters in the civil session, as defined by General  In re Nathaniel W. [trial] counsel and confer with his [trial] counsel, to hear the witnesses; there are other witnesses that are going to be testifying virtually;11 I don’t even know that the [trial] court can accommodate two ways of doing that.” (Footnotes added.) After further discussing the provi- sions of Practice Book § 35a-22, the court stated: “So, it would seem to the court that [in consideration of] judicial economy, the nature of this case and these proceedings and the complexity of it, as well as [§ 35a-22], the court is going to deny the motion [to participate virtually] and order that all parties appear in person.” Statutes § 46b-121 (a), in the following proceedings or under the fol- lowing circumstances: “(1) A party or a party’s representative in case status and case man- agement conferences; “(2) If a parent or guardian is incarcerated in this state, they may participate in plea hearings, judicial pretrials, order of temporary custody and termination of parental rights (TPR) case management conferences, reviews of protective supervision, permanency plan hear- ings, case status conferences, preliminary order of temporary custody hearings, neglect plea and disposition by agreement, neglect trials, TPR plea hearings, canvass of consents to TPR, contested transfer of guardianship hearings, motions to revoke commitment, emancipation petitions, and motions to reinstate guardian; “(3) If a parent or guardian is incarcerated in a federal correctional facility or another state’s correctional facility, they may participate in all matters set forth in subdivision (2) above and in contested hearings including, but not limited to, temporary custody hearings, neglect or uncared for proceedings or TPR trials; “(4) A foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver may appear and be heard on the best interests of the child or youth pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (p); “(5) A sibling of any child or youth committed to the Department of Children and Families, upon motion, may appear and be heard concern- ing visitation with, and placement of, any such child or youth pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (q); “(6) A witness may testify in any proceeding in the discretion of the judicial authority. “(c) Unless otherwise required by law or unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, prior to any proceeding in which a person appears by means of an interactive audiovisual device, copies of all documents which may be offered at the proceeding shall be provided to all counsel and self-represented parties in advance of the proceeding.” 11 The court previously granted motions filed by the petitioner and by Carrissa W. to allow out-of-state witnesses to testify virtually.  In re Nathaniel W. Following the court’s ruling, the petitioner’s trial counsel stated: “[B]efore the court issued its ruling, I was going to state . . . that [the petitioner] do[es] support [the motion to participate virtually]. There is a legitimate and factually established basis. [The respondent] under- stands that he’s giving up his rights to appear in person, but he still has a right to appear.” The court responded by stating that “[it had] issued its ruling.” Thereafter, counsel for the five children conveyed, and adopted, the position of the guardian ad litem, who was not present at the hearing, that it was in the five children’s best interests to have the respondent appear in person at trial. The court later stated that it would leave it to the parties’ respective counsel to confer and to determine what accommodations, if any, the respondent would need to appear in person at trial. On October 17, 2025, Carrissa W. consented to the termination of her parental rights as to the five children and Carter. On October 23, 2025, Kenneth W. consented to the termination of his parental rights as to Carter. On October 24, 2025, the court conducted the first day of trial on the termination petitions that remained pending against the respondent. The respondent’s trial counsel was present, but the respondent was not. Before the start of evidence, the respondent’s trial counsel stated that, although the respondent wished to participate at trial, the respondent objected to the court’s rulings on October 1 and 14, 2025, prohibiting him from appearing virtually. The court briefly addressed its prior rulings, stating that it denied the motion to participate virtually in accordance with Practice Book § 35a-22 and that it “did find that it would be too burdensome and cumbersome to allow” the respondent to appear virtually, noting that (1) Carrissa W. and Kenneth W. were part of the underlying proceedings when the court had issued those rulings, although neither of them remained involved at the time of trial, (2) the court had “a comprehensive list of wit- nesses and exhibits submitted by the parties,” with some witnesses permitted to testify virtually, (3) there were  In re Nathaniel W. five or six days of trial scheduled, and (4) the respondent never appeared in person for any scheduled court dates. After the court had addressed other preliminary issues, the petitioner’s trial counsel stated that the petitioner was not requesting that the court default the respondent; instead, the petitioner wished to proceed with the trial in absentia. The court allowed the trial to go forward in absentia while stating that “[the respondent], of course, is encouraged to attend these proceedings.” The petitioner’s trial counsel proceeded to call as a wit- ness Marie Levesque, a social work supervisor employed by the department. The petitioner’s trial counsel elicited testimony from Levesque on direct examination, and the respondent’s trial counsel cross-examined her. The court then took a morning recess. Once back on the record, the court noted that it had held a brief conference with all counsel during the recess. The court then again addressed its denial of the motion to participate virtually, stating: “[T]he court denied [the motion to participate virtually], and the court—that is within the court’s discretion, the court had referenced [Practice Book § 35a-22 regarding] when parties are permitted to appear virtually, and the court, in its dis- cretion, denied [the motion to participate virtually]. At the time [that it had denied the motion to participate virtually], there were three respondents and six children, and a list of several witnesses submitted by the parties who were going to be called as witnesses. The matter was scheduled over five days, and the court, in its discretion, denied the [motion to participate virtually]. As of yes- terday, late afternoon, both [Carrissa W. and Kenneth W.] . . . had tendered their consents to the termination of their parental rights. The court has heard the testimony of [Levesque]. There’s still, at least on the witness and exhibit list, several witnesses, and the court had indicated to counsel in chambers that if [the respondent] was still interested, the court would reconsider and allow him to appear virtually for the remainder of the trial, and as I indicated, this is scheduled for another several days,  In re Nathaniel W. and if it were requested, there could be a transcript of [Levesque’s] testimony, and it’s my recollection that [the petitioner’s trial counsel], in questioning [the respon- dent during the October 14, 2025 evidentiary hearing], had asked him and advised him that he would not have an opportunity to be speaking with his [trial counsel] through the testimony of the witnesses, and he had sort of indicated that that was acceptable to him.” The court then relayed its understanding that the respondent’s trial counsel was not seeking to have the respondent participate virtually for the remainder of the trial. Counsel replied that the respondent had been consistent in wishing to appear virtually at trial; how- ever, counsel believed that the respondent had the right to hear Levesque’s live testimony and that ordering a transcript of her testimony was not an acceptable alter- native. The court took an early lunch recess in order to permit counsel to contact the respondent and discuss the court’s proposal with him. Before breaking for the lunch recess, the court iterated that it “[stood] by” its denial of the motion to participate virtually under the circumstances that had existed at the time of the denial. Following the lunch recess, the respondent’s trial coun- sel reported that the respondent was requesting that the court restart the trial in light of his belief that reviewing a transcript of Levesque’s testimony was inadequate. The petitioner’s trial counsel opined that the respondent would have to file a motion to request restarting the trial; in the alternative, the petitioner was amenable either to the respondent appearing virtually for trial that day or the court continuing the trial to the following week, with Levesque retaking the stand and the respondent having an opportunity to review a transcript of her tes- timony. Counsel for the five children deferred to the court on the resolution of this issue, but she conveyed that it would not be burdensome on the five children if the court continued the trial until the following week to allow the respondent to review a transcript of Levesque’s testimony and to confer with his trial counsel.  In re Nathaniel W. The court rejected the respondent’s request to restart the trial, stating that (1) the court was unaware of any legal authority mandating that remedy, rather than the court allowing him to participate virtually for the remainder of the trial, with (a) him appearing that day or (b) the court continuing the trial to the following week to provide him with an opportunity to review a transcript of Levesque’s testimony, (2) there had been “a couple hours of direct testimony and some cross-examination” of Levesque, (3) the respondent previously had acknowl- edged that, if he were to appear virtually, he would not be in a position to confer with counsel during witness testimony, (4) the respondent had no right to appear virtually, and (5) the court’s proposal constituted an effort to accommodate the respondent, who “could be present if he chose to be present,” as there was now a “different set of circumstances . . . [such that the court] thought it would not be too cumbersome to allow him at this point to appear virtually . . . .” The respondent’s trial counsel informed the court that, unless it restarted the trial, the respondent was declining the opportunity to be present, whereupon the court resumed the eviden- tiary portion of the trial in the respondent’s continued absence. Levesque retook the stand, after which (1) the respondent’s trial counsel declined to cross-examine her further, (2) counsel for the five children cross-examined her, (3) the petitioner’s trial counsel elicited testimony from her on redirect examination, and (4) the respon- dent’s trial counsel recross-examined her. The petitioner called one additional witness before the court adjourned for the day. On October 29, 2025, the second day of trial, the respondent’s trial counsel appeared, but the respon- dent did not. Before the evidentiary portion of the trial had resumed, the respondent’s trial counsel again noted the respondent’s objection to the court’s October 1 and 14, 2025 rulings precluding him from participating virtually. Counsel further stated that, “[t]o the extent the court has made further rulings on this issue, [the respondent] objects to any ruling that does not allow him  In re Nathaniel W. to be present for testimony, all the testimony. He does have a constitutional right to a fair and full hearing, fair procedures . . . .” The court interjected: “Yes, [the respondent] does, and he has been given that right. And not only has he been given that right, the court has gone, I think, to great lengths to accommodate [him]. . . . And he does have a right to be present; he has chosen not to be pres- ent. We have continued this trial in his absence rather than defaulting him. At the time [the October 1 and 14, 2025] rulings were made . . . there were three parties,12 over approximately twenty-five witnesses, and many, many exhibits. And the court issued a ruling. The first day of trial that started at 10 [a.m.], at approximately noon, the court . . . offered [the respondent] the oppor- tunity to appear virtually, which [the respondent’s trial counsel] rejected out of hand. . . . And then, we came back . . . on the record and we continued the case until 2 [p.m.] to give [counsel] an opportunity, at that point, to talk to [the respondent], and to confer with him. At which point, we offered to have a transcript produced, to continue the trial until that transcript was produced and given to [counsel] and [the respondent] to review, and to allow [counsel] to recall [Levesque], with [the respondent] being present, and because there had been several days of trial already scheduled. At 2 [p.m.] that day, [counsel] rejected that offer and that opportunity, after conferring with [the respondent], because the court refused the request to begin the trial all over again when [the respondent]—not to mention that the department had made and offered several accommodations in order for [the respondent] to actually be physically present, which is actually his responsibility to be here. So, the trial continued in [the respondent’s] absence because he chose not to appear either in person or virtually that day. And it wasn’t because he was unavailable; it was because the court was not willing to begin the trial all over again. So, [the respondent] has had every opportunity to participate in this trial.” (Footnote added.) Counsel 12 We presume that the court intended to say “three respondents,” those being the respondent, Carrissa W., and Kenneth W.  In re Nathaniel W. then argued that the respondent had a right to confront witnesses and to be present for testimony and that his right to due process entitled him to a fair hearing, which he had not received. Counsel further informed the court that the respondent continued to decline to be present for the remainder of the trial. After resuming the evidentiary portion of trial, the court heard testimony from three additional witnesses. The respondent’s trial counsel rested without calling any witnesses or offering any exhibits. During his closing argument, counsel referred the court to his prior argu- ments regarding “the due process issue” and stated that “the changes in the circumstances of the case were known to the court prior to the taking of evidence. So, the fact that [Carrissa W. and Kenneth W.] have consented [to the termination of their parental rights] and the nature of the case had changed was known to the court. Though there [were] approximately two hours of testimony [by Levesque], that testimony was not incidental or pre- liminary; it was very important to this case. In fact, it was essentially [the petitioner’s] entire case. [Levesque] testified and laid out the entire history of the case. And finally . . . [Levesque] is a [department] employee and . . . would have been readily available to testify.” In its memorandum of decision terminating the respon- dent’s parental rights, the court noted that, although the respondent did not attend the trial, he was represented by counsel for the duration of the trial. The decision made no mention of the denial of the motion to participate virtually. On appeal, invoking the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), the respondent claims that the court vio- lated his procedural due process rights in denying the motion to participate virtually and commencing the trial in his absence.13 For the following reasons, we are not persuaded. 13 The respondent asserts that his claim is preserved, maintaining that his trial counsel (1) objected to the court’s denial of the motion to  In re Nathaniel W. “The United States Supreme Court established a three- pronged balancing test in Mathews . . . to determine what safeguards the federal constitution requires to satisfy procedural due process. Courts apply that balancing test when the state seeks to terminate parental rights. . . . The three factors to be considered are (1) the private interest that will be affected by the state action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, given the existing procedures, and the value of any additional or alternate procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to increased or substitute procedural requirements. . . . The bottom-line question is whether the denial rendered the [proceeding] fundamentally unfair in view of the Mathews factors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Janeleah I., 233 Conn. App. 633, 642–43, 341 A.3d 390 (2025). “Stated differently, we must determine if the private interest of the [respondent] in the compan- ionship, love and control of the child[ren] is at risk of being erroneously terminated because of the lack of an adequate procedural safeguard that could be provided for [the respondent] without disregarding the state’s interest in the well-being of the child[ren] and the fis- cal and administrative burden on the state.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew P., 153 Conn. App. 667, 675, 102 A.3d 1127, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104 A.3d 106 (2014); see also, e.g., In re Janeleah I., supra, 643 (concluding, after balancing Mathews fac- tors, that “[trial] court’s decision to proceed with trial in the [respondent mother’s] absence did not render the termination proceeding fundamentally unfair”). participate virtually and (2) argued expressly during closing argument that his due process rights were at stake. Alternatively, if we were to deem his claim unpreserved, the respondent seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). The petitioner does not address the preservation issue in her appellate brief. On the basis of the record, we deem the respondent’s claim to be preserved, and, therefore, we need not address Golding further.  In re Nathaniel W. A Our analysis of the first Mathews factor requires little discussion. The respondent contends, and the petitioner concedes, that this factor weighs in the respondent’s favor. We agree. See In re Janeleah I., supra, 233 Conn. App. 643 (“the respondent has an important, constitu- tionally protected interest in preserving [the respon- dent’s] parental rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B We next turn to the second Mathews factor, which requires an examination of the risk of an erroneous depri- vation of the respondent’s interest in his parental rights, given the existing procedures, and the value, if any, of the additional safeguard of permitting him to appear virtually during the morning of the first day of trial. See id., 642–43. Briefly, we iterate that, although the court initially denied the motion to participate virtually on October 1, 2025, and declined to reconsider that ruling on October 14, 2025, the court, following the morning recess on the first day of trial, granted the respondent permission to appear virtually for the remainder of the trial. The respondent declined that opportunity following the court’s rejection of his request to restart the trial.14 In short, we conclude that there was no violation of the respondent’s procedural due process rights re