Nunez v. Brown-White

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Nunez v. Brown-White SOLEDAD NUNEZ v. GWENDOLYN BROWN-WHITE ET AL. (AC 48330) Seeley, Wilson and Flynn, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defen- dants’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the motion to enforce the agreement because her former counsel, A, did not have actual authority to bind her to the agreement. Held: The trial court’s factual finding that there was a meeting of the minds as to the essential elements of the settlement agreement was not clearly errone- ous, as, during a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804) (Audubon), A testified that he had discussed the terms of the agreement with the plaintiff and sent an email containing the terms to the defendants’ counsel, who prepared and sent a draft of the agreement to A, and A had never sent changes to the draft agreement or anything disputing its terms to the defendants’ counsel and, thus, the fact that the plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement was unavailing. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly relied on preliminary email exchanges and oral communications between counsel as evidence of a binding settlement was unavailing, as it was not improper for the court to rely on the email communications entered into evidence at the hearing as evidence of the parties’ words and conduct in determining that a meeting of the minds had occurred, especially when the emails memorialized the terms that the attorneys had discussed at the pretrial conference and expressly indicated the plaintiff’s acceptance of the settlement offer, and, in addition, A informed the court’s caseflow coordinator that the case had been settled but not withdrawn. The plaintiff’s claim that A did not have actual authority to bind her to the settlement agreement was unavailing, as the trial court properly did not afford any evidentiary value to the plaintiff’s unsworn declaration and the statements contained therein, and the plaintiff did not file a motion for articulation of the court’s decision with respect to its failure to make explicit findings with respect to A’s authority to settle the action. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court misapplied Audubon by enforcing the settlement agreement despite the existence of disputed facts and ambigu- ity in certain terms of the agreement was unavailing, as the court’s finding that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement was supported by evidence, including the parties’ overt acts and words. Argued January 15—officially released August 4, 2026  Nunez v. Brown-White Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, invasion of privacy by false light, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Gould, J., granted the defendants’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Darnell D. Crosland, for the appellant (plaintiff). Michael Feldman, for the appellees (defendants). Opinion SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Soledad Nunez, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a hearing pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811–12, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon),1 grant- ing a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by the defendants, Gwendolyn Brown-White and Seaview Village Condominium Association, Inc. (condominium association). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement because (1) there was no meeting of the minds, (2) the court improperly relied on preliminary email exchanges and oral communications between counsel as evidence of a binding settlement, (3) the plaintiff’s former counsel, Attorney Daniel Angelone, did not have actual authority to bind the plaintiff to the settlement agreement, and (4) the court failed to resolve material factual disputes concerning the plaintiff’s con- sent, attorney authority and the finalization of essential terms before enforcing the settlement agreement and, thus, misapplied Audubon by enforcing the agreement 1 “An Audubon hearing is conducted to decide whether the terms of a settlement agreement are sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to be enforceable as a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karlen v. Saleeb, 238 Conn. App. 224, 225 n.2, 356 A.3d 352 (2026); see also Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225 Conn. 811–12.  Nunez v. Brown-White despite the existence of those disputed facts and ambi- guity in the terms of the agreement.2 We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court. The following procedural history and undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. In October 2022, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants. In a four count complaint dated October 21, 2022, the plain- tiff, both in her individual capacity and in her capacity as secretary of the executive board of the condominium association, alleged claims against the defendants for invasion of privacy by false light, defamation per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Gen- eral Statutes § 42-110a et seq. In her claims against the defendants, the plaintiff, a resident of a condominium and a member of a condominium association and former president of the executive board of the condominium association, alleged that Brown-White had engaged in a “campaign of intimidation, harassment, abuse, and blatantly false narratives against the plaintiff” for the purpose of supplanting the plaintiff as president of the executive board, which resulted in the plaintiff’s reputa- tion being severely tarnished. On July 9, 2024, the court held a pretrial conference, at which the plaintiff’s counsel at the time, Attorney Angelone, and the defendants’ counsel, Attorney Kris- ten Greene, engaged in settlement discussions. Specifi- cally, they discussed monetary and nonmonetary terms of a settlement. The next day, July 10, 2024, Attorney Angelone sent an email to Attorney Greene, stating: “As per my previous voicemail, [the plaintiff] accepts [the] [d]efendants’ offer of settlement for $5000. Additionally, subject to review of the specific language, she agrees to the principles of confidentiality, [nondisparagement], being responsible for attorney’s fees in future litigation raised by her against [the] [d]efendants in which [the] 2 We note that the plaintiff’s statement of the issues on appeal lists seven different issues, many of which overlap. As such, we have orga- nized the claims in a different manner, so as to address similar claims together.  Nunez v. Brown-White [d]efendants prevail, [and] not to run for [the] . . . board [of the condominium association]. Please forward for my review a draft of the [s]ettlement [a]greement at your convenience. I will alert caseflow that the matter has been settled.” Attorney Greene responded that same day with an email stating: “Ok, thanks [Attorney Angelone]. To clarify, the essential terms of the settlement agree- ment include: (1) $5000 payment; (2) [g]eneral release; (3) [nondisparagement]; (4) [c]onfidentiality; (5) [i]f [the plaintiff] brings legal action against the [condominium] [a]ssociation [or] its [representatives] in the future and loses or withdraws, she pays [the] [a]ssociation/[repre- sentive’s] attorney’s fees; (6) [n]o admission of liability; [and] (7) [s]he won’t run for the [b]oard in the future. I will prepare the agreement and send to you.” Also that same day, Attorney Angelone informed a caseflow coor- dinator that the case may be marked as “settled but not withdrawn,” after which a notice was issued indicating that “[t]his case has been marked settled but not with- drawn. A withdrawal is due by the date and time indicated above [September 9, 2024, at 5 p.m.]. Failure of counsel to file a withdrawal by the above date will result in the case being dismissed.” On July 11, 2024, Attorney Greene sent Attorney Angelone a draft of the release and settlement agree- ment, which contained the terms discussed at the pretrial conference on July 9, 2024, as memorialized in the July 10, 2024 emails between counsel. Attorney Angelone responded on July 11, 2024, stating: “Thanks. I’ll review and get back to you.” On July 19, 2024, Attorney Greene sent the first of a number of follow-up emails to inquire about the status of the plaintiff’s execution of the release and settlement agreement, asking, “When can I expect the signed [r]elease and [s]ettlement [a]greement?” That was followed by another email on July 23, 2024, ask- ing, “Can you please let me know about this?” Attorney Greene sent two more emails on July 25 and 26, 2024, asking for a response and indicating that she had not heard anything and intended to file a caseflow request for a conference with the trial judge. On July 26, 2024,  Nunez v. Brown-White Attorney Angelone responded by apologizing for the delay, explaining that he had had some personal medi- cal issues, and stating that his “client [was] coming to [his] office next week” and that he “hope[d] to have this wrapped up very soon.” Later that day, Attorney Greene responded by stating that she “look[ed] forward to get- ting the signed agreement next week.” Attorney Greene followed up with an email on July 29 asking Attorney Angelone to let her know when the plaintiff was coming in that week and when she could expect a signed agree- ment, to which Attorney Angelone responded with an email on July 31, 2024, stating that the plaintiff would be in his office on Friday, August 2, 2024, to execute the release and settlement agreement. On August 2, 2024, Attorney Greene emailed Attorney Angelone asking: “Has the agreement been signed? Please advise me asap.” On August 5, 2024, Attorney Angelone reported by email to Attorney Greene that “[t]he progress with [his] client [was] going slower than expected,” but that he would consent to a caseflow request for a status conference. Thereafter, Attorney Greene submitted a caseflow request for a status conference. On August 9, 2024, Attorney Darnell Crosland filed an appearance on behalf of the plaintiff in lieu of Attorney Angelone.3 After entering his appearance on behalf of the plaintiff, Attorney Crosland challenged whether Attor- ney Angelone had the plaintiff’s authority to enter into a settlement agreement. The defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement on August 15, 2024. In their motion, the defendants claimed that the parties had reached a settlement agreement, as the terms were discussed at the pretrial conference, Attorney Angelone agreed to discuss those terms with the plaintiff and to respond, which he did do, indicating that the plaintiff had agreed to accept the settlement offer and terms, and the case was reported as settled with the court. The 3 At the Audubon hearing, Attorney Angelone testified that, after Attorney Crosland filed his appearance, Attorney Angelone had no further involvement with the present case with the exception of the Audubon hearing.  Nunez v. Brown-White defendants contended further that “there was a meeting of the minds on all essential terms on July 10, 2024,” and that the plaintiff’s failure ultimately to sign the written agreement did not invalidate the settlement. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement on Sep- tember 30, 2024, in which the plaintiff asserted that she never signed a settlement agreement, that Attorney Angelone did not have authority to enter into a settle- ment agreement on her behalf, that no meeting of the minds was ever reached in light of the “subject to review” language in Attorney Angelone’s July 10, 2024 email, and that the terms of the purported settlement agreement were not clear. In her objection, the plaintiff referred to a purported “sworn declaration” (declaration) she had filed with the court on September 4, 2024, in which she asserted that she never agreed to the terms of the settle- ment offer presented to her by Attorney Angelone, who allegedly had attempted to accept the settlement offer on her behalf, against her instructions and understanding.4 The declaration includes a statement indicating that it was being made under penalty of perjury and it was signed and dated by the plaintiff. 4 Specifically, the declaration provides: “I, Soledad Nunez, being over eighteen (18) years of age and competent to testify, hereby make the following statements under oath and from personal knowledge: (1) I am a party to the above captioned matter. (2) I understand that this sworn declaration is being submitted in opposition to a [m]otion to [e]nforce [s]ettlement. (3) On July 10, 2024, my previous counsel, [A]ttorney . . . Angelone, informed me of a settlement offer. However, I did not agree to the terms. My understanding was that the offer and its terms were negotiable, and it was my intention to negotiate and discuss the terms before providing my authorization. (4) On August 9, 2024, I retained a new counsel, [A]ttorney . . . Crosland, primarily because I discovered that [A]ttorney . . . Angelone was attempting to accept a settlement on my behalf, against my instructions and understanding. In this vein, I hired [A]ttorney Crosland, whose office communicated on my behalf that I had never agreed to the settlement or its terms. (5) The key point I wish to emphasize is that I, Soledad Nunez, have never consented to or agreed to any settlement agreement, either with my previous attorney or with my current attorneys.” The declaration also provides: “I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the [s]tate of Connecticut that the foregoing is true and correct.”  Nunez v. Brown-White The court, Gould, J., held an Audubon hearing on the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agree- ment on December 12, 2024. At the Audubon hearing, Attorney Angelone was the only witness who testified. Specifically, he testified about the pretrial conference and having discussed with Attorney Greene monetary and nonmonetary terms of the settlement. With respect to his July 10, 2024 email, indicating that the plaintiff had accepted the defendants’ settlement offer, Attorney Angelone responded, “Yes” when asked whether he had authority from the plaintiff to make that communica- tion. Although, due to attorney-client privilege reasons, he would not disclose the content of his discussions with the plaintiff, Attorney Angelone testified that “[the plaintiff] authorized [him] to . . . [accept the settlement],” and that he “would never send any communication to opposing counsel saying [that his] client has agreed to settle, when they haven’t.” In his testimony, however, Attorney Angelone indicated that he did not believe the agreement was final because, even though the amount of the settlement was a definite and final term, the plain- tiff had agreed only to “principles” of the nonmonetary terms, and that the plaintiff needed to see the language of the nonmonetary terms “before [they] could come to a final agreement on them.”5 Attorney Angelone also 5 In particular, the following colloquy transpired on direct examination of Attorney Angelone by Attorney Greene: “Q. So, just to be clear, [the plaintiff] agreed to the principle of being responsible for attorney’s fees in future litigation raised by her against [the] defendants in which [the] defendants prevail, correct? “A. Those principles, yes. “Q. She agreed to the principle that she would not run for the condo board, correct? “A. Again, in principle; yes. “Q. She agreed to the principle that—of confidentiality, correct? “A. Again, in principle, yes. “Q. And she agreed to the principle of nondisparagement, correct? “A. Once again, in principle, yes. . . . “Q. Okay. You discussed them with your client before you sent this email? “A. I— “Q. I’m not asking about what the discussions were, but did you discuss them with your client before you sent this email?  Nunez v. Brown-White acknowledged that he had conveyed to the plaintiff the principles of those terms, as they had been discussed at the pretrial conference. During direct examination, Attorney Angelone was asked about his communications with the plaintiff regarding the settlement.6 The following colloquy took place: “Q. So, this is your email to [the plaintiff] on July 9, 2024, correct? “A. Yes. “Q. And that’s when we had the pretrial, right? “A. Yes. “Q. Same day? “A. Yes. “Q. And you told her the offer indicating the $5000 as well as these terms that, one, she agrees not to run for “A. Well, you got to remember, I did not have the language of the specific terms at the time, so I could not tell her what would be inside the terms. Nevertheless, the principles, as were outlined in our very brief conversation with [the court at the pretrial conference], I was able to convey to her. *** “Q. You understood when you sent this email that the agreement was not just to settle for money, correct? “A. I understood that part of the agreement to settle was for money. The other part were these principles, which needed to be flushed out in language that I had never seen before.” 6 Those communications were documented in emails that were included in the defendants’ proffered exhibit L. With respect to the email com- munications in exhibit L, Attorney Angelone expressed concern about violating the attorney-client privilege by disclosing some of the com- munications, and Attorney Crosland objected to their admission. The court stated that it would mark the exhibit for identification, conduct an in-camera review of the emails and determine whether any were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Thereafter, the court reviewed the emails and stated: “I’m going to . . . allow all of this in, with the exception . . . of the second and third paragraphs of the July 9, 12:17 p.m. email from [Attorney]. . . Angelone to [the plaintiff].” The court stated that it would “simply ignore them” or that they could be “whited out,” and informed Attorney Crosland that “this is in evidence at this  Nunez v. Brown-White the board at [the condominium association] again. You agree not to disparage [Brown-White] or [the condo- minium association]. The parties agree to keep the terms of settlement confidential. If you sue [the condominium association] in the future and lose, you would be respon- sible for their attorney’s fees, right? “A. Yes. “Q. And those are the terms we discussed with [the court] in the pretrial, correct? “A. The principles, yes. “Q. And those are the things that you communicated to [the plaintiff], correct? “A. Yes. “Q. And she agreed to those principles, correct? “A. She agreed to the principles, yes.” Attorney Angelone further testified that he had informed the caseflow coordinator on July 10, 2024, that “we could report [the present case] as settled but not withdrawn,” and that he specifically had requested a forty-five7 day time frame in which to withdraw, because, at that time, he had not yet received the draft settle- ment agreement to review, and he thought that there might be some issues with the language. Finally, Attor- ney Angelone testified that, at some point after he had reported the case settled to the caseflow coordinator, he had received a text message from the plaintiff, which contained a request by her regarding additional terms such as reimbursement for certain fines paid, removal time.” The list of exhibits and the exhibit sticker for exhibit L, however, incorrectly indicate that exhibit L is an identification exhibit only. See Docket Entry No. 150.00; see also exhibit L. Attorney Angelone was questioned and testified about the contents of those email communica- tions in detail during his testimony at the Audubon hearing. 7 Attorney Angelone testified that he had requested a forty-five day time frame in which to withdraw the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant but that the caseflow coordinator granted a sixty day time frame in which to withdraw the plaintiff’s claims.  Nunez v. Brown-White of a “no parking” sign, and a reciprocal bar on the ability of Brown-White to run for a position on the board of the condominium association. Attorney Angelone testified that he never communicated to Attorney Greene any proposed changes or new terms or that anything in the draft agreement was inconsistent with prior settlement discussions. Thereafter, the parties rested and the court orally rendered its decision on the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement.8 In its decision, the court first stated that it had “lis- tened carefully to the evidence in this case . . . [and] reviewed both the motion to enforce the settlement and the response thereto, and [that it would] make the fol- lowing findings of fact and . . . ultimate decision on the motion.” Those findings included: “[A]t a pretrial [conference] on or about July 9, 2024, both [Attorney Angelone] and [Attorney Greene] reached an agreement in settlement purposes in the amount of $5000, an agree- ment on the principles of confidentiality, nondisparage- ment, being responsible for attorney’s fees and future litigation raised by the plaintiff against the defendants in which the defendants prevail, and that [the plaintiff] would not run for the . . . board [of the condominium association]. This . . . agreement was memorialized by . . . Attorney Angelone to [Attorney Greene] on or about July 10, 2024. “Within that time frame, [Attorney Angelone] indi- cated to our caseflow office . . . that the case was settled and [that] it was placed on the settled but not withdrawn list, which is . . . generally the [step] that [is] taken in . . . a number of cases. “Once the case was marked settled, wording for poten- tial agreement on specific language for those principles contained in the July 10 email and the July 9 agreement was sent from [Attorney Greene] to . . . Attorney Ange- lone. . . . Attorney Angelone never indicated or com- municated any issue with the provisions of the written 8 The record contains a signed transcript of the court’s oral decision in compliance with Practice Book § 64-1.  Nunez v. Brown-White agreement [that] have been memorialized by [Attorney Greene]. What . . .Attorney Angelone did at some point was obtain some information from . . . [the plaintiff] after the case was marked as settled, and there was some discussion of language which was not contained in the agreement, as I’ve recited it previously. “Based on these findings of fact, my review of the documentation and the careful review both of the case law as indicated in the . . . defendants’ brief, I will find that the parties did reach a meeting of the minds to settle the case on July 9, 2024. Therefore, the motion to enforce the settlement is granted.” This appeal followed. Before we address the merits of the claims raised on appeal, we first set forth our standard of review and general principles of law governing motions to enforce a settlement agreement. “A trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . . Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit. . . . Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaning- ful way to resolve legal disputes. When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial. . . . Nevertheless, the right to enforce summarily a settlement agreement is not unbounded. The key element with regard to the settlement agreement in [Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225 Conn. 812] . . . [was] that there [was] no factual dispute as to the terms of the accord. Generally, [a] trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law [only] when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous . . . and when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement. . . . The rule of Audubon effects a delicate balance between concerns of judicial economy on the one hand and a party’s constitutional  Nunez v. Brown-White rights to a jury and to a trial on the other hand. . . . To use the Audubon power outside of its proper context is to deny a party these fundamental rights and would work a manifest injustice. . . . “A settlement agreement is a contract among the parties. . . . In order to form a binding and enforceable contract, there must exist an offer and an acceptance based on a mutual understanding by the parties . . . . The mutual understanding must manifest itself by a mutual assent between the parties. . . . In other words, [i]n order for an enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that the parties’ minds had truly met. . . . If there has been a misunderstanding between the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that their minds have never met, no contract has been entered into by them and the court will not make for them a contract which they themselves did not make. . . . Meeting of the minds is defined as mutual agreement and assent of two parties to contract to substance and terms. It is an agree- ment reached by the parties to a contract and expressed therein, or as the equivalent of mutual assent or mutual obligation. . . . This definition refers to fundamental misunderstandings between the parties as to what are the essential elements or subjects of the contract. It refers to the terms of the contract, not to the power of one party to execute a contract as the agent of another. . . . “A contract is not made so long as, in the contemplation of the parties, something remains to be done to establish the contractual relation. The law does not . . . regard an arrangement as completed which the parties regard as incomplete. . . . In construing the agreement . . . the deci- sive question is the intent of the parties as expressed. . . . The intention is to be determined from the language used, the circumstances, the motives of the parties and the purposes which they sought to accomplish. . . . Fur- thermore, [p]arties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. . . .  Nunez v. Brown-White “[When] the general terms on which the parties indis- putably had agreed . . . included all the terms that were essential to an enforceable agreement . . . [u]nder the modern law of contract . . . the parties . . . may reach a binding agreement even if some of the terms of that agreement are still indefinite. . . . The test of disputa- tion . . . must be applied to the parties at the time they entered into the alleged settlement. To hold otherwise would prevent any motion to enforce a settlement from ever being granted. . . . “When a party challenges the trial court’s legal conclu- sion that the agreement was summarily enforceable, we must determine whether that conclusion is legally and logically correct and whether [it finds] support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . . In addi- tion, to the extent that the [party’s] claim implicates the court’s factual findings, our review is limited to decid- ing whether such findings were clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . In making this determination, every reasonable presump- tion must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . Worth v. Picard, 233 Conn. App. 38, 47–50, 338 A.3d 1195 (2025).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian, 236 Conn. App. 228, 234–36, 347 A.3d 1207 (2025). I The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement because there was no meeting of the minds. Specifically, she claims that the court erred in finding a meeting of the minds “when no signed agreement existed and critical terms remained open.” According to the plaintiff, her “conditional acceptance,” as indicated by Attorney Angelone’s statement in the July 10, 2024 email that the settlement offer was “subject to review of  Nunez v. Brown-White the specific language” regarding the nonmonetary terms, defeated any contract formation. She also acknowledges that the absence of a signed writing is not dispositive by itself, but contends that it is “highly probative when combined with [her] conditional acceptance and [the] ongoing negotiations.” Finally she argues that her “sworn declaration rebutted any finding of mutual assent.” We disagree with these contentions. The following legal principles guide our analysis. As we have indicated, “[m]eeting of the minds is defined as mutual agreement and assent of two parties to contract to substance and terms. It is an agreement reached by the parties to a contract and expressed therein, or as the equivalent of mutual assent or mutual obligation. . . . This definition refers to fundamental misunderstandings between the parties as to what are the essential elements or subjects of the contract. It refers to the terms of the contract . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian, supra, 236 Conn. App. 235. “Although ‘[t]he phrase “meeting of the minds” is . . . commonly used by the courts to deter- mine whether there has been mutual assent,’ it has been described as a ‘misnomer because the minds of the parties to a contract need not, in fact, subjectively meet; rather . . . objective assent is all that is required.’ 1 R. Lord, [Williston on Contracts (4th Ed. 2007)] § 3:2, p. 259 n.1; see also Address v. Millstone, 208 Md. App. 62, 82, 56 A.3d 323 (2012), cert. denied, 430 Md. 646, 62 A.3d 731 (2013).” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor, 324 Conn. 245, 268, 152 A.3d 470 (2016). Indeed, “[t]he law of contract has come to recognize that a true ‘meeting of the minds’ is no longer essential to the formation of a contract and that rights and obligations may arise from acts of the parties, usually their words, upon which a reasonable person would rely. E. Farnsworth, Contracts [(1982)] § 3.6 [p. 113].” State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 140, 554 A.2d 713 (1989). As this court has explained with respect to the mutual assent needed to form a binding and enforceable contract:  Nunez v. Brown-White “It is axiomatic that . . . there must exist an offer and an acceptance based on a mutual understanding by the parties. . . . The mutual understanding must manifest itself by a mutual assent between the parties. . . . The parties’ intentions manifested by their acts and words are essential to the court’s determination of whether a contract was entered into and what its terms were. . . . Whether the parties intended to be bound without sign- ing a formal written document is an inference of fact [to be made by] the trial court . . . . [M]utual assent is to be judged only by overt acts and words rather than by hidden, subjective or secret intention of the parties. . . . Indeed, [a] manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identi- fied and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined. . . . Parties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated.” (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 317, 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903, 287 A.3d 601 (2023). “Whether a meeting of the minds has occurred is a factual determination.” M.J. Daly & Sons, Inc. v. West Haven, 66 Conn. App. 41, 48, 783 A.2d 1138, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 944, 786 A.2d 430 (2001). At the outset, we find the plaintiff’s reliance on the fact that she did not sign the settlement agreement to be unavailing. See Downing v. Dragone, supra, 216 Conn. App. 318–21 (court found, on basis of parties’ conduct and numerous emails exchanged, that defendant assented to be bound by unsigned written agreement); see also Karlen v. Saleeb, 238 Conn. App. 224, 239–40 n.13, 356 A.3d 352 (2026) (“Although the plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement, it is well settled in Connecti- cut that [p]arties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. . . . [T]here is evidence to support the court’s finding that there had been a meeting of the minds . . . and the court’s conclusion that the written agreement need not be signed [by the plaintiff] to be enforceable  Nunez v. Brown-White against him is therefore legally and logically correct.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). We also disagree with the plaintiff’s assertion that “critical terms remained open.” The plaintiff’s con- tention is largely premised on the “subject to review” language in Attorney Angelone’s July 10, 2024 email, although she has not cited any case law supporting her claim that the email constituted a “conditional accep- tance” that defeated any finding of mutual assent needed to form a binding contract. The July 10 emails exchanged demonstrate that Attorney Angelone informed Attorney Greene that the plaintiff “accept[ed] [the] [d]efendants’ offer of settlement for $5000. Additionally, subject to review of the specific language, she agree[d] to the principles of confidentiality, [nondisparagement], being responsible for attorney’s fees in future litigation raised by her against [the] [d]efendants in which [the] [d]efen- dants prevail, [and] not to run for [the] . . . board [of the condominium association].” Attorney Greene responded that same day with an email stating: “To clarify, the essential terms of the settlement agreement include: (1) $5000 payment; (2) [g]eneral release; (3) [nondisparage- ment]; (4) [c]onfidentiality; (5) If [the plaintiff] brings legal action against the [condominium] [a]ssociation [or] its [representatives] in the future and loses or withdraws, she pays [the association’s]/[representive’s] attorney’s fees; (6) [n]o admission of liability; [and] (7) [s]he won’t run for the [b]oard in the future. I will prepare the agree- ment and send to you.” Attorney Greene submitted a draft of an agreement embodying the terms to which the parties had agreed to Attorney Angelone for the plain- tiff’s review, and a series of emails followed, all of which supported an inference that the parties had reached an agreement that was awaiting the plaintiff’s signature. At no point during those email exchanges did Attorney Angelone convey to Attorney Greene that the plaintiff wanted to include new or different terms, or that the agreement as drafted was not satisfactory. The emails also must be considered in connection with Attorney Angelone’s testimony about what he had communicated  Nunez v. Brown-White to the plaintiff about the terms of the agreement. In particular, Attorney Angelone responded, “Yes” when asked whether he told the plaintiff “the offer indicating the $5000 as well as [the] terms that . . . she agrees not to run for the board at [the condominium association] again . . . not to disparage [Brown-White] or [the condo- minium association] . . . to keep the terms of settlement confidential . . . [and to] be responsible for . . . attorney’s fees” if she brings an action against the condominium association in the future and loses. Notwithstanding Attorney Angelone’s testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had agreed only to the “prin- ciples” of the nonmonetary terms, we conclude that the court reasonably could have found on the basis of the evidence before it that the parties had a meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the settlement agree- ment, although the specific language of the nonmonetary terms to which they had agreed had not yet been drafted and was subject to review. As we have indicated, to defeat the mutual assent necessary to find a meeting of the minds, there must be a “fundamental [misunderstand- ing] between the parties as to what are the essential elements or subjects of the contract.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian, supra, 236 Conn. App. 235. In the present case, the record does not show the existence of any such fundamental misunderstanding as to the essential ele- ments or the subject matter of the settlement agreement. Rather, the record demonstrates the existence of an offer and an acceptance, namely, that the plaintiff had agreed to a monetary payment of $5000 and to various nonmonetary terms, although the specific language of those nonmonetary terms was subject to review. See Wittman v. Intense Movers, Inc., 202 Conn. App. 87, 99, 245 A.3d 479 (“[when] the general terms on which the parties indisputably had agreed . . . included all the terms that were essential to an enforceable agreement . . . [u]nder the modern law of contract . . . the parties . . . may reach a binding agreement even if some of the terms of that agreement are still indefinite” (internal quotation  Nunez v. Brown-White marks omitted)), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 918, 245 A.3d 803 (2