Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services CHRISTOPHER REH v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES ET AL. (AC 47979) Elgo, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed, on the granting of certi- fication, from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court’s evidentiary rulings improperly limited his presentation of evidence and denied him a full and fair hearing in violation of his right to due process. Held: The habeas court did not violate the petitioner’s right to due process, as it did not abuse its discretion in precluding testimony by his expert witness, who lacked the requisite qualifications for his proposed testimony, which was irrelevant, sustaining objections to certain of habeas counsel’s questions to the petitioner and his criminal trial counsel, L, that were irrelevant, called for speculation or lacked sufficient foundation, denying the petitioner’s request to call additional witnesses after the conclusion of the trial, whose testimony would have been cumulative of other evidence presented at the trial or irrelevant, and rejecting his request to open the evidence to admit a video of the underlying incident that led to his arrest. The habeas court properly determined that L did not render deficient per- formance in advising the petitioner about the consequences of pursuing the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, as the petitioner’s claim was undermined by his answers during the criminal court’s pretrial canvass of him that L had explained the affirmative defense and told him that he could be confined indefinitely in a hospital, and L was not required to inform the petitioner about every possible consequence of commitment prior to proceeding with the affirmative defense. Argued March 17—officially released October 27, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and tried to the court, Baldini, J.; thereafter, the court granted the respondents’ motion to preclude certain evidence and denied the petitioner’s motion to open the evidence; judgment denying the petition, from which the  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Olivia M. Hally, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s attorney, and Donna M. Fusco, assistant state’s attor- ney, for the appellees (respondents). Opinion DiPENTIMA, J. In this certified appeal, we review the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a case in which the petitioner, Christopher Reh, was acquitted of criminal charges, having prevailed on an affirmative defense pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13,1 and thereafter was committed to the custody of the respon- dent Psychiatric Security Review Board (board)2 for a term not to exceed thirty-five years. The petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) violated his constitutional right to due process by denying him a full and fair hearing and (2) improperly concluded that he had failed to prove ineffective assistance of his criminal trial counsel. We disagree with the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court. On the basis of the evidence introduced at the peti- tioner’s criminal trial, the trial court reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of October 28, 2015, the South Windsor Police Department issued a “silver alert” for the petitioner, who was missing and suffering from mental health issues, and advised sur- rounding law enforcement agencies to be on the lookout 1 We note that, although § 53a-13 has been amended since the events giving rise to the petitioner’s prosecution; see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-27, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. Accordingly, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of § 53a-13. 2 The operative petition lists as respondents the chief executive officer of Connecticut Valley Hospital, the board, and the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services.  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services for him.3 As a result, officers from the Hartford Police Department received a radio dispatch broadcasting infor- mation about the petitioner, including that he was oper- ating a silver Acura, that he had a knife in his possession, and that he had threatened to harm himself and/or law enforcement if approached. Officer Rocky Last of the Hartford Police Department was dispatched to the area of Park Street after the peti- tioner’s cell phone was “ping[ed]” in that location. Last observed the petitioner’s car parked along the curb in front of 560 Park Street. He activated his cruiser’s lights and sirens and pulled over behind the petitioner’s car. Officers Andrew Nelson, Jr., and Alexander Ortolaza of the Hartford Police Department arrived to assist Last. Ortolaza parked his cruiser “nose to nose” with the front of the petitioner’s car. Nelson parked his cruiser directly across the street from the petitioner’s car. Last exited his cruiser and approached the open driver’s side window of the petitioner’s car. He saw the petitioner sitting in the driver’s seat. He ordered the petitioner to show his hands, but the petitioner did not comply. Instead, the petitioner was attempting to conceal or grab something from under the driver’s seat. Nelson also exited his cruiser and directed verbal commands at the petitioner. As the petitioner continued to disregard the officers’ orders, Last reached to open the door of the petitioner’s car. Last heard the petitioner’s engine “revving very loudly” and saw the petitioner put the car in drive. The petitioner drove his car forward and rammed into Ortolaza’s cruiser, damaging the cruiser and injuring Ortolaza, who was in the process of exiting the car. The 3 “The Silver Alert system . . . [is] an emergency notification system for law enforcement agencies to broadcast local, regional, or statewide public alerts via radio, television and electronic highway signs. The Silver Alert system mandates that law enforcement immediately begin searching for missing individuals who are ages [sixty-five] or older, or ages [eighteen] and over if mentally impaired.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Cassandra C., 316 Conn. 476, 490 n.5, 112 A.3d 158 (2015).  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services petitioner then put his car in reverse and collided with Last’s cruiser. The petitioner again put his car in drive and turned to the left, driving directly at Nelson. Nelson discharged his service weapon three or four times in the direction of the petitioner’s car. The petitioner’s car struck Nelson, who sustained injuries to his left leg, spine, neck, head, and eye. The petitioner attempted to flee but was unable to so, as his car went over the curb and hit a garbage can, a light pole, a tree, and then a building, before coming to a stop. Last and Ortolaza ran to the petitioner’s car while another officer rendered aid to Nelson. The petitioner was slouched over the center console into the passenger seat. Ortolaza pulled the petitioner out of the car, placed him on the ground, and immediately put him in handcuffs. Ortolaza then noticed that the petitioner was bleeding, having been struck by Nelson’s gunfire, and was trans- ported to a hospital. A knife subsequently was located on the ground at the scene, and another knife was found on the petitioner’s person. Trooper Jennilee Fratellenico of the Connecticut State Police responded to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center in Hartford, where she interviewed the peti- tioner during the early morning hours of October 29, 2015. The petitioner told Fratellenico about his mental health issues, including his previous suicide attempts and the medications that he had been prescribed. The petitioner described his plan to effectuate a “suicide by cop” and explained that he had gone to the area of Park Street because he knew it was a “bad area.” Once he was surrounded by officers, he drove forward, “hoping that the police would shoot [him] from behind” if they believed he was fleeing. The petitioner explained that he lost control of his car after he had been shot. He initially told Fratellenico that he had not hit anyone and had not intended to hurt anyone but, after being informed that he had hit a police officer, he apologized and reiterated that he had not intended to do so.  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services The state charged the petitioner with attempt to com- mit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1), interfering with an officer in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-167a, criminal mischief in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-115 (a) (1), and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (1). The petitioner, represented by counsel, pleaded not guilty to all charges and filed a notice of his intention to assert the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. He elected a trial to the court, Bentivegna, J., which took place on November 29, 2016. The state did not substantially contest the petitioner’s affirmative defense. Prior to the start of trial, the court canvassed the petitioner pursuant to Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 329, 803 A.2d 287 (2002),4 and found in relevant part that the petitioner’s decision to assert the affirmative defense was “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made with the assistance of competent counsel, and with the [petitioner’s] full understanding of the possible outcomes . . . .” After the state presented its case, the petitioner’s psychiatric expert, Peter Morgan, testified that the peti- tioner was suffering from severe psychotic symptoms of bipolar disorder at the time of the incident underlying the charges.5 Morgan opined that “the degree of those 4 In Duperry, our Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority over the administration of justice and ruled that, “in all future cases in which a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and the state substantially agrees with the defendant’s claim of mental disease or defect, with the result that the trial essentially is not an adversarial proceeding, the trial court must canvass the defendant to ensure that his plea is made voluntarily and with a full understanding of its consequences.” Duperry v. Solnit, supra, 261 Conn. 329. 5 Specifically, Morgan explained in relevant part that the petitioner “had the delusion that he was under orders from God to kill himself.”  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services symptoms left him unable to conform his behavior to the law.”6 At the conclusion of trial, the court found that the state had proven the elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, including the specific intent required for the charge of attempt to commit murder, which the petitioner’s counsel had called into question during his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. The court further concluded that the petitioner had met his bur- den of proving his affirmative defense, finding that he “lacked substantial capacity to control his conduct within the requirements of the law” due to symptoms of bipolar disorder.7 Accordingly, the court found the petitioner not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. As a result, the court committed the petitioner to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services for confinement and evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582.8 The petitioner then underwent the statutorily man- dated psychiatric evaluation, which was followed by a commitment hearing. After hearing testimony regard- ing the results of that evaluation, the court committed the petitioner to the maximum security setting at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hos- pital (Whiting) under the jurisdiction of the board for a period not to exceed thirty-five years. 6 The state’s psychiatric expert had interviewed the petitioner and reached the same conclusions as Morgan did. 7 General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.” See also Moon v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 181, 198, 350 A.3d 496 (2026) (differentiating between cognitive and volitional prongs of defense). 8 We note that, although § 17a-582 has been amended since the under- lying events at issue; see Public Acts 2022, No. 22-45, § 3; that amend- ment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. Accordingly, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of § 17a-582.  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services The petitioner commenced the present habeas action in July 2021. In his operative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed on October 4, 2022, he claimed ineffective assistance of his criminal trial counsel, Bruce Lorenzen. The petitioner alleged that Lorenzen’s per- formance was constitutionally deficient in various ways related to pursuing the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Specifically, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that Lorenzen had failed to conduct an adequate factual investigation before advis- ing the petitioner to pursue the affirmative defense; he failed to engage in any meaningful plea negotiations; he failed to take steps to adequately understand the petitioner’s mental state at the time of the pretrial pro- ceedings and his ability to meaningfully understand the implications of his decision to pursue the affirma- tive defense; he failed to advise the petitioner about the potential defenses available to him if he were to decline to pursue the affirmative defense; he failed to adequately investigate and otherwise determine “the likelihood that the petitioner could be successfully treated and otherwise comply with the program at Whiting such that the petitioner would have a reasonable possibility of being discharged into the community in any reasonably foreseeable period of time”; he “failed to ensure that the petitioner had a working understanding of any of the negative implications of [the affirmative defense]”; and he failed to provide the petitioner with “adequate and accurate information that would allow him to make a reasoned decision about whether to pursue [the affirma- tive defense] in his case . . . .” The petitioner alleged that, but for Lorenzen’s defi- cient performance, there was a reasonable probability that he would have declined to pursue the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect and that “his matter would have remained on the criminal docket for further proceedings,” the outcome of which “would have been different and more favorable to the petitioner.”  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services The habeas court, Baldini, J., held a trial on the opera- tive amended petition on October 2, 2023. The petitioner presented testimony from himself and Lorenzen and submitted various documentary exhibits. Notably, the petitioner presented no legal expert. The respondents offered no witnesses or exhibits. The habeas court issued a memorandum of decision on June 27, 2024, denying the operative habeas petition. The court rejected the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, concluding that Lorenzen did not render deficient performance and that the petitioner did not prove prejudice. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court granted. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The petitioner first challenges various evidentiary rulings of the habeas court. He claims that the court’s limitation on the presentation of his evidence violated his constitutional right to due process by denying him a full and fair hearing. Specifically, he contends that the court improperly (1) precluded his expert witness from testifying, (2) sustained objections by the respondents during his and Lorenzen’s testimony at the habeas trial, (3) denied his request to present several additional wit- nesses, including his mother and the officers involved in the incident underlying his criminal charges, and (4) denied his motion to open the evidence to admit a video of the incident. In resolving this claim, we first set forth the following relevant standard of review and legal principles. “We review the [habeas] court’s decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law . . . for an abuse of discretion. . . . We will make every reason- able presumption in favor of upholding the [habeas] court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . The [habeas] court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy [and admissibility] of evidence . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glen S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 152, 161,  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services 307 A.3d 951, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 951, 308 A.3d 1038 (2024); see also, e.g., Angel C. v. Commissioner of Correction, 226 Conn. App. 837, 847–48, 319 A.3d 168 (reviewing habeas court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 908, 323 A.3d 1091 (2024).9 “Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. . . . Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . . Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction, 164 Conn. App. 530, 576, 138 A.3d 378, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 923, 138 A.3d 284 (2016). “It is the obligation of the party seeking to have the evidence admitted to demonstrate its relevance to the habeas court. . . . Unless such a proper foundation is established, the evidence 9 To the extent the petitioner suggests that his claim presents a ques- tion of law subject to plenary review due to its constitutional nature, we are not persuaded. Although the petitioner attempts to characterize his claim as a violation of his due process rights, he challenges various evidentiary rulings by the habeas court and, thus, his claim is eviden- tiary in nature. See Kovachich v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 344 Conn. 777, 815 n.22, 281 A.3d 1144 (2022) (“[r]obing garden variety claims [of an evidentiary nature] in the majestic garb of constitutional claims does not make such claims constitutional in nature” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Jeffrey H., 176 Conn. App. 666, 684, 171 A.3d 64 (2017) (“Due process is not to be regarded as a giant constitutional vacuum cleaner which sucks up any claims of error which may occur to a party upon microscopic examination of the trial record. . . . Indeed, it would trivialize the con- stitution to transmute a nonconstitutional claim into a constitutional claim simply because [of] the label placed on it by a party . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, “[w]e first review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, if premised on a correct view of the law . . . for an abuse of discretion. . . . If, after reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence, then the [petitioner]’s constitutional claims necessarily fail.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hargett, 196 Conn. App. 228, 236, 229 A.3d 1047 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 604, 275 A.3d 601 (2022).  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services . . . is irrelevant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Angel C. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 226 Conn. App. 846. A The petitioner first contends that the court improperly precluded his expert, Brent Turvey, from testifying at trial. The following additional facts are germane to our resolution of the petitioner’s claim. Two weeks before the habeas trial, on September 18, 2023, the petitioner disclosed Turvey as an expert witness. The petitioner described Turvey as “a criminologist and forensic exam- iner with an expertise in crime scene reconstruction [and] forensic science” who was expected to testify about (1) the general standards and protocols for law enforcement interactions with individuals known to be in the midst of a mental health crisis; (2) the dynamics of the interac- tion between the petitioner and law enforcement during the underlying incident; and (3) his review of the crime scene evidence and the testimony at the criminal trial. On September 21, 2023, the respondents filed a motion in limine to preclude Turvey from testifying. The respon- dents argued that Turvey’s proposed testimony was “wholly irrelevant” and “outside the scope of his exper- tise.” Specifically, they asserted that there were no claims in the habeas petition related to expert testimony, and Turvey’s proposed testimony, which focused on the actions on law enforcement, was not connected to any of Lorenzen’s actions with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In addition, the respondents argued that Turvey did not have any professional expe- rience involving police procedure and, therefore, could not provide an expert opinion on that topic.10 The petitioner thereafter filed an objection to the state’s motion in limine, arguing that (1) Turvey’s 10 The respondents pointed out that issues regarding Turvey’s lack of relevant qualifications or training had previously been raised in two cases from other jurisdictions. See Southworth v. Commonwealth,  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services proposed testimony about police procedure was relevant to establishing that there was mitigating evidence or an alternative defense that Lorenzen could have raised if he had not pursued the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and (2) Turvey was qualified to testify about the issues he had disclosed. Specifically, as to relevance, the petitioner explained that Turvey’s proposed testimony would provide the court with the type of information that would have been available if Lorenzen had conducted an adequate pretrial investigation into the allegations against the petitioner, and that “insight into the conduct of the police officers in failing to adequately respond to the information provided to them that the petitioner was in a mental health crisis and failing to use tactics to deescalate the situation would have at least been mitigation information to use in plea negotiations and possibly a basis for a defense at trial if the petitioner did not pursue the [affirmative defense].” The petitioner further asserted that the respondents’ arguments related to Turvey’s qualifications went to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Aside from arguing that Turvey did not need to be a police officer to testify about police procedure, the petitioner did not explain what education or experience Turvey had regarding that topic. On September 28, 2023, the court held a hearing on the respondents’ motion in limine. At the hearing, the respondents emphasized that the operative habeas peti- tion involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and did not raise any claim regarding police miscon- duct. In addition, they argued that Turvey’s proposed 435 S.W.3d 32, 55 (Ky. 2014) (defense decided not to call Turvey as expert witness because, after court limited his proposed testimony, state obtained proof that some of his qualifications, such as that he had been police detective, were false); see also Culton v. Arnold, Docket No. 14-cv-05099-JST, 2016 WL 3049731, *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2016) (trial court determined that Turvey had “the very minimal qualifications” as expert in crime scene reconstruction, noting that he was author of books on criminal investigation in profiling and that he was not, inter alia, psychologist, criminalist, or crime scene technician (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services testimony was outside the scope of his expertise, as he had not worked for a police department and there was nothing in the record to indicate that he had any experi- ence studying police procedure. The petitioner’s counsel continued to argue that Tur- vey did not need to be a police officer or have police train- ing in order to have the requisite qualifications to provide his proposed expert testimony. The petitioner’s counsel stated that Turvey had been involved in training police officers and consulting on cases addressing “police related issues”—although he offered no additional details about the topic of that training and consultation11—and that being a criminologist involved identifying flaws in a criminal investigation, although he acknowledged that that was “slightly different” than what was at issue here. The court asked, inter alia, about what information and materials Turvey had reviewed related to the poli- cies and procedures of the Hartford Police Department. The petitioner’s counsel explained that Turvey had been unable to review the Hartford Police Department’s 2015 training protocols, which would contain the policies and procedures in effect at the time of the incident underlying the petitioner’s criminal charges, as the protocols were not publicly available, and, although he had subpoenaed them, he had not yet been provided with those materials. With respect to the issue of relevance, the court expressed concern about connecting Turvey’s proposed testimony, which focused on the police response, to Lorenzen’s actions. The court explained that “there’s nothing that [Turvey] could offer the court with regard to how an attorney receiving that information would have the wherewithal to know whether or not that would have 11 The respondents’ counsel subsequently responded that, from review- ing Turvey’s curriculum vitae, her understanding was that the training was related to crime scene reconstruction or forensic science, not police procedure or a police officer’s mental health response. Accordingly, “while [Turvey] may have interaction with or experience with police officers, it doesn’t give him the expertise in actual police procedure and their response to mental health crises . . . .”  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services been something that could have been pursued by way of a defense or used as mitigation or things of that nature.” The petitioner’s counsel acknowledged that Turvey’s testimony would not relate to a “complete defense” that would result in an acquittal on all charges but argued that the allegedly inappropriate police response could have helped the petitioner establish that he did not have the intent required for the attempted murder charge. Thus, according to the petitioner, Turvey’s testimony was relevant to establishing that there was an alterna- tive defense that he could have raised at trial if he had not pursued the affirmative defense.12 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the state’s motion in limine to preclude the admission of Turvey’s testimony. The court concluded that Turvey’s proposed testimony was irrelevant and that Turvey did not possess the requisite qualifications for his proposed testimony. Specifically, the court stated in relevant part: “I find that the proposed expert does not have the skill or knowledge that would offer . . . something that this court would need to make a fair assessment of the issues in dispute. I find that the proposed testimony is attenuated in many important respects. Notably, there is not an opinion with regard to what the expert’s findings are and how that would be directly tied to trial counsel’s claimed ineffectiveness. I also find that this proposed witness has not reviewed information that would form 12 During the habeas trial, Lorenzen testified that, at the time he represented the petitioner, he recognized that the police response was a potential issue to use either during cross-examination of the officers or as part of a potential defense for the petitioner, if they had not pursued the affirmative defense. In his perspective, the police had overreacted and responded “in what you might say is a traditional law enforcement way as opposed to responding to a person in [a] health crisis.” He explained: “[I]f this was to go to [a] standard trial, it would have been much more an issue about . . . what the police actions were and whether they were appropriate.” He also explained, however, with respect to the informa- tion in the police reports, that “there’s stuff you can work with, but there’s stuff that’s going to hurt,” and therefore it was “a mixed bag” as to whether he could use such information to obtain an acquittal had the case proceeded to a contested criminal trial.  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services the basis of his opinion set forth; specifically, it’s my understanding he has not yet reviewed the Hartford Police Department policies and procedures that were in effect at the time of the incident which forms the basis of this matter. Therefore, I am precluding him from testifying in this matter. I don’t find it relevant, useful or probative to the issue in dispute.” As with other evidentiary rulings, “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the qualification of expert witnesses and the admissibility of their opinions . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniel W., 180 Conn. App. 76, 104, 182 A.3d 665, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 929, 182 A.3d 638 (2018). “The court may prop- erly admit expert testimony only from a witness it has first determined to be qualified to testify on a particular matter. . . . Generally, expert testimony is admissible if (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testi- mony would be helpful to the court or jury in consider- ing the issues.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Commissioner of Correction, 145 Conn. App. 834, 860–61, 77 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013). We conclude that the habeas court properly granted the state’s motion in limine on the ground that Turvey did not possess the requisite qualifications for his proposed expert testimony.13 The petitioner claimed that Turvey had “expertise in crime scene reconstruction [and] foren- sic science . . . .” There is no indication in the record that Turvey had any “special skill or knowledge” regarding police policies and procedures; (internal quotation marks omitted) White v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 145 Conn. App. 860; particularly when responding to a person experiencing a mental health crisis, which was the subject of his proposed testimony. Although Turvey was 13 Because we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that Turvey did not possess the requisite qualifications as an expert, we need not consider the other bases for the court’s exclusion of the proposed testimony.  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services not required to be a police officer or possess any particular license to support his testimony, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Turvey had any education or experience involving the subject of police procedure or responses to mental health crises, such that his knowledge on the topic was significantly greater than that of the average person. See State v. Daniel W., supra, 180 Conn. App. 104–105. Accordingly, the court properly granted the respondents’ motion in limine because Turvey’s proposed testimony was outside the scope of his claimed expertise. B The petitioner also contends that the court improperly limited testimony from him and Lorenzen by sustain- ing several objections by the respondents related to his counsel’s questions about, inter alia, his mental health and the conditions of commitment at Whiting. First, the petitioner argues that the court prevented him from asking Lorenzen about his assessment of the petitioner’s mental health issues. At the habeas trial, during his direct examination, the petitioner’s counsel asked Lorenzen about his ability to communicate with the petitioner during pretrial discussions. Lorenzen testi- fied that he was able to communicate with the petitioner and that, although the petitioner manifested symptoms of mental illness, it would have been inappropriate to request a competency hearing. The petitioner’s counsel followed up by asking: “[W]hat do you recall about what signs he manifested during your representation?” The respondents’ counsel objected on the ground that the question lacked a sufficient foundation, as it was “beyond the scope of the knowledge of this witness.” The court sustained the objection and told the petitioner’s coun- sel: “You can ask him . . . if he has any foundation for a basis of knowledge. . . . Just build your foundation and then ask your question.” The petitioner’s counsel then elicited testimony from Lorenzen about the basis of his knowledge of the petitioner’s mental health issues and  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services how he evaluated whether there could be a competency issue. Second, the petitioner contends that the court improp- erly limited testimony from Lorenzen about his overall assessment of pursuing the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. At the habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel asked Lorenzen: “At the time that you represented [the petitioner], can you char- acterize how your attitude would have been toward pur- suing [the affirmative defense] for a client, if that would be cautious, optimistic, ambivalent?” The respondents’ counsel objected on the ground of relevance. The court sustained the objection, telling the petitioner’s counsel: “You can rephrase it.” The petitioner’s counsel then asked Lorenzen about whether he had advised the petitioner that pursuing the affirmative defense was the best course of action for him. Lorenzen responded that “the direct answer to that is yes,” but he also characterized his attitude toward pursuing the defense as “a long and possibly difficult road” ahead for the petitioner, in that “it gets you out of jail, but it doesn’t get you out to the street . . . .” Ultimately, they chose to pursue the affirmative defense in large part because the petitioner’s primary goal was to avoid jail time. Third, the petitioner contends that the court improp- erly sustained an objection to a question about Lorenzen’s knowledge about the conditions at Whiting. Specifically, the petitioner’s counsel asked Lorenzen: “Did you have any information about Whiting or the [board] at the time you represented [the petitioner] that you would characterize as negative or nightmare [stories?] . . . .” The respondents’ counsel objected on the basis of relevance. The petitioner’s counsel explained: “[W]hat I’m trying to get at is, there’s information that arguably would be out there to give a client a full view of what could happen in this [not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect] process, and I just want to know how much of that . . . Lorenzen had available and how much he conveyed that  Reh v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services to [the petitioner]. And, I do think there was information out there that would be relevant to giving that advice about how things were going to go once he got through the [affirmative defense], so that’s all I’m trying to get at in this question.” The court sustained the respondents’ objection, telling the petitioner’s counsel: “Rephrase, you can ask him about his knowledge of the process and things of that nature.” The petitioner’s counsel rephrased his question, ask- ing: “Had you ever read any official reports about the conditions at Whiting or complaints about people who have gone down the [not guilty by reason of mental dis- ease or defect] path in Connecticut at the time you rep- resented the petitioner?” Lorenzen responded that he “was certainly aware Whiting or [Connecticut Valley Hospital] had some issues for some people,” and that, although he did not know whether he had shared his knowledge of those reports with the petitioner, he would have explained to the petitioner what would be expected of him during commitment and what that process would entail. Lorenzen also subsequently explained his familiar- ity with the commitment process in light of his experience in asserting the affirmative defense in at least ten other cases he had handled and his continued involvement in his clients’ progression throughout their commitment. Fourth, the petitioner contends that the court improp- erly sustained objections to questions about the peti- tioner’s willingness to accept a plea agreement requiring a prison sentence if the petitioner had fully understood the consequences of pursuing the affirmative defense. During the habeas trial, both Lorenzen and the petitioner testified tha