State v. Layaw

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Layaw STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL LAYAW (AC 48031) Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Westbrook, Js.* Syllabus Convicted, following a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, the defendant appealed. The defendant claimed that the evidence presented by the state at trial was insufficient to prove that he had been operating the motor vehicle, an essential element of the statute (§ 14-227a (a) (1)). Held: When viewed in light of the reasonable inferences that the jury was entitled to make, there was sufficient evidence to support its finding that the opera- tion element of § 14-227a (a) (1) was satisfied, despite the defendant’s claim that he did not sniff heroin until he stopped at the red light at which he was detained, as the defendant’s medical records included the defendant’s admis- sion to medical personnel that he had snorted the drug while he was driving his vehicle, the defendant was found unconscious in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and the vehicle was stopped at a traffic light while in a lane of traffic. Argued June 4—officially released September 29, 2026 Procedural History Two part substitute information charging the defen- dant, in the first part, with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, and, in the second part, with previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen, where the first part of the infor- mation was tried to the jury before Davis, J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court, Davis, J., on a plea of guilty to the second part of the information; judgment of guilty in accordance with the verdict and the plea, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Gary A. Mastronardi, for the appellant (defendant). Maxwell S. Ficker, certified legal intern, with whom were Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  State v. Layaw and, on the brief, John P. Doyle, state’s attorney, and Kassie Rose Defala, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Michael Layaw, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol- lowing a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of any drug in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1).1 The defendant claims on appeal that the evidence presented by the state was insuf- ficient to prove that he was operating a motor vehicle, an essential element of the offense. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On April 24, 2021, emergency medical techni- cians (EMTs) for the Ambulance Service of Manchester, responded to a 911 call made around 3:01 p.m. reporting an unresponsive driver located at 234 Tolland Turnpike in Manchester. The EMTs arrived on scene around 3:16 p.m. The defendant’s vehicle was stopped in the road- way at a traffic light near the intersection of Tolland Turnpike and Parker Street. The EMTs immediately began providing aid to the defendant, who was the only occupant in the vehicle and was seated in the driver’s seat. As the EMTs treated the defendant, they noted that he was not breathing well and was likely suffering from agonal respiration,2 which tends to be present in individuals suffering from an overdose. As a result, the 1 General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both . . . .” Although § 14-227a has been amended since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-159, § 13; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute. 2 At trial, one of the EMTs explained that agonal respiration is “inter- mittent snorting that occurs . . . at . . . various increments. It is not . . .  State v. Layaw EMTs, believing that the defendant was suffering from an overdose, administered Narcan, which is a drug that blocks the central nervous system’s absorption of opi- ates. After the EMTs administered Narcan, they saw an immediate improvement in the defendant. The defendant was then moved into an ambulance, at which point his care transitioned to the Manchester Fire Department. Nicolas Caisse, a firefighter-paramedic for the Man- chester Fire Department, was called to respond to a poten- tial opiate overdose and arrived at the scene around 3:18 p.m. Caisse noted that the defendant was pale, unresponsive and apneic,3 with pinpoint pupils and a strong carotid pulse. Caisse documented his findings in a “run form,”4 including recording in the “[n]arrative” section of the form that the defendant “initially denied any and all illicit substance abuse but eventually stated he’d bought a bundle of heroin in Hartford earlier [that day] and had snorted one bag of heroin.”5 Officer Kevin Jackson was one of the last emergency responders to arrive at the scene. At the time Jackson arrived, the defendant’s vehicle was still located on the roadway, obstructing traffic. Jackson observed the defendant being loaded into the back of the ambulance and noted that the defendant’s “skin was pale . . . [a]nd his pupils were pinpoint.” Jackson, who was trained to recognize the signs of an overdose, concluded on the basis of his training that the defendant had suffered from an overdose. Jackson did not observe anyone else with the defendant or in the defendant’s vehicle, nor did he observe any signs of drug use within the vehicle. actual productive breathing. It is something that you tend to find when someone is unresponsive and not able to breathe on their own.” 3 Caisse testified at trial that “ ‘[a]pneic’ means without breath or breath [not conducive] to continued life.” 4 Caisse described the “run form” as “a patient care report generated by a contact.” 5 The court admitted the run form at trial as a full exhibit over the hearsay objection of defense counsel, concluding that it qualified as a recorded recollection. See Conn. Code. Evid. § 8-3 (6). The defendant does not challenge the admission of the run form in this appeal.  State v. Layaw Jackson followed the ambulance to Manchester Memo- rial Hospital, where he located the defendant in the emergency room. During the defendant’s conversation with hospital staff, he reported that “he was in his car driving when he sniffed heroin . . . .”6 (Emphasis added.) Additionally, “he report[ed] [that] he required Narcan” and denied using any other illicit substances. The defen- dant also admitted to Jackson at the hospital that “he had snorted a bag of heroin while stopped at the red light,” but when Jackson later informed the defendant that he would be applying for an arrest warrant, the defendant told Jackson that “he was not driving,” but that “he was stopped.” (Emphasis added.) Approximately one hour after the 911 call was made, the defendant’s urine tested negative for opiates.7 On March 31, 2022, the defendant was arrested and charged with one count of illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). The defendant pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial. The court, Davis, J., conducted the trial over two days, from April 17 to 18, 2024. At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state 6 The defendant’s statement was memorialized in the medical records that were prepared by the physician’s assistant who treated him at the emergency room and were admitted at trial, with some redactions not relevant here, as a full exhibit by agreement of the parties. 7 The state called an expert witness at trial who testified that Manches- ter Memorial Hospital’s urine based drug screening tests had a cut off of 300 nanograms per milliliter for opiates, meaning that any opiates present in amounts less than 300 nanograms per milliliter would return a negative drug screen result. She further explained that “opiates . . . ingested intranasally . . . pass through your lungs and into your small intestine into your stomach. And then, it would be metabolized by your liver and then liver into your kidneys. Once it reaches that point for your bloodstream . . . it would be eliminated in the urine from your kidneys.” The expert opined that, in the present case, “[i]t is . . . possible that the time of collection was not long enough for the body to process . . . the drug . . . from the blood into the urine.” The defendant’s medical expert also opined that urine screens “are not perfect. They’re a very good screening test, but they are not confirmatory . . . [and] they have false positives and false negatives.”  State v. Layaw had failed to meet its evidentiary burden with respect to all elements of the crime charged.8 With respect to the element of operation of a motor vehicle, defense counsel argued that the state had proffered “no evidence to prove [that the defendant] was operating his motor vehicle.” In particular, defense counsel noted that there was no evidence presented that the defendant’s vehicle was running at the time he was found or that the keys to the vehicle were in the ignition. The prosecutor responded that the jury was permitted to make reasonable inferences regarding the element of operation from other facts in evidence, such as the defendant having been found in the driver’s seat of a vehicle that was stopped in the roadway at a traffic light. The prosecutor also directed the court’s attention to the defendant’s medical records that had been admitted as a full exhibit and that memorialized the defendant’s statements that he had used heroin and had done so while driving. The court denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal, determining that a reasonable fact finder could find each element of the crime charged proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence admitted. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of illegally operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1).9 On June 20, 2024, the court sentenced the defendant to three years of incarceration, execution suspended after 8 As set forth by our Supreme Court, “the essential elements of § 14-227a are that the defendant (1) operated (2) a motor vehicle, (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or both.” State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 251, 288 A.3d 995 (2023). In the present appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with respect to the element of operation. We limit our discussion accordingly. 9 On April 18, 2024, following the guilty verdict, the defendant pleaded guilty to a part B information that charged him, pursuant to § 14-227a (g), with being a third time offender on the basis of two prior convic- tions in 2019 of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. General Statutes § 14-227a (g) (3) provides in relevant part that a per- son convicted as a third time offender must, inter alia, “be imprisoned not more than three years, one year of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner . . . .”  State v. Layaw twenty months, followed by two years of probation. This appeal followed. The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the state presented insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably determine that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle, an essential element of § 14-227a (a) (1). Specifi- cally, he argues that, to obtain a conviction, the state had to prove not only that he used an intoxicating drug, but that any operation of his motor vehicle occurred while he was under the influence of that drug. The defendant further argues that no evidence was admitted from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he was under the influence of drugs prior to his stopping at the intersec- tion. According to the defendant, at most, the evidence demonstrated that he ingested heroin only after he had stopped his vehicle, at which point he suffered an over- dose that rendered him unconscious and unable to operate his vehicle. In short, the defendant argues that no rea- sonable view of the evidence could support a conclusion that the defendant engaged in the process of operating his motor vehicle while drug impaired. We disagree. Our standard of review is well settled. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn there- from the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative  State v. Layaw effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reason- able doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 353 Conn. 382, 417, 342 A.3d 161 (2025). “In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [j]uries are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experience of the affairs of life, but, [to] the contrary, to apply them to the facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sparks, 39 Conn. App. 502, 517, 664 A.2d 1185 (1995); accord State v. Wilson, 118 Conn. App. 556, 562, 984 A.2d 114 (2009). Furthermore, “[i]n evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reason- able and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 417. “[I]t does not diminish the probative force of the evi- dence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[O]ur Supreme Court has observed that [t]here is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence [so] far as probative force is concerned . . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sienkiewicz, 162 Conn. App. 407, 410, 131 A.3d 1222, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924, 134 A.3d 621 (2016). “It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi- tude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn. 417. “[I]n determining whether the evidence supports a particular inference, we ask whether that inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . [A]n infer- ence need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the  State v. Layaw evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Glasper, 81 Conn. App. 367, 371, 840 A.2d 48, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 913, 845 A.2d 415 (2004). “[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn. 418. As previously noted, § 14-227a (a) (1) provides in rel- evant part that “[a] person commits the offense of operat- ing a motor vehicle while under the influence of . . . any . . . drug . . . if such person operates a motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of . . . any drug . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The statute does not define the term “operates” or otherwise provide what constitutes the operation of a motor vehicle. The same or similar term is also not defined elsewhere in our criminal statutes. See State v. Vega, 44 Conn. App. 499, 503, 691 A.2d 22 (it is appropriate for courts to look to unrelated statutes for meaning of unde- fined words and phrases because “where the legislature uses the same phrase it intends the same meaning”), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 930, 693 A.2d 302 (1997). Because no statutory definition of operation exists, our courts generally have determined what constitutes the opera- tion of a motor vehicle on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49, 56, 967 A.2d 32 (2009) (“[b]ecause the statute and its predecessors did not define the term ‘operate,’ and the legislative history of the statute is unilluminating, that task [is] left to the courts”). As our Supreme Court explained in Cyr, the definition of operation that courts have most often relied upon “has  State v. Layaw its origins in State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d 359 (1939), an appeal in which this court approved the following jury instruction explaining what it meant to operate a vehicle: ‘A person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the] statute, when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechani- cal or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.’ ” State v. Cyr, supra, 291 Conn. 56–57. “Adoption of that definition established, and subse- quent cases confirmed, that the term operating encom- passes a broader range of conduct than does [the term] driving. . . . After a number of decisions made clear that sitting at the steering wheel of a nonmoving vehicle with the engine running constituted operation . . . the ques- tion arose whether the definition could be satisfied when a defendant had been seated in a vehicle that neither was in motion nor had its motor running.” (Citations omit- ted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 57. Our Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 552, 903 A.2d 217 (2006), a case in which the defendant was found sleeping in the driver’s seat of a legally parked car with the motor off but with the key in the ignition and the headlights turned on. Id., 547. The court reiterated that “[n]othing in our definition of ‘operation’ requires the vehicle to be in motion or its motor to be running.” Id., 552. The court, relying in part on cases from other jurisdictions construing similar statutes,10 concluded 10 In reaching its decision in Haight, our Supreme Court cited as instructive a number of out-of-state cases. See State v. Haight, supra, 279 Conn. 553 (“other jurisdictions have concluded that a motorist who is found sleeping or unconscious in a stationary vehicle with the motor not running violates the applicable prohibition on operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs”). Although in Haight, and in the cases it relied on, the keys were found in the ignitions of the vehicles, the court did not hold or suggest that evidence of a key in the ignition of a vehicle would be necessary to establish the element of operation in all cases. See id., 553–55.  State v. Layaw that, under the facts before it, the element of operation was established in part due to the fact that the defendant was in the car and was in a position to continue to control its movements. Id., 552–55. We have previously held that a defendant who had been found unconscious in the driver’s seat of an idling vehicle located in a parking lot operated the motor vehicle despite not having moved the vehicle. State v. Ducatt, 22 Conn. App. 88, 89, 93, 575 A.2d 708, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 804, 584 A.2d 472 (1990). In Ducatt, this court concluded that, because the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating substance, was inside the vehicle, and was “in a position to control its movements,” he must have manipulated the machinery of the motor or other machinery manipulable from the driver’s posi- tion that affected or could have affected the vehicle’s movement. Id., 93. Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that the defendant operated his vehicle was also at issue in State v. Smith, 179 Conn. App. 734, 746–47, 181 A.3d 118, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 927, 182 A.3d 637 (2018). In that case, a state police trooper came upon the defendant’s vehicle stopped in the travel lane of the road. Id., 739. After approaching and engaging with the defendant, who was in the driver’s seat and who told the trooper that he was “ ‘just stopped’ ” and was trying to use his cell phone; id., 739; the trooper arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Id., 741. At trial, the defen- dant testified that his vehicle had become inoperable due to a mechanical problem and that he had then gone to a bar with a friend who later dropped him back off at his vehicle to call roadside assistance. Id., 749–50. On appeal, the defendant relied on his testimony and the fact that the trooper had never observed his vehicle in motion to claim that there was insufficient evidence of operation. Id., 750. This court determined that there was ample evidence to support a finding that he had oper- ated the vehicle just prior to the point in time when he  State v. Layaw was arrested, including his own statement provided to the police following his arrest. Id., 751. He had told the police in his statement that he had been “attempting to make a phone call and had pulled over for safety. A [s]tate [t]rooper then pulled in behind my car and came up to the passenger side of my car and asked for my paperwork.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This court stated that the jury, “exercising common sense in its evaluation of the evidence, reasonably could have found that, when the defendant provided this explanation to the police to explain what had occurred when the police found his automobile obstructing traffic, he admitted that he had ‘pulled over for safety’ just prior to [the trooper’s] arrival on the scene.” Id. This court concluded that, in light of all the evidence presented and viewed in its entirety, the “jury reasonably could have interpreted the evidence of the defendant’s candid explanation [of his actions] . . . as evidence of an implicit admission by the defendant that he [was operating] his automobile . . . .” Id., 752. Finally, we reemphasize that the operation of a motor vehicle may be inferred through circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 119–20, 124, 256 A.2d 231 (1969) (finding no error when jury concluded, on purely circumstantial evidence, that defendant operated motor vehicle while under influ- ence of alcohol); State v. King, 204 Conn. App. 1, 16, 251 A.3d 79 (2021) (“[t]here is no requirement that the fact of operation be established by direct evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 346 Conn 238, 288 A.3d 995 (2023). In Englehart, the defendant’s vehicle was found in the center of the road, meaning that, “in order to get to the spot where it was found, the car had to be driven, towed or pushed there.” State v. Englehart, supra, 122. The Supreme Court held that, “[s]ince the car was found to be in good operating condition and since there were no facts indicating that it had been towed or pushed, there was no reasonable basis for an inference that it had not been operated by someone.” Id. Put differ- ently, the jury was free to infer that the defendant was operating the motor vehicle in order for it to be found  State v. Layaw at that location. See also State v. Teti, 50 Conn. App. 34, 41–42, 716 A.2d 931 (“[i]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 921, 722 A.2d 812 (1998). In the present case, the jury was presented with evi- dence that the defendant admitted that “he was in his car driving when he sniffed heroin . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The defendant’s medical records from Manches- ter Memorial Hospital were admitted into evidence dur- ing Jackson’s testimony without objection. The medical records contained the defendant’s admission, stating: “He reports he was in his car driving when he sniffed heroin . . . .” (Emphasis added.) This admission was read into evidence by Jackson without objection. Jackson also testified that, after he told the defendant about his intent to arrest him, the defendant stated that he was not driving but that he was, instead, stopped at the red light. As the trier of fact, however, the jury was entitled to believe and credit the defendant’s admission that he ingested heroin while he was driving his vehicle. Like in Smith, the defendant’s candid explanation of his actions leading up to his being found unconscious and at the wheel of his vehicle was an admission by the defendant that he was operating his vehicle and, together with the other evidence presented to the jury concerning where the vehicle was found and where the defendant was seated within the vehicle, constitutes sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict.11 See State v. Smith, supra, 179 Conn. App. 751. Although the courts in Haight and Ducatt found that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that a 11 As previously noted, the defendant changed his story and recanted the admission once he was told that the police would be seeking a warrant and stated that he did not sniff heroin until he had stopped the vehicle at the red light. Although the jury was free to make that inference, it also was free to reach the more logical conclusion, particularly in light of his admission to the contrary, that he had driven the vehicle while  State v. Layaw defendant operated a legally parked, stationary vehicle, partially on the basis of direct evidence that the key was in the ignition, their analyses nevertheless support the conclusion that a defendant may be found to have oper- ated a vehicle if it is stationary and located on a public road in a lane of traffic. See State v. Haight, supra, 279 Conn. 553; State v. Ducatt, supra, 22 Conn. App. 92–93. A jury reasonably could look to the location where the vehicle and the defendant were found, together with all other relevant evidence, to infer that the defendant was drug impaired while in a position to control the move- ments of the vehicle and that the vehicle could be set in motion, becoming a danger to the defendant and others around him.12 See State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 269–70, 288 A.3d 995 (2023). In order for the defendant to have been found at the stoplight at 234 Tolland Turnpike, he must have first entered his motor vehicle and engaged with the functions of the vehicle allowing for motion, which is consistent with a finding of operation under the definition set forth by our Supreme Court in Swift. See State v. Swift, supra, 125 Conn. 403. Together with his admission that he had ingested heroin while driving, a jury reasonably could infer that the defendant had driven his vehicle onto a public road and ingested heroin while driving the vehicle. Such an inference is particularly reasonable because the defendant was found in the driver’s seat of the vehicle stopped at a traffic light in a lane of traffic. Following the defendant’s decision to engage with the functions of his vehicle, the defendant continued operating the vehicle up to, and including, the moment snorting the heroin and eventually passed out at the traffic light. See State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn. 417 (jury is not required to accept as dispositive inferences consistent with defendant’s innocence). 12 We note that there was no evidence presented from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the vehicle had become inoperable after the defendant drove it. In fact, the evidence supports the infer- ence that he was driving and the vehicle stopped under his control, not as a result of a mechanical defect.  State v. Layaw when he stopped at the traffic light.13 Given the totality of the evidence before the jury, it reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had operated the vehicle while impaired. In sum, on the basis of the defendant’s admission that he snorted heroin while driving, viewed in light of the reasonable inferences that the jury was entitled to make on the basis of the location in which he and his vehicle were found, the jury was free to infer that the defen- dant had operated the vehicle while impaired. Having construed the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there was suf- ficient evidence to support the operation element and, thus, the judgment of conviction. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 13 The defendant attempts to make much of the fact that, although Jackson entered the defendant’s vehicle, he was unable to testify about whether the defendant’s vehicle was running or whether a key was in the ignition or nearby. The absence of such direct evidence, however, did not preclude the jury from making reasonable inferences on the basis of circumstantial evidence to reach its verdict.