Krasko v. Konkos

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Krasko v. Konkos ROBERT J. KRASKO ET AL. v. ROBERT KONKOS ET AL. (AC 48824) Moll, Seeley and Palmer, Js. Syllabus The defendants, owners of certain real property that is subject to a right- of-way easement benefitting the plaintiffs’ neighboring property, appealed from the trial court’s judgment ordering the defendants to authorize the removal of a utility pole that is located in the easement area so that the plaintiffs could widen their driveway. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding that their refusal to consent to the removal of the pole was an obstruction of the plaintiffs’ easement. Held: The trial court did not err in concluding that the defendants’ refusal to consent to the removal of the utility pole constituted an obstruction of the plaintiffs’ easement, as the court properly applied the reasonable use analysis articulated in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC (221 Conn. App. 657), the court’s analysis of whether the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the easement was reasonably necessary was sound, the majority of the court’s factual find- ings were not clearly erroneous, and any erroneous findings were harmless. The trial court did not err by ordering unpleaded declaratory relief as claimed by the defendants but, rather, properly awarded injunctive relief as requested by the plaintiffs in their operative complaint, as the judgment directed the defendants to take a specific action, namely, to authorize the utility companies to remove the utility pole and to transfer the defendants’ electrical service to a different utility pole, rather than merely establishing the existing rights and legal relations of the parties, and the purpose of the order was to stop the defendants’ interference with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the easement, which is a classic purpose of an injunction. Argued September 9—officially released November 10, 2026 Procedural History Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction requiring the named defendant et al. to consent to the relocation of a utility pole that obstructed the plaintiffs’ ease- ment, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Stevens, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motions to cite in Frontier Communications Corporation et al. as party defendants; thereafter, the named defendant et al. filed a counterclaim; subsequently, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs’  Krasko v. Konkos motion to cite in Owned Wealth, LLC, et al. as party defendants; thereafter, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint against the defendant Margaret Mary Kane; subsequently, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement, and the named defendant et al. appealed to this court, Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js., which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with direction to deny the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, rendered judgment for the plaintiffs with respect to the complaint and with respect to counts three through six of the counterclaim filed by the named defendant et al., from which the named defendant et al. appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povo- dator, judge trial referee, dismissed counts one and two of the counterclaim filed by the named defendant et al. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed. Alexander Copp, for the appellants (named defendant et al.). Alan R. Spirer, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Opinion MOLL, J. This long running dispute over a utility pole returns to us on appeal from the Superior Court follow- ing this court’s remand in a prior appeal. See Krasko v. Konkos, 224 Conn. App. 589, 611, 314 A.3d 34 (2024). The defendants Robert Konkos (Konkos), Chelsea Konkos (Chelsea), 105 Honeysuckle Trust, dated March 9, 2021, Owned Wealth, LLC, as trustee, and Owned Wealth, LLC,1 now appeal from the trial court’s judgment 1 “The plaintiffs initially commenced the underlying action against only [Konkos and Chelsea]. On January 22, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to cite in Frontier Communications Corporation (Frontier) and Margaret Mary Kane as defendants in the underlying action. On February 3, 2020, the [trial] court, Stevens, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motions and added Frontier and Kane as defendants to the underlying action. On July 6, 2022, the plaintiffs moved to cite in 105 Honeysuckle Trust, dated March 9, 2021, Owned Wealth, LLC, as trustee, and Owned Wealth,  Krasko v. Konkos rendered after a bench trial in favor of the plaintiffs, Robert J. Krasko and Francis L. O’Neill,2 ordering the defendants to authorize the removal of a utility pole in order to allow the plaintiffs to widen their driveway. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that their refusal to consent to the removal of the utility pole was an obstruction of the plaintiffs’ easement and (2) granting unpleaded declaratory relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as either found by the court or undisputed by the parties, and procedural history are rel- evant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiffs are the owners of real property located at 115 Honeysuckle Hill Lane in Easton (plaintiffs’ property). The defen- dants are the owners3 of the abutting property located at 105 Honeysuckle Hill Lane in Easton (defendants’ property). The properties were originally laid out in a 1978 subdivision map, which designated the defendants’ property as lot 7 and the plaintiffs’ property as lot 8. Lot 7 adjoins Honeysuckle Hill Lane, but lot 8 does not; thus, the subdivision map contains a right-of-way over lot 7, twenty-five feet wide, that connects lot 8 with the public road. The properties were once commonly owned. During the period of common ownership, a house was constructed on lot 7, while lot 8 remained undeveloped. A utility pole (original pole) was placed on lot 7, close to the LLC, as additional defendants. . . . On July 18, 2022, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs’ motion. On September 20, 2022, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint against Kane.” Krasko v. Konkos, supra, 224 Conn. App. 591 n.1. Frontier is nominally a defendant in the underlying action; however, no claim has been made by the plaintiffs against Frontier. Frontier and Kane are not participating in this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Konkos, Chelsea, 105 Honeysuckle Trust, dated March 9, 2021, Owned Wealth, LLC, as trustee, and Owned Wealth, LLC, collectively as the defendants. 2 Francis L. O’Neill is referred to as Francis Krasko in parts of the record. 3 105 Honeysuckle Trust, dated March 9, 2021, Owned Wealth, LLC, as trustee, and Owned Wealth, LLC, are the current legal owners of the defendants’ property, while Konkos and Chelsea are the former owners and current beneficial owners of the defendants’ property.  Krasko v. Konkos center of the right-of-way, to provide utility service to the house. The original pole is jointly owned by Frontier Communications Corporation (Frontier), which provides telephone service, and The United Illuminating Company (UI),4 which provides electrical service (collectively, utility companies). In 2015, the then owner of both lots, John M. Barry, as trustee of the Richard A. Barry Testamentary Trust (trustee), planned to sell lot 8 for development. A sur- veyor prepared a site plan, dated December 16, 2015 (site plan), for the development of a single-family house on lot 8 for Margaret Mary Kane, a prospective buyer. The site plan indicated that a driveway would be constructed across the right-of-way on lot 7 to service the new home on lot 8, with the original pole located in the proposed path of the driveway. The site plan also contained a nota- tion stating “EXISTING POLE TO BE RELOCATED” and included a proposed location for a new utility pole. The record does not indicate whether the site plan was shared with the trustee. On December 29, 2015, the trustee, as the owner of lots 7 and 8, executed an Easement and Mutual Drive- way Agreement (easement agreement). The easement agreement granted and conveyed “to the owner of [l]ot 8, its successors and assigns, a perpetual easement over, under and across [the] 25 [foot] Right of Way to [l]ot 8: a. for ingress and egress to and from Honeysuckle Hill Lane on foot and by motor vehicle; including the right to construct a driveway in common with lot 7; b. for the installation, maintenance, replacement and repair of all utilities, including without limitation, water, gas, cable TV, telephone, and electricity . . . .” The easement agreement further specified “that the owners of [l]ot 7 will at no time obstruct in any manner the owners of [l]ot 8’s access to [l]ot 8 in, under or over the 25 [foot] Right of Way . . . .” The easement agreement was duly recorded in the Easton land records. On that same day, the trustee conveyed the defendants’ property to Konkos 4 UI is not a party to this action.  Krasko v. Konkos and Chelsea by warranty deed. The trustee’s deed speci- fied that the defendants’ property was subject to the easement agreement, as well as an overlapping utility easement now owned by Frontier.5 At some point thereafter, the trustee conveyed lot 8 to Kane. A single-family home was then built on lot 8, and a driveway was constructed within the easement area to service the new home. During the development of lot 8, a new utility pole (new pole), somewhat close to the original pole, was installed to provide utility service to the newly built home. The original pole was never removed or relocated, and it continues to provide util- ity service to the defendants’ property. Subsequently, the plaintiffs purchased lot 8 from Kane. The current driveway servicing the plaintiffs’ property is adjacent to the original pole. The plaintiffs commenced the present action on August 9, 2019. In their operative complaint, dated October 18, 2024, the plaintiffs alleged that they “have a perpetual easement over, under and across a twenty-five (25) foot right-of-way to the plaintiffs’ [property] and which ease- ment burdens the defendants’ [property] as set forth in [the easement agreement] . . . . The plaintiffs’ ability to use the easement is obstructed by the location of [the original pole] owned and maintained by Frontier and located within the right-of-way that is the subject of the easement. . . . The removal of the [original] pole, which obstructs the plaintiffs’ driveway, requires that electrical service to the defendants’ house be transferred from the [original] pole to the new . . . pole. . . . Despite due demand, the defendants have failed and refused to consent to allowing Frontier to relocate the [original pole] . . . .” Throughout most of the present action, the parties believed that moving the defendants’ electrical service from the original pole to the new pole would require the defendants to upgrade the electrical service to their 5 The utility easement was originally granted to Southern New Eng- land Telephone Company and now belongs to Frontier as its successor.  Krasko v. Konkos home to meet current code standards. Accordingly, at prior stages of the action, the plaintiffs’ prayer for relief requested “a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to upgrade their electrical connection between their house and the [new] pole so that the said connection complies with the current building code . . . .” Upgrading the electrical connection would have required installation of new cables from the new pole to the defendants’ home, which would in turn have required excavation of the defendants’ driveway and yard—a significant expense and inconvenience for the defendants. Following extensive motions practice, discovery, and a prior appeal,6 however, on August 28, 2024, the plain- tiffs’ counsel sent a letter to the defendants’ counsel explaining that, instead of upgrading their electrical connection, the defendants could simply transfer their existing electrical connection from the original pole to the new pole; accordingly, the plaintiffs proposed a new scope of work. The new proposal (splice box proposal) would involve disconnecting the defendants’ existing cable from the original pole, running the existing cable through a seven foot trench between the original pole and the new pole, installing a splice box at the base of the new pole, and installing a conduit from the splice box to the UI connection on the new pole. The splice box proposal would involve a relatively minimal interruption in electrical service to the defendants’ home while the work was completed. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint to the operative version, the prayer for relief in which requested a mandatory injunction ordering the 6 In the prior appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812, 626 A.2d 729 (1993). Krasko v. Konkos, supra, 224 Conn. App. 594, 604. This court agreed with the defendants, concluding that “[t]he record is clear that the parties did not reach a clear and unambiguous agreement.” Id., 611.  Krasko v. Konkos defendants to authorize the removal of the original pole and the work described in the splice box proposal.7 The defendants filed their operative answer and special defenses on November 14, 2024. In addition to denying the plaintiffs’ substantive allegations, the defendants raised what they characterized as eight special defenses. On November 15, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a reply deny- ing all allegations of the defendants’ special defenses and stating that they were not cognizable special defenses. The case was tried to the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povo- dator, judge trial referee, on November 20 and 21, 2024. Both Krasko and Konkos testified at trial, as did a repre- sentative of Frontier and experts hired by both parties. The parties presented numerous exhibits, including the easement agreement, the site plan, the pertinent deeds, written communications between the parties, and photo- graphs showing vehicles using the plaintiffs’ driveway. On May 21, 2025, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to their operative complaint. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the ease- ment to remove the original pole in order to widen their driveway was reasonable and/or reasonably necessary.8 The court assessed the reasonableness of the proposed use by analyzing four factors: “[1] the amount of harm caused, [2] its foreseeability, [3] the purpose or motive with which the act was done, and [4] the consideration of whether the utility of the use of the land outweighed the gravity of the harm resulting.” (Internal quotation 7 The operative complaint asked the court for injunctive relief in the alternative: “1. That the court issue a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants . . . to consent to the removal of the [original] pole that obstructs the easement, and consent to [the splice box proposal] . . . . 2. In the alternative, that the court issue a mandatory injunction requir- ing the defendants to upgrade their electrical connection between their house and the [new] pole . . . .” The second claim, however, requiring the upgrade of the defendants’ electrical connection, was abandoned for purposes of trial. As such, the plaintiffs’ only claim at trial was for an injunction requiring the defendants to authorize the work described in the splice box proposal. 8 The court used the terms “reasonably necessary” and “reasonable” use interchangeably. See footnote 10 of this opinion.  Krasko v. Konkos marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 657, 685–86, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024). The court found that there was no real risk of any significant harm to the defendants because the removal of the original pole could be accomplished by simply moving the defendants’ existing electrical service to the new pole, as described in the splice box proposal, with only a relatively minimal interruption of service. The court then found that it was foreseeable that the original pole would not remain in its original location. As to the third factor, the court found that the plaintiffs were motivated by a desire to comply with the local zoning regulations for the width of a driveway and the need for vehicles to avoid being stuck between the original pole and a relatively steep drop-off on the other side of the driveway, and that the alterna- tive solution proposed by the defendants—to expand the driveway on the other side—was not reasonable because of engineering challenges. Finally, the court determined that the utility of the use of the land by the plaintiffs in widening the driveway would outweigh the minimal burden on the defendants if the work were completed. The court went on to reject the defendants’ special defenses. The court ordered the defendants to provide authoriza- tion to remove the original pole and to splice the power line from the new pole to the existing cable(s) serving the defendants’ property, as well as to transfer any other service as may be required by elimination of the original pole, as described in the splice box proposal. This appeal followed.9 Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. The defendants raise two claims on appeal, namely, that the court erred in (1) concluding that the defendants’ 9 In its decision disposing of the plaintiffs’ operative complaint, the trial court also rendered judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor on counts three through six of a six count counterclaim filed by the defendants, with the court expressly declining to rule on the first and second counts because it was unclear whether those counts were ripe for adjudication, and the parties had not yet briefed the issue of ripeness. In their appeal to this court, filed June 9, 2025, the defendants also challenged the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs on counts three through six of the  Krasko v. Konkos failure to consent to removing the original pole consti- tuted an obstruction of the plaintiffs’ easement, and (2) ordering unpleaded declaratory relief. We address each claim in turn. I The defendants’ first claim on appeal is that the trial court on remand erred in concluding that their refusal to consent to removing the original pole constituted an obstruction of the plaintiffs’ easement. In support of this claim, the defendants argue that the court applied the wrong legal standard. The defendants then argue that, when the issues are analyzed under the purportedly correct standard, “the plaintiffs failed to establish that the removal of the original pole was reasonably neces- sary for the continued enjoyment of [their] right-of-way and would not unreasonably burden the defendants’ property.” In support of this argument, the defendants assert that certain factual findings made by the court were clearly erroneous. Additionally, the defendants argue that the court erred in finding that the original pole constitutes an “ ‘obstruction’ ” for purposes of the counterclaim. At that time, the trial court had not yet ruled on counts one and two of the counterclaim. On June 16, 2025, the trial court ren- dered judgment dismissing counts one and two of the counterclaim as not ripe for adjudication. The defendants did not amend their appeal. On November 3, 2025, this court ordered the parties to file memoranda addressing “whether the portion of this appeal challenging the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on counts three through six of the defendants’ counterclaim should be dismissed for lack of a final judgment because counts one and two of the counterclaim were still pending against the plaintiffs when this appeal was filed and the defendants did not amend their appeal after the trial court rendered a final judgment on the counterclaim.” See Ahern v. Board of Education, 219 Conn. App. 404, 418–21, 295 A.3d 496 (2023); see also Practice Book §§ 61-3 and 61-4. In their memoranda, both parties agreed that that portion of the appeal may be dismissed for lack of a final judgment. On December 3, 2025, this court dismissed the portion of the appeal chal- lenging the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on counts three through six of the counterclaim. Thus, only the defendants’ chal- lenge to the trial court’s judgment rendered on the plaintiffs’ operative complaint is before us on appeal.  Krasko v. Konkos easement because the original pole predates the easement agreement. We address each argument in turn. A We first address the defendants’ argument that the court applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing the issues. Specifically, the defendants contend that the court erred by analyzing the plaintiffs’ claims in terms of whether a proposed use of the easement is reasonably necessary, applying the factors this court articulated in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 685–86. We disagree with the defendants and conclude that the court applied the proper legal standard. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal stan- dard is a question of law over which this court’s review is plenary. See Mirjavadi v. Vakilzadeh, 310 Conn. 176, 183, 74 A.3d 1278 (2013) (“[i]t is well established that [t]he . . . determination of the proper legal standard in any given case is a question of law subject to [an appel- late court’s] plenary review” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We begin with the general legal principles relating to easements. “It is well settled that [a]n easement cre- ates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by the easement. . . . [T]he benefit of an easement . . . is considered a nonpos- sessory interest in land because it generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose. . . . [E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privileges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain purpose . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn. App. 833, 844, 115 A.3d 497 (2015). “Easements are classified as either easements appurte- nant or easements in gross. . . . Two distinct estates are involved in an easement appurtenant: the dominant to which the easement belongs and the servient upon which the obligation rests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Krasko v. Konkos Il Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven Land Co., 254 Conn. 502, 512, 757 A.2d 1103 (2000). The rights of the dominant estate holder and the servi- ent estate holder “are not absolute, but are so limited, each by the other, that there may be a reasonable enjoy- ment of both.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuras v. Kope, 205 Conn. 332, 342, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987). “Of necessity, the interests of the owner of the easement often conflict with the interests of the owner of the burdened estate. By law, however, each of the parties owes certain duties to the other.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) 57 Broad Street Stamford, LLC v. Summer House Owners, LLC, 184 Conn. App. 834, 847, 195 A.3d 1143 (2018). “Except as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement . . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary10 for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Like- wise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.” (Footnote 10 As the trial court observed, this court has used “reasonably nec- essary,” “reasonableness of the use,” and other similar terms inter- changeably in the easement context. See, e.g., Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 685–86 (“[T]he scope of the easement is such that it may be used for those purposes reasonably necessary to the full enjoyment of the premises to which the right-of- way is appurtenant. Whether a particular use is reasonable is a question of fact and must be determined on a case by case basis, considering all the relevant circumstances . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 164 Conn. App. 279, 293, 134 A.3d 1278 (2016) (“Generally, [a right-of-way] granted or reserved in general terms may be used for any purpose reasonably necessary for the party entitled to use it. . . . The grant being gen- eral in terms, it must be construed to include any reasonable use to which the land may be devoted.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)), aff’d, 327 Conn. 431, 174 A.3d 779 (2018); Hagist v. Washburn, 16 Conn. App. 83, 86, 546 A.2d 947 (1988) (“It is well established that a right-of-way granted in general terms may be used for any purpose reasonably necessary for the party entitled to use it. . . . Moreover, the issue of what constitutes reasonable use is a question of fact . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)).  Krasko v. Konkos added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Freidheim v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 779, 290 A.3d 801 (2023). “The manner, frequency, and intensity of the [dominant estate holder’s] use of the servient estate may change over time to . . . accommodate normal develop- ment of the dominant estate . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zhang v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., 272 Conn. 627, 637, 866 A.2d 588 (2005). “The use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit. . . . Ordinarily when [judicial] opinions speak of the use of an easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus use frequently involves the amount of traffic over the ease- ment or alterations to the land to make it passable. . . . This is not to overlook, however, that [t]he owner of an easement has all rights incident or necessary to its proper enjoyment, [although] nothing more.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ringel v. Gottlieb, 233 Conn. App. 798, 804, 342 A.3d 1039, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 930, 346 A.3d 514 (2025). In light of these principles, this court explained in Williams that resolving a claim of interference with use and enjoyment of an easement requires a three part analysis. Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 686. “[T]he trial court [must] determine (1) the character, extent, and scope of the easement granted to the plaintiffs, (2) whether the plaintiffs’ use of the easement [is] reasonable in light of the character and extent of the easement, and (3) whether the defen- dants’ actions [have] interfered with the plaintiffs’ use of the easement.” Id. This court further explained that “[w]hether a particular use is reasonable is a question of fact and must be determined on a case by case basis, considering all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as [1] the amount of harm caused, [2] its foreseeability, [3] the purpose or motive with which the act was done, and [4] the consideration of whether the utility of the use of the land outweighed the gravity of  Krasko v. Konkos the harm resulting.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 685–86. In the present case, there is no dispute that the plain- tiffs, as the owners of the former lot 8, hold a valid ease- ment appurtenant over the defendants’ property, the former lot 7. In the parlance of easements, the plaintiffs’ property is the dominant estate, and the defendants’ property is the servient estate. There is also no dispute as to the general character, extent, and scope of the easement. The easement agreement incorporates a pre- existing twenty-five foot right-of-way “for all lawful purposes” and specifically gives the plaintiffs the right to “ingress and egress to and from [the public street] on foot and by motor vehicle; including the right to construct a driveway in common with [the defendants’ property]” within the twenty-five foot right-of-way. (Emphasis added.) Rather, the present case centers on a specific proposed use of the easement by the plaintiffs, as hold- ers of the dominant estate: to remove the original pole so that they can expand their driveway into the area currently occupied by the original pole. This proposed use falls within the general character and scope of the easement. See, e.g., State v. Quintiliano, 206 Conn. App. 712, 724, 261 A.3d 31 (recognizing “the right of a dominant estate holder of a right-of-way easement . . . to remove obstructions placed in the right-of-way that materially interfere with his or her reasonable enjoyment of the easement”), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 918, 262 A.3d 136 (2021). There is also no dispute that the defendants’ refusal to authorize the transfer of their utility service interferes with the removal of the original pole. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the proposed use is rea- sonable or reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ rights under the easement. The trial court assessed the reasonableness of the pro- posed use by applying the four factors that this court recited in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 685–86. The defendants attempt to distinguish Williams by pointing out that the issue in  Krasko v. Konkos Williams was whether the dominant estate holder’s proposed use was within the scope of the easement. This distinction is both accurate and immaterial. The trial court in Williams interpreted the applicable deed as allowing foot passage only and concluded that the ease- ment holders’ use of the easement for vehicular travel was outside of its scope. Id., 677–78. On appeal, this court held that the trial court had misinterpreted the deed: vehicular travel was within the scope of the easement. Id., 686. The four reasonableness factors recited in Wil- liams were never applied in Williams itself; rather, this court explained that those were the factors the trial court should have applied but did not because it misinterpreted the deed. Id. Here, however, there was no dispute as to the overall scope of the easement, such that the trial court analyzed the specific proposed use of the easement under the four reasonableness factors. The defendants contend that the question before the trial court was whether the removal of the original pole “(1) [is] reasonably necessary for the continued enjoy- ment of the right-of-way, and (2) would not unreasonably burden the [servient] property.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Somers v. LeVasseur, 230 Conn. 560, 567, 645 A.2d 993 (1994). We observe, however, that both requirements set forth in Somers are function- ally contained within the reasonableness factors from Williams, which require the court to consider both the proposed use’s foreseeability, purpose, and benefit to the dominant estate in light of the scope of the easement and the harm to the servient estate that would result from the proposed use. See id.; Williams v. Green Power Ven- tures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 685–86. Indeed, in the present case, the court made express factual findings, both that the proposed use was reasonable and that the harm to the servient estate would be minimal. Thus, the quoted language from Somers does not establish a test meaningfully different from the test applied by the court. We conclude that the reasonable use analysis articu- lated in Williams was the correct standard for the court  Krasko v. Konkos to apply in the present case. The defendants have not identified a meaningfully different legal standard that the court should have applied, let alone explained why their preferred standard is correct. Thus, the defendants’ claim fails. B We next turn to the defendants’ claim that the plain- tiffs have not carried their burden of showing that their proposed use of the easement is reasonably necessary and that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants’ refusal to consent to removal of the original pole was an obstruction of the easement. In support of this claim, the defendants challenge several subsidiary factual findings. We conclude that the court’s reason- ableness analysis was sound, that the majority of its factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and that any erroneous findings were harmless. Accordingly, we disagree with the defendants. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At trial, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of Stephen Gemmell, a representative of Frontier. Gemmell testified about Frontier’s role as the co-owner, installer, and “custo- dian” of the original pole and the new pole. Gemmell also testified as to what the splice box proposal would entail, who would perform the work, and the risks of the proj- ect based on his own experience working for Frontier, as well as his understanding based on a conversation he had with his counterpart at UI. Gemmell explained that the Public Utility Regulatory Authority has policies relating to the removal of “double utility poles” and that the original pole and the new pole constitute a “double utility pole” situation. The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of James Luczak, a registered professional engineer. Luczak testi- fied that the plaintiffs’ driveway is more than 200 feet long and that the Easton Zoning Regulations require driveways of that length to have a width of at least twelve  Krasko v. Konkos feet. Luczak measured the “travel way” of the driveway11 as being eight and one-half feet wide. Luczak testified that, on the side of the plaintiffs’ driveway opposite the original pole, there is a seven foot vertical drop-off, which he characterized as a “steep slope.” He explained that, if the original pole were not removed, the other way to widen the driveway to twelve feet would be to expand the driveway on the side opposite the original pole, which, because of the seven foot drop-off, would require the construction of a retaining wall of substantial size and strength. Luczak’s expert report, which was admitted as a full exhibit, specified that the retaining wall would need to be approximately 175 feet long and seven feet high. Luczak’s report also indicated that, with the driveway in its current state, there is a risk of injury from falling or driving off the seven foot drop-off opposite the original pole. The defendants presented the testimony of two experts: Carl Cianci, a consulting structural engineer, and Nick Sarro, a building consultant and professional estimator. Cianci testified that he measured the travel way of the plaintiffs’ driveway at eleven feet, six inches. He also testified that the drop-off on the side of the driveway opposite the original pole was four to five feet, which was not something over which he would want to drive a car. Cianci testified that, to widen the driveway to twelve feet on the side opposite the original pole, a small retain- ing wall, no more than twenty feet long, would need to be constructed. Cianci also testified that the plaintiffs’ driveway is more than 200 feet long. Sarro testified that widening the driveway on the side opposite the original pole would require a retaining wall four to five feet high and twenty feet long and that an engineer would need 11 Luczak defined the “travel way” of a driveway as the portion of the driveway that can be comfortably navigated by a vehicle, including considerations for turns, passing, and snow removal.  Krasko v. Konkos to design such a retaining wall. Sarro also testified that trenching for electric utility lines is “routine” work. Krasko and Konkos also testified at trial. Krasko testi- fied that some delivery trucks had been unable to make it past the original pole up the driveway and that he had safety concerns about using the driveway, especially in snow and ice. He also testified to his understanding that the utility companies were willing to move forward with the splice box proposal. Konkos testified that he had numerous concerns about the utility work requested by the plaintiffs, including cost, potential loss of electrical service, and damage to the defendants’ property. Konkos also testified that he has seen numerous trucks make it up the plaintiffs’ driveway, past the original pole, and that he has seen trucks have issues going up the driveway only when backing up instead of going forward. Konkos testified that he was aware of the easement agreement when he bought the house and was generally aware that a house would be built on lot 8 at some point. He also acknowledged that the work in the splice box proposal would be done within the easement area and would be completed by a licensed electrician. The court admitted the following documents, among others, as full exhibits: (1) photographs showing vehicles using (or attempting to use) the plaintiffs’ driveway; (2) historical maps of the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ properties, including the original subdivision map and the site plan; (3) a 2020 survey map showing the state of the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ properties, which indicates that both the original pole and the new pole are within the easement area; and (4) releva