Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ******************************************************  TUXIS OHR’S FUEL, INC. v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, ET AL. (SC 18791) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.* Argued January 10—officially released July 30, 2013 Vincent T. McManus, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff). Krista Dotson O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney gen- eral, for the appellee (named defendant).  Opinion ROGERS, C. J. This case raises the question of whether the legislature, in enacting a particular provi- sion of Connecticut’s Unemployment Compensation Act (act),1 intended to disqualify an individual from receiving benefits when he loses his commercial driv- er’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol while off duty, and, as a consequence, is discharged from employment for which that license is required. The plaintiff employer, Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc., appeals2 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s dismissal of its appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board). The board had sustained an award of benefits to the plaintiff’s employee by the defendant, the Administrator of the act,3 after rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (14) barred that award. The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly held that § 31-236 (a) (14), which disallows unemployment benefits to a discharged employee who ‘‘has been disqualified under state or federal law from performing the work for which [he] was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program mandated by and conducted in accordance with such law,’’ did not apply to a commercial truck driver who, while off duty, loses his license for driving under the influence and, therefore, is unable to work. After a close examination of this provision and other laws relating to disqualification from unemployment benefit eligibility, we are constrained to disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Connecti- cut’s statutes and regulations governing unemployment compensation do not provide for disqualification in these circumstances, and, because unemployment com- pensation benefits are entirely a creature of statute, any change to the law in this regard must be effected by the legislature. The relevant facts and procedural history are not in dispute. The Appellate Court’s opinion recounts them as follows. ‘‘On December 18, 2007, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, the plaintiff . . . filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court to challenge a decision of the [board] finding that a former employee of the plain- tiff was entitled to unemployment benefits. The employee, who worked as a driver for the plaintiff, had his commercial driver’s license suspended as a result of his arrest for driving, on his own time, while intoxicated. Agreeing with the board’s construction of the relevant statutes, the court dismissed the appeal.’’ Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compen- sation Act, 127 Conn. App. 739, 741, 16 A.3d 777 (2011). The employee ‘‘had been employed by the plaintiff as a fuel oil delivery truck driver since October 12, 2004. State law requires a person driving that type of vehicle to have a commercial driver’s license. General Statutes § 14-44a.4 On July 20, 2007, the employee informed the plaintiff that the department of motor vehicles had sus- pended his commercial driver’s license for one year, effective July 21, 2007, because he had been arrested after an automobile accident that had occurred when he was driving his own car during nonworking hours. He had registered a blood alcohol level of .216 percent on a Breathalyzer test. State law provides that the holder of a commercial driver’s license will lose his or her license for one year if a blood alcohol test shows a blood alcohol level in excess of .04 percent, when driving a commercial vehicle, or .08 percent when driv- ing any other motor vehicle. General Statutes § 14-44k (c).5 Although the employee’s misconduct did not occur in the course of his employment, the plaintiff discharged him because he could no longer perform the work that he had been hired to do. ‘‘The plaintiff argued at trial, as it had argued unsuc- cessfully in the underlying administrative proceedings, that in light of the fact that the employee had lost his state commercial driver’s license as a result of his own misbehavior, he was ineligible for unemployment bene- fits. According to the plaintiff, the employee’s ineligibil- ity is established by § 31-236 (a) (14), because, as the plaintiff construes that provision, the employee had disqualified himself from performing the work for which he had been hired by failing a state alcohol testing program, as manifested by his state mandated license suspension. ‘‘The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s argument. It noted that the [board], relying on § 31-236 (a) (2) (B), had a well established policy of confining disqualifica- tion for unemployment benefits to cases of wilful mis- conduct in the course of employment. In this case, the employee’s misconduct, although concededly wilful, had not occurred in the course of his employment. The court furthermore agreed with the [board’s] construc- tion of § 31-236 (a) (14) to require an employer to estab- lish that its employee ‘test[ed] positive for alcohol as part of a testing program conducted by [his employer], the plaintiff.’6 (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.) Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.’’ Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemploy- ment Compensation Act, supra, 127 Conn. App. 741–43. The plaintiff then appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court had construed § 31-236 (a) (14) improperly to require ‘‘that an employee be disqualified due to the use of drugs or alcohol as documented by an employer testing program.’’ Id., 743. Examining the plain language of § 31-236 (a) (14), the Appellate Court first agreed that the statute did not necessarily contemplate a program established by an employer. Id. The Appellate Court ultimately concluded, however, that the other statutory provisions pursuant to which the employee was tested for alcohol by the police and subsequently lost his license, thereby rendering him unable to perform his job for the plaintiff, did not constitute a ‘‘state law program’’ within the meaning of § 31-236 (a) (14).7 (Emphasis in original.) Id., 746. The Appellate Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment. This appeal followed. The plaintiff claims that General Statutes §§ 14-227a,8 14-227b9 and 14-44k10 together constitute a ‘‘statutory program developed by the state of Connecticut to deal with drunk drivers’’ and, further, that that program is the legally mandated ‘‘drug or alcohol testing program’’ contemplated by § 31-236 (a) (14). The plaintiff, citing Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, notes the ordinary meaning of the word ‘‘ ‘program’ ’’ as ‘‘ ‘a plan or system under which action may be taken toward a goal,’ ’’ and argues that the cited statutory provisions, which govern drunk driving offenses and license sus- pension, clearly fall within that meaning. According to the plaintiff, the goal of the cited statutes is to remove dangerous intoxicated drivers from the state’s highways so as to increase public safety. Moreover, the plaintiff contends, the statutes provide a system for doing so and specifically provide for severe penalties. The plaintiff identifies § 14-227b as ‘‘defin[ing] the testing program’’ pursuant to which its employee was tested and, as a result, lost his commercial driver’s license by operation of § 14-44k (b). In the plaintiff’s view, ‘‘[t]here is no other program ‘mandated and conducted in accordance with state law’ [to] which the legislature could have been referring’’ when it enacted § 31-236 (a) (14), and the statute ‘‘cannot be talking about an employer testing program for the simple reason that [an] employer test- ing program cannot suspend and revoke [an] employ- ee’s driver’s license.’’ The defendant, in response, contends that the term ‘‘program,’’ as used in § 31-236 (a) (14), is ambiguous, and that extratextual evidence indicates that the legisla- ture, when passing this provision, was referring specifi- cally to employment based drug and alcohol testing programs that are required by state or federal law for certain categories of employees in high risk jobs, and not to discretionary, police administered testing resulting from off-duty motor vehicle incidents. The defendant cites to previous board decisions applying the provision in the described circumstances, and utiliz- ing a test that makes clear that an employer testing program is what the statute contemplates. Moreover, according to the defendant, the correctness of this inter- pretation is clear when § 31-236 (a) (14) is considered in the context of the act as a whole. We agree with the defendant. We begin with the standards applicable to a court’s review of decisions of the board. ‘‘To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry facts nor hear evidence. . . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Histor- ical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Com- pensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 276, 679 A.2d 347 (1996). The parties do not dispute the relevant facts, but rather, the meaning and applicability of § 31-236 (a) (14). The proper construction of this statute ‘‘is a ques- tion of law over which we exercise plenary review. . . . When interpreting a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec- tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relation- ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra- textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fullerton v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 280 Conn. 745, 755, 911 A.2d 736 (2006). However, ‘‘[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and com- mon law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . . A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Thompson, 307 Conn. 567, 577–78, 57 A.3d 323 (2012). We recently have elaborated on the role of agency interpretations in cases involving questions of statutory construction. In such cases, ‘‘the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scru- tiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commis- sion, 284 Conn. 149, 163, 931 A.2d 890 (2007). Conversely, ‘‘an agency’s interpretation of a statute is accorded deference when the agency’s interpretation has been formally articulated and applied for an extended period of time, and that interpretation is rea- sonable.’’ Id., 164. Deference is warranted in such cir- cumstances ‘‘because a time-tested interpretation, like judicial review, provides an opportunity for aggrieved parties to contest that interpretation. Moreover, in cer- tain circumstances, the legislature’s failure to make changes to a long-standing agency interpretation implies its acquiescence to the agency’s construction of the statute. . . . For these reasons, this court long has adhered to the principle that when a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation [of a statute] is rea- sonable it should be accorded great weight by the courts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Finally, when interpreting provisions of the act, ‘‘we take as our starting point the fact that the act is remedial and, consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries. . . . Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act ‘shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualification in doubtful cases.’ General Statutes § 31-274 (c).’’ (Citation omitted.) Mattatuck Museum- Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, Unem- ployment Compensation Act, supra, 238 Conn. 278; see also 76 Am. Jur. 2d 735, Unemployment Compensation § 14 (2005) (‘‘[p]rovisions of an unemployment compen- sation statute imposing disqualifications for the benefits available should be strictly construed in favor of the claimant’’). We begin with the statutory language at issue. In general, § 31-236 (a) enumerates all of the circum- stances under which an individual shall be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, and it further provides a number of definitions for the terms used therein. Among the disqualifying events listed is subdivision (14), which provides that ‘‘[a]n indi- vidual shall be ineligible for benefits . . . [i]f the administrator finds that the individual has been dis- charged or suspended because the individual has been disqualified under state or federal law from performing the work for which such individual was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program mandated by and conducted in accordance with such law . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (14). ‘‘[D]rug or alcohol testing program’’ is not further defined. In general usage, ‘‘program’’ means ‘‘a plan of proce- dure: a schedule or system under which action may be taken toward a desired goal’’; Webster’s Third Interna- tional Dictionary (1993) p. 1812; or ‘‘a plan of action to accomplish a specified end . . . .’’ Random House Dictionary (2d Ed. 1993) p. 1546. The parties do not dispute this definition, but disagree as to what type of ‘‘drug or alcohol testing program’’ the statute is refer- encing. The plaintiff contends that the legislature could have meant only the state statutory scheme directed toward removing intoxicated drivers from the road, while the defendant insists that the term encompasses any employment based drug or alcohol testing that is conducted pursuant to a federal or state mandate, which typically exists for positions necessitating a high level of safety. The plaintiff’s proposed interpretation is reasonably plausible. Sections 14-227a, 14-227b and 14-44k together do provide a system, along with specific procedures, pursuant to which intoxicated drivers are identified via testing and, thereafter, prevented from operating motor vehicles, commercial or otherwise. See footnotes 5, 8 and 9 of this opinion. It seems more accurate, however, to characterize the statutorily authorized testing as within the discretion of law enforcement officials to conduct, rather than as ‘‘mandated’’ by any of the cited provisions. See General Statutes § 14-227b (b) (describ- ing testing as ‘‘at the option of the police officer’’). Additionally, if the plaintiff’s interpretation is correct, the only category of employees who could be ‘‘disquali- fied’’ from performing their work under § 31-236 (a) (14) would be drivers, and the only ‘‘program’’ that would result in their disqualification would be the cited statutes. Section 31-236 (a) (14) does not simply state this, however, but uses the more general terms of ‘‘[a]n individual’’ and ‘‘drug or alcohol testing program,’’ which suggests that a broader application is contem- plated. The defendant’s offered construction also is reason- ably plausible. Certain hazardous occupations are heav- ily regulated on the state or federal level or both, with drug testing required as a condition of employment and dismissal resulting if an employee fails to pass such testing. At the same time, § 31-236 (a) (14) does not refer specifically to an ‘‘employment based’’ or ‘‘employer’s’’ drug or alcohol testing program, but simply to a ‘‘drug or alcohol testing program . . . .’’ Because neither party’s proposed interpretation fits neatly within the statutory language, nor is either interpretation obviously incon- gruent with that language, we conclude that § 31-236 (a) (14) is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Accordingly, the statute is ambiguous and resort to extratextual interpretive aids is warranted.11 See State v. Thompson, supra, 307 Conn. 578–79. Subsection (a) (14) was added to § 31-236 in 1995 as part of No. 95-323 of the 1995 Public Acts (P.A. 95-323), which generally aimed to tighten eligibility qualifica- tions for unemployment benefits and reduce fraud and overpayment in the administration of those benefits. Our examination of the limited legislative history asso- ciated with this act discloses that it supports the inter- pretation advanced by the defendant. Specifically, during the Senate debate on the underlying bill, Senator Louis C. DeLuca, a cosponsor of that bill, indicated that disqualification from a failed drug or alcohol test would result when ‘‘it is part of [an employer’s] work rules and it is a state or federal requirement that [its employ- ees] take drug tests such as truck drivers, school bus drivers and people of that nature who are required by law to take drug tests, [and] if they fail, they can lose their job[s].’’ 38 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1995 Sess., p. 2329. Thereafter, another legislator asked Senator DeLuca why the type of disqualification contemplated by subdi- vision (14) was not already covered by another portion of § 31-236 (a) that was under consideration, namely, disqualification for a ‘‘violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer . . . .’’12 General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (16); see 38 S. Proc., supra, p. 2347. Senator DeLuca responded that the newly proposed disqualification was listed sepa- rately so as ‘‘to definitely address federal and state laws that required drug tests,’’ but that other employers, if they did not employ ‘‘for instance, truck drivers that have to take a federal drug test, if they were to say that they wanted to make sure that it is a policy of their company, that they would not allow drugs and/or alco- hol during work hours and if it affected someone’s ability, they could be subject to dismissal, that would be a reasonable and uniformly enforced work rule or policy,’’ the violation of which could disqualify an employee from receiving benefits under the other sub- section being discussed. 38 S. Proc., supra, pp. 2347–48. During the subsequent debate in the House of Repre- sentatives, Representative James A. O’Rourke III clari- fied the purpose of the bill as follows: ‘‘[W]hat we are saying here, ladies and gentlemen, and let me be clear about it, is for workers who are mandated under federal or state law for performing, for not failing drug or alco- hol tests, they can be, and they are in . . . public safety sensitive positions in [the] motor carrier, aviation, rail- road, mass transit sectors, we are saying today that if that is your job, don’t do drugs. Don’t fail a drug test because there will be more serious consequences as a result of this bill.’’ 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1995 Sess., p. 7239. A bill analysis provided by the Office of Legislative Research in connection with the legislation is consistent with the foregoing discussions.13 The analysis described the provision as follows: ‘‘The bill denies unemployment compensation benefits to anyone who is suspended or fired from his job because he was disqualified from performing his duties for failing a drug or alcohol test required by state or federal law and conducted according to those laws. Under current law, such claim- ants are not automatically barred from receiving bene- fits. . . . This provision mainly affects employees in safety-sensitive positions in the motor carrier, aviation, railroad, and mass transit transportation sectors, because they are subject to mandatory drug and alcohol testing under federal law. Under state law, drivers of commercial motor vehicles engaged in intrastate com- merce are also subject to mandatory drug testing follow- ing the federal scheme.’’ Office of Legislative Research, Amended Bill Analysis, Substitute Senate Bill No. 847, ‘‘An Act Concerning Additional Recovery to the Unem- ployment Compensation Fund of Fraud Overpayment,’’ (1995), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/ps95/ba/ 1995SB-00847-R01-BA.htm (last visited July 18, 2013). We have examined and, in large part described, the entire available legislative history for § 31-236 (a) (14). There is no mention in that history that the provision was intended to apply in any other context than employ- ment related drug and alcohol testing that is required under state or federal law, as described by Senator DeLuca and Representative O’Rourke. Particularly, there is no discussion anywhere of the state statutes pertaining to drunk driving offenses. Because § 31-236 (a) (14) has been the law for nearly two decades, we also have reviewed the board’s data- base of published decisions to discern whether there exists a long-standing administrative construction of the provision. See generally Connecticut Employment Security Appeals Division, Appeals Decision Library, available at http://ctboard.org/adlib.asp (last visited July 18, 2013). When the statutory citation is entered as a search term, 128 decisions of the board are retrieved. Although some of those decisions include only tangen- tial references to § 31-236 (a) (14), the majority of them involve application of the statute, or a finding that it is inapplicable due to the type of employee involved or the particular circumstances at hand, to instances of workplace based drug and alcohol testing of employees. The decisions collectively reveal the defendant’s articu- lation of detailed prerequisites that must be satisfied before benefits will be denied pursuant to § 31-236 (a) (14), tracking the statute’s requirements that testing be mandated by state or federal law and conducted in accordance with that law. See, e.g., Gebeau v. All-Star Transportation, LLC, Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1158-BR-11 (February 10, 2012) (‘‘[i]n order to prevail under . . . § 31-236 [a] [14], the employer must demon- strate that: [a] state or federal law required the drug test the employer directs its employee to undergo; [b] the federal pre-conditions for testing were met, i.e., the testing was done under circumstances meeting the federal conditions for random, reasonable suspicion, return-to-duty follow-up, and post-accident testing and was pursuant to a policy that satisfies the minimum requirements articulated in the federal regulations; and [c] the testing procedures were in accordance with the federal regulations’’14). Those prerequisites were first articulated by the board in 1996, shortly after the pas- sage of P. A. 95-323; see Howell v. Bridgeport, Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1396-BR-96 (September 27, 1996); and have been applied consistently since that time. See, e.g., Hairston v. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1133-BR-05 (February 17, 2006) (pipeline operator; subject to random drug testing pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Pts. 199 and 40, Research and Special Programs Administration regulations for pipe- line operators); Schwarzmann v. NEFCO Corp., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1380-BR-05 (November 9, 2005) (truck driver; subject to drug testing under federal and state law, 49 C.F.R. Pt. 382 and General Statutes § 14- 261b [b) [1]); Brady v. Penn Maritime, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 483-BR-02 (May 23, 2002) (merchant marine officer; subject to mandatory drug testing under Coast Guard and federal Department of Transportation regulations, 46 C.F.R. § 16.101); Lawson v. Double A. Transportation, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1653-BR-99 (November 8, 2000) (school bus driver; ran- dom drug testing mandated by 49 C.F.R. §§ 382.103 and 382.305); Pelrin v. AGC, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employ- ment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 924-BR-97 (August 31, 1998) (airplane parts inspec- tor; subject to mandatory drug testing under Federal Aviation Agency regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 121.455 and Pt. 121, App. I [III]).15 Additionally, the question before this court today was not, from the board’s perspective, an issue of first impression. On at least three prior occasions, employers argued before the board that police administered drunk driving tests fell within the purview of § 31-236 (a) (14). Each time, the board disagreed. See Haas v. USA Haul- ing & Recycling, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 861-BR-09 (July 28, 2009) (rejecting claim that § 31- 236 [a] [14] precluded award of benefits to commercial driver who lost license after off-duty arrest for driving while intoxicated); Deane v. Pace Air Services, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 222-BR-00 (March 29, 2000) (same, as to tractor trailer truck driver); cf. Saltarella v. A & B Auto Salvage, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 862-BR-09 (July 24, 2009) (§ 31-236 [a] [14] inapplicable to claimant who lost license for his off-duty refusal to take Breathalyzer test as directed by local law enforce- ment official).16 The board’s interpretation of § 31-236 (a) (14) as being applicable only to state or federally mandated, employment based drug or alcohol testing is consistent and long-standing and, moreover, is entirely in line with the available legislative history of the statute. The board has applied the statute in this fashion with considerable frequency. Notably, since subsection (a) (14) was added eighteen years ago, the legislature has amended § 31- 236 six times. If the legislature believed that the board was applying the provision incorrectly, it is likely that it would have responded with a clarifying amendment. Additionally, as we will explain hereinafter, the board’s interpretation is true to Connecticut’s general policy, as reflected in its statutes and regulations, of disqualifying unemployment compensation claimants for workplace misconduct only. Under these circumstances, the defen- dant’s interpretation of § 31-236 (a) (14) is a reasonable one to which we should afford considerable deference. In sum, in light of the statutory language, legislative history and remedial purpose of the act, we agree that the defendant’s construction of the statute is the bet- ter one. We recognize that some courts in our sister states, in cases involving individuals situated similarly to the plaintiff’s employee in the present matter, have con- cluded that those individuals are ineligible for unem- ployment compensation benefits. In so doing, however, those courts have relied on statutory schemes that differ from Connecticut’s in important ways. Typically, stat- utes governing unemployment compensation preclude employees from collecting benefits if they leave work ‘‘voluntarily.’’ See, e.g., General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (A). Some courts, interpreting that word broadly, have employed the ‘‘constructive quit’’ or ‘‘constructive dis- charge’’ doctrine, whereby an individual is deemed to have left work voluntarily if he or she voluntarily engaged in actions that made it likely he or she would be discharged from employment, specifically, by com- mitting motor vehicle violations that led to the loss of an occupationally required license. See, e.g., Yardville Supply Co. v. Board of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 375–77, 554 A.2d 1337 (1989) (truck driver who lost job after driving privileges suspended for driving while intoxi- cated during nonworking hours ‘‘left work voluntarily’’ within meaning of statute). That doctrine was rejected, however, long ago in Connecticut; see Lewis v. Admin- istrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 39 Conn. Supp. 371, 372–73, 465 A.2d 340 (1983) (rejecting claim, on basis of constructive quit doctrine, that three employees who were discharged after losing their driv- er’s licenses left work voluntarily because their termina- tion was brought about by their own conduct in violating motor vehicle laws); Bertini v. Administra- tor, Unemployment Compensation Act, 39 Conn. Supp. 328, 331–32, 464 A.2d 867 (1983) (constructive quit doc- trine has no basis in our statutes); and the defendant thereafter promulgated a regulation17 that clearly pre- cludes the doctrine’s application. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-236-18 (‘‘[i]n order to establish that an individual left work voluntarily, the [a]dministrator [of the Unemployment Compensation Act] must find that the individual committed the specific intentional act of terminating his own employment’’ [emphasis added]). At other times, our sister states have treated a claim- ant’s loss of an occupationally required license, due to off-duty motor vehicle violations, as disqualifying ‘‘misconduct’’ under the applicable state statute. See, e.g., Look v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Commission, 502 A.2d 1033, 1034–35 (Me. 1985) (telephone service- man’s loss of required license due to off-duty arrest for operating vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor was disqualifying misconduct). In these cases, however, the statute at issue specifies that misconduct is disqualifying if it is ‘‘ ‘connected with’ ’’ the claimant’s employment. See, e.g., id., 1034. Our state’s comparable provision, however, is more narrowly drawn. In Con- necticut, an employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits if he or she has been discharged for ‘‘wilful misconduct in the course of the individual’s employment . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (B). That phrase is further defined, in the defendant’s regulations, as ‘‘tak[ing] place during working hours, at a place the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or otherwise performing any service for the employer’s benefit.’’ (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agen- cies § 31-236-26c (a). Thus, in Lindsey v. Commercial Contractors, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 1786-BR- 97 (December 8, 1998), the board held that a claimant’s loss of his occupationally required license, for an off- duty arrest for driving while intoxicated, did not meet this test, even if it did have an indirect impact on his employer. See also Rafferty v. F & G Realty, Inc., Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review Case No. 692-BR-97 (December 8, 1998) (same, even though required license was ‘‘ ‘intrinsically linked’ ’’ to claimant’s ability to perform services for employer). The rejection of the constructive quit doctrine, and the requirement that disqualifying misconduct occur during working hours, are basic, long-standing features of Connecticut’s unemployment compensation system which, for the most part, our legislature has not seen fit to change. Section 31-236 (a) (14), because it may disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits due to his or her off-duty mis- conduct, namely, drug or alcohol consumption, and in the absence of his or her specific, intentional act of terminating his or her own employment, creates an exception to the general rules governing disqualifica- tion. As we have determined, this particular exception was intended to apply only in specific, narrowly defined circumstances. Although we seriously question whether the state’s provision of benefits to an individual who loses his occupationally required license for operating under the influence, and the imposition of the cost of those benefits on an innocent employer, are consistent with Connecticut’s strong public policy against driving while under the influence, we also are mindful that, as a reviewing court, our role in this area is limited. As the Appellate Court aptly observed, ‘‘[e]ligibility for unemployment compensation and disqualification for unemployment compensation are both entirely statu- tory.’’ Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unem- ployment Compensation Act, supra, 127 Conn. App. 740. Consequently, what ‘‘should be covered by or excluded from the operation of the [act] . . . is a mat- ter for legislative determination.’’ (Citation omitted.) Winnie v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensa- tion Act, 169 Conn. 592, 593, 363 A.2d 1029 (1975); see also General Statutes § 31-236e (a) (‘‘the determination of a claimant’s eligibility for unemployment compensa- tion benefits shall be based solely on the provisions of [the act] and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto’’). As with any statute, ‘‘[c]ourts may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them. . . . It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mayfield v. Goshen Volun- teer Fire Co., 301 Conn. 739, 758, 22 A.3d 1251 (2011). The specific provisions of the act affect both employers and employees and reflect a careful balancing of their interests. Accordingly, whether an additional disqualifi- cation should be added to § 31-236 (a), so as to preclude the receipt of benefits in cases like the present one, is a question we leave for the legislature.18 The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion PALMER, EVELEIGH and VERTE- FEUILLE, Js., concurred. * This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Norcott, Palmer, Zarella and Eveleigh. Thereafter, Senior Justice Vertefeuille was added to the panel and she read the record and briefs and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision. 1 General Statutes § 31-222 et seq. 2 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding an administrative construction of General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (14) pursuant to which the employer was held liable for unem- ployment benefits for an employee truck driver who lost his driver’s license for driving while intoxicated?’’ Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 301 Conn. 911, 19 A.3d 180 (2011). 3 The plaintiff’s employee, Gerald T. Aleksiewicz, also was named as a defendant but has not participated in this appeal. We therefore refer to the administrator alone as the defendant. 4 General Statutes § 14-44a (a) provides: ‘‘No person may drive a commer- cial motor vehicle on the highways of this state unless the person holds a commercial driver’s license issued by this state or another state, with applica- ble endorsements valid for the vehicle he is driving.’’ 5 General Statutes § 14-44k (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In addition to any other penalties provided by law . . . a person is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year if the commissioner finds that such person has refused to submit to a test to determine such person’s blood alcohol concentration while operating any motor vehicle, or has failed such a test when given, pursuant to the provisions of section 14- 227b . . . For the purpose of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have failed such a test if . . . when driving any other motor vehicle [than a commercial motor vehicle], the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person was eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.’’ Although several changes not relevant to this appeal were made to § 14- 44k since the time of the employee’s offense in 2007; see, e.g., Public Acts 2010, No. 10-110, § 3; subsection (c) has remained unchanged, and for pur- poses of clarity and convenience, we refer to the current revision of the statute. 6 There was no evidence presented in the administrative proceedings that the plaintiff even had a drug or alcohol testing program; Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 127 Conn. App. 743 n.5; let alone that the employee had failed a test administered as part of such a program. 7 The Appellate Court’s rationale for rejecting the plaintiff’s claim is not entirely clear. The court purported to avoid construing § 31-236 (a) (14) by observing that the plaintiff, as an evidentiary matter, had failed ‘‘to prove the existence of a state program . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 127 Conn. App. 746.