Utz v. Utz

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Utz v. Utz LORRAINE A. UTZ v. PETER D. UTZ, SR. (AC 47777) Alvord, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js.* Syllabus The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had been dissolved in 2007, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying several of her postjudg- ment motions, including motions for contempt. The defendant failed to pay certain amounts required by the terms of the dissolution judgment, and, in 2017 and 2019, the parties entered into agreements with respect to certain arrearages and amounts owed, which became orders of the court. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied her motion for contempt regarding a home equity line of credit. Held: The trial court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt for his failure to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close a home equity line of credit, as the court properly deter- mined that the 2017 and 2019 agreements were ambiguous in that respect, which precluded a finding of contempt. The trial court’s finding that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the children pursuant to their 2017 and 2019 agree- ments was clearly erroneous, as the reference to “property settlement” in the 2017 and 2019 agreements was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount owed and the agreements therefore did not address the defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, and this court was left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed. The trial court did not improperly deny the plaintiff’s motion for contempt on the basis that the defendant’s incomplete financial affidavit could not have supported any credibility finding in his favor, as the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should have been found not credible was inadequately briefed, and the court had before it the defendant’s testimony with respect to the assets that the plaintiff claimed were omitted from his financial affidavit, and it was for the trial court to accept or reject that testimony. The trial court properly determined that no interest was awarded on the amounts to be repaid by the defendant to the children’s Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts, as the court declined to read into a previous memoran- dum of decision an order of interest that was not plainly stated. Argued February 4—officially released September 15, 2026 Procedural History Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New London at Norwich, where the defendant * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Utz v. Utz filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Swienton, J.; judgment dissolving the mar- riage and granting certain other relief; subsequently, the court, Diana, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for con- tempt and issued certain financial orders; thereafter, the court, Connors, J., approved an agreement of the parties as an order of the court; subsequently, the court, Hadden, J., approved an agreement of the parties as an order of the court; thereafter, the court, Spallone, J., rendered judg- ment denying the plaintiff’s motions for contempt; sub- sequently, the court, Spallone, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Lorraine A. Utz, self-represented, the appellant (plain- tiff). Brandon H. Marley, with whom was Drzislav Coric, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion ALVORD, J. In this postdissolution matter, the self- represented plaintiff, Lorraine A. Utz, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying several postjudg- ment motions she filed against the defendant, Peter D. Utz, Sr. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, (2) found the defendant credible despite his submission of an incomplete financial affidavit, and (3) determined that no interest had been awarded on the amounts that the defendant was ordered to repay to the parties’ children following his withdrawal of money contained within their Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts (UGMA accounts).1 We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.2 1 We have consolidated and reordered the plaintiff’s claims. See foot- notes 2 and 12 of this opinion. 2 The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly denied her motion for reconsideration. Because we reverse the judgment in part with  Utz v. Utz The following facts and procedural history are rele- vant. “The parties were married on August 18, 1990. The court dissolved the parties’ marriage by a memorandum of decision filed on March 29, 2007. At the time of dis- solution, the parties had two minor children. The court found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, and, in addition to a stipulated custody and visitation order, it entered various financial orders. In relevant part, it ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $435 per week in child support, $1 per year in nominal alimony,3 $1000 per week in periodic alimony4 and a lump respect to her motion alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home, we need not address the claim with respect to the motion for reconsideration on that issue. Because we reject the remainder of the plaintiff’s challenges, which formed the basis of her motion for reconsideration, we need not review the appropriateness of the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See Hohorst v. Easton, 237 Conn. App. 665, 699, 353 A.3d 263 (2026) (“[b]ecause we conclude that the court properly granted [the] motion for summary judgment, we need not review the propriety of its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration”). Additionally, we note that the plaintiff’s appeal form identifies only the order denying her motion for reconsideration as the order from which she appeals. However, the plaintiff asserts in her preliminary statement of the issues that one of the issues that she intends to present on appeal is “[w]hether the trial court erred by entering judgment based on a misapprehension of facts.” Moreover, she includes in her principal appellate brief arguments challenging the underlying judgment. Mind- ful of the plaintiff’s self-represented status, we construe the plaintiff’s appeal to be from both the denial of her motion for reconsideration and the underlying judgment. See Prioleau v. Agosta, 232 Conn. App. 94, 95 n.1, 335 A.3d 93 (2025). 3 “The court ordered nominal alimony of $1 per year ‘until such time as the property settlement [entered by the court was] paid in full and the liens and encumbrances on the [marital home], which the defendant is obligated to indemnify on account of [the property settlement, were] paid in full and, or, released, or he exercises his option to purchase the residence and acreage.’ It further stated that the order of $1 per year alimony would be ‘modifiable to the extent necessary to ensure that the defendant satisfies all of his obligations’ under the property settlement, periodic alimony and lump sum alimony orders.” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.1, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009). 4 “The court ordered periodic alimony of $1000 per week ‘until the death of either party, the remarriage of the [plaintiff] or March 31, 2017, whichever shall sooner occur’ with the intent that the order  Utz v. Utz sum alimony payment of $150,000. The defendant also was ordered to pay all counsel fees for the minor children and guardian ad litem, plus make a $50,000 contribu- tion toward the plaintiff’s counsel fees.” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 632–33, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009). With respect to the marital home, the court ordered: “The defendant shall transfer all of his right, title and interest in and to the home and all the acreage located at 735 Fire Street, Oakdale, Connecticut [(marital home)], including its contents, which transfer shall relate back to the plaintiff’s lis pendens dated September 6, 2005. The plaintiff shall be responsible for the payment of the balance of the recorded first mortgage on the property to John and Anna Utz. The defendant shall pay off and close the line of credit on the [marital home] within [ninety] days of this memorandum. “The defendant shall have the option to purchase the property for [$750,000] and shall notify the plaintiff by certified mail within [ninety] days of this memorandum if he intends to exercise the option to buy out. . . . In the event the defendant does not exercise his option to buy the property, he shall make all necessary arrangements to remove the Assignment of Right of Usage, recorded at volume 485, page 755, of the Montville Land Records, and any recordation of the promissory notes (plaintiff’s exh[ibit] 2) so that the plaintiff shall have uninterrupted and exclusive use of the home and property. Said arrange- ments shall include facilitating a possible quiet title action, [with] which the defendant shall fully cooperate and pay all legal fees and costs.” Nine years after the judgment of dissolution, on May 11, 2016, the court, Diana, J., adjudicated a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, which alleged that the ‘shall be nonmodifiable by either party as to term.’ ” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.2, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).  Utz v. Utz defendant had failed to pay the lump sum alimony owed. In that decision, the court determined that the “financial orders of the 2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” The court set a payment order requiring the defendant to pay $50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was fully satisfied. The court further ordered that following the expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony obligation on March 31, 2017, the defendant then would pay $350 weekly toward the lump sum alimony order. In May 2017, the self-represented plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the defen- dant had failed to comply with orders contained in the dis- solution judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed an arrearage balance of $17,591.31 with respect to “child support and alimony,” was “behind on his monthly tax payments in the amount of $3250” as to the total real estate taxes owed in the amount of $18,839.77,5 and was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300” as to the total lump sum alimony award of $150,000. The motion for contempt did not include allegations with respect to the marital home or any related financial obligations. On June 8, 2017, the court, Connors, J., approved an agreement of the parties (June 2017 agreement), mak- ing it an order of the court. The June 2017 agreement provided: “Defendant will pay plaintiff $450 per week until the total amount of unallocated support arrearage of $17,531.31, property tax of $17,376.95, and $146,250 of property settlement are fulfilled according to their divorce decree, totaling $181,158.26. Any changes to these payments of amounts owed will only be altered as mutually agreed on by both parties.” In November 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for con- tempt, in which she referenced the June 2017 agreement and alleged that the defendant was behind on the payment obligations set forth in that agreement. In that motion 5 In the 2016 decision, the court, Diana, J., had ordered the defendant to pay real estate taxes on the marital home in the amount of $18,839.77.  Utz v. Utz for contempt, the plaintiff also noted that the dissolution judgment required the defendant to “pay off a [home equity line of credit] he took out during the divorce.” Relatedly, the plaintiff alleged that “[t]he defendant did not pay off the . . . loan, resulting in a foreclosure sale [which] is now pending appeal, thus resulting in homelessness.”6 The November 2017 motion for contempt was not adjudicated. On October 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion, which was coded in the court file as a motion for modification of child support. She identified as the current unallo- cated support amount $450 weekly, and the order to be modified as expressed in the June 2017 agreement. The plaintiff checked the box asking the court to modify child support and represented in the motion “[w]e have come to an agreement on [Docket] Entry [No.] 366 [the June 2017 agreement].” Immediately following this document in the paper file is a document signed by both parties on October 3, 2019 (October 2019 document). The October 2019 document states that the parties have “mutually agreed to a lump sum settlement payment,” which pay- ment “satisfies the [June 2017 agreement]. . . . In the [June 2017 agreement, the defendant] was to pay [the plaintiff] $181,158.26 in total. To date, the outstanding balance that [the defendant] owes totals $126,508.26.” (Citations omitted.) The October 2019 document states: “The mutually agreed upon payment amount is $66,000. Through executing this agreement, [the defendant] agrees to pay [the plaintiff] $66,000 in three installments each equaling $22,000. The installments shall be tendered on the third of every month for the next three months. The first installment shall be conveyed on October 3, 2019. 6 The plaintiff alleged: “The defendant has the ability to pay and has offered to pay various lump sums of $60,000 and $30,000 in cash as a settlement of these claims.”  Utz v. Utz The second on November 3, 2019. The final installment on December 3, 2019. . . . “This agreement is executed when [the defendant] delivers the first installment payment to [the plaintiff] and both parties sign below. This agreement will be sub- mitted to the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut for the District of Norwich, from which the Dissolution Order originated. . . . “The parties hereby certify that the terms above are true and accurately represent the will of the parties. The [p]arties further certify this agreement settles all debt [the defendant] owes to [the plaintiff], except for any and all monies owed pertaining to the children.” On October 10, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion coded in the court file as a motion for modification of alimony and child support. Therein, she identified as the current alimony amount $450 weekly and checked the boxes ask- ing the court to modify both alimony and child support and represented in the motion, “[w]e have an agreement. Please see attached.” There is no attachment in the court file following the October 10, 2019 motion to modify. On November 7, 2019, the court, Hadden, J., following a brief canvass, approved and made an order of the court an agreement of the parties, finding it “fair and equitable under the circumstances of this matter.” The November 7, 2019 agreement (November 2019 agreement) provided: “The parties agree: On June 8, 2017, the parties agreed that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total amount of $181,158 which included support arrearage, property tax and property settlement. The parties agree that the amount owed is to be reduced to $66,000 to be paid in three installments each equaling $22,000. The defendant has paid the first two installments and the third install- ment shall be paid on December 3, 2019. All other orders will remain in full force and effect.” In 2022, the plaintiff filed several motions. The plaintiff filed a motion to modify alimony, in which she requested, inter alia, that the court modify the alimony  Utz v. Utz orders to require the defendant to make weekly alimony payments in the amount of $650 until the defendant’s obligation with respect to the marital home as ordered in the dissolution judgment was satisfied. The plaintiff filed a motion for modification of child support, in which the plaintiff sought an order requiring the defendant to continue making $1000 payments to the parties’ daugh- ter until satisfaction of the $6460.98 balance owed her for postsecondary educational support. The plaintiff subsequently amended this motion. The plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with orders regarding payment of the children’s postsecondary educational expenses, including allegations that he owed $26,686.54 to the parties’ son. The plaintiff subsequently amended this motion. Finally, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the mari- tal home. The plaintiff sought an order requiring the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the marital home to foreclosure.7 The court, Spallone, J., held a hearing on the motions filed by the plaintiff in 2022 over three dates in March, April and November 2023. Between the first and second hearing dates, the plaintiff retained counsel. Both parties testified, along with the defendant’s brother, and intro- duced documents into evidence. The parties submitted posttrial briefing on December 22, 2023. On April 19, 2024, the court issued its decision on the plaintiff’s 2022 motions. The court first consid- ered the text of the June 2017 agreement and the May 2017 motion for contempt that preceded the agreement. The court next considered the filings in 2019, including the motions for modification and the November 2019 agreement. The court stated that it “listened to the offi- cial court recording of the canvass” that occurred on 7 The plaintiff also filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defen- dant had failed to comply with orders of the court regarding life insur- ance. The plaintiff does not raise any claims on appeal with respect to the court’s denial of this motion.  Utz v. Utz November 7, 2019, and noted that neither party asked a question of the court or expressed any concern regarding the November 2019 agreement. The court next turned to the parties’ arguments. The defendant’s position was that the November 2019 agree- ment was “dispositive of almost all the issues before the court.” The plaintiff’s position was that the November 2019 agreement “only addressed certain issues raised in a motion for contempt and did not include, particularly, a home equity line of credit . . . on the marital residence that she alleges the defendant failed to pay off.” The plaintiff argued that she never had agreed that the defen- dant was no longer obligated to pay off and close the home equity line of credit. The court recited the plaintiff’s framing of the principal issue as “whether the November . . . 2019 agreement precludes the plaintiff from mak- ing a claim that the defendant still owes her the value of the [marital home] which was lost to foreclosure by the bank for nonpayment of the [home equity line of credit] in 2019, and, if yes, how much does the defendant owe the plaintiff and what schedule of payments ought to be entered.” In its analysis, the court concluded that the June 2017 agreement, which was referenced in the November 2019 agreement, was “comprehensive, encompassing the then known financial disputes between the parties.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on all the information before the court, including the content of the motions, the canvass, the content of the agreement, the relevant circumstances gleaned from the record and briefs and the reference to the [October 2019 document], the court concludes that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children through [the June 2017 and November 2019] agreements.” The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claims that the defendant owed money to the parties’ adult chil- dren, which claims the court noted were addressed only in passing in the plaintiff’s posttrial brief. The court stated: “The record reflects that on May 11, 2016 . . .  Utz v. Utz [Judge Diana] found that the defendant owed the par- ties’ daughter . . . $22,581.78 as of February 23, 2016, and their son . . . $24,632.82 as of February 23, 2016. The court went on to order that the obligations be repaid within three years. The defendant points out in his brief that there were exhibits presented during the hearing itemizing payments made to the children since 2011. The exhibits point to $61,018 being paid to [the daughter] and $34,424 being paid to [the son] between 2011 and 2022, including $54,542 to [the daughter] and $30,315 to [the son] since the May 2016 order. The defendant alleges he exceeded his court-ordered obligation to the children. The exhibit pertaining to [the son] is defen- dant’s exhibit C, while the exhibit pertaining to [the daughter] is defendant’s exhibit D. The exhibits consist of spreadsheets supported by contemporaneous documents including copies of receipts, money orders and the like. Significantly, [Judge Diana’s order] from 2016 does not mention interest, and . . . it is not reasonable to infer the interest was ordered. Therefore, the motions pertaining to moneys owed to the children are denied.” The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsidera- tion, and the defendant filed an objection. On June 14, 2024, the court denied the motion for reconsideration with the statement that it had “articulated its factual findings and conclusions of law in its comprehensive memorandum of decision addressing each of the plain- tiff’s motions. Additionally, the plaintiff argues facts outside of the record in her motion for reconsideration that the court cannot consider.” This appeal followed. I We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly denied her motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close the home equity line of credit. The plaintiff contends that the court improperly construed the parties’ agreements, in that the agreements had “misidentified” as property settlement the defendant’s lump sum alimony obligation.  Utz v. Utz For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the parties’ agreements were ambiguous but erroneously resolved the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. In light of the agreements’ ambi- guity, we conclude that the court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt but that the matter requires a remand for a new hearing and determination of whether remedial orders should issue. We begin by setting forth general principles of law and our standard of review. An agreement of the parties that has been incorporated into a judgment “must be regarded as a contract and construed in accordance with the gen- eral principles governing contracts. . . . When construing a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . When only one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside the four corners of the contract. . . . Extrinsic evidence is always admissible, however, to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument. . . . When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact. . . . When the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the contract must be given effect according to its terms, and the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of law. . . . “A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordi- nary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . More- over, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambigu- ous. . . . “In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language  Utz v. Utz of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties. . . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nation- Bailey v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182, 191–92, 112 A.3d 144 (2015). The threshold question of whether contractual language is itself ambiguous is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Simpson v. Simpson, 352 Conn. 81, 95–96, 335 A.3d 472 (2025). We first turn to the threshold question of whether the language of the agreements is ambiguous. Although the court did not expressly state that it had found the agree- ments ambiguous, it is clear from the court’s memoran- dum of decision that it looked outside the four corners of the agreements. Following its examination of “the plain language of the [November 2019] agreement,” the court stated that “[s]ome historical context is help- ful.” It then examined the motions in the file and the October 2019 document. The court then stated that it had determined the parties’ intent “[b]ased on all the information before the court, including the content of the motions, the canvass, the content of the agreement, the relevant circumstances gleaned from the record and briefs and the reference to the [October 2019 document] . . . .” Having considered that range of information, the court concluded “that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in deny- ing the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the home equity line of credit, the court stated that it was denying the motion “based upon the extensive review of the testimony, evidence and record set forth above.”8 See Chang v. Chang, 197 Conn. App. 733, 742 n.3, 232 8 Although the court referenced its review of the testimony, we note that the court did not make any factual findings regarding the testimony of the parties as bearing on its determination of intent.  Utz v. Utz A.3d 1186 (2020) (“[w]itness testimony as to his or her interpretation of language in an order is extrinsic evi- dence, which should only be considered when the order is found not to be clear and unambiguous”). Thus, the trial court necessarily determined that the agreements were ambiguous. We agree with the trial court’s implicit conclusion that the agreements are ambiguous. As the trial court cor- rectly pointed out, the agreements use a “broad term”— property settlement—and attached a specific sum to that term. As the trial court found, the agreements “[do] not directly reference” the marital home. Thus, we conclude that the language of the agreements is reasonably sus- ceptible to more than one interpretation, rendering the agreements ambiguous. We next turn to the court’s finding that, through the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements, “the par- ties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children . . . .” “When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact, and the trial court’s interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. . . . “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great defer- ence to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation  Utz v. Utz marks omitted.) Reiner v. Reiner, 214 Conn. App. 63, 76–77, 279 A.3d 788 (2022). In the present case, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed and that the trial court’s finding that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the children is clearly erroneous. For the reasons that fol- low, we conclude that the reference to “property settle- ment” in the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount owed. Therefore, the agreements did not address the defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home. First, we note that, although the court recognized that “the parties’ briefs do not address the calculation of the property settlement amount in the [June] 2017 agree- ment,” a careful review of the record suggests the basis for the sum identified. The amount identified in the June 2017 agreement as “property settlement” is $146,250, which figure is slightly less than the $150,000 lump sum alimony amount ordered by the court in the dissolution judgment. Despite more than nine years having passed since the dissolution judgment, as of May 11, 2016, when adjudicating the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regard- ing the defendant’s failure to pay the lump sum alimony, Judge Diana explained that the “financial orders of the 2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” As noted previously, Judge Diana set a payment order requiring the defendant to pay $50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was fully satisfied. Judge Diana further ordered that, follow- ing the expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony obligation on March 31, 2017, the defendant would pay $350 weekly toward the lump sum alimony order. Were the defendant to be credited with making all payments in accordance with the orders issued on May 11, 2016, a balance of approximately $144,550 would remain on  Utz v. Utz the obligation.9 In the plaintiff’s May 2017 motion for contempt, she alleged that the defendant was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300,” which would mean that the defendant would have owed approximately $145,850. We note that there remains only a $400 difference between the amount owed as lump sum alimony and the $146,250 amount, which reasonably could be accounted for as a $350 and a $50 payment. Unlike the correspondence between the amount owed for lump sum alimony and the amount stated in the June 2017 agreement, the dissolution judgment contains no amounts under the heading of “property settlement” that can be identified as the source of the $146,250 sum. The following orders were contained within the “[p]roperty settlement” section of the dissolution judgment: orders related to the marital home, the defendant shall retain his interest in two businesses, orders related to motor vehicles, each party shall retain their respective bank accounts, the plaintiff shall retain her lot in Florida, the parties shall share equally in the defendant’s shares of Pfizer stock and Putnam Fund (worth a combined total of $25,313), the plaintiff shall retain the proceeds from the sale of a property in Killington, Vermont (proceeds of approximately $25,000), and no claims were made regarding home furnishings and personal property. As to the specific term “property settlement,” we are convinced that the term was inaccurately used in the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements. See 11 S. Willis- ton, Contracts (4th Ed. 1999) § 32:6, p. 432 (“The context and subject matter of a contract may indicate that an ordinary word or phrase has an unusual meaning in a given sentence. The context and subject matter may even show that a word or phrase of otherwise clear meaning has been inaccurately used by the parties. In either case, 9 This sum is calculated by multiplying forty-six weeks by $50, which totals $2300, and multiplying $350 by nine weeks, which totals $3150. Subtracting both total amounts from the $150,000 total owed equals $144,550.  Utz v. Utz the parties’ true intention will control notwithstanding the conventional meaning.”). Our determination in this regard is buttressed by our review of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the resolu- tion of which resulted in the June 2017 agreement. In that motion, she specifies the obligations of the defendant for which she is seeking a finding of contempt. She alleges that he had failed to provide proof of life insurance, had “not paid the child support and alimony consistently and thus owes an arrearage balance of $17,591.31,” was behind on his monthly tax payments, was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300,” and had not made efforts to repay amounts due to the children’s UGMA accounts. Absent from the motion for contempt is any reference to property division. The trial court decision underlying the present appeal down- played the significance of that omission from the motion by stating that “issues could be settled through an agree- ment that are not necessarily raised or referenced in a motion.” Interpreting the June 2017 agreement to refer to a settlement regarding property division, however, would mean that the agreement did not encompass the lump sum alimony obligation. We find it unlikely that the parties would resolve the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, with the largest amount alleged owing therein being the lump sum alimony, by omitting from their agreement that obligation entirely, and instead setting forth an agreement regarding property division, which was not a claim in the motion for contempt.10 We are persuaded that the more reasonable interpretation of the June 2017 agreement is that it addressed the arrearages identified in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and that the label of “property settlement” erroneously was applied to the lump sum alimony obligation. See R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61, 237, 156 A.3d 539 (2017) (“we should avoid construing 10 We note that the plaintiff filed, in November 2017, another motion for contempt. In this motion, the plaintiff expressly alleged that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit, as ordered in the dissolution judgment. The motion was not adjudicated.  Utz v. Utz the contract language in a manner that has no rational explanation, especially when a more reasonable inter- pretation is readily available”), aff’d, 333 Conn. 343, 216 A.3d 629 (2019). Although we cannot identify the specific source of the term “property settlement” as used in the June 2017 agreement, we note that the record reveals prior instances of the defendant seeking to have the lump sum alimony award categorized as a property settlement. In 2014, the court, Adelman, J., rejected the defendant’s contention that the lump sum alimony award consti- tuted a property settlement, which interpretation the defendant argued in support of his efforts to have the spousal support obligation discharged under the Bank- ruptcy Code. Judge Adelman analyzed the judgment and concluded that the dissolution court clearly intended for the lump sum obligation to constitute alimony. The court in this matter placed emphasis on the tim- ing of the November 2019 agreement, explaining that the plaintiff had stated in her July 2022 motion for modification that the defendant had taken advantage of her “dire situation” at the time of the November 2019 agreement when she was being forced to move out of the marital home due to the foreclosure. The court states that this acknowledgment in her motion “indicates that the plaintiff was, indeed, concerned about the loss of the [marital home] on November 7, 2019, but entered into an agreement that does not directly reference it. While she may have regretted that decision three, four, or five years on, that does not provide a basis for the court to revisit it now.” We are not persuaded that the plaintiff’s concern about losing the marital home leads to a conclusion that the parties intended that the November 2019 agreement encompass the defendant’s obligations with respect to the marital home, particularly because the November 2019 agreement settled the obligations contained within the June 2017 agreement, which we previously have  Utz v. Utz interpreted as not addressing the defendant’s obligation with respect to the marital home. Next, we examine the court’s consideration of the October 2019 document in interpreting the intent of the parties with respect to the November 2019 agreement.11 “[W]hen the words used in the contract are uncertain or ambiguous, parol evidence of conversations between the parties or other circumstances antedating the con- tract may be used as an aid in the determination of the intent of the parties which was expressed by the written words.”12