Tschummi v. Fegan

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Tschummi v. Fegan CAROLYN TSCHUMMI v. KIMBERLY FEGAN (AC 47468) Cradle, C. J., and Wilson and Norcott, Js.* Syllabus Pursuant to a provision (§ 46b-553) of the Connecticut Parentage Act (act) (§ 46b-450 et seq.), the provisions of the act only “apply to a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.” The respondent, who had previously been in an intimate relationship with the petitioner, appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating the petitioner as a legal parent of the respondent’s minor child, M, pursuant to the act. She claimed, inter alia, that, because the court had previously dismissed a custody action brought by the petitioner in 2021 on the ground that the petitioner was not a legal parent of M and, thus, lacked standing, the court improperly denied her motion to dismiss the petitioner’s parent- age petition. Held: The trial court erred in denying the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition seeking an adjudication of parentage, as, pursuant to § 46b-553, the court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s prior custody action constituted an adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2022; thus, the petitioner did not have standing to bring the parentage petition and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M. Argued February 17—officially released September 8, 2026 Procedural History Petition for the adjudication of the parentage of a minor child, and for other relief, brought to the Supe- rior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the court, M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the court, Caron, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss; subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Caron, J.; judgment adjudicating the petitioner a parent of the minor child, from which * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Tschummi v. Fegan the respondent appealed to this court. Reversed; judg- ment directed. Mark J. Claflin, for the appellant (respondent). Kevin B. F. Emerson, for the appellee (petitioner). Opinion WILSON, J. The respondent, Kimberly Fegan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Caron, J., adjudi- cating the petitioner, Carolyn Tschummi, a legal parent of a minor child, M, under the Connecticut Parentage Act (act), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq. On appeal, the respondent claims, inter alia, that the trial court, M. Murphy, J., improperly failed to dismiss the petitioner’s parentage petition brought under the act due to lack of standing under General Statutes § 46b-475 on the ground that her parentage as to M had already been adjudicated in a prior custody action (custody action) before the effec- tive date of the act and that her petition was therefore barred by the act’s “transitional provision” set forth in General Statutes § 46b-553.1 The respondent also claims that the court, Caron, J., improperly concluded that the petitioner had standing under General Statutes § 46b-458 by overlooking its provision incorporating the standing requirements of General Statutes §§ 46b-488 (a) and 46b-553. The respondent claims that, because the court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the parentage petition, the parentage adjudication cannot stand. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M and 1 In addition to the respondent’s claim that the court, M. Murphy, J., improperly denied her motion to dismiss because the petitioner lacked standing to bring the petition, the respondent claims that the court, Caron, J., in adjudicating parentage, improperly applied the act retro- actively in violation of Connecticut law; lacked statutory authority to hear the petition; improperly determined the best interest of the child; improperly excluded relevant admissible evidence; and that the court’s decision was against the weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion, and the respondent’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, we need not reach these additional claims.  Tschummi v. Fegan remand the case to the trial court with direction to grant the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for an adjudication of parentage under the act. The following facts and procedural history as set forth in the trial court’s memorandum of decision and the record are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The petitioner and the respondent were in an intimate rela- tionship with one another beginning in September 2011 but were never married. In October 2015, the respondent moved into the petitioner’s home in Somers. During the early years of their relationship, the par- ties discussed the possibility of having children. Being a same-sex couple, the parties decided to pursue in vitro fertilization (IVF). The respondent took on the primary role of choosing the sperm donor and she paid for all the expenses associated with securing the sperm. On the basis of discussions that the parties had, the respondent nar- rowed down the search to donors who most resembled the petitioner in terms of traits including physical appear- ance, intellect, and ethnicity. The respondent showed the petitioner the donor profile that she preferred and asked the petitioner her opinion. The petitioner concurred, and they jointly chose that donor. Following successful IVF treatment, the respondent gave birth to M at Baystate Medical Center in Massachusetts in April 2018, by way of a planned cesarean section. After M was born, the parties remained in a committed intimate relationship until late 2019, when the relation- ship ended. They continued to live together in the peti- tioner’s home, with the petitioner moving into a separate bedroom in the home. This arrangement continued until the respondent moved out of the petitioner’s home in late January 2021. On January 28, 2021, the petitioner returned home from work to find that the respondent had moved out, taking M with her to Massachusetts. The respondent also removed from the family home all of her personal items, clothing and a significant amount of furniture, as well as all of M’s belongings, including M’s clothing, toys, books, and furniture.  Tschummi v. Fegan On February 3, 2021, in accordance with General Stat- utes § 46b-61, the petitioner filed a custody application in Superior Court. As required by § 46b-61 (a), in her application for custody, the petitioner stated that, by the first scheduled date the matter appeared on the docket, she would file “accompanying documents” as defined in § 46b-61 (b). The petitioner also filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, which the court, Macierowski, J., granted on February 3, 2021, ordering that the respondent may not remove M from the state of Connecticut and giving the petitioner shared parenting time consistent with their prior practice. On February 10, 2021, the court, while keeping the ex parte orders then in effect, continued the matter for three weeks so that the petitioner’s counsel could effectuate service on the respondent. On March 3, 2021, the court entered further orders, including that the child be returned to Connecti- cut, that the petitioner have primary residence, and that the parties share parenting time in accordance with their prior practice. The petitioner hired a Massachusetts attorney to have the Connecticut orders enforced in Mas- sachusetts. On March 22, 2021, the petitioner traveled to Plymouth, Massachusetts, where the respondent and M were living with the respondent’s sister, and, with the assistance of marshals, returned the child to Con- necticut. On that same day, the respondent filed her own application for an emergency ex parte order of custody in Connecticut and the court ordered that she could have regular visits with M in Connecticut. The respondent traveled to Connecticut and stayed in a hotel for four nights so she could visit with the child. On March 31, 2021, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s application for custody on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner was not a legal parent of the minor child and had no standing to apply for custody. Pending a hearing and ruling on the motion to dis- miss, on April 1, 2021, the court entered further orders that the parties were to have shared parenting with M  Tschummi v. Fegan in their respective homes. On April 9, 2021, the court entered temporary orders that the petitioner would have at least two consecutive overnights per week with M and encouraged the parties and their attorneys to work out a mutually agreeable schedule until the parties could return to court. M returned to the respondent’s home in Massachusetts on April 9, 2021, and the petitioner had M in her home in Connecticut every other weekend. The petitioner altered her work schedule so she could have access with M in Connecticut, and the parties negotiated certain changes to the access schedule during this time. The petitioner’s access with M continued until Novem- ber 4, 2021, at which time, after evidentiary hearings had been held on the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the court, Macierowski, J., determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custody action because the petitioner “is not a legal par- ent, and therefore, does not have standing to pursue this claim.” Significantly, the court considered whether the petitioner was able to establish that she had the rights of a legal parent as to M under “[the] four recognized statutory or legal pathways to parentage under current Connecticut law . . . .” The court observed that it did not have the equitable authority “to define or determine who is a legal parent . . . .” The court, therefore, confined its analysis to the legally defined methods of establish- ing parentage under existing law, as described by our Supreme Court in Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 689, 12 A.3d 783 (2011). Consequently, the custody case was dismissed. Following the judgment of dismissal, the petitioner did not bring an appeal. Thereafter, on January 6, 2022, the petitioner filed the petition in the present case to adjudicate parentage under the act, which became effective on January 1, 2022. In her petition, the petitioner alleged that, pursuant to § 46b-458 (4), “she is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under the provisions of the Connecticut Parentage Act . . . [t]he [respondent] is the biological parent of the minor child; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent] were  Tschummi v. Fegan never married; [t]here was one minor child born during the parties’ relationship, to wit [M], born [in] April . . . 2018; [t]he petitioner reside[d] in this state at the time of the filing of this petition; [t]he petitioner is a presumed parent of the minor child under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the act in that the petitioner jointly with another parent resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the petitioner’s own child from the time the child was born or adopted and for a period of at least two years thereafter, including any period of temporary absence; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent] entered into assisted reproduction (IVF) together as a couple; [t]he petitioner is an intended parent under [General Statutes §§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the act as the petitioner manifested an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction; [o]nly the petitioner and the [respondent] claim parent- age of the minor child; [i]t is in the best interest of the minor child that the petitioner be adjudicated a parent pursuant to the factors set forth in [§ 46b-475] of the act; [and] [n]either the petitioner, the [respondent] nor the minor child have received any aid from the state of Connecticut.” On February 10, 2022, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner lacked standing. The respondent asserted that the petitioner lacked standing because she was previously adjudged, on November 4, 2021, in the custody action, not to be a legal parent of M, and § 46b-553 expressly provides that the provisions of the act “apply to a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.” General Statutes § 46b-553. The respondent further claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition pur- suant to General Statutes § 46b-115k.2 2 The jurisdictional issue raised by the respondent in the present appeal is based solely on the application of § 46b-553 of the act and not on §  Tschummi v. Fegan On May 3, 2022, the petitioner filed an objection to the motion to dismiss and argued that there was no adjudica- tion of parentage in the previous custody action and that, even if there was an adjudication of parentage, there is no question that the ruling was without prejudice. The court, M. Murphy, J., heard oral argument on the motion on May 6, 2022, and, thereafter, on July 25, 2022, denied the motion to dismiss and sustained the petitioner’s objection to the motion. The court stated in its ruling on the motion: “The court in the custody application case . . . dismissed the application for cus- tody without prejudice. When asked by [the petitioner’s] counsel if the court was making an adjudication about whether the [petitioner] was a parent of [M] in dismiss- ing the custody application, the court responded that it was not deciding about the parentage of [M] . . . . After reviewing the records in [the custody application case], this court finds that no court has made an adjudication regarding the parents of [M].” (Citation omitted.) Prior to proceeding on the merits of the petition, on March 9, 2023, the respondent filed a second motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion. The court, Caron, J., heard oral argument on the motion on May 5, 2023. Although the respondent chal- lenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, she did not reiterate her earlier claim that the petitioner lacked standing under § 46b-553 because of the prior adjudica- tion of parentage.3 The court, Caron, J., in denying the 46b-115k. We therefore limit our analysis of whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s parentage petition to whether § 46b-553 applies thereto. 3 The respondent argued that Connecticut courts lacked subject mat- ter jurisdiction over any matters related to custody or visitation of M because the child had not resided in Connecticut in more than two years and, thus, the court could not make necessary findings related to M’s best interest “to determine custody, visitation, or any other purpose.” The respondent also argued that any ruling rendering the petitioner a legal parent “would grievously and permanently impair [the respon- dent’s] parental liberty rights” because Connecticut lacks any interest, let alone a compelling interest, in entertaining an action that should have been brought in Massachusetts. According to the respondent, the  Tschummi v. Fegan motion to dismiss in an oral ruling on May 5, 2023, prior to the trial on the merits of the parentage petition, did not address that distinct ground, which is the basis of the petitioner’s present claim before this court.4 Nev- ertheless, because a challenge to a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and the record is adequate for us to review the claim, we will consider its merits. See Milford Redevelopment & Hous- ing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593, 602, 325 A.3d 971 (2024) (“claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings, including on appeal”). The petition was tried to the court, Caron, J., on June 21, 26 and 30, July 7, August 28, and December 8 and 15, 2023. In its March 6, 2024 memorandum of decision finding parentage, the court, Caron, J., determined that the petitioner had standing to maintain a proceeding to establish parentage under the act because “the petitioner legislature did not provide enabling legislation permitting the court to exercise jurisdiction to decide the best interest of a child who has permanently resided in another state since January 2021, and the court lacked “[any] other source of authority, common-law, constitutional or otherwise to make such a determination.” The court rejected the respondent’s argument and concluded that its jurisdiction was not based on M’s residency and that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner, a resident of Connecticut, sought to be adjudicated a parent under the act. The court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the facts relevant to a best interest analysis would not be available to it. The court also noted that, under the act, it need not be established “that there be no other court that might be able to establish jurisdiction over the issue. So, we’re not precluded from going ahead and hearing it here even though there’s a possibility that [a] Massachusetts [court] could also establish parentage.” Finally, the court rejected what it labeled the respondent’s “collateral estoppel argument” based upon the judgment in the custody action. The court reasoned that the custody action was brought under a different statute and that the judgment rendered in that action “was decided under the law in effect in Connecticut at the time of the decision.” The court also relied on the fact that Judge Macierowski, in the custody action, made it clear that the petitioner “should be free to be able to adjudicate her claim of parentage under the new [act].” 4 The respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing in the present case, which was denied by Judge Murphy, and from which the respondent appealed and which is presently before this court.  Tschummi v. Fegan is seeking to be adjudicated a parent under the [act] and, as such, has standing under [§] 46b-458 to maintain these proceedings.” The court did not consider the prior par- entage adjudication and the application of § 46b-553 in its determination that the petitioner had standing. The court further determined that it had personal jurisdic- tion over both the petitioner and the respondent. The court concluded, therefore, that it had jurisdiction over the matter to hear and decide the petitioner’s request to be adjudicated the parent of M. After hearing evidence on the merits of the petition, the court adjudicated the petitioner a legal parent of M. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. The standard of review that we apply to a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . In undertaking this review, we are mind- ful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . . “Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter differ- ent situations, depending on the status of the record in the case. . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed. “When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations . . . in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the alle- gations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . .  Tschummi v. Fegan “In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undis- puted facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . . If affida- vits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a . . . motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdic- tion is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the . . . jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counter- affidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). “[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 689–90. “The issue of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to plenary review. . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose  Tschummi v. Fegan standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . . Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) V. V. v. V. V., 218 Conn. App. 157, 167, 291 A.3d 109 (2023). We now turn to the respondent’s claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for parentage and therefore should have granted her motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no standing under the act because her parentage as to M was adjudicated prior to January 1, 2022, and the petition is therefore barred by § 46b-553 of the act. We note that this appeal raises an issue of first impression in that it requires us to determine, for the first time since the enactment of the act, who has standing under the act and, specifically, to interpret its transitional provision, § 46b-553. Before addressing the merits of the respondent’s claims, it is important to outline the historical legal framework governing the establishment of parentage in Connecticut, particularly in light of the context sur- rounding this appeal. Prior to the enactment of the act, the legal landscape for establishing parentage in Con- necticut was shaped by legal precedent and statutory provisions that defined parental rights and responsibili- ties. This historical overview is important to understand the evolution of parentage laws in this state prior to the passage of the act. Prior to the passage of the act, “[our Supreme Court] [had] long recognized that there are three ways by which a person may become a parent: conception, adoption or pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes. . . . The definitional section of chapter 803 of the General  Tschummi v. Fegan Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights and adoption, defines [p]arent as a biological or adoptive parent. . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (5). The same definitional section defines [t]ermination of parental rights as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibili- ties, between the child and the child’s parent or parents . . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (8). Reading these two subdivisions of the same statute together suggests that only persons who are biological or adoptive parents have parental rights with respect to the subject children. “In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-233, now codified at General Statutes § 45a-774. Section 45a-774 provides: Any child or chil- dren born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legiti- mate child of the husband and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D. A.I.D. is defined as artificial insemination with the use of donated sperm or eggs from an identified or anonymous donor. General Statutes § 45a-771a (2). Artificial insemination is specifically defined to include both intrauterine insemination and in vitro fertilization. . . . General Statutes § 45a-771a (1). Accordingly, a child born to a married woman and conceived through artificial insemination by an egg or sperm donor is the child of the wife and husband who requested and consented to the use of A.I.D.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 690–91. “Our [Supreme Court’s] decisions prior to the pas- sage of [the act and the court’s decision in Raftopol] confirm[ed] that these three avenues were the exclu- sive means by which a person could acquire parental status. The question of the meaning of the term parent ha[d] most commonly arisen in the context of dissolution actions, when the parties [had] raised claims relating to custody or support.” Id., 692; see, e.g., Remkiewicz v.  Tschummi v. Fegan Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117, 429 A.2d 833 (1980) (trial court’s judgment denying order of support was affirmed because defendant was not child’s biological father, he had not been adjudicated so in paternity pro- ceeding and had not adopted child); see also Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (reaffirming principle under existing statutory scheme that parent- age could arise only by conception, adoption or by way of artificial insemination statutes). In Raftopol, which supersedes Doe, our Supreme Court established a fourth avenue by which parentage could be established. The court held that Connecticut law permit- ted an intended parent who was neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement.5 Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 698. In Raftopol, the plaintiffs, Anthony Raftopol and Shawn Hargon, who were domestic partners, entered into a written gestational agreement with the defendant, Karma Ramey, in which she agreed to act as a gestational carrier for the plaintiffs. Id., 687. “Pursuant to the ges- tational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her parental rights to any children resulting from the proce- dures, and to sign any forms necessary for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs as the parents of such children. Ramey also had agreed to consent to the adoption of such children by Hargon and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal. 5 We note that, in bringing a petition for parentage under the act, the petitioner did not rely on a gestational agreement. In the custody action, however, the petitioner represented that, among the “accompanying documents” that she would present to the court, was “[a] gestational agreement giving [her] parental rights [with respect to M] . . . .” She failed to do so. We discuss Raftopol because it is an important part of the historical legal framework governing the establishment of parent- age in Connecticut and it provides legal context for the underlying proceedings in the present case. Specifically, the court, in dismissing the custody action, concluded, under Raftopol, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that she had an existing legal relationship with M by failing to provide “a legal document drafted with the intent of creat- ing a legal parentage relationship or the obligations of a legal parent.”  Tschummi v. Fegan “Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought [an] action [against Ramey and the department of public health (department)] seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and requesting that the court order [pursuant to General Statutes § 7-48a]6 the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children. . . . Following a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling declaring that: (1) the gestational agreement [was] valid; (2) Raftopol [was] the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon [was] the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey [was] not the genetic or legal mother of the children. The court therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to § 7-48a.” (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) Id., 687–88. Our Supreme Court in Raftopol affirmed the judg- ment of the trial court and concluded that, (1) because Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon’s parental status with respect to the children and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory 6 General Statutes § 7-48a provides in relevant part: “(b) If the birth is subject to a surrogacy agreement, the Department of Public Health shall create a replacement certificate of birth immediately upon: (1) Receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction issuing an order of parentage pursuant to such surrogacy agreement, if such order is received by the department after the birth of the child, or (2) the filing of an original certificate of birth, if such order is received by the department prior to the birth of the child. The department shall prepare the replacement certificate of birth for the child born of the agreement in accordance with such order. The replacement certificate of birth shall include all information required to be included in a certificate of birth of this state as of the date of the birth, except that the intended parent or parents under the surrogacy agreement shall be named as the parent or parents of the child. When a certified copy of a certificate of birth is requested by an eligible party, as provided in section 7-51, for which a replacement certificate of birth has been created pursuant to this subsection, a copy of the replacement certificate of birth shall be provided. The department shall seal the original certificate of birth in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of section 19a-42. . . .”  Tschummi v. Fegan ruling regarding Hargon’s parental status. Id., 689. The court further concluded that § 7-48a allowed an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement to become a parent without first adopting the children, without respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children. Id., 698. Consistent with that conclusion, the court “conclude[d] that the trial court properly ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate listing Hargon as parent of the children.” Id. The court “emphasize[d] that the [trial] court’s order to the department to place Hargon’s name on the replacement birth certificate follows from its declaratory judgment concluding that Hargon is a parent to the children.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The decision in Raftopol thus established a fourth avenue by which to establish parentage. After Raftopol, but prior to the passage of the act, the law in Connecticut was that parentage could be established in the follow- ing four ways: conception, adoption, pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes, or pursuant to a valid gestational agreement. In January 2022, the Connecticut legislature passed the act, which “clarifies and broadens who can be included in the legal relationship between a child and a parent of the child.” A. Walsh, note, “All in the Family? Adopting the Uniform Parentage Act is One Step Towards Equality in Parentage,” 37 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 273, 274 (2024). The act is an adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act, which was revised by the Uniform Law Commission in 2017, and provides equal access to parentage regard- less of marital status, sexual orientation, or biological relationship. Id. The act “removes gender references to parental roles, thereby creating a more inclusive environ- ment for children born to same-sex couples” and “expands recognition of non-biological parents, specifies criteria for adjudicating parentage, and provides the process for establishing acknowledged parentage.” Id. The act has broadened the ways in which to estab- lish parentage beyond the four ways established by  Tschummi v. Fegan Connecticut statutes and articulated in Connecticut decisional law prior to its enactment. See id., 277. “The [a]ct provides ten different ways for establishing a par- ent-child relationship.” Id.7 Notably, “[a] person is pre- sumed to be the parent of a child if they or their spouse gave birth to the child, if the child is born within 300 days of the marriage ending, or if they resided with the child and held them out as their own. Along with this, a parent-child relationship is established if a person is adju- dicated a parent of the child, the person adopts the child, or the person acknowledges parentage of the child, all as provided under the [act]. Such a relationship may also be established in situations utilizing assisted reproduc- tion or surrogacy agreements.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id. In the present case, the petitioner alleged in her peti- tion in relevant part that, pursuant to § 46b-458 (4), “she is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under the provisions of the act; that she is a presumed parent of the minor child, [M] under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the 7 General Statutes § 46b-471 provides: “A parent-child relationship is established between a person and a child if: “(1) The person gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in sections 46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive; “(2) There is a presumption under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488 of the person’s parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding; “(3) There is a presumption under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488, and the person is adjudicated a parent of the child or acknowledges parentage of the child under sections 46b-476 to 46b- 487, inclusive; “(4) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under section 46b-490; “(5) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under sections 46b-495 to 46b-505, inclusive; “(6) The person adopts the child; “(7) The person acknowledges parentage of the child under sections 46b-476 to 46b-487, inclusive, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under section 46b-482 or successfully challenged under section 46b-483; “(8) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections 46b-509 to 46b-517, inclusive; “(9) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections 46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive; or “(10) The court is deemed to have made an adjudication of parentage pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-468.”  Tschummi v. Fegan act in that she jointly with another parent resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the petitioner’s own child from the time the child was born or adopted and for a period of at least two years thereafter, including any period of temporary absence; that she and the respondent entered into assisted reproduction (IVF) together as a couple; that she is an intended parent under [§§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the act as she manifested an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction; and that it is in the best interest of the minor child that she be adjudicated a parent pursuant to the factors set forth in [§ 46b-475] of the act.” As previously noted, in the present action, the court, M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dis- miss the petitioner’s petition for lack of subject mat- ter jurisdiction because it determined that the court in the custody action had not adjudicated parentage and, therefore, the petitioner had standing to maintain the proceedings to establish parentage under the act. The court, Caron, J., in ruling on the respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss in t