Donshik v. Donshik

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Donshik v. Donshik KAREN DONSHIK v. DANIEL DONSHIK (AC 46983) Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her mar- riage to the defendant and finding in his favor as to her claims of conversion and statutory (§ 52-564) theft. The plaintiff, who was a joint holder with the defendant of certain brokerage accounts, claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that the torts of conversion and statutory theft did not apply to moneys misappropriated by joint account holders. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded the plaintiff’s expert witness from testifying about the value of the defendant’s business enterprise, as the expert was not disclosed until the middle of trial even though the case had been pending for more than three years, the defendant’s prior responses to the plaintiff’s discovery requests were sufficient for an expert to offer an opinion on the value of the business, and the court’s pre- clusion order was a proportionate sanction for the plaintiff’s noncompliance with prior disclosure requirements and a reasonable exercise of the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. This court declined to review the plaintiff’s unpreserved, conclusory claim that the trial court’s limitation of her counsel’s direct examination of the defendant at trial constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s right to procedural due process, as the claim was inadequately briefed. The plaintiff’s contention that the trial court applied an improper legal standard in awarding her only nominal damages on her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress was unavailing, as the court effectively compensated the plaintiff through its financial orders when dissolving the marriage, virtually all of the evidence to support the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim had been presented in the dissolution portion of the trial and was relevant to the factors the court was required to consider in making its financial orders, and the court recognized that an award of damages on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would violate the common-law rule precluding double recovery. The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims of conversion and theft in violation of § 52-564 relative to the parties’ jointly held brokerage accounts, as the court made no factual findings regarding the accounts but, instead, improperly relied on the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 36a-290) governing joint bank and credit union accounts in determining, as a matter of law, that the defendant could not be held liable for the conversion of funds in the brokerage accounts; accordingly, the judg- ment was reversed as to those claims and the case was remanded for further proceedings on those counts of the plaintiff’s complaint.  Donshik v. Donshik This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court sum- marily denied her motion to stay the trial proceedings without first balancing the interests of the parties, nonparties, the public and the court, as the plain- tiff’s failure to seek an articulation of the trial court’s reasoning rendered the record inadequate for review, and, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, it was presumed that the court applied the correct legal standard in declining to stay the proceedings. Argued September 18, 2025—officially released September 29, 2026 Procedural History Action for, inter alia, the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Klau, J.; thereafter, the court granted in part the defendant’s motion to preclude certain evidence; judgment in part for the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Igor G. Kuperman, for the appellant (plaintiff). Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom was Kathleen E. Scelfo, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion SUAREZ, J. In this dissolution action, the plaintiff, Karen Donshik, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant, Daniel Donshik, and rendering judgment in favor of the defen- dant on certain civil tort counts raised in her amended complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) precluded her expert witness from testi- fying at trial, (2) limited her direct examination of the defendant, (3) awarded only nominal damages on her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) rendered judgment for the defendant on her claims of conversion and statutory theft, and (5) denied her motion to stay the proceedings. We conclude that the trial court erred only with respect to the plaintiff’s counts alleging conversion and statutory theft concerning certain of the parties’ joint accounts and, accordingly, reverse in part  Donshik v. Donshik the judgment of the court and remand the case for further proceedings on those counts consistent with this opinion. The following facts, which were either found by the trial court or are otherwise undisputed, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On March 24, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the present action, seeking, inter alia, a dissolution of marriage, child support, alimony and an equitable division of assets. On March 22, 2021, the plaintiff, in a self-represented capacity, filed a separate civil action against the defen- dant in the Superior Court. See Donshik v. Donshik, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (civil action). In a three count com- plaint sounding in conversion, civil theft, and forgery, she alleged that “the defendant had stolen the plaintiff’s share of jointly owned marital assets and had forged the plaintiff’s name to various documents, including credit card applications.” On June 17, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil action in which he alleged that “the same underlying rights involving the same par- ties are at issue in a dissolution action currently pending in Connecticut Superior Court . . . . Accordingly, [the civil action] should be dismissed pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine.” A trial in the present dissolution action commenced before the court, Klau, J., on February 1, 2022. On March 16, 2022, the court, Rosen, J., issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the civil action. In its memorandum of decision, the court in the civil action concluded that the dissolution action and the civil action were “virtu- ally alike” and that trying the civil claims separately from the dissolution claims would result in unnecessary, duplicative litigation. Specifically, the court stated that all “counts of the [civil] action require adjudication of the same underlying rights at issue in the dissolution action, namely, the parties’ property rights.” The plain- tiff timely appealed to this court from the judgment rendered in the civil action.  Donshik v. Donshik While the dissolution trial was pending, the court, Klau, J., “invited the plaintiff to file an amended com- plaint in family court asserting the marital dissolution and civil tort claims. The court’s invitation required the plaintiff to agree to withdraw her appeal and both parties to waive their right to a jury trial on the plaintiff’s civil claims. The parties accepted the court’s invitation and its terms.” (Footnote omitted.) Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her appeal from the judgment rendered in the civil action, and the parties entered into a stipulation in the present case in which the plaintiff agreed to waive her right to a jury trial on her tort claims, and both par- ties agreed to try the issues presented in the dissolution action and the civil action simultaneously.1 The court accepted the stipulation. On October 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, the operative complaint, seeking a dissolution of the parties’ marriage and asserting several civil tort claims, including conversion, statutory theft, forgery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, identity theft, common-law fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent convey- ance pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, General Statutes § 52-552a et seq., and fraud.2 In the second count of her operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had converted assets belonging to her in whole or in part. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant were 1 The parties also agreed that the claims alleged in the civil action were subject to the same claims and defenses in the dissolution action that would have applied in the civil action such as any applicable statutes of limitations and laches defenses. Additionally, the parties agreed that trying the issues presented in the two actions after the trial in the dissolution action had begun would not give rise to any grounds for a mistrial. 2 After dissolving the parties’ marriage and entering orders of custody, child support, alimony and division of assets, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the negligent infliction of emotional dis- tress and forgery counts. The court, however, awarded nominal damages on both counts. The court rendered judgment for the defendant on the remaining counts.  Donshik v. Donshik co-owners of at least two Schwab brokerage accounts, the defendant wrongfully liquidated the investments in the accounts without her knowledge, authorization or permission by forging her signature, and that the defendant had concealed “excessive cash withdrawals from the jointly held accounts into bank accounts exclu- sively controlled by the defendant, including at least $135,000 wired into the bank account of Rollcage Tech- nology, Inc. [(Rollcage)] . . . .” Additionally, the plaintiff alleged in the second count of her operative complaint that the defendant withdrew funds from other jointly held accounts3 that were paid “directly to bank accounts and other financial accounts under the sole control of the defendant.” Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had secretly withdrawn the cash value from a Pacific Life Company whole life insurance policy (insur- ance policy), of which she was the sole beneficiary, with all proceeds paid to bank accounts controlled exclusively by the defendant for his sole personal use. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages. In the third count of the operative complaint, the plaintiff, asserting the same factual allegations that she made in count two, claimed that the defendant, with the intent to deprive her of property or to appropriate the property to himself or a third person, wrongfully took, obtained and withheld such property from her. The plaintiff sought treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-564.4 In the sixth count of the operative complaint, the plain- tiff asserted, inter alia, that, as a result of the defen- dant’s secret dissipation of funds and the accumulation of substantial credit card debt and other debt, she sus- tained severe emotional distress. She further alleged that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress 3 The plaintiff does not specifically identify these other bank accounts by either their account numbers or the names of the applicable institu- tions in the operative complaint. 4 General Statutes § 52-564 provides: “Any person who steals any property of another, or knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay the owner treble his damages.”  Donshik v. Donshik or that he knew, or should have known, that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct. The plaintiff claimed that she sustained actual damages as a result of the defendant’s actions.5 According to the plaintiff, the defendant acted recklessly, thereby entitling her to recover punitive damages. On January 11, 2023, at the beginning of the seventh day of trial, the court bifurcated the marital dissolu- tion count of the amended complaint from the civil tort counts. The court concluded evidence on the dissolution count on January 25, 2023. The court heard evidence on the civil tort counts on May 18 and 19, 2023. All evidence submitted on trial dates before May 18, 2023, was part of the trial record on the tort counts but not on the dis- solution count.6 On September 27, 2023, the trial court issued a memo- randum of decision in which it found that the parties were married on April 20, 1997, and had three issue of the marriage, two of whom had reached the age of major- ity. The court also found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The trial court further found that the plaintiff was approximately fifty years old and a graduate of Amherst College and the University of Connecticut School of Law. She also earned an LLM degree in elder law and estate planning. After passing the bar examination in 1996, she was employed as an adjunct professor “teaching paralegals until December, 1999, several months before the parties’ eldest child was born. From that time until May, 2020, the [plaintiff] was the primary caretaker of the home and the children. She worked ‘a few hours a week’ as a tutor, including for students preparing to take 5 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered from an inabil- ity to sleep, extreme anxiety, crying daily, constant worry, a sense of betrayal, an inability to obtain loans and credit cards in her name, a constant threat of cancellation of health insurance, and additional health issues with their children. 6 The trial was held on eleven nonconsecutive days over the course of fifteen months.  Donshik v. Donshik the [Law School Admission Test]. Her annual earnings from such work were approximately $2500.” The trial court found that, at the time of the dissolution trial, the plaintiff was working as a contract attorney for a law firm in Vernon. “She bills approximately ten hours per week, for which she is paid $50 per hour plus a commission on work that she brings to the firm. She also works an additional ten hours per week on business development. She is not paid for that time. Her financial affidavit (dated October 25, 2022) shows gross weekly income of $484.61 and gross annual income of $20,213 for 2022. Her net weekly income is $410.46.” The court noted that the plaintiff testified that, “for all intents and purposes, she is a new attorney trying to develop a book of business, her current income reflects her earning capacity now, and she hopes that her business develop- ment efforts will result in higher earnings in the future.” The court agreed with the plaintiff’s testimony that she was in essence a new attorney trying to develop her busi- ness; however, it disagreed with her testimony that her current income reflects her earning capacity. Rather, the court found that the plaintiff “is a highly educated individual who is capable of earning at least a minimum wage income now. She has decided to forgo that level of income now in the hope that her business development efforts as an attorney will result in substantially greater income in the coming years. Exactly how much more she can earn, however, is difficult for the court to ascertain with reasonable certainty. Neither party presented an earning capacity expert, and the [plaintiff] does not have a significant earning history.” The court concluded that the plaintiff had at least a minimum wage earning capacity. As to the defendant, the trial court found that he was fifty years old and had significant physical and men- tal health conditions. The defendant was being treated for anxiety, alcohol, and substance abuse disorders. He was taking multiple medications. The court further found that the defendant had an undergraduate degree  Donshik v. Donshik in history from Columbia University and a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Connecticut. The court found that the defendant had started his own business, Rollcage, which “provided enterprise support for clients around PeopleSoft soft- ware.” The court further found that Rollcage had filed for bankruptcy protection in 2022 but that, historically, the defendant had drawn an annual salary of $185,000 to $225,000 from Rollcage. The defendant’s income varied significantly since Roll- cage filed for bankruptcy. The trial court found that, despite the defendant’s persistent job-seeking efforts, the defendant was unemployed for many months, and he had been unable to find full-time employment as of the last day of trial. The court further found that, “[i]n late 2022, he obtained temporary employment for ten weeks, at a rate of approximately $3000 weekly (gross).” The court noted that it was “confident that the [defendant] [would] find permanent employment and that he [would] earn between $150,000 to $200,000 annually.” On that basis, the court found that the defendant had an earning capacity of $150,000. With respect to the marriage, the trial court noted that the parties had agreed to a “traditional division of labor” in which the defendant was the primary breadwinner and the plaintiff was the primary caretaker of the children and the home. As to the breakdown of the marriage, the court found that the failure of Rollcage and the steps the defendant took to save the company had devastating financial consequences for the parties and their family. Rollcage had grown from its creation in 2000 into a successful business by 2017. “In late 2017, a salesman . . . Shaun White . . . presented the [defendant] with a proposal to significantly increase Rollcage’s business by expanding its customer base.” The defendant decided to follow White’s proposed business plan. The defendant hired White and additional employees, made large capital expenditures and leased significant additional computer server capacity. White’s plan was not successful. By the  Donshik v. Donshik summer of 2019, Rollcage was experiencing significant financial problems, including its inability to make pay- roll. The defendant was reluctant to fire employees7 so he began to use personal credit cards and other family assets to finance the business. “When Rollcage ceased operations, it still had several customers under contract. The value of those contracts at the time was approximately $600,000.” The trial court noted that the plaintiff repeatedly pointed to those con- tracts as irrefutable evidence that Rollcage was a viable company. Moreover, the court stated that the plaintiff maintained that the defendant had fraudulently trans- ferred those remaining contracts to a new company, and she speculated that he was secretly operating a new company and hiding his income from that company. The court, however, specifically rejected that speculation. The court also credited the defendant’s testimony that Rollcage’s expenses and liabilities far exceeded the value of those remaining contracts and found that, by April 2022, Rollcage was no longer a viable company. Additionally, the trial court noted that “[t]he [plaintiff] contended throughout the trial that she left all financial decisions to the [defendant]” and that the defendant “was less than transparent with [the plaintiff] about family and business finances.” The court, however, found that the plaintiff’s testimony that she did not know anything about the parties’ finances was not credible. Instead, the court found that the plaintiff “often spoke with Rollcage employees, and she was aware of the problems Rollcage was having meeting payroll in 2019.” Specifically, the court found that, “although she may not have appreci- ated the severity of Rollcage’s financial problems and their impact on family finances, she cannot credibly claim complete ignorance.” The trial court further found that, in the midst of Rollcage’s financial problems, the parties had decided 7 In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that Rollcage’s former chief operating officer testified credibly that the plaintiff also opposed laying off two particular employees.  Donshik v. Donshik to purchase a second home in Florida. The parties began to look at possible properties in April 2019 and made an offer of $760,000 on a five bedroom home. The defendant withdrew $200,000 from an IRA to use toward the pur- chase price of the Florida home; however, the parties were unable to secure a mortgage loan to finance the home, so the defendant entered into a “draconian lease”8 instead. In January 2020, after returning to Connecticut from Florida, the parties received a notice of foreclosure on their Connecticut home, and the plaintiff received a tele- phone call from USAA Federal Savings Bank inquiring about certain credit cards that the plaintiff did not know existed. The plaintiff ran a credit report that showed many credit cards with large balances. The plaintiff con- fronted the defendant, and he acknowledged responsibil- ity for the financial situation that existed and vowed to fix it. The defendant left the family home permanently on March 14, 2020. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that the plaintiff placed “100 percent of the blame for the breakdown of the marriage on the [defendant].” The court, however, “[did] not share that view.” Instead, the court found that “the parties had a troubled marriage for many years, well before 2019, when they began to experience serious financial challenges. The [defendant] made what turned out to be a bad business decision when he hired . . . White and pursued a new business strategy that failed. The [defendant] tried to keep Rollcage afloat by borrowing excessively against credit cards and using other family finances. The parties made a bad situation worse by trying to buy a second home in Florida. The [plaintiff] learned the full extent of the parties’ financial situation in January 2020.” Although the court did not find the defendant at fault for making a bad business 8 At trial, the defendant testified that he had commenced an action to recover the $200,000 he paid for the lease on the property but that he lacked the money to pursue the action. The court noted that the status of the action was unclear but, to the extent a viable legal action still existed, the court indicated that it addressed any possible recovery in its property division orders.  Donshik v. Donshik decision, the court did find him responsible for failing to communicate clearly and openly with the plaintiff about the deteriorating financial situation and the steps he was taking to save the business. Likewise, the court found that the plaintiff “shares responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage by, among other things, insisting that the parties buy a second home in Florida when she knew Rollcage was experiencing financial dif- ficulties.” The court concluded that, while both parties bore responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage, “[o]n balance . . . the [defendant] is primarily at fault for the breakdown.” With respect to the parties’ financial situation at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the trial court noted that the parties had “little left by way of marital assets, and much left by way of debt.” The court noted that the plaintiff’s financial affidavit dated October 25, 2022, listed assets totaling $122,134 and liabilities of $165,000. The defendant’s financial affidavit dated January 11, 2023, listed cash assets of $94,558 and total liabilities of $1,165,654. The court noted that, from the plaintiff’s perspective, the most important asset was Rollcage, which she claimed had a value of at least $4.5 million, and she was seeking a payment to her of 50 percent of that value. On the other hand, the court noted that the defendant maintained that Rollcage had no value. The court credited the defendant’s position and found that Rollcage had no value. The court based its valuation of Rollcage on the defendant’s credible testimony, the fact that the plaintiff never disclosed an expert witness with an opinion as to the value of Rollcage to rebut the defendant’s opinion of its value,9 and the plaintiff’s “nonexpert evidence of value, including her personal opinion and the arguments of counsel based on 9 In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that “[i]t is well settled that the owner of property is competent to testify to its value. . . . The weight to be accorded such testimony is for the trier to decide. . . . Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 35, 664 A.2d 719 (1995).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Donshik v. Donshik miscellaneous business records,” which the court found to be “neither persuasive nor credible.” Before issuing its financial orders, the trial court noted that the “[t]he distance between the parties’ proposed financial orders borders on the infinite; their proposals reflect fundamentally different views of the world. The [defendant’s] proposed orders are rooted in a fact based reality in which Rollcage is defunct and he is struggling to find permanent employment. The [plaintiff’s] are rooted in a view of the world in which Rollcage is worth millions of dollars, and the [defendant’s] earning capacity is more than double what he ever earned from Rollcage in two decades.” In issuing its property orders, the trial court noted that it considered all of the statutory factors under General Statutes § 46b-81 (c)10 and gave particular weight to the defendant’s primary responsibility for the extraordinary marital debt. The court also noted that it gave significant weight to each party’s ability to pay the marital debt. It ordered that the defendant be solely responsible for the credit card debt, tax debt and other liabilities listed on his financial affidavit. It further ordered that the plaintiff be solely responsible for the debts listed on her financial affidavit, “provided that the [defendant] shall indemnify the [plaintiff] for any liability imposed by the final judgment of a court concerning the Citibank credit card debt . . . but only if the judgment is based on a finding that the [defendant] fraudulently opened the account in [her] name.” 10 General Statutes § 46b-81 governs the assignment of property in a dissolution action and provides in relevant part: “(c) . . . [T]he court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisi- tion, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”  Donshik v. Donshik With respect to alimony, the trial court likewise con- sidered all of the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82.11 The court stated that the plaintiff was in need of alimony and that, if “the parties had lim- ited debt, the court would be inclined to order that the [defendant] pay alimony (combined with child support) in an amount equal to 35 to 40 percent of the parties’ combined net incomes, based on their earning capacities. However, equity requires an adjustment in consideration of the marital debt. The court shall order the [defendant] to pay $200 in weekly alimony. When the minor child is no longer eligible for child support, the alimony obligation shall increase to $500 per week. These amounts are sub- ject to a motion to modify based on substantial changes in the parties’ financial circumstances, including the discharge in bankruptcy of either party’s personal debts.” After issuing its orders of custody, child support, property division, and alimony in the dissolution claim, the trial court addressed the tort claims. With respect to the conversion count, the court noted that the plaintiff had alleged that she and the defendant were co-owners of the Schwab brokerage account12 (Schwab brokerage accounts), which raised “the question of whether a co- owner of a bank account can ‘steal’ it from the other 11 General Statutes § 46b-82 governs the award of alimony in a dis- solution action and provides in relevant part: “(a) . . . In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolu- tion of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . .” 12 We note that the plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that the defendant converted “at least two large accounts” with Schwab. In addition, the defendant’s January 2022 financial affidavit lists two brokerage accounts with Schwab, in addition to one IRA account with Schwab. Accordingly, it appears that the court’s reference to the Schwab brokerage account as a singular account was a scrivener’s error. For clarity, all references in this opinion to the Schwab brokerage accounts are to the joint brokerage accounts the parties held with Schwab only and not to the defendant’s IRA account, which the court held was solely owned by the defendant.  Donshik v. Donshik owner by making withdrawals without the other co- owner’s knowledge or consent.” The court noted that General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 36a-29013 provides that joint owners of a bank account have an undivided interest in the entire account. The court concluded that, under Connecticut law, “a co-owner of an account cannot be held liable for conversion of the funds in the account.”14 As to the plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the trial court stated that “it [had] 13 General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 36a-290 provides in relevant part: “(a) When a deposit account has been established at any bank, or a share account has been established at any Connecticut credit union or federal credit union, in the names of two or more natural persons and under such terms as to be paid to any one of them, or to the survivor or survivors of them, such account is deemed a joint account, and any part or all of the balance of such account, including any and all subsequent deposits or additions made thereto, may be paid to any of such persons during the lifetime of all of them or to the survivor or any of the survivors of such persons after the death of one or more of them. Any such payment constitutes a valid and sufficient release and discharge of such bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union, or its successor, as to all payments so made. “(b) The establishment of a deposit account or share account which is a joint account under subsection (a) of this section is, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, or other clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, prima facie evidence of the intention of all of the named owners thereof to vest title to such account, including all subsequent deposits and additions made thereto, in such survivor or survivors, in any action or proceeding between any two or more of the depositors, respecting the ownership of such account or its proceeds. . . .” All references in this opinion to § 36a-290 are to the 2019 revision of the statute. 14 With respect to the plaintiff’s remaining allegations in the second count of the operative complaint, the trial court found that the defen- dant had borrowed against the insurance policy for legitimate family and business purposes. The court further found that, “[w]hile the divorce proceedings were pending, and after the [defendant] moved out of the marital home, a bill for the annual policy premium came to the marital home. Unaware of the bill, the [defendant] did not pay the annual premium. Nor did the [plaintiff]. The failure to pay the pre- mium resulted in the policy lapsing. . . . These facts do not support a claim for conversion.” Regarding the plaintiff’s allegations of money taken from the family safe, from the other bank accounts, and from the defendant’s IRA, the court found that the plaintiff was not the owner of the IRA, and, therefore, she did not hold legal title to that account and, furthermore, that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the  Donshik v. Donshik serious concerns about turning distressing conduct dur- ing a marriage into an emotional distress claim. . . . However, nothing in Connecticut state law categorically bars such a claim between married persons.” The court concluded that the plaintiff “has proved the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress by a pre- ponderance of the evidence. The court finds: (1) that the [defendant] should have realized that his efforts to save Rollcage by depleting family assets and running up large credit card debts without the [plaintiff’s] knowledge created an unreasonable risk of causing the [plaintiff] emotional distress; (2) the [plaintiff] did, in fact, suffer, and continues to suffer, severe emotional distress, includ- ing overwhelming anxiety and persistent sleeplessness; (3) and the emotional distress was so severe that it might have resulted in illness.” The court, however, found that “the evidence [the plaintiff] presented to support her negligent infliction claim was also presented during the divorce trial as relevant to the statutory factors in . . . §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, particularly the requirement that the court consider the causes for the dissolution of the marriage. On the basis of this evidence, the court has found [the defendant] primarily at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. The court gave significant weight to this factor in its financial orders. To award [the plaintiff] significant general damages for her negligent infliction claim would penalize [the defendant] twice, and reward [the plaintiff] twice, for the same under- lying conduct.” Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover more than nominal damages with respect to this claim. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly precluded her expert witness from testifying concerning evidence that she alone owned the funds in the family safe and the remaining bank accounts from which the defendant withdrew moneys without her knowledge or consent. The plaintiff does not challenge these findings on appeal.  Donshik v. Donshik the value of Rollcage. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court relied on a “purported ruling . . . that does not appear to exist in the record. This nonexistent ruling formed the foundation of the court’s exercise of its discretion. Consequently, the trial court could not have ‘reasonably concluded as it did’ because it unreason- ably relied on an order or ruling that was not part of the case.” The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s claim is without merit because “(1) she has an inadequate record and/or inadequate briefing to raise this issue; (2) she did not properly preserve this issue in the trial court; [and] (3) the court acted within its discretion to limit the tes- timony of the plaintiff’s expert . . . .” In her reply brief, the plaintiff asserts that the record is adequate for review because the error is evident from the transcript of the proceedings and that “there is no need for this court ‘to guess at possibilities’ or to ‘speculate as to the reason- ing of the trial court or to presume error from a silent record.’ ” We conclude that the plaintiff’s unfounded assertion, which finds no support in the record, has no basis in fact or law. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. The record reflects extensive and contentious discovery disputes during this pro- tracted litigation. On September 1, 2021, the court, Hon. Constance L. Epstein, judge trial referee, appointed a discovery special master pursuant to Practice Book § 25-32B.15 In its order, the court indicated that “[a]ll pending and future discovery issues shall be presented to the special master, who shall have authority to recom- mend resolution of any discovery disputes. The special master’s recommendations may be accepted and adopted as orders of the court without further hearing.” On December 8, 2021, the defendant filed a request for a 15 Practice Book § 25-32B provides: “The judicial authority may appoint a discovery special master to assist in the resolution of discovery dis- putes. When such an appointment is made, the judicial authority shall specify the duties, authority and compensation of the discovery special master and how that compensation shall be allocated between the par- ties.”  Donshik v. Donshik status conference to address outstanding discovery mat- ters that may need court intervention, and a hearing was held on January 12, 2022. After the hearing on January 12, 2022, the court issued a written order in which it noted that, “[a]s of the date of today’s hearing, the par- ties were still in the midst of exchanging documents, some just a short time prior to the commencement of the hearing . . . .” It then ordered that “[t]he effect of any claimed deficit in pretrial disclosure will be left to the trial judge, if any, when such deficit is claimed during the course of trial.” On February 1, 2022, the first day of trial, the plain- tiff’s counsel, Timothy J. McGuire, filed