Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ******************************************************  DAVID KERVICK, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF RUTH FARRELL) v. SILVER HILL HOSPITAL ET AL. (SC 18805) (SC 18806) Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh and Sheldon, Js. Argued December 3, 2012—officially released August 13, 2013 Robert C. E. Laney, with whom, on the brief, was Lauren E. Abbate, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 18805 (named defendant). David J. Robertson, with whom, on the brief, were Madonna A. Sacco and Rachel E. Katz, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 18806 (defendant Ellyn Shander). Sandra J. Akoury, for the appellee in both cases (plaintiff).  Opinion EVELEIGH, J. The primary issue in this certified appeal is whether, in a civil case, the trial court was required to grant a party’s request to poll the jury to determine if the jurors had read or otherwise been exposed to a newspaper article concerning the subject matter of the case that was published prior to trial. The defendants, Silver Hill Hospital (hospital) and Ellyn Shander, appeal, following our grant of their petitions for certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court that was rendered in their favor after a jury trial. On appeal,2 the defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in declining the request by the plaintiff, David Kervick, the executor of the estate of Ruth Farrell (decedent),3 to poll the jury in order to determine whether any of the jurors had read an article concerning the subject matter of the case that was published in The New York Times (article) prior to trial. In response, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to poll the jury. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts and procedural history. ‘‘On January 21, 2002, the decedent admitted herself to the hospital for treatment for numerous illnesses, including major depression and personality disorder. At the time of her admission, the decedent was diagnosed with extremely high suicide ideation and had previously attempted sui- cide by hanging herself over the bathroom door of her hospital room. As such, the admitting [physician] ordered that the decedent’s bathroom door remain locked. Nonetheless, the day after the decedent’s admis- sion, Shander, the decedent’s treating psychiatrist, ordered that the bathroom door be unlocked and reduced supervision of the decedent from full time to fifteen minute intervals. On January 28, 2002, the dece- dent committed suicide by hanging herself over the unlocked bathroom door in the same hospital room in which she had previously attempted to do so. ‘‘On February 6, 2004, [the plaintiff] filed this medical malpractice action, claiming that the defendants had failed to meet the standard of care owed to the decedent as a patient of the hospital and that this failure resulted in the decedent’s death. In June, 2004, the defendants filed apportionment complaints against Kervick, alleg- ing that his negligence, ‘abuse and hostile behavior’ toward the decedent were the proximate causes of her suicide. Subsequently, Kervick moved to preclude the defendants from presenting expert testimony as to the possible causal connection between his alleged behav- ior and the decedent’s suicide. On November 14, 2007, the court granted Kervick’s motion to preclude, finding that the defendants had failed to disclose their proffered experts in a timely manner. Then, on November 19, 2007, [the plaintiff] moved for summary judgment on the apportionment complaints arguing that, without expert testimony as to the possible causal link between [Ker- vick’s] alleged behavior and the decedent’s suicide, the defendants would be unable to prevail in their appor- tionment claims against him. Thereafter, the court denied [the plaintiff’s] motion for summary judgment as untimely without considering further the merits thereof.’’ (Footnotes altered.) Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, 128 Conn. App. 341, 343–45, 18 A.3d 622 (2011). Evidence was scheduled to begin in the present case on November 27, 2007. On November 14, 2007, counsel for the plaintiff notified the trial court that his associate had received a telephone call from The New York Times, notifying her that an article regarding the case was going to be published shortly and, most likely, prior to trial. After bringing the imminent publication of the article to the court’s attention, the following colloquy ensued: ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: . . . We are all concerned I think because the jury, unless it was instructed in the opening remarks by whomever greeted them down there on the first day when they show up about not reading things— ‘‘[The Hospital’s Counsel]: She did. . . . [F]irst of all, we voir dired everyone. And it is part of [the court clerk’s] introduction not to expose yourself—remem- ber—to any media. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yeah. I just bring it to the court’s attention. I don’t know what we can do about it but it is out there. ‘‘The Court: Well, let’s see. We could think about citing The New York Times and putting a gag order on them. Now that might violate the constitution. I’m not sure what we really can or should do. If counsel agreed that there ought to be some communication made to the jurors then I would be happy to consider that. If it is coming out this weekend, then since today is Wednesday, that means we’ve got time. *** ‘‘The Court: . . . If counsel feel[s] that something ought to be done vis-á-vis the jurors, even to the point of calling them in for some sort of an instruction, but sometimes I wonder whether that is more harmful than it is worth. Please do not read your New York Times and go looking for articles about this upcom- ing case. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Go out and buy it. ‘‘The Court: You know. It is almost an invitation to— or a temptation to ignore the court’s order. So I think everyone has got the same stake in this. Since nobody knows what the article is going to say, it could be helpful, it could be harmful to anybody. In any event they will be told not to do it and to ignore it when I give my opening statement. But if there is a sense that that is too late I will be happy to consider some sort of a prophylactic measure in advance if counsel can agree upon what that is or can make an appropriate application to the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) On November 23, 2007, the Friday immediately fol- lowing Thanksgiving, the article appeared in The New York Times. A. Cowan, ‘‘Lawsuit Over a Suicide At a Hospital For the Elite,’’ N.Y. Times, November 23, 2007, p. B1. The article was extensive, and contained facts concerning the decedent’s suicide and the upcoming trial.4 Id., pp. B1, B5. At the time the article was pub- lished, the jury had been impaneled, but evidence had not yet begun. Despite the trial court’s offer to deliver a more specific instruction regarding the article or to take some other type of remedial action prior to trial, the plaintiff’s counsel never requested that the court do so before trial. On November 27, 2007, on the date that evidence was scheduled to begin, counsel for the plaintiff requested that the trial court poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read the article and, if so, whether they had been unduly influenced thereby. The following colloquy ensued: ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I would appreciate it if you would ask the jury when they come in if they read the article in The New York Times. ‘‘The Court: Well, why would I do that? ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: To find if anyone has been influenced by it. ‘‘The Court: I saw the article that appeared in The New York Times on Friday, the Friday after Thanksgiv- ing, which I would expect for a lot of working people who get The [New York] Times at their office or read it on the train or whatever, would have been a day when they maybe failed to pick it up, because while it’s not a holiday, nevertheless, it’s a . . . day when a lot of business activities closed. The stock market was only opened for half a day. I read the article. It seemed to be, it didn’t seem to be pro plaintiff or pro defendant. There were some factual matters in there. Rather than asking the jury and calling their attention to the [arti- cle] . . . wouldn’t it be more prudent simply to instruct them to ignore anything in the press or on the media? ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think that would be pru- dent, but I think I would like to have the court find out if anyone has read it. Because I don’t know how people interpret what they read. I don’t know if it was influen- tial or not. And if it is, we all want a fair trial. So if somebody violated— ‘‘The Court: What is your authority for my interrogat- ing the jury on this one particular reference in the media? ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: They were instructed not to read it. ‘‘The Court: They were. Okay. Well, I expect that if it comes to their attention that somebody has read it, then we’ll be hearing about it. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Well, how are we going to hear about it, unless we ask? ‘‘The Court: I would expect that any jurors might report misconduct. That’s usually the way we hear about it. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So the court is not going to ask them if they’ve— ‘‘The Court: I’m not inclined to do so, but you’re standing up here as the plaintiff’s attorney and you’re not representing to me that everybody has suggested that this is the proper thing to do. . . . Now, look, if you have an agreement and you came to me and you said: ‘We’ve agreed upon this procedure. This is what we want to do with respect to the article.’ Then I might be willing to listen. But the jurors are here. We’re ready to hear evidence. If you don’t have a plan, we’re not [putting] one together at the last moment. . . . ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Judge, [with] all deference to you, I don’t think we need agreement of counsel on— ‘‘The Court: Well, you haven’t convinced me that in light of the nature of the article, that there’s any need to make an inquiry.’’ (Emphasis added.) The trial court then declined to inquire further into whether the jury had read or otherwise been exposed to the article.5 ‘‘The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the defendants without considering the merits of the defendants’ apportionment complaints. On February 25, 2008, the court denied [the plaintiff’s] motions to set aside and to impeach the verdict, rendering judgment in favor of the defendants on November 5, 2008.’’ Ker- vick v. Silver Hill Hospital, supra, 128 Conn. App. 345. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly declined to poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read the article and the possible influence the article may have had on the jury’s impartiality. The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff and concluded that, in light of the inflamma- tory nature of the article, the trial court abused its discretion in declining the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury. Thus, the Appellate Court remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 351–52. The defendants thereafter filed separate petitions for certification, which we granted. See Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, 301 Conn. 922, 22 A.3d 1279 (2011). I On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read the article. Specifi- cally, the defendants claim that the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of juror misconduct to the trial court. Thus, the defendants contend that the judge had no obligation to conduct any inquiry to determine whether any of the jurors had read the article. In response, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discre- tion in declining to poll the jury because of the inflam- matory nature of the article and the potential prejudice that exposure to the article would have had on the jury. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury, because polling the jury was the only way that the plaintiff could have possibly shown that any of the jurors had read the article. We agree with the defendants. The trial court declined to poll the jury on the day that evidence was scheduled to begin partly because it was concerned that polling the jury had the potential to delay trial. Thus, the trial court’s decision involved an exercise of the court’s discretion in managing a trial. Accordingly, the parties agree that our review of the trial court’s decision to refuse to poll the jury is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. See, State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 674–75, 835 A.2d 895 (2003). ‘‘In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this court must make every rea- sonable presumption in favor of [the correctness] of its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mul- lins, 288 Conn. 345, 372, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). Our review of allegations of jury misconduct has occurred primarily in the context of criminal cases. When reviewing claims of juror misconduct in the con- text of a criminal trial, we have employed the following standard of review. ‘‘[T]he right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impar- tial, indifferent jurors. . . . The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court. . . . To ensure that the jury will decide the case free from exter- nal influences that might interfere with the exercise of deliberate and unbiased judgment [we previously have held, pursuant to our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, that] a trial court is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry, on the record, when- ever it is presented with information tending to indicate the possibility of juror misconduct or partiality. . . . ‘‘Th[e] form and scope [of that preliminary inquiry] may vary from a preliminary inquiry of counsel, at one end of the spectrum, to a full evidentiary hearing at the other end of the spectrum, and, of course, all points in between. Whether a preliminary inquiry of counsel, or some other limited form of proceeding, will lead to further, more extensive, proceedings will depend on what is disclosed during the initial limited proceedings and on the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion with respect thereto. . . . ‘‘Any assessment of the form and scope of the inquiry that a trial court must undertake when it is presented with allegations of jur[or] [bias or] misconduct will necessarily be fact specific. No one factor is determina- tive as to the proper form and scope of a proceeding. It is the trial court that must, in the exercise of its discretion, weigh the relevant factors and determine the proper balance between them. . . . Consequently, the trial court has wide latitude in fashioning the proper response to allegations of juror bias. . . . We [there- fore] have limited our role, on appeal, to a consideration of whether the trial court’s review of alleged jur[or] misconduct can fairly be characterized as an abuse of its discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. 672–73; see also State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 524, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995) (abuse of discretion only occurs in highly unusual cases). Whether a trial judge in a civil case abused his discre- tion by declining to poll the jury prior to trial based on the existence of an article concerning the subject matter of the action is an issue of first impression. We have, however, previously addressed the issue in the context of a criminal case. See State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. 617. In Merriam, the defendant claimed that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated because of the trial court’s failure to poll the jurors regarding their possible exposure to media coverage of the trial. Id., 672. After completion of jury selection, but before the jury had been sworn, the defendant informed the trial court that two newspaper articles regarding the case had been published in two local newspapers. Id., 674. The defendant believed that the articles contained some ‘‘disturbing’’ details and, there- fore, he requested that the trial court poll the jury to determine if they had read anything about the case in a local newspaper and warn the members of the jury not to do so. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The defendant, however, did not request that the court make a specific inquiry as to whether any juror had read either of the two articles. Id. The defendant also did not indicate that he had any reason to believe that any juror had actually seen or read one or both of the two articles. Id. In Merriam, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to poll the jury. Id. In doing so, the trial court noted that the jurors had previously been instructed to avoid media coverage pertaining to the subject matter of the case and that there had been no indication that the jurors had failed to obey that instruction. Id. The court also stated that the two articles identified by the defendant were brief and ‘‘not notorious or anything.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court fur- ther observed that, during the voir dire of prospective jurors, counsel had asked the prospective jurors whether they had had any exposure to the case and that each prospective juror had answered in the negative. Id. Finally, the court expressed its concern that ‘‘bringing these things to light [sometimes] is more harmful than letting [them] be . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 674–75. Thus, the court declined to poll the jury, but indicated that it was open to the possibility of taking further action in the event that the defendant presented specific information in support of his request. Id., 675. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of the crimes charged, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. Id., 621– 22. The defendant thereafter appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to poll the jurors to determine whether they had been exposed to media coverage of the trial. Id., 674. On appeal in Merriam, this court concluded that the defendant did not present facts that indicated the possi- bility of juror misconduct and, thus, the trial court did not have a duty to conduct even a preliminary inquiry. Id., 675. Specifically, we noted that the defendant in that case did not present any evidence that any juror had actually read or discussed either of the two articles, but rather claimed that the ‘‘mere existence of the arti- cles required the court to poll the jury.’’ Id. The court declined to poll the jury based on the mere existence of the articles ‘‘in light of the fact that the [trial] court previously had instructed the jurors, as they each had been selected to serve on the jury in the defendant’s case, to avoid exposure to any media accounts of the case.’’ Id. Accordingly, because there was no indication that the jurors failed to follow the trial court’s instruc- tion to avoid media coverage, this court presumed that the instruction was, in fact, followed. Id. Thus, we con- cluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to poll the jury or otherwise take further action regarding the matter. Id. We have also considered other civil actions that pre- sented clear evidence of clear juror misconduct. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 101–106, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008) (jurors considered exhibit marked for identification only); Brodie v. Con- necticut Co., 87 Conn. 363, 367, 87 A. 798 (1913) (jurors viewed scene of the accident); Williams v. Salamone, 192 Conn. 116, 120, 470 A.2d 694 (1984) (when jurors improperly discussed case contrary to court’s instruc- tions we stated that ‘‘the burden is on the moving party in a civil proceeding to establish that juror misconduct denied him a fair trial’’). We have, however, never had the occasion, in the context of a civil action, to rule on the propriety of a court exercising its discretion and refusing to poll a jury in the absence of an indication of juror misconduct. The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Merriam. In both cases, the trial judge was presented with a request from counsel to poll the jury, prior to trial, based on the mere existence of an article concerning the subject matter of the action. See State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. 674–75. We recognize, however, that Merriam involved a criminal case and that this court has never decided whether the rule requiring a trial judge to conduct an inquiry on the record when pre- sented with allegations of juror misconduct in a criminal case must extend to the context of a civil action as well. See State v. Brown, supra, 235 Conn. 526 n.27. We similarly decline to decide that issue today. More- over, even if this court was to assume that the rule applied in criminal cases would extend to a civil action, the trial judge in the present case would not have been required to conduct an inquiry on the record because, as in Merriam, the trial judge was not presented with an allegation of juror misconduct. Rather, as in Mer- riam, the issue in the present case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to poll the jury based on the mere existence of an article. See State v. Merriam, supra, 675. Accordingly, we find this court’s analysis in Merriam instructive in the present case. The defendants claim that our analysis of the present case should follow this court’s analysis in Merriam. Specifically, the defendants claim that, unlike in a crimi- nal case, voir dire in civil cases is traditionally con- ducted off of the record and without the continuous presence of a judge. The defendants therefore claim that, because the present case is a civil case, the judge was not required to be present during voir dire and, thus, the instruction to avoid media coverage given by the court clerk was adequate. The defendants further claim that the plaintiff conceded at trial that the jurors were instructed to avoid media coverage and, therefore, the fact that voir dire was conducted off of the record is not detrimental to their claim. Thus, the defendants contend that, because there is no evidence that the jury disregarded the court’s instruction to avoid media coverage, we should conclude, as this court did in Mer- riam, that the trial judge was not required to poll the jury. In response, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court properly concluded that, in the present case, ‘‘none of the safeguards of jury impartiality identified in Merriam are present’’; Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, supra, 128 Conn. App. 350; and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to poll the jury. The plaintiff claims that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those in Merriam because, in the present case, there is no evidence in the record that the prospective jurors were instructed to avoid media coverage during voir dire. Furthermore, the plaintiff claims that if the jurors were, in fact, instructed to avoid media coverage that instruction would have been given by a court clerk and not by a judge. The plaintiff there- fore contends that an instruction given by a court staff member does not rise to the level of an instruction given by a judge and is thus inadequate. We agree with the defendants. Although we have concluded that a judge is required to be continuously present on the bench during voir dire in a criminal case; see State v. Patterson, 230 Conn. 385, 397, 645 A.2d 535 (1994); it has long been the practice in this state for a judge to be absent during voir dire in a civil case unless he is called by the parties to rule on a challenge for cause or a disagreement about the propriety of questions being posed to the potential jurors. Voir dire in civil cases is also traditionally con- ducted off of the record. The principal reason for these practices is to advance the interest of judicial economy. Furthermore, money is saved by conducting voir dire without a court reporter present. Thus, this long-stand- ing practice, whereby the judge is absent and voir dire is conducted off of the record, allows for the ‘‘efficient use of scarce judicial resources . . . .’’6 Id., 399. In light of the fact that a judge is typically absent during voir dire in a civil case, we disagree with the plaintiff’s assertion that an instruction given by a court clerk during voir dire in a civil case is always inadequate to convey the import of an instruction to the jurors. If a judge was required to deliver every instruction during voir dire in a civil case he would be required to spend much more time in the courtroom and far less time on other judicial matters. Moreover, if counsel believes that an instruction given by a court clerk is inadequate, he or she can request that the judge enter and give the instruction, just as counsel typically calls the judge in to rule on certain challenges and objections that occur during voir dire. Counsel can also object on the record if he or she believes that a court clerk’s instructions are insufficient and, thus, preserve their claim for appeal. See Bernier v. National Fence Co., 176 Conn. 622, 627–28, 410 A.2d 1007 (1979) (if party believes that court’s cautionary instructions given to jury regarding exposure to media coverage are inadequate, party must object at time instructions are given, and cannot reserve possible objections until after adverse verdict is ren- dered). We see no reason why such an instruction should be considered insufficient where a court clerk delivers an instruction to the jurors during voir dire and counsel does not object to the manner in which the instruction is given. As a result, we decline to con- clude that instructions given by a court clerk during voir dire in a civil case are per se inadequate. In the present case, the plaintiff did not claim, either prior to or during trial, that the jurors were never instructed to avoid media coverage or that the instruc- tions the jurors did receive were inadequate because they were not delivered by a judge. Rather, the record shows that there was an understanding between the court and counsel that the jurors had been adequately instructed by the court clerk to avoid media coverage of the case. On the day that the plaintiff’s counsel initially notified the trial court about the article, counsel did not state that his concern about the article would only be alleviated if the jurors received an instruction to avoid media coverage from a judge, but rather stated that he was concerned about the potential influence that the article could have on the jurors unless the jurors had received an instruction not to do so by ‘‘whomever greeted them’’ during voir dire. In response, counsel for the hospital stated that the prospective jurors were, in fact, instructed during voir dire by the court clerk not to expose themselves to any media coverage of the case. Counsel for the plaintiff did not object to this statement and, instead, appeared to agree that the court clerk gave the instruction. Additionally, after being notified that the article was likely to be published before trial, the trial judge offered to give a more specific instruction to the jurors regard- ing the article in advance of trial if the parties agreed upon what should be said or, in the alternative, if any party made an appropriate application to the court.7 Despite the trial judge’s willingness to ‘‘consider some sort of a prophylactic measure in advance [of trial],’’ the plaintiff’s counsel never requested that the trial judge take any action regarding the article prior to trial. Thus, at no point before trial did the plaintiff’s counsel express any concern regarding the instructions given to the prospective jurors during voir dire. Furthermore, when counsel for the plaintiff requested that the court poll the jury immediately prior to the start of trial, counsel never expressed any con- cern that it was the court clerk, rather than the judge, who had given the instruction to avoid media coverage during voir dire, nor did counsel express a concern as to whether such an instruction had, in fact, been given. To the contrary, the plaintiff’s counsel represented to the court that the jurors had been instructed during voir dire to avoid media coverage of the subject matter of the case. For example, when asked by the court why it should poll the jury to determine if any of the jurors had read the article, the plaintiff’s counsel responded, ‘‘they were instructed not to read it.’’ The court then responded, ‘‘they were. Okay.’’ Thus, the plaintiff’s counsel did not claim that the jurors had disobeyed the instruction to avoid media coverage or that the instruction was inadequate; rather, counsel’s only con- cern was that, without polling the jury, it would be impossible to know whether the jurors had obeyed the instruction to avoid media coverage. On the basis of these facts, we conclude that all of the parties agreed at trial that the jurors were instructed by the court clerk to avoid media coverage during voir dire. If counsel for the plaintiff was concerned that the jurors had not been instructed to avoid media coverage of the case prior to the article’s publication, or thought that the instruction was inadequate because it was not given by a judge, he surely would have made that claim to the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the instruction given by the court clerk in the present case was adequate to convey to the jury the importance of avoiding media coverage of the trial. Having concluded that the court clerk’s instruction to the prospective jurors to avoid media coverage has not been proven to be inadequate, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to poll the jury. This court concluded in Merriam that the mere existence of an article concerning the subject matter of the case did not require the court to poll the jury in light of the fact that there was no evidence that the jurors had failed to follow the court’s instruction to avoid media coverage of the case. See State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. 675. As we have previously stated herein, the parties in the present case agreed at trial, and represented to the trial judge, that the jurors were instructed during voir dire to avoid media coverage of the case.8 The plaintiff did not present any evidence tending to show or raising a possibility to the trial judge that any of the jurors had read or discussed the article. Thus, because there is not a clear indication to the contrary, we must presume that the jurors followed the instruction to avoid media coverage. See State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 131, 622 A.2d 519 (1993). Fur- thermore, despite the fact that the parties represented that the jurors had been instructed to avoid media cov- erage of the case, the trial judge nevertheless offered to take remedial action regarding the article prior to trial. The plaintiff’s counsel, however, declined to ask the court to do so until the morning on which trial was scheduled to begin. At that point, the trial judge declined the plaintiff’s request because he was concerned that polling the jurors would delay trial.9 Finally, the trial judge reasonably believed that bringing the article to the jury’s attention could have caused the jurors to read the article and, thus, become prejudiced by it when they otherwise would not have.10 Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing factors, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to poll the jury. II Although there is no showing in the present case that any juror was exposed to the article, we consider the issue of potential juror exposure to media coverage of a case extremely important, particularly in light of the twenty-four hour news cycle of today’s world. Accord- ingly, we conclude that the important issue presented in this case warrants the use of this court’s supervisory authority in order to minimize the probability of juror exposure to media coverage of a case. ‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594, 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012). ‘‘Under our supervi- sory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process . . . and on the civil side, as well. Thus, this court has exercised its supervi- sory authority over a wide variety of matters . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 601, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010). ‘‘We ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to enun- ciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marquez, 291 Conn. 122, 166, 967 A.2d 56, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 895, 130 S. Ct. 237, 175 L. Ed. 2d 163 (2009). Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we now direct all trial judges in this state to enforce the following policy when presiding over a jury trial: immediately after each juror is selected, he or she must be instructed by the court, either orally or in a written order from the presiding judge, which the juror must read and sign before leaving the courthouse, that: (1) his or her sworn duty as a juror will be to decide the factual issues of the case for which he or she has been selected based only upon the evidence presented at trial; (2) consistent with that duty, he or she must avoid all publicity about the case and all communications to or from anyone about the case or any issues arising in it; and (3) if he or she is exposed to any such publicity or communications despite his or her best efforts to follow this instruction to avoid it, he or she must immediately inform the court about the exposure in writing, without advising any other jurors about the fact or the nature of the exposure, so that the court can follow up, as necessary, with him or her and/or other jurors, to protect the parties’ right to a fair trial. By giving the threshold instruction set forth in the previous paragraph, either orally or in writing, the trial court can assure itself that an order to avoid publicity and outside communications about the case has been given before any likely exposure to such publicity or communications has occurred. Additionally, ordering jurors to report any exposure to publicity or communi- cations about the case will underscore the ongoing importance of the instruction and substantially increase the probability that instances of inadvertent juror expo- sure to prejudicial information will be brought to the attention of the court.11 III The plaintiff also claims that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed on the following alternative grounds: (1) the trial court abused its discre- tion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike and motion for summary judgment regarding the defen- dants’ apportionment complaints; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate the trial; (3) the trial court abused its discre- tion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in deny- ing the plaintiff’s motion to impeach the verdict; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing coun- sel for Shander to engage in inappropriate conduct which denied the plaintiff a fair trial. We address each of the plaintiff’s claims in turn. A The plaintiff first claims that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plain- tiff’s motion to strike the apportionment complaints and motion for summary judgment on the apportionment complaints as untimely. The plaintiff claims that the motion to strike was timely because it was brought pursuant to Practice Book § 11-3, which does not con- tain a time restriction. The plaintiff further contends that his motion for summary judgment was timely because it was based on court rulings that had occurred only five days prior to the date that the motion was filed. In response, the defendants claim that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motions, and that, even if the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying the motions, any error was harmless. We agree with the defendants. The following facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-572h and 52-102b, the defendants filed apportionment complaints against Kervick. In their respective apportionment com- plaints, the defendants12 claimed that the suicide of the decedent was proximately caused by Kervick’s alleged abusive relationship with t