Taylor v. Frazier

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Taylor v. Frazier ANTOINETTE C. TAYLOR ET AL. v. PHYLLIS A. FRAZIER ET AL. THADDEUS TAYLOR v. EVELINA M. RUSZKOWSKI ET AL. (AC 48557) Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and Clark, Js.* Syllabus The self-represented plaintiffs, A and T, appealed from the trial court’s judgments dismissing their respective appeals from a decision of the Probate Court appointing the defendant F as executor of the estate of the parties’ father. A claimed that the trial court abused its discretion when it rendered a judgment of nonsuit as to her after she failed to appear for trial, and T claimed that the trial court improperly dismissed his probate appeal for lack of aggrievement. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rendering a judgment of nonsuit as to A after she failed to appear for trial, as the record revealed that the court made every effort to accommodate A as a self-represented party and A demonstrated that she was conversant with the Judicial Branch’s electronic filing and docketing system, which provided her with adequate notice as to when the trial was to be held and a means of communicating with the court. The trial court improperly dismissed T’s probate appeal for lack of standing on the basis of its determination that he was not aggrieved by the appoint- ment of F as executor, as the plaintiffs made specific allegations that F had appropriated substantial estate assets for her personal use and that the degree of acrimony among the parties made it impossible for F to communicate effectively and constructively with the other beneficiaries regarding the settlement of the estate, which made the potential injuries to T’s pecuniary interests in the estate on par with other cases in which aggrievement has been held to lie. Argued February 3—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Appeal in each case from the decision of the Probate Court for the district of Hartford appointing the defen- dant Phyllis A. Frazier as executor of the estate of Charles J. Taylor, Sr., brought to the Superior Court in the judi- cial district of Hartford, where the appeals were consoli- dated for trial; thereafter, the court, Rosen, J., granted * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Taylor v. Frazier the motions of the defendant Evelina M. Ruszkowski et al. to dismiss; subsequently, the court, Chavey, J., ren- dered a judgment of nonsuit as to the named plaintiff in the first appeal; thereafter, the appeals were tried to the court, Chavey, J.; judgments dismissing the appeals, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Antoinette C. Taylor, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff). Thaddeus Taylor, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff). Samantha Graves, with whom, on the brief, was Maria C. Barall, for the appellee (defendant Phyllis A. Frazier). Opinion SUAREZ, J. This consolidated appeal of the self-repre- sented plaintiffs, Antoinette C. Taylor (Antoinette) and Thaddeus Taylor (Thaddeus), arises from the December 12, 2023 decree of the Probate Court appointing the defendant Phyllis A. Frazier (Frazier),1 their half-sister, as the executor of the estate of the parties’ father, Charles J. Taylor, Sr. (decedent). Before this court, Antoinette contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it rendered a judgment of nonsuit as to her after she failed to appear for trial. For his part, Thaddeus contends that the Superior Court improperly dismissed his probate appeal for lack of aggrievement. We conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in rendering a judgment of nonsuit as to Antoinette. We further conclude, however, that the court improperly dismissed the appeals for lack of standing with respect to Thaddeus. As a result, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the Superior Court. We begin with the relevant procedural history and facts. The decedent died testate on July 20, 2023. In 1 Also named as defendants were The Prue Law Group, P.C., and an attorney, Evelina M. Ruszkowski. The trial court dismissed all claims against them, which decision is not at issue in this appeal.  Taylor v. Frazier his last will and testament, he directed that the major- ity of his property be divided equally among fourteen heirs: Frazier, the plaintiffs, ten of his other children, including his son Charles Taylor, Jr. (Charles Jr.), and one grandchild. Certain property, including the dece- dent’s interest in a hot dog business, he bequeathed solely to Charles Jr. The decedent designated Frazier as the executor of his estate and he appointed Charles Jr., since deceased, as successor executor in the event that Frazier was unable or unwilling to serve. Before the Probate Court, the plaintiffs filed various challenges to the appointment of Frazier as executor. They alleged, among other things, that she had actual and potential conflicts of interest, that she had improp- erly accessed the decedent’s safe deposit boxes and bank accounts and taken the decedent’s property as her own, that she had improperly collected rents from the dece- dent’s various rental properties before she received a certified fiduciary appointment, that she was improperly using funds of the estate to pay her private attorneys, that she had failed to file the will in a timely manner,2 and that she was unable or unwilling to communicate effectively with the other beneficiaries. Accordingly, they requested that Charles Jr. be appointed executor in place of Frazier.3 The will was admitted without objection, and the Pro- bate Court conducted two hearings off the record on the 2 This is the only allegation that is undisputed. General Statutes § 45a- 283 (a) requires that “[e]very person having knowledge of his designation in a will as an executor of a testator’s estate shall, within thirty days next after the death of the testator, apply for probate of the will . . . .” Frazier filed the will on September 12, 2023, twenty-four days past the thirty day deadline. The Probate Court found that she and the counsel she retained to administer the estate; see footnote 1 of this opinion; had made a good faith effort to comply with the statute and, therefore, declined to impose a fine for the late filing under § 45a-283 (b). 3 Several of the other heirs filed motions in support of the plaintiffs’ request. Notably, one heir, Keith M. Taylor, objected to the appointment of either Frazier or Charles Jr. as executor. He stated that “[w]e are a dysfunctional family and cannot work together” and that appointment  Taylor v. Frazier appointment of an executor.4 Following those hearings, the Probate Court appointed Frazier as executor, con- sistent with the dictates of the will. The court’s stated reasons for this appointment were that (1) “[p]robate courts are under an obligation to appoint the named executor in a last will and testament” unless the designee “has died or refuses to accept or is incapable of accepting such trust”; (2) “[t]here has been no evidence presented that [Frazier] is not an appropriate person to serve as executor aside from allegations and statements with no foundation”; and (3) various civil actions that the plaintiffs filed against Frazier in state and federal court did not create a conflict of interest that would prevent her from serving as executor. The plaintiffs filed appeals from the decree of the Pro- bate Court to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186. In addition to challenging Frazier’s appointment as executor, they alleged that the hearings before the Probate Court had, in various ways, violated their procedural due process rights. They also named as defendants, and alleged various misconduct on the part of, Frazier’s attorneys. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The trial court, sitting as a court of probate, conducted a trial de novo as to the appointment of Frazier as execu- tor. See, e.g., Salce v. Cardello, 348 Conn. 90, 103–104, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023). Frazier testified and denied essen- tially all of the plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing. See footnote 2 of this opinion. After Antoinette failed to appear for the trial, the trial court rendered a judg- ment of nonsuit against her and overruled and denied, respectively, her subsequent objection to and motion for reconsideration of that nonsuit. The court subse- quently determined that Thaddeus lacked standing to challenge the decree of the Probate Court because he was not aggrieved by Frazier’s appointment. Accordingly, the of “any of [his] siblings will only cause more friction, more hatred, more division, and more drama.” 4 The record suggests that those hearings were highly acrimonious. The Probate Court repeatedly muted the microphones of remote participants and called for security to assist in managing in person participants.  Taylor v. Frazier court dismissed both appeals, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I We begin with the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it rendered a judgment of nonsuit as to Antoinette after she failed to appear for trial.5 We find no abuse of discretion.6 The following well established legal principles guide our resolution of this claim. “If a party . . . fails without proper excuse to appear in person or by counsel for trial, the party may be nonsuited . . . by the judicial authority.” Practice Book § 17-19. We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a judgment of nonsuit for failure to appear for a scheduled hearing. See, e.g., Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information Commission, 136 Conn. App. 405, 410, 46 A.3d 937, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 907, 53 A.3d 222 (2012). “[E]rror must be demonstrated by an appellant on the basis of an adequate record. . . . [A]lthough we afford self-represented parties some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, we make every 5 Although she does not expressly characterize her appeal in this man- ner, we understand Antoinette to have properly appealed from the trial court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration of the nonsuit. 6 Frazier argues that Antoinette’s appeal should be dismissed because it was not timely filed within twenty days after the trial court denied her motion for reconsideration of the judgment of nonsuit. Despite Fra- zier’s assertions, however, it is well established that “[t]he twenty day time limit set forth in Practice Book § 63-1 (a) . . . is not jurisdictional, and where the appellee has failed to file a motion to dismiss the appeal within the ten day time limit set forth in Practice Book § 66-8, we have deemed any claim of untimeliness to be waived.” Parlato v. Parlato, 134 Conn. App. 848, 850 n.1, 41 A.3d 327 (2012); see also W. Horton & K. Bartschi, Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut Rules of Appellate Procedure (2025–2026 Ed.) § 63-1, p. 156. The case on which Frazier relies is not to the contrary. See Brochu v. Aesys Technologies, 159 Conn. App. 584, 123 A.3d 1236 (2015). Because Frazier did not file a timely motion to dismiss, we resolve Antoinette’s claim on the merits.  Taylor v. Frazier presumption in favor of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Claude v. Claude, 143 Conn. App. 307, 309, 68 A.3d 1204 (2013). The following additional procedural facts are relevant. During the course of the probate appeal, Antoinette lived in Kentucky. On at least three separate occasions, she sought the trial court’s leave to participate remotely in the proceedings. The court granted each request. On October 28, 2024, two days before a scheduled evidentiary hearing, Antoinette sought a continuance, representing that she had not had adequate time to serve subpoenas. The trial court denied the request but indi- cated that it would “give due consideration to the plain- tiffs’ need to reconvene for another hearing day once all subpoenas have been served.” Later that day, Antoinette filed two additional requests to appear remotely at the October 30 hearing, which the court again granted. The following day, on October 29, 2024, Antoinette filed additional motions, requesting either a continuance of or to be excused from the October 30 hearing.7 This time, she represented that she was “unavailable remotely to participate . . . because of a recent and mandatory job training scheduled on October 30, 2024.” The trial court denied the request on October 30, stating that “[Antoi- nette’s] request to be excused from the probate appeal hearing today is denied. Notice of the hearing was issued on September 24, 2024, and [Antoinette] subsequently appeared at a remote status conference and made mul- tiple requests, which the court granted over [Frazier’s] objection, to appear remotely for today’s hearing. Her eleventh hour request to be excused from today’s hear- ing cites ‘a recent and mandatory job training,’ but this conflict was not mentioned at any time prior to October 29. In fact, as of October 28, [Antoinette] was continuing to file requests for remote participation in today’s hear- ing. As described, [Antoinette’s] work-related scheduling 7 Frazier represents that the October 30 trial date originally had been scheduled at Antoinette’s insistence and over Frazier’s objections.  Taylor v. Frazier conflict is not an exigent circumstance that would war- rant her failure to appear.” Because the parties who did appear were not prepared to proceed with trial on October 30, the court contin- ued the proceedings to December 11, 2024. The court “enter[ed] a nonsuit as to [Antoinette] for her failure to appear, without a proper excuse, for [the] properly noticed probate appeal hearing” and rendered judgment accordingly. Antoinette then filed a series of motions requesting, among other things, that the trial court reconsider, vacate the nonsuit, and reinstate her as a plaintiff. The trial court granted those motions and reinstated Antoinette to the case, accepting her rep- resentation that she had attempted unsuccessfully to notify the court via facsimile of her unavailability for the October 30 proceeding. On December 9, 2024, Antoinette again sought a continuance of the trial from its rescheduled date of December 11. She represented that, as a result of the temporary nonsuit, she had not received proper notice of the hearing and that, for various reasons, she was not prepared to proceed. The trial court, which had indicated on October 30 that it was unlikely to further postpone the trial beyond December 11, denied Antoinette’s requests. Trial commenced as scheduled on December 11, 2024. Antoinette again failed to appear virtually for trial. The court paused the proceedings so that court staff could attempt to call Antoinette’s telephone number of record, but they were unable to reach her. Having found that Antoinette had adequate notice of the proceedings, the court issued a second nonsuit. Antoinette subsequently objected to and sought reconsideration of this second judgment of nonsuit, contending that she had not been provided with the necessary remote video link, which motions the court respectively overruled and denied. In short, the record reveals that the trial court made every effort to accommodate this self-represented plain- tiff. By filing numerous motions, including last minute  Taylor v. Frazier requests for continuances, Antoinette demonstrated that she was conversant with the Judicial Branch’s electronic filing and docketing system. If nothing else, that system provided her with adequate notice as to when the trial was to be held and a means of communicating with the court.8 We understand that navigating the challenges of discovery, trial preparation, and judicial procedure can be an overwhelming process for self-represented litigants. On this record, however, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering a judgment of nonsuit as to Antoinette.9 II We next consider whether the trial court properly dismissed Thaddeus’ appeal for lack of standing on the basis of its determination that he was not aggrieved by the appointment of Frazier as executor. The plaintiffs assert that Thaddeus has a significant interest in the decedent’s estate and that he has been adversely affected by the decree entered on December 12, 2023. We conclude that Thaddeus was aggrieved by Frazier’s appointment. The following legal principles guide our analysis. Pro- bate appeals are creatures of statute; see, e.g., Exchange Buffet Corp. v. Rogers, 139 Conn. 374, 376, 94 A.2d 22 (1952); and the jurisdictional preconditions for filing an appeal are likewise defined by statute. Specifically, § 45a-186 (b) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny per- son aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a Probate 8 The trial court also reasonably could have found on this record that she had notice of the hearing and a means of communicating with the court to resolve any difficulties regarding remote access, by mail, email, and conversations with her coplaintiff. 9 To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that our review is de novo because this case presents the novel legal question of whether a judg- ment of nonsuit can be rendered in a probate appeal, we disagree. That a nonsuit can be issued in a probate appeal is well established. See, e.g., White’s Appeal, 75 Conn. 314, 315–16, 53 A. 582 (1902); Goetz v. Estate of Pufahl, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2025 WL 1639396, *1 (Conn. Super. June 5, 2025). The authorities on which the plaintiffs rely estab- lish that an aggrieved party has the right to commence a proper, timely filed appeal, but they do not support the plaintiffs’ contention that such an appeal, once brought, cannot be terminated for failure to prosecute.  Taylor v. Frazier Court may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court. . . .” Whether Thaddeus was aggrieved for purposes of § 45a- 186 (b) presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor, 354 Conn. 240, 247, 350 A.3d 534 (2026). Although § 45a-186 (b) does not define what it means for a person to be “aggrieved” by a ruling of the Probate Court, we do not write on a blank slate in this regard. It is by now well established that “[t]he concept of aggrieve- ment turns on whether there is a possibility, as distin- guished from a certainty, that the Probate Court’s order or decree has adversely affected some legally protected interest that the appellant has in the subject matter of the decree or order or in the estate.” Adolphson v. Wein- stein, 66 Conn. App. 591, 596, 785 A.2d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 921, 792 A.2d 853 (2002). The traditional view was that an individual was aggrieved by a ruling of the Probate Court if and only if he or she had a pecuniary interest that would be injuri- ously affected thereby. See, e.g., Woodbury, Trustee, Appeal from Probate, 70 Conn. 455, 456, 39 A. 791 (1898). Over time, as the law has evolved, the concept of aggrievement has expanded, as this court discussed in Buchholz’s Appeal from Probate, 9 Conn. App. 413, 519 A.2d 615 (1987): “The jurisdictional requirement of aggrievement serves both practical and functional purposes to assure that only those parties with genuine and legitimate interests are afforded an opportunity to appeal. . . . If an appellant is a mere stranger or interloper to the proceedings with no direct interest in the outcome, the court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. . . . Aggrievement falls within two broad categories, clas- sical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement usually requires that the party claiming aggrievement has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. . . . Because of the types of issues often presented in pro- bate appeals, however, the concept of aggrievement in such cases has evolved into a broader standard than that  Taylor v. Frazier requiring a showing of a direct pecuniary interest. . . . A two-prong analysis is used in probate appeals to deter- mine whether a party is classically aggrieved . . . . That analysis includes a consideration of (1) the nature of the appellant’s interest, and (2) the adverse effect, if any, of the Probate Court’s decision on that interest.” (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 415–16. “Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat which grants an appellant standing by virtue of particular legislation, rather than by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.” Id., 416; see also M. Kenney, “Aggrievement Under 45a-186,” 11 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 37, 38 (1997) (discussing expanded, modern conception of aggrievement in Connecticut). Even under the traditional conception of classical aggrievement, it was clear that an heir is sufficiently aggrieved to bring a probate appeal when there is a colorable claim that the appointment of a particular administrator, executor, or trustee may adversely impact the heir’s nonspeculative interest in the estate.10 See, e.g., Spencer’s Appeal, 122 Conn. 327, 333–34, 188 A. 881 (1937) (where trustee was granted discretion over disposition of estate assets, beneficiary was aggrieved by appointment); cf. Mallory’s Appeal from Probate, 62 Conn. 218, 222, 25 A. 109 (1892) (any residuary legatee has sufficient interest to request appointment of administrator). That rule applies with even greater force under the more expansive, modern conception of aggrievement. See, e.g., M. Kenney, supra, 11 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 45–46 (“[I]t remains a general rule that an heir usually has standing in the normal course of events. . . . In regard to a court of probate’s appointment of an administrator to the estate, the courts have recognized that an heir of the decedent can object and appeal the appointment.” (Footnotes omitted.)); see also Kucej v. Kucej, 34 Conn. App. 579, 582, 642 A.2d 81 (1994) (“an heir of the decedent can object to the appointment of an 10 Compare Maloney v. Taplin, 154 Conn. 247, 224 A.2d 731 (1966), in which our Supreme Court held that the appellant lacked standing because he had only a “mere possibility of future inheritance.” Id., 250.  Taylor v. Frazier administrator or administratrix of the decedent’s intes- tate estate”), overruled on other grounds by Heussner v. Hayes, 289 Conn. 795, 961 A.2d 365 (2008). The trial court in the present case did not address these authorities before concluding that Thaddeus was not aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decree and, there- fore, lacked standing to appeal. Rather, the court relied primarily on its conclusion that (1) “[i]f [Thaddeus’] concerns with [Frazier] were deemed to rise to the level of an adverse effect on his interest in the estate, then every heir or beneficiary could appeal the appointment of a fiduciary on the ground that that fiduciary is not a good choice and will not make appropriate decisions,” and (2) pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-290 (c), the Probate Court did not have any legal discretion to refuse Frazier’s acceptance as the decedent’s executor.11 Those concerns do not constitute sufficient bases for conclud- ing that Thaddeus lacked standing to appeal from the Probate Court’s appointment of Frazier as the decedent’s executor. The plaintiffs have made specific allegations that Fra- zier has taken advantage of what might be characterized as her “favored child” position to appropriate substantial assets from the decedent’s safe deposit boxes and bank accounts for her personal use. They also claim, in effect, that the degree of acrimony among the parties makes it impossible for Frazier to communicate effectively and constructively with her siblings regarding the settlement of the estate, an allegation that is difficult to dispute when one considers the record in this case and the other litigation between the parties. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Those allegations make the potential injuries to Thaddeus’ pecuniary interests in the estate far less hypothetical than in the cases on which the trial court relied12 and place the present matter squarely on par 11 The court’s conclusion that the Probate Court had no legal discre- tion under § 45a-290 (c) to refuse Frazier’s acceptance as the decedent’s executor speaks not to aggrievement, but to the merits of the claim. 12 See, e.g., Bailey v. Rahm, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2023 WL 6993335, *3 (Conn. Super. October 16, 2023); Concannon v. Concannon,  Taylor v. Frazier with cases such as Spencer’s Appeal, supra, 122 Conn. 327, in which aggrievement has been held to lie. See also Dept. of Income Maintenance v. Watts, 211 Conn. 323, 326, 558 A.2d 998 (1989) (“[i]n determining whether a party is aggrieved, the test is whether there is a pos- sibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest that he has in the estate has been adversely affected”); Appeal from Probate of Ben- civenga, 30 Conn. App. 334, 337, 620 A.2d 195 (1993) (“The question of standing does not involve an inquiry into the merits of the case. It merely requires allega- tions of a colorable claim of injury to an interest that is arguably protected . . . .”), aff’d, 228 Conn. 439, 636 A.2d 832 (1994). We thus conclude that Thaddeus was aggrieved by the appointment of Frazier as executor of the decedent’s estate. The judgment with respect to Thaddeus Taylor is reversed and the cases are remanded for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion; the judgment with respect to Antoinette C. Taylor is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2019 WL 1568622, *3 (Conn. Super. March 1, 2019).