DiBella v. Norwalk

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  DiBella v. Norwalk MARY LOU DIBELLA v. CITY OF NORWALK ET AL. (AC 48597) Alvord, Seeley and Pellegrino, Js.* Syllabus The defendants, the city of Norwalk and two of its employees, appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment for the plaintiff’s husband, E, on the defendants’ complaint seeking apportionment of liability and indemnification from E in connection with the plaintiff’s action for damages for injuries she sustained when she was attacked by a dog that she and E had adopted from the city. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in conclud- ing that the defendants’ failure to file a motion for permission to implead E pursuant to statute (§ 52-102a) rendered the entirety of their apportionment and indemnification complaint procedurally improper. Held: The trial court properly held that the indemnification portion of the defen- dants’ apportionment and indemnification complaint was procedurally improper, as the defendants failed to file a motion for permission to implead E pursuant to § 52-102a. This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in failing to find that E waived his right to contest the defendants’ compli- ance with § 52-102a by neglecting to timely file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and by filing an answer, as the defendants did not raise the issue before the trial court, and no exceptional circumstances existed warranting this court’s review of the claim. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for E as to the counts of the apportionment and indemnification complaint that sought to apportion responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages between the defendants and E on the ground that the defendants’ failure to move for permission to implead E pursuant to § 52-102a rendered the entire complaint legally insufficient, as the defendants were not required to seek the court’s permission prior to filing an apportionment complaint and it was undisputed that the defendants timely served their complaint pursuant to statute (§ 52-102b (a)). The trial court properly applied the law of the case doctrine in denying the defendants’ motion to implead E, as the court had previously granted E’s motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ indemnification claim based on the defendants’ failure to file a motion to implead pursuant to § 52-102a, and the defendants were essentially asking the court to reopen what already had been decided in the absence of any new or overriding circumstances. Argued March 10—officially released September 22, 2026 * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  DiBella v. Norwalk Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen- dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defendants filed a complaint for apportion- ment and indemnification against Patrick Edenburn; thereafter, the court, Clark, J., rendered judgment dis- missing the action as to the defendant Thomas Kulhawik; subsequently, the court, Clark, J., rendered summary judgment for Patrick Edenburn on the apportionment and indemnification complaint; thereafter, the court, Clark, J., denied the motions of the named defendant et al. to implead and to reargue, and the named defendant et al. appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. M. Jeffry Spahr, deputy corporation counsel, for the appellants (named defendant et al.). Edward W. Gasser, with whom, on the brief, was Stephanie M. Javarauckas, for the appellee (appor- tionment defendant). Opinion ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, Mary Lou DiBella, brought this action against the defendants, the city of Norwalk (city), Robert Sirico and Alexi Pennoyer, employees of the city, and Thomas Kulhawik, the city’s former chief of police, seeking damages for injuries that she allegedly sustained when she was attacked by a dog that she and her husband, Patrick Edenburn, had adopted from the city.1 The defendants thereafter filed a complaint seek- ing apportionment and indemnification from Edenburn (apportionment/indemnification complaint). The defen- dants now appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Eden- burn with respect to the apportionment/indemnification 1 On February 26, 2024, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against Kulhawik. As he is no longer a party to this action, all references to the defendants in this opinion are to the city, Sirico, and Pennoyer.  DiBella v. Norwalk complaint, denying their motion to reargue the granting of the motion for summary judgment, and denying their motion to implead. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in (1) concluding that the defendants’ failure to file a motion for permission to implead Edenburn pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102a rendered their apportionment/indemnification complaint procedur- ally improper, (2) failing to find that Edenburn waived his right to contest the defendants’ compliance with § 52-102a by neglecting to timely file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and by filing an answer, (3) concluding that the defendants’ failure to move for permission to implead Edenburn pursuant to § 52-102a entitled Edenburn to summary judgment in his favor as to both the indemnification claim and the apportionment claims that had been joined thereto, and (4) denying the defendants’ motion to implead Edenburn.2 We conclude that the court properly granted Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to count three, the indemnification portion of the apportionment/indemnification complaint, based on the failure of the defendants to file a motion for permission to implead pursuant to § 52-102a. We further conclude, however, that the court improperly granted Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two of the apportionment/indemni- fication complaint seeking to apportion responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages between the defendants and Edenburn. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to its granting of Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to count three of the 2 The defendants also contend that the trial court erred in (1) concluding that the apportionment/indemnification complaint apportioned duties instead of damages, (2) concluding that General Statutes § 52-572h prohibits the apportionment of negligence claims brought against a municipality pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n, and (3) failing to address the claims against all municipal defendants sounding in negligence. In light of our conclusion, as set forth in this opinion, that the trial court improperly granted Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to the apportionment portion of the apportionment/indem- nification complaint, we need not address these claims.  DiBella v. Norwalk apportionment/indemnification complaint and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its grant- ing of Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two of the apportionment/indemnifica- tion complaint. The following facts and procedural history are nec- essary for the resolution of this appeal. In the opera- tive complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, on or about November 5, 2021, she and Edenburn adopted two dogs from the city. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff and Eden- burn discovered that the dogs were vicious and posed an immediate and imminent risk to their health and safety. The plaintiff and Edenburn contacted the defendants to advise of the need to return the dogs, but the city refused to accept the return of the dogs. On November 15, 2021, one of the dogs attacked the plaintiff, causing her injuries. In her complaint, the plaintiff asserted negligence claims against the city (count one), Sirico (count six), and Pennoyer (count nine). Additionally, the plaintiff alleged claims of negligent misrepresentation (count two), public nuisance (count three), private nuisance (count four), and municipal estoppel (count five) against the city. Count seven sought indemnification from the city pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465 for the negligence of Sirico. Counts eight and ten alleged common-law recklessness claims against Sirico and Pennoyer.3 On January 6, 2024, the defendants served Edenburn with a “[c]omplaint for apportionment and indemnifica- tion.” The apportionment/indemnification complaint was brought “pursuant to [General Statutes] §§ 52-102a and 52-102b, for indemnification and apportionment of liability, respectively.” Counts one and two of the appor- tionment/indemnification complaint sought to apportion 3 Count eleven alleged negligence against Kulhawik and count twelve sought indemnification from the city pursuant to § 7-465 for the neg- ligence of Kulhawik. On February 26, 2024, however, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against Kulhawik. See footnote 1 of this opinion.  DiBella v. Norwalk responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages between the defendants and Edenburn on the grounds that Edenburn was liable for the plaintiff’s injuries under theories of strict liability pursuant to the dog bite statute, General Statutes § 22-357, and common-law negligence, respec- tively. In count three, the defendants sought indem- nification for the plaintiff’s damages pursuant to the dog adoption agreement that Edenburn had executed. On June 5, 2024, Edenburn filed an answer and special defenses to the apportionment/indemnification com- plaint.4 The defendants thereafter replied to Edenburn’s special defenses. On November 8, 2024, Edenburn filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all three counts of the defendants’ apportionment/indemnification complaint and as to his first three special defenses. In his memoran- dum of law in support of the motion, Edenburn argued, in relevant part, that the entire complaint was legally insufficient because the defendants did not first move the court for permission to assert the indemnification claim pursuant to § 52-102a. In their memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment, the defendants countered that the apportionment portion of their com- plaint properly was brought pursuant to § 52-102b, which rendered Edenburn “a party for all purposes” pursuant to § 52-102b (a). The defendants argued that, as a result, it was unnecessary to file a motion to implead Edenburn because § 52-102a applies only when the proposed third- party defendant is not already a party. Alternatively, Edenburn sought summary judgment in his favor on the apportionment claim in count two of 4 Edenburn’s special defenses asserted that (1) the “[defendants’] claim for apportionment based on the dog injury statute fails to state a valid cause of action,” (2) the “[defendants’] claim for indemnification fails to state a valid cause of action, as the [defendants have] failed to seek permission of the court to file a third-party claim for indemnification,” (3) the “[defendants’] complaint fails to state a valid cause of action, as the indemnification agreement is void ab initio against public policy,” (4) the “[defendants’] first count fails to state a valid cause of action by a noninjured party,” and (5) the “[defendants’] claim in count two for negligence fails to state a valid cause of action in that [Edenburn] owes the city no duty.”  DiBella v. Norwalk the defendants’ complaint on the ground that it improp- erly “attempt[ed] to apportion liability for nondelegable ministerial duties . . . .” More specifically, he argued that the plaintiff’s claims under General Statutes § 52-557n alleged breaches by the defendants of “nondelegable ministerial duties imputed by statute and the [city’s] ordinances” and that “apportionment of liability for the breach of a nondelegable duty is inappropriate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) On January 17, 2025, the defendants filed a motion to implead Edenburn into the action. In the motion to implead, the defendants maintained that, although the motion was not necessary because Edenburn had become a party through service of the apportionment complaint, they had filed it “to the extent that [Edenburn] has argued that he must be [impleaded] into this action additionally . . . .” On January 31, 2025, Edenburn filed an objection to the defendants’ motion to implead. The trial court did not rule on the defendants’ January 17, 2025 motion to implead or Edenburn’s objection thereto. On February 14, 2025, the court, Clark, J., granted Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment “on both procedural and substantive grounds.” As to the proce- dural grounds, the court held that, in the absence of a motion for permission to cite Edenburn in as a defendant consistent with § 52-102a, the complaint was legally insufficient. Although this procedural ruling was dis- positive of the motion, the court further held that the defendants’ claim under § 22-357 failed as a matter of law. Specifically, the court noted that, pursuant to § 22-357, the plaintiff, as the owner of the dog, could not allege damages and there is “no precedent for allowing § 22-357 to be worked around through an apportionment claim as the damages alleged are rooted in that of the plaintiff owner.” Finally, the court held that Edenburn was entitled to summary judgment on count two of the  DiBella v. Norwalk apportionment/indemnification complaint, as the city could not apportion nondelegable duties to him. On February 21, 2025, the defendants filed a motion to implead Edenburn pursuant to § 52-102a and a motion to reargue the court’s order granting Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment. On March 14, 2025, the court denied the defendants’ motion to implead “[b]ased on the law of the case . . . and pursuant to the discretion of the court as outlined in § 52-102a . . . .” (Citation omit- ted.) On the same date, the court denied the defendants’ motion to reargue without comment. The defendants then filed the present appeal. I The defendants first claim that the trial court erred in concluding that their failure to file a motion for per- mission to implead Edenburn pursuant to § 52-102a rendered their apportionment/indemnification com- plaint procedurally improper. They contend that they initiated a timely apportionment proceeding against Edenburn pursuant to § 52-102b, rendering Edenburn a “party for all purposes,” including for the purpose of asserting a cross claim sounding in indemnification. The defendants contend, therefore, that it was not necessary to seek the court’s permission through the filing of a motion to implead Edenburn because Edenburn already had become a party to the litigation. Edenburn coun- ters that the defendants’ complaint was not merely an apportionment complaint but, rather, was a complaint seeking both apportionment and indemnification. Eden- burn contends, therefore, that the trial court properly determined that the defendants were required to seek the court’s permission pursuant to § 52-102a prior to serving their apportionment/indemnification complaint. At the outset, we note that the issue before this court, namely, whether a defendant can file a hybrid apportion- ment/indemnification complaint pursuant to §§ 52-102a and 52-102b without first moving for permission to file the indemnification complaint pursuant to § 52-102a,  DiBella v. Norwalk raises a question of statutory construction, which is a question of law, over which we exercise plenary review. See Belgada v. Hy’s Livery Service, Inc., 220 Conn. App. 102, 118, 297 A.3d 199 (2023); see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 346 Conn. 216, 227, 288 A.3d 615 (2023) (“[the] analysis of whether the [trial] court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the defendants correctly note, there is a significant procedural distinction between §§ 52-102a5 and 52-102b.6 Section 52-102a requires that a defendant obtain permis- sion of the court “to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.” As this court stated in Ahrens v. Hartford Florists’ Supply, Inc., 198 Conn. App. 24, 232 A.3d 1129 (2020), “[t]he language of § 52-102a is plain and unambiguous; 5 General Statutes § 52-102a (a), captioned “Impleading of third party by defendant. Rights and remedies of third-party defendant,” provides: “A defendant in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. The motion may be filed at any time before trial and permission may be granted by the court if, in its discretion, it deems that the granting of the motion will not unduly delay the trial of the action nor work an injustice upon the plaintiff or the party sought to be impleaded.” (Emphasis added.) 6 General Statutes § 52-102b (a), captioned “Addition of person as defen- dant for apportionment of liability purposes,” provides: “A defendant in any civil action to which section 52-572h applies may serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable pursuant to said section for a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s damages in which case the demand for relief shall seek an apportionment of liability. Any such writ, summons and complaint, hereinafter called the apportionment complaint, shall be served within one hundred twenty days of the return date specified in the plaintiff’s original complaint. The defendant filing an apportionment complaint shall serve a copy of such apportionment complaint on all parties to the original action in accordance with the rules of practice of the Superior Court on or before the return date specified in the apportionment com- plaint. The person upon whom the apportionment complaint is served, hereinafter called the apportionment defendant, shall be a party for all purposes, including all purposes under section 52-572h.”  DiBella v. Norwalk it prescribes the procedure for defendants to use if they seek to implead a third-party defendant. The permissive language in § 52-102a states that a defendant ‘may’ implead a third-party defendant if that party is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim; however, § 52-102a does not require a defendant to do so. Under § 52-102a, if a defendant does choose to implead a third- party defendant, however, it must seek permission of the court before filing a third-party complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 32. Thereafter, § 52-102a provides in rel- evant part that the court may grant permission “if, in its discretion, it deems that the granting of the motion will not unduly delay the trial of the action nor work an injustice upon the plaintiff or the party sought to be impleaded. . . .” Unlike § 52-102a, § 52-102b (a) allows a defendant, as of right, to “serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable . . . for a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s damages . . . .” Pursuant to § 52-102b (a), the apportionment com- plaint must be served within 120 days of the return date specified in the original complaint. Section 52-102b (a) thereafter provides that the apportionment defendant “shall be a party for all purposes . . . .” The defendants contend that the trial court erred in ruling that “hybrid” third-party complaints involv- ing apportionment and indemnification are de facto improper. They claim that a party seeking to assert an apportionment claim is required to serve the complaint on the nonparty pursuant to § 52-102b, whereupon the apportionment defendant becomes a party “for all pur- poses.” They contend that this allows the apportionment plaintiff to assert any additional claims that it may have against the apportionment defendant without having to satisfy the requirements for impleading under § 52-102a, as that statute applies only when the third-party defen- dant is not already a party to the action. The defendants further contend that, because they first could have served Edenburn with an apportionment complaint and later  DiBella v. Norwalk amended it as of right to include an indemnification claim, there is no reason why they should be barred from asserting the two claims at the same time. The defendants thus conclude that they “appropriately asserted their apportionment and indemnification claims together through their service of the apportionment complaint upon the apportionment defendant with indemnification claims included . . . .” We disagree with the defendants that the trial court held that hybrid third-party complaints involving appor- tionment and indemnification are per se improper. On the contrary, the court held that, in this case, the defendants’ complaint was improper solely due to their failure to file a motion to implead pursuant to § 52-102a.7 Further- more, although the defendants cite several Superior Court cases8 for the proposition that apportionment and indemnification claims may coexist in the same litiga- tion when asserted against the same party, those cases do not specifically address the procedural situation at issue in the present case, namely, the filing of a hybrid apportionment/indemnification complaint without first 7 The court stated: “As to the procedural issues with the [apportion- ment/indemnification] complaint, [the city] conceded the point that it did not seek permission of the court prior to filing its third-party complaint. While [the city] attempted to argue that it was merely being efficient in pursuing this ‘hybrid’ complaint for apportionment and indemnification and not wasting the time of the court with additional paper, the court is not persuaded. Absent a motion for permission to cite [Edenburn] in as a defendant consistent with § 52-102a, the com- plaint filed is legally insufficient and summary judgment is proper and ripe for adjudication. There is no dispute that the city failed to file the § 52-102a motion for permission to cite [Edenburn] in as a defendant, [and, therefore] summary judgment is granted [in] favor of [Edenburn] as to all claims of the [apportionment/indemnification] complaint and as to [Edenburn’s] second special defense.” 8 See Reichman Brodie Real Estate, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-18- 6078581-S (December 15, 2020); Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-18- 6079642-S (February 13, 2020); Girolametti v. Danbury, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 15, 2011) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 449).  DiBella v. Norwalk moving for permission to file the indemnification com- plaint pursuant to § 52-102a. On the other hand, we find persuasive the reasoning of other Superior Court cases that have concluded that an indemnification count is inappropriate in an appor- tionment complaint. For example, in Larocca v. Char- ter Oak Appraisal, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 20, 2009) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 891), the court stated: “Neither our Supreme Court nor our Appellate Court have considered whether an indemnification count is properly included in an apportionment complaint. However, several judges of the Superior Court have considered the issue and held that an indemnification count is inappropriate in an apportionment complaint. . . . “These courts have concluded that the fundamental differences between apportionment and indemnification mandate this result. [T]he impleading statute addresses the situation where the third-party defendant is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff. The apportionment statute addresses only those situations where the third-party defendant is or may be liable for a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s damages. . . . In Clark [v. VIN Agency, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-95-326940-S (August 18, 1997) (20 Conn. L. Rptr. 286)], the defendant filed a two-count apportionment complaint. Count one sought apportionment of liability, count two sought indemnification. The court held that [w]hen reading [§§ 52-102a and 52-102b] together, it becomes apparent that claims under each may not be brought within the same complaint. Impleading is accom- plished with the permission of the court, while filing an apportionment complaint is done at the discretion of the defendant where allowed under [General Statutes] § 52-572h.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Larocca v. Charter Oak Appraisal, supra, 47 Conn. L. Rptr. 892.  DiBella v. Norwalk As discussed in these Superior Court cases, a motion to implead pursuant to § 52-102a addresses the situa- tion in which the third-party defendant may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all of the plaintiff’s claims against him and requires the permission of the court. An apportionment complaint pursuant to § 52-102b is filed at the discretion of the defendant when allowed under § 52-572h and addresses the situation in which a third- party defendant is or may be liable for a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s damages. The trial court, there- fore, properly held that the indemnification portion of the defendants’ apportionment/indemnification complaint was procedurally improper, as the defendants failed to file a motion for permission to implead Edenburn pursu- ant to § 52-102a.9 II The defendants next contend that the court erred in failing to find that Edenburn waived his right to contest the defendants’ compliance with § 52-102a by neglect- ing to timely file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and by filing an answer. Specifically, the defendants argue that their failure to seek the court’s permission to implead Edenburn, to the extent they were required to seek such permission, constituted a defect in the manner by which Edenburn was brought into the case and that this “represented a jurisdictional defect that implicated the court’s personal jurisdiction over him.” Because personal jurisdiction may be waived by failing to file a motion to dismiss within thirty days of filing an appearance as required by Prac- tice Book § 10-30 or by answering the complaint prior to contesting jurisdiction; see Practice Book §§ 10-6, 10-7 and 10-32; the defendants contend that Edenburn waived his right to contest their compliance with § 52-102a by 9 In a separate section of their appellate brief, the defendants contend that the trial court improperly failed to address their indemnification claims. This argument appears to be an extension of the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the apportionment/ indemnification complaint was procedurally improper.  DiBella v. Norwalk raising it for the first time in his motion for summary judgment.10 In response, Edenburn notes that the defen- dants failed to raise this issue in the proceedings before the trial court. “It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of prac- tice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. . . . [O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . . [See] Practice Book § 60-5 (court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial). [T]he determination of whether a claim has been properly preserved will depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain whether the claim on appeal was articulated below with sufficient clarity to place the trial court [and the opposing party] on reasonable notice of that very same claim.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Manage- ment, LLC, 193 Conn. App. 381, 454–55, 219 A.3d 801 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020), and cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020). A review of the defendants’ memorandum of law in opposition to Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment and their motion to reargue the court’s order granting summary judgment reveals that the defendants did not argue that Edenburn had waived his right to contest personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the defendants did not raise this claim during oral argument on Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment. Because the defendants 10 Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment was filed more than ten months after service of the apportionment/indemnification complaint and after he already had filed an answer to the complaint.  DiBella v. Norwalk did not argue that Edenburn had waived his right to contest personal jurisdiction in the trial court, and no exceptional circumstances exist warranting our review of this claim, we decline to review this claim on appeal. III The defendants next contend that the court erred in concluding that the defendants’ failure to move for per- mission to implead Edenburn pursuant to § 52-102a entitled Edenburn to summary judgment in his favor with respect to both the indemnification claim and the apportionment claims that had been joined thereto. We agree and conclude that the court should have granted the motion for summary judgment only as to the indem- nification claim. In his motion for summary judgment, Edenburn con- tended that, because the defendants had not moved for permission to implead him pursuant to § 52-102a, their apportionment/indemnification complaint was legally insufficient. He requested that “summary judgment . . . enter in [his] favor . . . as to all claims of the [appor- tionment/indemnification] complaint and as to his sec- ond special defense.” Edenburn did not cite any legal authority to support granting his motion for summary judgment as to the apportionment counts of the appor- tionment/indemnification complaint in addition to the indemnification count. Similarly, in its decision, the court concluded, without citation to legal authority, that, “[a]bsent a motion for permission to cite [Edenburn] in as a defendant consistent with § 52-102a, the complaint filed is legally insufficient and summary judgment is proper . . . .” The parties have not cited, and our research has not revealed, any appellate authority addressing whether, under these circumstances, the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment as to both the indemnification and apportionment counts of the defen- dants’ apportionment/indemnification complaint rather than only the indemnification count. Several Superior  DiBella v. Norwalk Court cases, however, have allowed an apportionment count to proceed after striking an indemnification count that had been improperly included in an apportionment complaint. See Rosario v. Orlando Annulli & Sons, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 9, 2007) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 9); Clark v. VIN Agency, Inc., supra, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 286; see also Larocca v. Charter Oak Appraisal, supra, 47 Conn. L. Rptr. 891. Furthermore, as set forth in this opinion, the defen- dants were not required to seek the court’s permission prior to filing an apportionment complaint. The defen- dants, rather, were required to serve their apportionment complaint within 120 days of the return date specified in the original action. See General Statutes § 52-102b (a). The return date in this action was December 26, 2023. Edenburn was served with the apportionment/indemnifi- cation complaint on January 6, 2024. The parties do not dispute that the apportionment complaint in this case was served within 120 days of the return date specified in the original action. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of Edenburn as to counts one and two of the apportionment/ indemnification complaint, which sought to apportion responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages between the defendants and Edenburn. The court, rather, should have granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Edenburn only as to count three of the apportionment/ indemnification complaint, which sought indemnifica- tion from Edenburn.11 IV The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to implead. We disagree. 11 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the defendants’ claims regarding the trial court’s substantive conclusion that the defendants could not apportion nondelegable duties to Edenburn. Specifically, we need not address the defendants’ claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that the apportionment complaint apportioned duties  DiBella v. Norwalk As set forth earlier in this opinion, after the trial court issued its decision rendering summary judgment in favor of Edenburn based on the defendants’ failure to file a motion to implead pursuant to § 52-102a, the defendants filed a motion to implead as well as a motion to reargue the court’s order granting Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied the defendants’ motion to implead “[b]ased on the law of the case . . . and pursuant to the discretion of the court as outlined in § 52-102a . . . .” (Citation omitted.) The court also denied the defendants’ motion to reargue without comment. The defendants contend that, to the extent the court’s ruling denying their motion to implead was based on the exercise of its discretion under § 52-102a, the court abused that discretion because permitting the indem- nification claim would not unduly delay the trial of the underlying action and would not have caused any preju- dice to the plaintiff. They claim that, “[d]ue to the lack of substantive analysis clarifying the basis for the trial court’s ruling, the parties are left clueless as to what specific considerations, if any, the trial court entertained in denying the motion to implead.” The defendants, how- ever, did not seek an articulation to determine the basis for the court’s decision denying the motion to implead. “[I]n the face of an ambiguous or incomplete record, we will presume, in the absence of an articulation, [that] a trial court acted correctly, meaning that it undertook a proper analysis of the law and made whatever findings of the facts were necessary.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zaniewski v. Zaniewski, 190 Conn. App. 386, 396, 210 A.3d 620 (2019). The defendants further contend that the “law of the case” referenced in the order denying their motion to implead is the court’s ruling granting summary judgment instead of damages, (2) concluded that § 52-572h prohibits the apportion- ment of negligence claims brought against a municipality pursuant to § 52-557n, and (3) failed to address the claims against the defendants sounding strictly in negligence.  DiBella v. Norwalk for Edenburn based on the defendants’ failure to file a motion to implead. “The application of the law of the case doctrine involves a question of law, over which our review is plenary. . . . The law of the case doctrine expresses the practice of judges generally to refuse to reopen what [already] has been decided . . . . [When] a matter has previously been ruled [on] interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was cor- rectly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance. . . . A judge should hesitate to change his own rulings in a case and should be even more reluctant to overrule those of another judge. . . . Nevertheless, if . . . [a judge] becomes convinced that the view of the law previously applied by his coordinate predecessor was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if followed, he may apply his own judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kabel v. Rosen, 215 Conn. App. 528, 534–35, 284 A.3d 301 (2022). In the present case, the trial court granted Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ indemnification claim based on the defendants’ failure to file a motion to implead pursuant to § 52-102a. By then filing a motion to implead, the defendants were essen- tially asking the trial court to reopen what already had been decided. Given the court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to reargue its decision on the motion for summary judgment, however, the court presumably determined that the motion had been decided correctly and that the indemnification claim had been finally disposed. In the absence of any new or overriding circumstance presented in the motion to implead, the court properly applied the law of the case doctrine in denying the defendants’ motion to implead. The judgment is reversed with respect to the grant- ing of Edenburn’s motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two of the apportionment/indemnifica- tion complaint and the case is remanded with direction  DiBella v. Norwalk to deny Edenburn’s motion for summary judgmen